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There has been a rapid growth of private participation in infrastructure projects throughout 
the world in the last three decades. China as the largest developing country in the world has 
a huge amount of demands for high quality infrastructure projects and public services. The 
government has actively developed and used the Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) model to 
deliver public facilities and services, particularly after 2002. Certain benefits have been 
brought by the adoption of the BOT model in China’s motorway and water sectors. 
However, issues were also found in the processes behind BOT applications. International 
organisations as well as scholars suggested that China should learn experiences and lessons 
from the UK and its PFI scheme. The UK has been the leading country to use private 
finance in developing public buildings and services. However, very little has been written 
addressing how lessons from British PFIs can be learnt by China to improve its BOT 
practice.  
This study is an attempt to address this vacuum in the existed literature. It was designed to 
explore the current problems of using BOTs in Chinese motorway and water sectors and 
looks at what needs to be improved, based upon the PFI lessons in the UK.  
A mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods has been employed and various methods 
of data collection used in this study. These included: 21 interviews, 2 observations and one 
focus group and the analysis on 14 government reports about BOT’s in China. The 
governments’ decision-makers, directors, project managers and contractors were involved 
in the research to explore the results and emerging issues involving the implementation of 
BOT models in 87 Chinese motorway and water projects in 10 cities covering six provinces. 
As a result of its findings, the research is able to discuss and identify the relevant 
experiences and lessons from PFIs in the UK to improve further application of China’s 
BOTs.  
This study fills the gap in knowledge regarding comparisons between PFIs and BOTs. It 
also gives recommendations for good practice in relation to Chinese BOT policy decision 
making, development and evaluation. Finally, the study hopes to give recommendations 
that enable the implementation of BOT model in Chinese motorway and water sectors to be 





My first big thanks go to my supervisory team, Mr. Ashok Patel, Mr. Fred Mear and Dr. 
Sally Ruane for their invaluable professional guidance and help over the last five years. An 
excellent supervisory team, they have always given me strong encouragement and helpful 
feedback. Without them, the hard work of conducting my PhD study would not have been 
possible. 
 
I am very grateful to all staff and fellow PhD students in the Accounting and Finance 
Department at Leicester Business School, for their helpful suggestions and comments on 
my research thesis. My special thanks go to my best friends and my previous colleagues 
from the Chinese local governments and banks, who provided massive support and 
encouragement during my period of research in China.  
 
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to those who were interviewed and shared their 
time and experience with me. Without their kind support, my research could not have been 
completed. Also I would like to thank my proof-readers and friends, Michael Fletcher 
Feakins and Anthony Cooper, who always checked my script carefully. Mr. Michael 
Fletcher Feakins, a systems process engineer also shared his invaluable experiences gained 
from a number of BOT projects in China, Thailand, Nigeria, Mexico, Spain, Canada, the 
United States and the UK.   
 







TABLE OF CONTENT 
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Background to study                                                                                              2 
1.1.1 British PFI as an expanding and global policy                                              4 
1.1.2 Chinese Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) as a growing and infantile scheme       5                                                                                                                                                                                           
1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of BOT and PFI: New Public Management and New 
Institutional Economics                                                                                              9 
1.2.1 Public Choice Theory                                                                                            11 
1.2.2 Principal –Agent Theory                                                                                12 
1.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics                                                                                14 
1.2.4 Applying New Institution Economics in New Public Management: the    relevance 
to the PFI and the BOT                                                                                            19 
1.2.5 From theories to practice: the critiques of the New Public Management and its 
application in China                                                                                                           21 
1.3 Lessons learning: A theoretical framework                                                           23 
1.4 Aims and Objectives of this Study                                                                    28 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis                                                                                29 
 
PART TWO: Literature Review                                                                                        31 
Chapter 2 The Build-Operate-Transfer in China: A literature Review                    32 
2.1 Introductions                                                                                                        32 
2.2 Explaining BOT in China: Definitions, Models and Arrangements                    35 
2.2.1 The definitions and models of Chinese PPP and BOT                                35 
2.2.2 The structure of the BOT in China                                                                    37 
2.2.3 The Policies and governing frameworks on China’s BOT                                41 
2.2.4 The policies of Chinese BOT                                                                                44 
2.2.5 The official rationales for the BOT programme                                            51 
2.3 Application of BOTs in China: Contexts and histories in the period of 1986-2008    53 
iv 
 
2.3.1 An introduction: the political, economic and social contexts of China’s BOT 
programme                                                                                                                    53 
2.3.2 The Application of BOTs in China (1986-1994): Open-door policy and 
decentralisation in the Chinese public sector                                                                    56 
2.3.3 The booms and busts of Chinese BOTs: 1994-2001—centralised BOT management, 
the Fiscal and Taxation Reforms and the Asian Economic Crisis                                 60 
2.3.4 The Application of BOT in China (2001-2008): Deregulations and marketisation 
reforms in public infrastructure, and the Financial Crisis since 2008                               68 
2.4 Debates and arguments concerning the implementation of China’s BOT        76 
2.4.1 The overall effect of the implementation of BOTs in China                                76 
2.4.2 The competition, efficiency and the implementation of BOT                    79 
2.4.3 The debates on the BOT contract and management                                            81 
2.4.4 The risk transfer and allocation in the BOT arrangement                                82 
2.4.5 Under-developed Chinese BOT legal, regulatory and governance framework     85 
2.4.6 The Lack of expertise, experience and skills of BOTs in the public sector        87 
2.4.7 Transparency of Information and the implementation of BOTs                    89 
2.5 Summary                                                                                                        91 
 
Chapter 3 The Literature Review: a Critical Evaluation on the British Private Finance 
Initiative programme - the lessons that can be learnt by Chinese Build-Operation-Transfer                                                                                                        
3.1 Introduction                                                                                                                93 
3.1.1 The increasing communications between China and the UK’s PFI industries       93 
3.1.2 The structure of chapter three                                                                                 94 
3.2 The British PFI model                                                                                                95 
3.2.1 The Private Finance Initiatives in the UK                                                               95 
3.2.2 The structure of the PFI and the responsibilities of the private contractor             96 
3.2.3 The roles of government and the public sector in the PFI                                     99 
3.2.4 The procedures and the complexity of the British PFI contracts                          100 
3.2.5 The British PFI governing structure and institutions                                            101 
3.2.6 Three different narratives on the British PFI programmes                                        103 
v 
 
3.3 The history and background of developing PFI and in the UK                                    109 
3.3.1 Privatisation on the British Public Industry and Infrastructures                                109 
3.3.2 The introduction of the PFI in the UK: the British Experiences and Lessons in the 
period of 1992-2000                                                                                                            111 
3.3.3 The rapid expansion of PFI programmes in the UK: the Experiences and Lessons in 
the period of 2000-2008                                                                                                     122 
3.4 The British PFIs in practice: the debates and lessons                                                  127 
3.4.1 the debates on PFI in the UK                                                                                    127                                                                                                               
3.4.2 Is PFI a transparent and measurable policy?                                                             128 
3.4.3 Is PFI mobilising private investments and off-balance sheet financing?                  129 
3.4.4. Value-for money: the myth of the British PFI?                                                        132 
3.4.5. PFI and the Risks Transferred                                                                                  135            
3.4.6. The British PFI as a contracting method: the lessons from the UK                         140   
3.5 The General lessons of the PFI applied in the UK                                                       151                 
3.6 The lessons learnt from the PFIs in the Road and Water Sectors                                154              
3.7 The BOT in China and the PFI in the UK: the potential to learn                                155                                   
 
PART THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
Chapter 4 Research Methodology                                                                                     161                                                                
4.1Introduction                                                                                                                  161                                   
4.2 The formulation of research questions: literature review, pilot studies and secondary 
quantitative data analysis                                                                                                   162                                                  
4.2.1 The pilot study                                                                                                          162                                            
4.2.2 The Quantitative Data from Secondary sources                                                       165                         
4.3 Methodology                                                                                                               167                                        
4.4 Conducting the research: the data collection methods                                                169                           
4.4.1. Interviewing as a data collection method                                                                169           
4.4.2 Conducting focus groups: sample selections and gathering qualitative data           173                                                                  
4.4.3 Non-participant observations: project selection and observation as a mean to gather 
data                                                                                                                                   176                
vi 
 
4.5 Analysing data                                                                                                            178                                        
4.6 Research ethics                                                                                                           182                                         
4.7 Reliability and Validity                                                                                              183                                                      
4.7.1 Validity                                                                                                                    183                                
4.7.2 Generalisation                                                                                                         184                                           
4.7.3 Reliability                                                                                                                185                                   
4.8 Conclusion                                                                                                                 185                                 
PART FOUR DATA ANALYSIS                                                                                     186 
Chapter 5 Data Analysis I: an Overview of the Implementation of Built-Operate-Transfer in 
Chinese Motorway and Water Sectors: The Development and Results                  187 
5.1 Introduction                                                             187 
5.2 An overview of BOT in China’s motorway and water sectors                     188 
5.2.1 BOTs in China’s motorway and water sectors: an underestimated scale of 
application                                                               188          
5.2.2 The implementation of BOTs in motorway and water projects: the regional, 
economic and industrial difference                                                                             189 
5.2.3 The BOT in China: increasing demands and the national plans on developing 
motorway and water services                                                                                         191  
5.3 The BOTs involved in this study                                                                 196 
5.4 Have BOTs in Chinese motorway and road sector lived up to the governments’ 
expectations                                                                                                                 200 
5.5 Have motorway and water BOTs improved the availability of finance for public 
infrastructure?                                                                                                          201 
5.5.1 Shortages of local public funding in the motorway and water sectors: the use of 
BOTs for extra extra-budget financing                                                                  201 
5.5.2 Applying BOTs in motorway and water projects: increasing the finance available to 
local government                                                                                                       204 
5.5.3 BOT accelerates the development of local infrastructure—evidence from W, Y and 
V provinces                                                                                                                  205 
5.5.4 The Difficulties of Attracting Private Investment: the Application of BOTs in Small 
vii 
 
Water and Sewage Treatment BOTs                                                                             206 
5.5.5 Motorway and Water BOTs were undertaken by state-controlled businesses: should 
this be a Public-Private Partnership or Public-Public Partnership                             207 
5.6 BOTs in Chinese Motorway and Water sectors: monopoly, competition and the 
diversifying investment strategy                                                                             208 
5.6.1 Encouraging competition in China’s motorway and water BOTs: the official strategy 
and approach                                                                                                                 208 
5.6.2 Increasing the number of BOT contractors and changes to the BOT market structure: 
evidence from W and Y provinces                                                                             210 
5.6.3 Weak competition in the bidding phase of BOTs                                         211 
5.6.4 Regional Monopoly of Motorway and Water BOTs in China: Exclusivity of BOT 
Contracts and Weak Competitions at Post-contract phases                                        213 
5.7 Have BOTs improved the constructional and operational efficiencies of Motorway 
and Water Projects                                                                                                    214 
5.7.1 Debates on inefficiencies in the public sector and criticisms on publicly funded 
motorway and water projects                                                                                        215 
5.7.2 The quality  and efficiency of publicly funded projects and BOTs                217 
5.7.3 Construction Performances of Motorway and Water BOT projects                218 
5.7.4 Operational Performance of Motorway and Water BOT projects                220 
5.8 Have Motorway and Water BOTs met the local demands and improved local 
infrastructure investment decision-makings                                                                222 
5.8.1 Indentifying local demands, the design and planning of BOT projects    222 
5.8.2 Political and administrative interventions on motorway and water BOT projects  
                                                                                                                                       225   
5.9 Applying BOT in local motorway and water projects: boosting local economy, 
markets and job opportunities                                                                                       227 
5.9.1 BOTs boosting local economy and construction markets                            227 
5.9.2 The economic benefits for local business and residents                            229 
5.10 Have BOTs adopted new technology and technical innovation?                230 




Chapter 6  Contracting Public Infrastructure and Services: BOTs in China’s Motorway 
and Water Sectors—the Institutional Context and Difficulties                         
6.1 Introduction                                                                                                235 
6.2 BOTs in practice: the opinions and incentives of policy-makers and executors at city 
level                                                                                                                        236 
6.3 The Implementation of BOTs in China’s Motorway and Water Projects: the 
Emerging Problems with Contracts                                                                        242 
6.3.1 Transaction costs of motorway and water BOT contracts                        244 
6.3.2 The incomplete nature of a BOT contract                                                247 
6.3.3 Difficulties on identifying and allocating risk in a BOT project            249 
6.3.4 Opportunistic behaviours in the BOT contracts                                    251 
6.3.5 Cooperation and Partnerships between BOTs and governments            253 
6.3.6 Managing and monitoring BOT contracts                                                256 
6.4 Institutions and resources as the necessary means to ensure BOT projects work in 
China                                                                                                                         259 
6.4.1 The means of implementation of BOTs: institutions in China             259 
6.4.2 Expertise and capabilities of the governments: the constraints of water and 
motorway BOTs                                                                                                 261 
6.4.3 Collaboration between different departments in local councils             266 
6.4.4 Corruption and illegal activities involved in China’s Motorway and Water BOT 
projects                                                                                                                       268                                                                                                                          
6.4.5 Financing institutions and capital markets: the ‘bias’ for China’s domestic BOT 
contractors                                                                                                             270 
6.4.6 Low Quality, inexperienced BOT contractors and consultants: the barriers of 
applying BOTs in China                                                                                     272 
6.4.7 The Constraints on China’s BOTs: Absence of BOT related Laws and Regulations                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                   274 
6.5 Summary                                                                                                276 
PART FIVE DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ix 
 
Chapter 7 Findings and Discussions                                                                             280 
7.1 The findings about the development and implementation of China’s BOT             280 
7.2 The findings on comparing Chinese BOT projects and British PFI schemes: the 
similarities and differences                                                                                         283 
7.2.1 PFIs and BOTs as long-term contract projects                                                     283 
7.2.2 BOT and PFI: their similar official objectives, but different priorities                 284 
7.2.3 Different social-economic contexts in the UK and China leading to different practices
                                                                                                                             285 
7.2.4 Management practice of BOT and PFI: decentralisation vs centralisation           287 
7.2.5 The relevance of BOTs and PFIs                                                                 288 
7.3 The Discussion: BOT’s problems and PFI’s lessons—what can be leaned by China        
                                                                                                                                        293 
7.3.1 What causes the problems of BOTs: the weaknesses of implementation of BOT model 
in China’s motorway and water infrastructure                                                       293 
7.3.2 Transaction costs of using long-term contracts, the lessons from the PFI     297 
7.3.3 Building a relational BOT contract: the experience and lessons from the PFIs   299   
7.3.4 Building effective BOT management in the governments at provincial and city level: 
some relevant experiences from PFIs                                                                             301 
7.3.5 Improving Planning of BOTs in motorway and water sectors: the relevant experience 
and lessons from the British PFIs                                                                             304 
7.3.6 Improving the procurement and tendering processes of BOT: qualified bidders, 
tendering methods, transaction costs and degree of competition                             307 
 7.3.7 Improving evaluation and inspection on construction and operation of BOT projects
                                                                                                                             308 
7.3.8 Improving institutional capabilities of city government to manage BOTs     310 
7.3.9 Creating enabling environments to implementation of BOT policy: BOT legislation 
and financing system                                                                                                     311 
7.3.10 Accounting issues related to BOTs in China                                                     312 
7.4 Summary                                                                                                                 313 




8.1 Introduction                                                                                                                   316 
8.2 Rule 1: Thinking and planning strategically                                                                 320 
8.3 Rule 2: Enhancing the understanding of the objectives of private contractors, managing 
interests and conflicts between governments and private participants in BOTs    
                                                                                                                                             322 
8.4 Rule 3: Developing an 'open' and 'transparent' BOT project                                        324 
8.5 Rule 4: Establishing a clear BOT management framework                                          325 
8.6 Rule 5: Maintaining reasonable competitions in BOT biddings                                   326 
8.7 Rule 6: BOT model is not suitable for all kinds of projects: characteristics of 
infrastructure projects and BOT's transaction costs                                                            327  
8.8 Rule 7: Increasing the involvement of Chinese state-owned banks and creating more 
financial channels for private investors in BOT projects                                                    328              
8.9 Rule 8: Avoiding low debt-to-equity financing ratio, reducing financing costs and risks 
in BOTs                                                                                                                               329 
8.10 Rule 9: Establishing a transparent and low cost negotiation and arbitration system and 
identifying the private contractor exiting procedures in BOT contracts.                            330 
8.11 Summary                                                                                                                     331 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusions and Recommendations                                                    
9.1 Introduction                                                                                                          334 
9.2 Conclusions                                                                                                          334 
9.3 Cross-sector and strategic recommendations on the improvement of BOT policies   337                                                                                                                              
9.4 Recommendations on the developing motorway and water BOTs: improving BOT 
practice                                                                                                                      340 
9.5 The relevance between this study and previous research into China’s motorway and 
water BOTs                                                                                                                      344 





Reference and Bibliography                                                                                            348 
Appendices                                                                                                                  373 
Appendix 1, The China’s Fiscal and Taxation Reforms in 1994                              373 
Appendix 2 China’s Key facts and indicators in 2009                                          374 
Appendix3 China’s ‘Open Door’ Policy and Special Economic Zones (SEZs)      377 
Appendix 4 The reviews on value-for-money and performance of the PFI in the UK   378                                                                                                                                     
Appendix 5 Information sheet and Introduction for this study                                                         
Appendix 6 Interview Consent Form                                                                               381 
Appendix 7 Pilot Interviews schedule showing key themes and topics                  383 
Appendix 8 Interviews schedule and Guidance                                                      384 
Appendix 9 Interviews schedule and Guidance                                                      386 





LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure 1.1Governance Model costs and asset specificity degree                                       17 
Diagram 1.2 From the characteristic of transaction to the Governance structure Transaction 
Cost Economics Model                                                                                                      18 
Table 1.3 The relevance of PFI and BOT to the prescriptions of the NIEs and the strategies 
of the NPM                                                                                                                         20 
Box 1.4 Ten steps in lesson-drawing                                                                                  27                                              
Diagram 2.1 The Structure of Lai’bin B Power Station BOT project, Guangxi Province, 
China,1995                                                                                                                         38                 
Table 2.2 the process of implementation of BOT                                                              40   
Diagram 2.3 The structure of the China’s BOT policies and governance’s framework    43 
Table 2.4 The fields and industries open to Chinese private investors and Foreign investors 
after 2010 (General Office of the State Council, China, 2010)                                          46  
Table 2.5 Chinese PPPs and BOT Policy Framework and the adjustments between 1995 and 
2010                                                                                                                                    49 
Diagram 2.6: BOT Policy development in China’s context: 1979-2010                           54 
Table 2.7 Chinese government’s budgetary Share of GDP (1979-2005)                           64 
Table 2.8 Chinese BOT and PPP’s development in the period between 2001 and 2009, by 
capital values                                                                                                                      68 
Table 2.9 PPPs in China: Industries and Numbers                                                             69 
Table 2.10 Comparative Infrastructure Indicators of China                                               73 
Diagram 3.1 The structure of PFI and SPV                                                                        97 
Table 3.2  The major private participants in the British PFI market                                  98 
Diagram 3.3 the UK PFIs institutions and organizations in the public and private sectors102                                                                                                                            
Diagram 3.4: PSC in the PFI appraisal process                                                                 105 
xiii 
 
 Figure 3.5 Net Public Investments as a Percentage of GDP, 1948–2000                       112 
Figure 3.7  The Private Finance Projects development in the UK                                  122 
Table 3.8  UK PFI and PPP policy and guidance frameworks                                        123 
Table 3.9 The Facts of PFI in the UK and BOT in China                                               157 
Table 4.1 Pilot Study: The in-depth interviews and interviewees by sector and organisation  
                                                                                                                                         163 
Table 4.2 Pilot Study: Interview Questions Guide                                                          164 
Table 4.3 The Quantitative Data and Their sources                                                        166 
Table 4.4 Semi-structured Interviewees by professional history, job position and level, 
industry and projects                                                                                                       172 
Chart 4.5  Date Analysis, Coding and Themes: Themes and Sub-themes                     180 
Chart 4.6 Data Collection and Analysis flow and steps                                                 181 
Table 5.1 The motorway network in China’s 30 provinces at the end of 2009 (ranked by 
length)                                                                                                                             190 
Diagram 5.2 A map of China: 34 provinces and Municipalities                                    190 
Box 5.3 China’ motorway development plans                                                               192 
Table 5.4The Comparison of Density of Motorways for some Developed Countries   193 
Table 5.5 BOT Projects: Industries, Values, Locations, Project Quantities, Locations, and 
the interviewees Involved                                                                                               196 
Table 5.6  The BOT projects in order of commenced operations dates                          198 
Table 5.7 The Size and Capital Values of the BOT projects                                           199 
Table 6.1 Reasons for the Cancellation and Buy-out of BOT contracts by Governments 237 
Diagrame 7.1 Failure of China’s BOT Model in the Motorway and Water Sectors        282 
Table 7.2 A Comparison of PFI in the UK and BOT in China                                         290 
Diagram 8.1 Determinants of Transaction costs in BOT and PFI cases: human factors, 
xiv 
 






Part One              Introduction  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background to study  
 
Prior to the 1980s, the principal providers of infrastructure and public services in most 
countries were the government or state-owned enterprises, with the exception of the 
United States (Parker and Saal, 2003, Worthington and Britton, 2005, Hillman, 2009). 
Governments in both the developed and the developing world had  built and operated a 
large number of public sector organisations to provide the necessary ‘public 
infrastructure, goods, and services’ (Savas, 2000). In those days, the UK possessed one 
of the largest public sectors in Europe (Savas, 2000; Bishop and Kay, 1989), which 
existed not only within the public service and social infrastructure, but also in ‘strategic’ 
economic sectors such as communications, steel, automotive, shipbuilding and 
aerospace industries. These nationalized industries’ share of the UK’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was ‘about 10 percent in 1979, one seventh of the total investment and 
about one-tenth of the Retail Prices Index’ (OECD, 1998:3). However, from 1980 the 
government’s position of control in state economies began to change. Governments in 
Europe and elsewhere embarked on a process of privatization and embraced market-
oriented strategies, and applied these to social infrastructure and public service. A large 
number of government-owned businesses and assets were privatized, resulting in the 
selling of public-owned assets to the private sector completely or partially (Parker and 
Saal, 2003). In its broadest sense, ‘privatisation’ involves a massive scale of transfer of 
assets, employees or different forms of ‘economic activity’ from the public to the 
private sector. In countries such as the UK, this has taken a number of forms including 
(Worthington and Britton, 2005):  
 the sale of nationalized industries or industries in which the government had a 
substantial shareholding;   
 the sale of state-owned assets and facilities; 
 the contracting-out of services normally provided by the public sector (e.g. 
hospital cleaning and catering);  
 the deregulation of activities over which the state had previously placed some 
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restriction (e.g. postal services);  
 the introduction of private capital into areas traditionally financed by the public 
sector (e.g. PFI in the road system);  
 the sale of local-authority-owned property to private citizens or organisations 
(e.g. council houses);  
 and, the privatization of government agencies.  
These initiatives have taken many forms, but the strategy underpinning them was aimed 
to restructure whole services as markets with a diversity of providers. Governments 
have actively introduced market mechanisms and the greater involvement of profit-
driven companies into the public service and social infrastructure sectors since the 
1980s. Parker and Saal (2003) and Private Participation in Infrastructure department of 
the World Bank (PPI, 2010) have investigated that, over the last decade such 
privatization and marketisation strategies have been adopted in over 100 countries, 
although specific backgrounds and contexts have differed.   
In the case of the UK, public corporations were privatised from the 1980s, to reform and 
re-construct the public sector. The wave of privatizations from 1980 also drove the 
government to continuously seek to increase the involvement of the private sector in the 
delivery of public goods and services, areas that had traditionally been deemed as the 
‘state’s responsibilities’ (Savas, 2000). New approaches to developing infrastructure and 
providing public services were attempted first in the UK. Notably through the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) that was introduced by the Conservative government in 1992, 
and confirmed by the Labour government after 1997. PFI is a form of Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP), which refers to the collaborations between the government and the 
private sector to provide public services and social infrastructure. The PFI in the UK is a 
programme encompassing arrangements whereby private sector partners come together 
to form a consortium to provide an asset-based public service under contract to a public 
body (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). The Treasury (2003a:3) explained, ‘the PFI and other 
arrangements where the public sector contracts to purchase quality services on a long-
term basis so as to take advantage of private sector management skills incentivised by 
having private finance at risk. This includes concessions and franchises, where a private 
sector partner takes on the responsibility for providing a public service, including 
maintaining, enhancing or constructing the necessary infrastructure’.  
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Arguably, the PFI has introduced and mobilised a considerable amount of private sector 
investment into many fields of public infrastructures with a more extensive role in the 
UK, such as transport, defence, health, education and prisons (Whitfield, 2007). Instead 
of the traditional public-funded projects that involve the private sector in short-term 
relationships with public agents, the PFI is a long-term contract-based arrangement with 
the private sector for delivering public services over in a period of twenty or thirty years. 
Under the PFI arrangement, the different functions of design, build, finance, operation 
and maintenance are integrated together (called the DBFO model). The private sector 
normally has several companies organised into a consortium, which can take 
comprehensive roles in managing public projects, e.g. the main contractor, hard facility 
management contractor, soft facility management contractor, and financier. As returns 
within the PFI contract, private contractors receive service charges for the associated 
services from the public bodies annually until the contract finishes. However, due to the 
payment mechanism of the British PFIs, the public bodies normally make payments to 
the contractors through budget revenues. 
1.1.1 British PFI as an expanding and global policy 
PFI is aimed at providing an alternative means for funding public sector services and 
infrastructure without increasing public borrowings or raising taxes (Kerr, 1998, Ruane, 
2000). Particularly after 1997, when the Labour Party won the general election, the PFI 
has been an important part of the UK government’s infrastructure investment 
programme, and covering all major areas of public infrastructure and service. By 2010, 
according to the Partnerships UK (2010) database, there had been almost 920 PPP (777 
PFI) project contracts signed, and 702 of these had been put into operation, with an 
estimated value of almost £72 bn, 36.7% (£26.45 bn) of which had been accounted for 
by the transport industry. Out of all of the departments, the Department of Health has 
signed the largest number of PFI contracts, with 279 with a total value of just under 
£13.6 bn. There have also been 42 projects in the water and waste sectors, with a value 
of £3.5 bn. 
Use of the PFI model is not restricted to the UK. The British PFI model has strongly 
influenced other countries, both the industrialized and the developing (Treasury, 2000, 
Holden, 2009, Pavoni, et. al, 2007).  Despite the debates and problems that have arisen 
around the uses of PFIs in the UK, this approach is being increasingly utilized and 
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studied across the world in countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, 
Australia, Canada, South Africa, Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, and China (CBI, 2007, Pavoni, et. al, 2007). Furthermore, the use of British 
PFIs has been highly advocated by a number of international bodies, including the IMF 
(2007), the World Bank (PPI, 2010), the European Committee (2005), the Asian 
Development Bank (2000) , and European Investment Bank (Barrett, 2007). A large 
number of developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central Europe are 
either already implementing the PFI, or are considering the feasibility of doing so. In 
addition, there is clear evidence that the governments in the UK (Department of Health, 
The Treasury and Department of Trade and Industry), the major British PFI contractors, 
financiers and consulting firms actively ‘exported’ the PFI model and its related services 
to other developed and developing countries, particularly for China, the largest 
developing country in the world, with huge demands for bigger and better infrastructure 
and public services (Holden, 2009, Pavoni, et. al, 2007) . 
 
1.1.2 Chinese Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) as a growing and infantile scheme 
Although China has a long history of using private finance to fund public services and 
infrastructure, maintaining public facilities, the recent implementation of Build-
Operation-Transfer (BOT) started in 1986. Both central and local governments in China, 
which have a very large public sector, have experimentally applied private finance into 
developing public infrastructure projects over the last three decades. The programme 
China adopted is known as the ‘Build-Operate-Transfer’ model (BOT) which was not 
initially introduced by the government of China, but by private companies from Hong 
Kong in the 1980s (see chapter 2, pages 33-34). BOT is the most popular model of 
private participation in Chinese public infrastructure. It was defined by the Ministry of 
Construction (2004) as a concession contract between the government and private 
contractors which allows for private investor financing, operation and delivery of public 
facilities and services within a certain period. The idea behind BOT can be seen as a 
variant of the PFI (DBFO), which states that in a contracted period of time (normally in 
25 or 30 years), the private sector contractor will finance, build, operate and maintain an 
asset or a facility, collecting payment from the usage charges until the contract has 
matured. The users of BOT can be the government in China and its departments, or the 
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end-users of the BOT’s service or facilities (for instance, the BOT toll roads in China). 
When the BOT contract finishes, the private sector will transfer the project or the 
facilities to the public sector. 
Via an initial comparison, common features can be found in the definitions of British 
PFI and the Chinese BOT model (in theory). First, the initial objective or claim of BOT 
and PFI is to attract private finance into the public sector, plugging an infrastructure gap 
or deficit. The impact of BOT and a PFI in the short-term is that governments can 
mobilise large amounts of financing on urgently needed public infrastructure projects 
without increasing public spending and debts ( in the UK, this was known as the Off-
Balance Sheet Financing).  Second, the government as the client of PFI or BOT project 
defines the quality and quantity of services and facilities, and the timeframe within 
which they are to be delivered in the contract. Third, the private sector, as contractor of 
the project, is responsible for delivering the defined service, while the government 
should be involved in regulation and procurement (State Planning Commission, 1996, 
China BOT circular, article 22). Fourth, the duration of the PFI and the BOT agreement 
between the public and private sector will be long-term, typically between 25 and 30 
years, depending on the nature of the projects or services. Fifth, responsibilities and 
risks are allocated to the party best able to manage them, but both the BOT and the PFI 
involve the substantial transfer of risk to private partners. Risks transfer and allocation 
in BOTs and PFIs also have to be evaluated in the projects’ tendering and bidding 
phases as part, and written into the contract.  Sixth, the private sector finances the 
project (wholly or in part) and recoups its investment from charges or payments made 
during the life of the contract (SPC,  1996, Chapter III). Seventh, the private sector must 
deliver good quality, cost-effective services throughout the project lifecycle, based upon 
the specific standards or requirements on outputs. And finally, the different functions of 
(design,) construction, operation and maintenance are integrated.   
At the same time, some minor and implicit differences between the BOT and the PFI 
were also observed. First of all, under the Chinese BOT scheme, the government is 
normally required to provide the design proposals and planning appraisals for the 
projects, but this is not compulsory. In some BOT cases, private contractors could make 
changes on the project’s design or provide their own design (e.g. Chengdu City No. 6 
water Factory BOT was designed by the BOT contractor— Veolia, a French water 
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multinational) . While in the majority of the PFI cases in the UK, the design of the PFI 
is provided by the private contractors, except in a few of cases, such as the Berlin 
Embassy PFI project. Some scholars (for instance, Laughlin and Broadbent, 2005) 
believed that PFI (DBFO) model is a more advanced and complicated model than BOT, 
because the government needs to write an ‘output specification’ on the facilities or the 
services required, and private contractor is responsible for ‘design’ under the PFI 
(DBFO) model. However, Laughlin and Broadbent (2005) also pointed out, in the BOT 
model there is an ‘implicit expectation’ that the private sector partner will have control 
over design, working from an output and outcome specification supplied by the public 
sector. Secondly, a difference existed between the objectives of the BOT and the PFI. 
For instance, the British government claimed that it would not consider using PFIs 
unless they could show the potential to obtain better ‘value for money’ than traditional 
public procurement options (Treasury, 2006). In contrast, Chinese BOT does not 
compulsorily require BOT projects to represent ‘value for money’. As a developing 
country, the government in China may focus on attracting private investment rather than 
on value for money (National Development and Reform Committee, the NDRC, China, 
2004). But it now seems the Chinese central government (Ministry of Construction, 
MOC, 2005 and the NDRC, 2010) has started to address ‘value-for-money’ matters 
when evaluating performance and efficiency of BOT contracts in the recent six years, 
since more and more projects have been put into operations since 2002.  
In addition, the payment mechanisms of the British PFI and Chinese BOT differed. 
Most of the Chinese motorway and a large number of water BOTs directly charge the 
users of the services (pay as you go model). While in the UK, the governments usually 
‘purchased’ the services from the contractors, except for several road and transport PFI 
cases, e.g. M6 DBFO project, Dartford River Crossing PFI, Sky Bridge PFI etc (Shaoul, 
2008). But, in practice, this difference between the BOT and the PFI was not explicit, 
due to more and more local governments in China making payments to BOT contractors 
through the budgets in recently developed projects. For instance, Wuhan City in China 
started to use a ‘Shadow Toll’ system into all urban BOT bridges and tunnels, with a 
large portion of payments to the BOT contractors were from the government budgets. 
These payment arrangements are similar to the British PFI.  The initial comparison 
between the BOT and the PFI indicates that the fundamental elements of the two 
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programmes are the same, although some implicit differences were found. Therefore, 
some researchers, such as Grimsey and Lewis (2004), Qin and Yu (2005), Wang (2009) 
believe that the BOT model and the PFI are fairly similar and comparable, due to the 
fundamentals and the ideas underpinning them. 
The Chinese BOT policy was developed and flourished within the context of China’s 
market-oriented reforms and privatisations after 1979. This followed the Chinese 
‘agricultural privatisation’ in 1979 and the ‘Open-door’ policy that was adopted in 1980. 
In 1992, China declared that its objective was to achieve ‘a socialist market economy’. 
The first step in building this market economy was privatisation and restructure of 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) on a massive scale from 1986, which led in some cases 
to bankruptcies in the late 1990s. In 2004, the remaining SOEs, including energy, 
telecoms, airlines, railways, steel, banking, public utilities and social infrastructure, 
represented only 30% of GDP, a reduction from the 78.8% it had accounted for in 1978 
(OECD, 2009: 4).  
Since 2002, there have been new trends and strategies used for the marketisation of 
state-owned assets. The pressures of fiscal shortfall, rapid economic development and 
abnormal urbanisations in China led the government to make more aggressive use of the 
private sector by using various forms of the BOT to deliver social infrastructure and 
public services. Several Circulars were published by the government in 2002, 2004, 
2005 and 2010, in order to encourage marketisation in public utilities, transportation, 
energy as well as telecom. By the end of 2009, 884 BOT contracts had been signed in 
China, with a value of $107bn (£ 70bn). Most recently, the central government also 
declared that the strict regulations and market entry limitations on China’s healthcare, 
education, telecom, civil aviation, railway and defence sectors would be removed for 
Chinese domestic investors, and partly removed for international investors from 2010. 
The National State Council acknowledged these newly opened sectors to Chinese and 
international investors and it is expected that new Chinese BOTs will be implemented in 
these areas over the next five years.  
However, number of problems have been emerged in China’s implementation of BOT. 
China has a limited history and experience of applying BOTs and operating a market 
economy in the last 30 years. Although a huge number of BOTs have been implemented 
in China’s social infrastructure and public services, the practice of Chinese BOTs is still 
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underdeveloped. Both the government and private sector have still not learnt how to 
properly use BOTs. To date, the result of using BOTs in China remains unclear since 
few studies have been conducted, and a limited amount of data has been released by the 
government. Government, policy makers and practitioners have not yet conducted a full 
investigation into either of the BOT related theories or of the lessons learned from other 
countries. In fact, it can be argued that the Chinese government has rushed and been 
arbitrary to open so many public service sectors and infrastructure to private investors in 
2010. As prior research (Adams, et. al, 2003, Qin and Yu, 2005, the World Bank, 2003, 
Handley-Schachler and Gao, 2003) suggests, in order to make the best use of BOTs in 
China, the authorities could benefit from carefully studying the lessons and experiences 
from other countries, particularly the UK. The UK has the largest number of PFI 
contracts in Europe, and given the UK’s role in developing PFI to an advanced stage, 
there could be benefits for China’s government to use the UK as an example, to consider 
what lessons can be learnt for developing China’s social infrastructure and public 
services. This thesis will discuss these issues, drawing on the lessons from a policy (the 
British PFI) that has been used in one country (the UK), in order to improve a similar 
policy (the Chinese BOT) in another country (China).  
1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of BOT and PFI: New Public Management and 
New Institutional Economics   
Although these topics are discussed in later chapters in the detailed cases of the UK and 
China, in order to gain a broader understanding of the issues around BOTs and PFIs, it 
is necessary to explore and clarify the key ideas and theories that underpin them. Much 
of the previous literature has examined BOTs and PFIs as part of the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms (Qin and Yu, 2005, Mayston, 1999, Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2004, Dunleavy, et. al., 2005, Ruane, 2004), underpinned by the ideas of 
Public Choice Theory (Niskanen, 2004), Principal-Agent Theory (Lane, 2005) and the 
Transaction Costs Economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996). Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2004) commented that the PFI is a recent extension of what has now become well 
known as the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) agenda for changes in the way public 
services are provided. The NPM normally refers to the wave of public sector reforms 
throughout the world since the 1980s.  The term NPM is often used in discussing the 
issues about ‘reinventing government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This involves 
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examples such as, how governments organise the public sector and services, in what 
structure and by what means, to solve problems in their countries (and within what 
contexts). It is difficult to define the term of NPM, since there are still a number of 
debates on it (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002, Barzelay, 2002 and Flynn, 2002). Some 
scholars, such as Boston (1991) believed that NPM is the practical application of the 
New Institutional Economics (NIEs). NPM is a series of public sector reforms in 
western countries, which are driven by the associated theories (Boston, et. al., 1991). 
However, some scholars believed that the NPM is just a practical pattern of policy 
choice in different countries and within different contexts (Barzely, 2002). Therefore, it 
is not possible to offer a unified definition or a model without considering the detailed 
contexts. But, by reviewing the previous studies, key features of NPM can be 
summarised here, as Hood (1995), and Osborne and McLaughlin (2002) discussed: the 
new public management reforms normally 
 focus on hands-on and entrepreneurial management,  
 uses explicit standards and measures of performance,  
 emphasis on out-put control rather than input,   
 adopt decentralisation of public services and management,   
 promote competition in the provision of public services,  
 stress on private sector styles of management and superiority,  
 promote discipline and cost saving in resource allocation,  
 and finally, separate political decision-making from the direct management of 
public services.  
The major reasons, drivers and paths of implementation of NPM differed from country 
to country. But in the case of the UK, the NPM was adopted and driven by a articulated 
number of dissatisfactions and critiques on traditional public administration and the 
welfare state system, e.g. dissatisfaction with poor public services, and inefficient and 
ineffective management in the public sector (Osbone and McLaughlin, 2002). 
Meanwhile, NPM also appears to be heavily dependent on some theoretical schools 
developed in the western countries, which was known as the New Institutional 
Economics, including public choice theory, principal agent theory and transaction cost  
economics (Hood, 1995, Boston, et. al., 1991, Greve and Jerspersen, 1999, Lane, 2002, 




1.2.1 Public Choice Theory  
The first theory highly relevant to the NPM is the public choice theory. The heart of the 
public choice theory is the behaviours and incentives of politicians and bureaucrats. The 
theory is often discussed when a political decision contradicts the public interests. The 
public choice theory primarily assumed that politicians and bureaucrats are motivated 
by self-interest (as an ‘economic man’) rather than by public interests. For example 
factors such as salary, good working conditions, public reputation, power  and the ease 
of managing the bureau’ (Niksanen, 1971). With this assumption, the public choice 
theorists argued that ‘politicians’ in a liberal democratic state often made a policy or a 
decision under pressures from ‘interests groups’ or ‘lobbying organisations’, which 
could help them to win their next election (the biggest ‘interest’ for them) (Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1962, Downs, 1967). Therefore, the policies and decisions made by self-
interested politicians often are short-term oriented, and only reflect a small number of 
viewpoints rather than the whole of public and social welfares in long-term. The 
negative effects of behaviours of self-interested politicians often led to a number of 
issues with public sector management, e.g. waste of public resource allocation and a 
large amount of government deficit. 
At the same time, the public choice theorists (Niksanen, 2004) believed that the 
‘bureaucrats’ also are self-interested. The officials and managers in the government, 
public agencies and public-owned enterprises would only promote their own interests, 
such as rising their own wages, benefits and achieve bigger budgets. The bureaucrats 
always maximise their biggest possible benefits and at the least costs. These decisions 
often lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the public sector management, e.g. a 
growing of department budgets, large public sectors, but the poor public services.  
The problems that the public choice theory discussed appears to be especially valid in 
the case of public utilities, social services and the state-owned enterprises. Boyne et. al. 
(2003) discussed, that public organisations have been unduly protected from the 
pressures of competition, because these organisations had a large share of the market in 
public services and infrastructure, e.g. health, education, housing, water, gas and public 
transportation. Due to the public agencies monopolising these public services and social 
infrastructure, the public had little option to choose the services they used. That 
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suggests that even the public are not satisfied with the services provided by the public 
agencies or enterprises. However they had no choice, but to use the products provided 
by the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the bureaucrats have not incentives to improve their 
products and services or cutting costs, since there are few pressures from competition in 
the market. In addition, due to imperfect information and a poor performance evaluating 
system in the public sector, it is difficult to know ‘real’ costs, or the performance and 
productions of bureaucrats. Under this situation, it is easy for officials to persuade 
politicians to allocate more budgetary financing than is really needed for service 
provision. As Niskanen (2004) argues that although big bureaucracies are especially 
able to extract revenue from their political sponsors, they provide low-quality services 
at high cost, and evade attempts to monitor their performance. Taken these arguments 
together, the selfishness and monopoly power of public officials lead to a number of 
negative effects on the production of public utilities and social services: such as 
oversupply, poor efficiency, quality, effectiveness and responsiveness of public services, 
and continuing expansion of the public organisations(Boyne et.al., 2003).  
By criticising politicians and bureaucracy, in order to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector, the public choice theorists recommend that a dramatic 
reform in the public sector is needed. These reforms may include establishing a 
competitive structure (market) in the public sector, creating the competition between 
public and private organisations. Also, the performance information of public agencies 
and enterprises should be more transparent to the public. Furthermore, it is best to 
minimise the role of the state and reduce the size of the public sector. The, private sector 
should be allowed to participate in the public service (Niskanen, 2004).  
 
1.2.2 Principal –Agent Theory  
 
The second theory to have an effect on public sector reforms is the principal-agent 
theory. This theory assumes that the agent (managers) and the principal (shareholders) 
have different interests and are both attempting to maximize their interests: in the 
private sector, shareholders maximize profits; managers maximize salaries and other 
non-financial benefits. The principal wants to induce the agent to act in the principal’s 
interests, but the principal’s control over the agent is always somewhat imperfect due to 
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the lack of full information about the circumstances and behaviour of the agent. 
Therefore, the principal faces monitoring problems and associated costs (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Vickers and Yarrow 1988).  
According to this theory, the central issue for the principal is to strengthen monitoring 
the performance of the agent and create the optimal incentive scheme for the agent in 
order to solve the principal-agent dilemma and thus ensure the efficient operation of the 
firm. The solutions for the principal-agent issues is that the activities of agents should 
be closely monitored by principals. Secondly, a compensation contract or agreement 
should be made between principal and agent, to build an incentive for agents, and to 
specify and clarify their obligations and rights.  
The agency problem existed not only in the private sector, but also in the public sector. 
However, as the principal-agent theory discussed, the problem seems to be more 
complex in the public sector, for some reasons (Boyne et. al., 2003). Firstly, it is really 
difficult to find out who the principals are and what they want in the cases of public 
sector management. In theory, the public as a whole is the owners of the public sector, 
and with a variety of agents acting on its behalf, e.g. government officials, members of 
parliament, managers of public agencies and state-owned enterprises. A variety of 
agents in the public sector also do not know who their ‘principal’ is and what the public 
‘interests’ are in many cases. Secondly, the principal-agent theorists argued (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972, Boyne et. al., 2003 and Hassard et al. 2007) that it is difficult to 
identify and evaluate the ‘performance’ of the agents (e.g. education and healthcare), 
due to the characteristics of public sector. The public and taxpayers do not have the 
effective means and information to evaluate and monitor the work of these agents in 
public agencies and organisations. Thirdly, unlike private firms, the agents (e.g. officials, 
managers and MPs) in the public sector are not profit-driven and there is no pressure to 
gain greater ‘market shares’. Moreover, the bankruptcy threat does not exist in the 
public agencies and the state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the agents (officials and 
managers in the public sector) do not necessarily perform as the principal (the public) 
wished, or they have few incentives to do so. As a result, the principal-agent problem is 
likely to be worse in the public sector. The principal-agent and the ‘property-right’ 
theorists (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Lane, 2002) suggest, that production in the 
private sector has more efficient and economic than the production under the public 
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ownership, due to the agency problem in the private sector is not serious as the public 
sector experienced.  
To deal with the problems of principal-agent in the public sector, particularly in the 
public service and infrastructure sectors, the principal-agent theorists (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972, Lane, 2002, Boyne et. al., 2003) suggest  that monitoring  the agents’ 
performance should be enhanced, more information should be disclosed by the 
bureaucrats (agent), and an optimal incentive scheme for the agent should be established, 
e.g. the uses of different forms of ‘contract’. Also, the ownership-solution literature 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) claimed privatizing or contracting out the public services 
and works to private contractors should be promoted as much as possible. It may reduce 
the agent problem in the public sector, since private enterprise was assumed to have 
fewer agency problems than public sector and, it is less costly to monitor agents in 
private than  the public enterprises (Hassard et. al., 2007). 
1.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics 
The third theory which has profound influences on the new public management practice 
is the Transaction Costs Economics (TCEs). Transaction cost economics is an approach 
to analysing how a firm or an organisation (in private and public sector)  organise their 
production and under ‘what’ kind of governance structure and by what instruments. The 
heart of the transaction cost economics is, as its name presents, ‘the costs’ (or ‘fees’) 
associated with a trade. An important point of the transaction cost economics is: in the 
‘real world’, that the exchange of goods and services are neither easy nor expense-free. 
To achieve an agreement between a good or a service’s producer and purchaser, there 
are costs incurred in this process. Costs are associated with the searching for potential 
trade partners and informing them of the opportunity to trade, negotiating the terms of 
the exchange and write an agreement, and the costs involved in monitoring and 
enforcing contracts on the other party, regarding the terms of the agreement.  
The concept of the ‘transaction cost’ was discussed by Coase (1937) in his work, the 
nature of firm. Two questions were raised by Coase firstly: ‘why do firms sometimes 
choose to buy their inputs in the market place, and at other times, decide to make input 
themselves? Secondly, when is it best to organize production through the market and 
when is it best to organize it through a hierarchy of employees?’ (Flynn, 2007: 228). 
These questions were so-called as: the choice between ‘buy or make’. As TCE 
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(Williamson, 1999) indicates that some transactions are better using market-
arrangements when the transaction costs of making a contract are low, but others may 
suited to hierarchical or rule-driven organization (in-house provision). The key point of 
the answers for these questions is the ‘transaction cost’. From this views of point, the 
transaction cost economics is studying a firm or an organization how to organize, 
produce and distribute a particular good or service with what kind of institutions, e.g. 
hierarchy structure, market mechanism, or a mix of them. In other words, the TCEs 
discussed the ‘efficiency matters’ from the perspectives of institutional governance 
structure.  
Williamson is another main contributor for the development of the transaction cost 
economics. As Williamson (1967, 1985) pointed out, the existence of transaction costs 
depended on various factors (e.g. human factors and environmental factors), named as 
‘bounded rationality’, ‘opportunistic behaviours’, ‘uncertainty’, and the nature of the 
transaction. Unlike neoclassical economics, the basic assumption of the transaction cost 
economics assumes that all individuals do not know the true model of the world and 
calculate their optimal actions with fewer costs. In other words, all individuals may 
calculate their actions according to their own situations and abilities (rationality), but 
this calculation is not ‘perfect’ in the ‘real world’ (Simon, 1982). This is called 
‘bounded rationality’ which is contradictory to the ‘economic man’ and ‘rationality’ 
assumption in neoclassical economics. Another human factor is called opportunistic 
behaviours, which refers to the behavioural aspect that arises under the features of 
limited and asymmetric information, one party to the transaction attempts to take 
advantage of the other. This term often includes:  
 Adverse selection: when one of the parties has a pre-contract informational 
advantage which leads to signalling and screening costs.  
 Moral Hazard: in cases where the non-observability of one of the parties´ action 
provokes costs of monitoring or incentive schemes. And Non-verifiability of 
information to outsiders: when it is difficult or expensive to audit a firm. 
Williamson and other scholars explained that a number of factors may also have  an 
impact on the costs of transactions. But these contributing factors are from the 




 Uncertainty: there are too many uncertain events and factors associated with the 
transaction in the future, therefore, it is impossible to takes them all into account 
in a contract. 
 Complexity: the transaction is too complex to consider all potential options and 
choice 
 Language: the language of contracts may not be specified as both parties agreed 
on; 
 Small numbers: few suppliers in the market thereby, probably leading to 
opportunistic behaviours to the disadvantage of the purchasers; 
 Information ‘impactedness’ (known as information asymmetry’): suppliers of a 
transaction may have more information, than purchasers or other parties 
 Atmosphere: the parties of transaction may be influenced by other factors, such 
as, politics, social values, moral values and the norms, not purely ‘self-interests’ 
seekers. 
Bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviours as well as the situation in the market give 
rise to the possibility that one or other of the parties to a transaction will exploit their 
information advantage at either the pre-contract or post-contract stages. In the real 
exchanges in the market, the TCE theorists (Williamson, 1973, Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992, Ménard and Shirley, 2005) suggest it is difficult and impossible to write a 
‘complete contract’ in practice from ex-ante contract design, or in its interpretation ex-
post. Most contracts in practice are incomplete which cover all possible events or 
contingencies, which would be written in such a way that both parties know exactly 
what would be the consequences of every possible event, excepted the most simple 
contracts. Even if writing a ‘complete contract’ were possible, the costs of designing 
such contract would be extremely high. Contractual incompleteness is another important 
part of the TCEs. An incomplete contract leads to a significant increase in the costs of 
the transaction through market mechanism, particularly in the ex post contracting stage 
when a contract has been made and put into enforcement. Both parties of the contract 
may behave opportunistically when environment changes in the ex post contractual 
stage. In some cases, the danger of opportunism is increased where there is an ‘asset 
specificity’ matter (Williamson, 1985). This refers to the investments associated with the 
transaction are specific to the parties involved, and (these specific investments) with a 
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very low value for other uses. Specific investments for the transaction result in a 
situation of bilateral monopoly where both parties are confined to exchanging with each 
other (Walsh, 1995). In other words, both parties are ‘locked-in’ to the exchange by the 
contract. In this situation, both sides of the transaction are difficult to ‘quit’, unless high 
compensation is paid (or one party writes off the specific investments).  Asymmetric 
lock-in occurs where one party has made the majority of the specific investments. In the 
situation of ‘lock-in’, any changes in the balance of power creates scope for 
opportunistic behaviour or ‘hold-up’ whereby one party attempts to exploit the 
dependency of the other party which has been brought about by the latter’s specific 
investment (Walsh, 1995). The ‘hold-up’ issue is significant when there are a small 
number of suppliers in the market.  
 
The TCEs analysis shows, for example, if a transaction is highly asset-specified thus 
transaction cost is high, the firm or the organisation may prefer the hierarchy structure 
rather than use the market mechanism. However if a transaction is not asset-specific, the 
firm may preferred the market structure. Furthermore, it is also possible that a firm may 
choose a governance structure which combined the hierarchy and market instruments 
(e.g. a hybrid governance structure). This is because the transaction costs of this 
18 
 
governance structure is lower than others, see last page, figure 1.1: the curve A-B.  
Secondly, if a transaction has a number of uncertainties with environmental and the 
human factors (such as, rational boundary, opportunisms, trusts), then costs of the 
transaction are high (such as the costs of designing, drafting, negotiating and monitoring 
of a contract). In this case, the firm may organise its production internally, not buying 
from the market. Thirdly, if frequency of a transaction is high, generally, the firm may 
tend to internally organise this transaction, in order to reduce the costs of transaction 
and production. The TCE does not offer a certain solution for any contracting issues, but 
it provides a framework to analyse the possible governance structure of public service 
production and delivery, in terms of human factors, environmental conditions 
(uncertainty) and the nature of the transaction, see diagram 1.2 below.  
Diagram 1.2 From the characteristic of transaction to the Governance structure  
Transaction Cost Economics Model  
 
Source: adapted from Williamson, 1984 
 
Due to uncertainty and asset specificity, with frequency of transaction, transaction cost 
analysis suggests a kind of ‘relational contracting’ which is a relationship based upon 
‘trust’ between both parties within the contract. In this way, the buyer and supplier of a 
contract treat the ‘contract’ as an outline or a guide and does  not ‘entirely rely on the 
contract for the supply of a particular good at particular time’ (Flynn, 2007:230). In a 
relational contract, both parties of the contract establish a long-term relationship and 
achieve ‘win-win’ results. The relational contract was advocated, this is because it can 
reduce the opportunistic behaviours in the contracting process, therefore reducing the 
transaction costs.   
The TCE analysis is applied into different areas of the private and public sectors, 
particularly in contracting matters within the public sector. Notably, the TCEs can be 
used to explain and analyse that practical issues of contracting out public services and 
productions by the private sector. There are many practical factors and problems in the 
design and management of contract, that will impact on the production and provision of 
public services. The TCE is fairly relevant to this research. Based on the analysis of 
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TCEs, it can be seen that BOT and PFI contract is not ‘complete contract’, due to the 
complexity, imperfect information, bounded rationality and the nature of a long-term 
contract. The problems of ‘boundary rationality’, ‘information asymmetry’, 
‘opportunism’ and ‘trust’ between the government and contractors will have influences 
in the implementation of BOT and PFI contracts in the real world. Whether PFI and 
BOT were a suitable governance structure to develop social infrastructure and public 
services, it needs to consider each individual case in terms of ‘costs of transaction’.  
 
1.2.4 Applying New Institution Economics in New Public Management: the 
relevance to the PFI and the BOT 
 
To sum up, by reviewed these prescriptions of NIEs and practice of NPM, many of them 
are directly and indirectly relevant to the implementation of PFI and BOT see table 1.3, 
next page. Therefore, many scholars believed that the PFI and the BOT are the 
extension of the NPM, and the application of NIE.  
 
From the perspective of public choice theory, PFI and BOT can establish a competitive 
structure in the public sector, creating the competition between public and private 
organisations. Also, the uses of PFI and BOT are good approaches to minimise the role 
of the state and reduce the size of the public sector.  
 
Under the framework of PFI and BOT, in the views of principal-agent theory, the 
private sector wants to earn a return  on its investments and perform though designing, 
building, financing and operating a project. The public sector wants contracts where  
incentives exist for the private sector to deliver services on time to specified standards 
year after year. The  public sector shares an identity of interest with private contractors 





Table 1.3 The relevance of PFI and BOT to the prescriptions of the NIEs and the 
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Sources: adapted from Osborne and McLaughin, 2002, Savas, 2000, Lane, 2000 
However, in a PFI or a BOT project, the principal-agent problem still exists between 
public clients and private contractors. In the case of PFI and BOT (in theory), to some 
extent the principal-agent issue is less complex than in the conventional publicly-funded 
projects (which involve a number of principal-agent relationships among the public, 
politicians, officials, managers of public sector and private sector, etc.). Because PFI or 
BOT structural relationships between the public client and private contractor are simpler, 
the performance indicators and standards are better defined in the PFI or BOT contract. 
Finally, the performance-based payment system motivate private contractor working 
because the targets are set by the public clients. If targets are not met, penalties will be 
applied. In principal, if ‘transaction costs’ were not take into account, BOT and PFI may 
be a better approach to develop public infrastrucuture and servcie, based upon the 
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reasons mentioned above.  
In terms of transaction cost economics, a BOT or a PFI will be neither a completely 
public nor a completely private firm. It locates between the two extremes of the private 
sector (the market) and the government (hierarchy). Both BOT and PFI engage the 
private sector to deliver services under the competitive bidding model, while they allow 
the governments to retain an ongoing interest in the delivery of public services. 
Therefore BOT and PFI can be deemed to be a ‘hybrid’ governance structure. The 
question is if the ‘hybrid’ governance structure would be better way to organize public 
services than the ‘hierarchy’ and the ‘market’ structures? There is no definite answer for 
this question. In transactional costs terms, a PFI or a BOT will be better only when it is 
‘cheaper’ than other governance structures. The central matter here is the costs 
associated with PFI and BOT transactions. By looking into the dimensions and 
contributory factors of transaction costs (e.g. bounded rationality, opportunisms, 
uncertainty, incomplete contract, asset specificity and frequency of transaction), BOT 
and PFI may have very high transaction costs.  When costs of a PFI or a BOT are higher 
than it organized through a hierarchical structure, in-house provision by the government 
would be better (e.g. small-size PFI projects, The Treasury, 2003).  
Using the ideas of TCEs, the UK Treasury has build a tool named as the Public Sector 
Comparators  to evaluate if the PFI should be adopted or not. The PSCs have been used 
to compare the costs of proposed PFI projects and the costs of conventional publicly 
funded projects (developed by government). However, the PSCs received lots of 
criticism and challenges, due to its inaccuracy in application (this will be discussed in 
chapter 3). One key point is that ‘transaction costs’ of a PFI can be underestimated; 
resulting in the PFI proposal always being cheaper than ‘conventional projects’ 
(Coulson, 2005).  
 
1.2.5 From theories to practice: the critiques of the New Public Management and its 
application in China 
The proponents of the NPM (e.g. Lane, 2000, Savas, 2000) argued a number of benefits 
of NPM have been brought into public management, such as cost efficiency and service 
effectiveness in the public sector. However, a range of critiques have arisen on the NPM 
and the theories that they are underpinning. Firstly, it is criticized that the NPM reforms 
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and the theoretical underpinnings ignore the differences between the public and private 
sector. The NPM focused too much on ‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy’ 
indicators in public services, undermining the importance of ‘accountability and 
equality’ of public services to the local communities. Also, the NPM reforms may focus 
on short-term gains (cost reduction and efficiency improvement), but undermined the 
capability of the state to take long-term perspectives. Secondly, the application of the 
NPM achieved some negative results. As Pollitt (2000) argued that the NPM has failed 
to deliver the promised efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Introduction of 
private sector in public infrastructure and services did not result in improvement of 
efficiency and quality of the services. Thirdly, as the strategies of the NPM, 
privatization and contracting out have been adopted in many countries. While the 
experience from the developing countries showed these reforms may promote self-
interests and corruption of policy makers and bureaucrats opt for privatization and 
contracting out, increasing the opportunities of ‘rent-seeking’. In addition, the 
transaction costs of the privatization and contracting out are very high, which result in 
the reforms being inefficient and wasteful. Fourthly, the public participation in the NPM 
is rare, although the NPM claimed the customer or citizen-orientation. Finally, a number 
of scholars have questioned the adaptability of the NPM in developing countries, since 
many attempts of NPM reforms have failed, particularly in the African countries. The 
key reason for the failure in the developing world is the governments may be 
irrespective of national contexts and institutional capabilities to carry out such reforms. 
As a developing country, it is hard to say China’s economic and public sector reforms of 
the last three decades have been completely driven by theories which originated in the 
west. Unlike the UK’s PFI ‘top-down’ approach reforms, many Chinese economic and 
public sector reforms are ‘bottom-up’ approach and are ‘pragmatism’ driven. For 
instance, BOT was introduced in the 1980s by the local government in Guangdong 
province to solve the practical matters of developing into local infrastructure.  
However, based on the policies’ interpretations and detailed measures of Chinese 
reforms in the public sector, the decision-makers and politicians who advocated the 
China’s reforms were affected by the practice of the NPM and the viewpoints of the 
public choice theory and principal-agent theory. Since the 1990s, the Chinese 




 China’s public fiscal and taxation reforms (1994),  
 state-owned banks’ corporatisation and commercialisations (1995),  
 restructuring, downsizing, commercialising and privatising state-owned 
enterprises (1994-2001),  
 Chinese health, housing and education’s ‘socialisation’ or ‘marketisation’ (1994-
present)  
 and Chinese central and local governments’ institutional adjustments and 
downsizings (1998),  
 the public investment reform in 2004,  
 Finally, public utilities and infrastructure management reforms (2004-present).  
 
All these measures have shown the governments hope to reduce their control on 
economic and social affairs, introduce ‘marketisation’ in the public service and 
infrastructure, decentralisation of decision-making in the public management to local 
governments and agencies at provincial and city levels, and deregulation of the private 
economy in the country. These reforms underpinned the concepts and ideas of the New 
Institutional Economics (Hassard et al., 2007). The results of these public sector reforms 
in China still remain unclear, although the government claimed that benefits have been 
achieved with some ‘costs’. BOT as a sub-sector of these reforms also underpinned the 
ideas of the NIEs. This thesis will examine if BOTs have achieved the expected results 
and look at the problems that occurred along the way. 
Through the above analysis, it can be seen that the BOT and the PFI are fairly similar 
model in financing social infrastructure and public service. The theoretical underpinning 
is also similar. China and the UK both face similar problems in developing their 
infrastructure and public service projects. Given the UK’s role in developing PFI to an 
advanced stage, this study considers what lessons can be learnt from PFIs for 
developing China’s social infrastructure and public services.  
1.3 Lessons learning: A theoretical framework 
There are four terminologies often involved with ‘knowledge about how policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or 
present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
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and ideas in another political setting’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5): policy transfer, 
policy diffusion, policy convergence (Bennet, 1991) and lessons-drawing. These 
concepts are of great relevance, developed by different scholars and widely used in 
different public policy and social studies in the last number of decades. Many 
researchers treated the ‘policy transfer’ as a broad concept or a label, including the 
terms of policy diffusion, convergence, lessons-drawing and a series of comparative 
studies in public policy and politics crossing countries and states. Evans (2004) believed 
that ‘the contemporary study of policy transfer (broadly defined) originates from policy 
diffusion studies, a sub-set of the comparative politics in the U.S.A by Walker (1969) 
and Gray (1973).  
Policy diffusion is commonly defined as ‘the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among members of social systems. It 
is a special type of communication in that the messages are concerned with a new idea’ 
(Roger, 1995: 5). However, this term is used most often to internal policy transfers 
within a country. Also Bennett (1991: 220) suggests that diffusion refers to similar 
adoptions of policy without evidence of emulation. 
Policy convergence (Bennet,1991) focuses on the comparative politics literature which 
identifies similarities across a number of countries in terms of policy goals, content, 
instruments, outcomes and/ or styles. There is the potential for convergence to refer to 
policy change which occurs relatively independently of other countries. In other words, 
countries with similar policy problems could address them in similar ways without there 
being policy transfer.  
Policy transfer was developed and narrowly defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) as 
‘the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development 
of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political 
system’. 
Rose (2007) defined ‘Lesson-drawing is future-oriented, drawing on current experience 
in other countries to improve national policy.’ It concerns itself with ‘understanding the 
conditions under which policies or practices operate in exporter jurisdictions (countries) 
and whether and how the conditions which might make them work in a similar way can 
be created in importer jurisdictions (country)’ (Page, 2000) . 
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By looking through these terms of ‘policy transfer’, it could be found that ‘policy 
diffusion’ and ‘convergence’ are not suitable for usage within this study. As mentioned 
in the last section, policy diffusion usually was used in internal policy transfer within a 
country rather than international policy transfer and lesson-drawing. Policy diffusion is 
a gradual process. Considering the concept of ‘policy convergence’, it involves in the 
‘comparative policy or politics transfer’ studies without policy transfer. Many countries 
may face similar social and political problems; they adopted similar policies 
independently without any communication, without ‘any policy transfer or lessons-
drawing’. In comparative studies, researchers called this process, trend or actions as 
‘convergence’, some degree of ‘harmonization’.   
While this research focus is on a policy (PFI) which has already been used in the UK, to 
explore how these experiences and lessons could be borrowed, for developing Chinese 
BOTs in the water and road industries in the future. Therefore, this research is a ‘cross-
national’ study involving a ‘rational’ consideration on possible policy and lessons 
learning to improve a national policy (Chinese BOT) in China. Therefore, it could be 
said that the ‘policy transfer’ model (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) and lessons-drawing 
theory (2005) may be fit for this study. However, as commented by Page (2000), 
Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) and Rose’s model (2001, 2005) have different emphasis 
and considerations: Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework (2000) paid more attention when 
‘on understanding the process by which policies and practices move from exporter to 
importer jurisdictions, above all the agents of policy transfer’. It concerns much on the 
processes of decision making in the importer country. Different from Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s framework (2000), Rose’s Lesson-drawing model (2001, 2005) tends to use 
cross-national experience as a source of policy advice by policy importer country. It not 
only addresses how policies operate in the policy export country, but also how they may 
be applied in the country of import and what modifications are needed to transpose 
between them. Furthermore, the lessons-drawing literature focuses on understanding the 
distinctive political, administrative, social, economical or cultural conditions that sustain 
cross-national policy differences.  
This thesis is to draw the lessons, which are relevant to developing public services in 
China’s motorway and water industries, from the PFIs’ development and 
implementation in the UK over the last number of decades. Therefore, it needs to study 
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not only how PFIs worked in the UK, but also how BOTs operating in China under 
what kind of contexts and conditions, and eventually identify what policy and lessons 
may be borrowed for developing Chinese motorway and water BOTs. Therefore, the 
lessons-drawing model is certainly more relevant to this research. Rose (2007) 
described that ‘Lesson-drawing is future-oriented, drawing on current experience in 
other countries to improve national policy. It offers an evidence-based alternative to 
developing a new programme. It is evidence-based, since a lesson is based on 
programmes that have been operating for a long time elsewhere. Attention is focused on 
the measures that other countries employ to deal with a problem similar to one's own. It 
is based on experience, albeit the experience of other countries rather than one’s own 
government.’ Also, he explained that, (Rose, 2007) ‘Lesson-drawing is about 
contingencies: under what circumstances and to what extent will a programme that 
works there also work here? It is about specifying ways of learning from foreign 
experience in order to develop a programme that can better deal with a domestic 
problem. The contingent nature of lesson-drawing specifies whether obstacles are 
variable (e.g. the economic priorities of the government of the day) or long-term (e.g. 
federal as against unitary institutions). It encourages policymakers to be sceptical about 
assuming that so-called ‘best practice’ policies can readily be adopted, but it also 
encourages scepticism about arguments that what is done there can never happen here…’  
Under Rose’s lesson-drawing framework, there are ten steps to draw lessons from 
abroad. The first step is identify the problems at home (diagnosing your problem). By 
investigation and reviews, the policy in the policy import country can understand ‘what 
is the problem’; this is the basic step of lesson-drawing. If there is no problem, there is 
no need to learn from another country. The second step of this model is identifying 
‘where to look for the lessons’. Rose (2001) suggested when selecting a country to learn 
from, the following points need to be considered: 1) the ideological compatibility 
between the importer country and the exporter country; 2) similarities in resources: such 
as financial, personal and organizational capabilities; 3) psychological, not geographical 
proximity, for example national histories, culture’s influence on both institutions and 
political values; 4) availability of evidence, especially the available reports, news and 
relevant information produced by governments, academics and organizations in policy 
exporter countries.  
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The third step is investigating how a programme works in exporter countries from 
different channels: official and unofficial, second and primary investigations. The forth 
step is abstracting a cause-and-effect model for export, by review, abstract and 
summaries the elements of a programme necessary to make it operate, such as rules for 
action set out in laws and regulations, administrative requirements for delivering the 
programme, human resources for operating a programme or implementing a policy, 
possible financial costs and revenues and, finally, programme or policy recipients.  
The following steps, from step five to step nine, concern the questions ‘what should be 
learned and could be applied by policy or lessons import country?’. As Rose explained 
that, based upon the understanding on specific problems in import countries and the 
programme already implemented in export countries, it is necessary to ‘design a lesson’ 
(step 5), and ‘decided if to adopt or not the lessons from abroad’ (step 6), if the lessons 
were chosen to adopt, then consider if the import country have necessary resources to 
apply the programme (step 7), furthermore, at the same time, it needs to address the 
national context influences (step 8), how and can a programme operate, and whether it 
may be effective. Step 9 is bounding speculation through prospective evaluation, 
considering contingencies and uncertainty in the future, finally using foreign countries 












1.4 Aims and Objectives of this Study 
Transferring lessons learnt from policies in one country to another is a complex but not 
impossible undertaking (Rose, 1992, 2007, Page, 2000). Despite the benefits that could 
Box 1.4 Ten steps in lesson-drawing  
1 learns the key concepts: what programme is and what a lesson is and is not 
2 catch the attention of policy markers  
3 scan alternatives and decide where to look for lessons 
4 learn by going abroad 
5 abstract from what you observe a generalized model of how a foreign 
programme works 
6 turn the model into a lesson fitting your own national context 
7 decide whether the lesson should be adopted 
8 decide whether the lesson can be applied 
9 simplify the means and ends of a lesson to increase its chances of success 
10 evaluate a lesson’s outcome prospectively and, if it is adopted, as it evolves 
over time 
Source: Rose, R., 2005, Learning from comparative public policy, a practical guide, 
Routledge, 2005, Oxon  
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affect to China, analyses of PFI in the UK with a view to identifying lessons for BOT in 
China, has not yet been undertaken. This study aims to look at the implementation of 
the PFI in the UK through another perspective, called the ‘lessons-learning’ approach. 
In this way, the first concern of this research is a critical review of how the PFI works in 
the UK, and to look at the lessons leant from it. This research also required a diagnosis 
of the current problems of implementing BOTs in China. Only the problems of 
implementing BOTs were explored, this research therefore looks at what needs to be 
improved for the BOTs, based upon the PFI lessons. Certainly, not all the experiences 
and lessons from the UK are relevant to China’s BOT when the availability of resources 
and capabilities, as well as social-political and institutional contexts in China are taken 
into account. However the relevant ones can be identified. Finally, this thesis will make 
recommendations on improving BOT policy implementation, based upon the past 
experiences and lessons learned from the PFI.  
There are a large number of studies on the implementation of PFI in the UK. PFI may 
bring certain benefits in developing public infrastructure and delivering public services. 
However, the problems and lessons associated with implementation also need to be 
studied. Only a small number of studies have addressed the matter of implementing 
BOTs in China’ motorway and water sectors, and there is no literature on how China 
can learn from the experiences of other countries. In order to do this, and informed by 
Rose’s model of lessons-learning, the first aim of this study will explore how the BOT 
model is operating in China. The second is to evaluate the problems that have been 
experienced by local authorities using BOTs to provide public infrastructure facilities 
and services. By collecting, analysing and interpreting up to date data relating to BOTs 
in China’s motorway and water sectors, it is hoped to:  
 Learn how Chinese BOTs are operating within the contexts of the Chinese 
motorway and water sectors (the results, problems and obstacles of these 
applications); 
 This study will also analyse literature surrounding PFI in the UK to understand 
how PFI has been developed, what problems have been experienced in the 
development and implementation of PFI and how these have been or are being 
addressed. 
 The study will identify the lessons from the development and implementation of 
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UK PFIs relevant to China, in order to make better use of BOTs taking into 
consideration the context and conditions in China 
  This thesis will make recommendations for China’s utilisation of the BOT 
model within China’s socio-economic context. 
Due to BOTs being applied to a large number of sectors of the Chinese infrastructure 
over the last three decades (e.g. electricity generation, roads, ports, water, sewage 
treatment, heating supply, solid waste treatment, and with the new potential to be 
adopted into the education, health, housing, railway and defence sectors etc.), it is 
impossible to study BOTs in all areas. Therefore, this thesis will concentrate on the 
implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway (including bridges) and water treatment 
(including sewage) sectors. Meanwhile, due to all BOTs being implemented by local 
governments at city level, this study then will focus on the implementation of BOTs 
from the perspective of governments. 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is divided into five parts. Part one is introduction. Part two reviews and 
critically evaluates the experiences and lessons of BOTs and PFIs in China and the UK 
through an analysis of earlier academic literature (chapter 2 and 3). Part three discussed 
the methodology used in the research. Part four is data analysis. It explores current 
practice in the implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway and water industries 
through a mixed method which includes in-depth, semi-structured interviews, focus 
group and the observations of participants from the Chinese public sector. Part five 
discusses the relevance of British PFIs and Chinese BOTs, identifying the lessons and 
experiences that are useful to China’s motorway and water industries, and making 
recommendations for improving the utilisation of the BOT model in China.  
The thesis is organized into nine chapters.  
Chapter 2  Explores the evolution of Chinese BOTs and identifies the 
limitations of current research in that area.  
Chapter 3  Critically reviews and evaluates the experiences and lessons of 
British PFIs. The reviews are not restricted to matters regarding 
the adoption of British PFIs in the road and water industries, but 
also cover transport, health and education.  
Chapter 4  Discusses the methodology, including data collection and analysis.  
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Chapter 5 Presents an overview of the data about Chinese road and water 
BOTs. Focuses on the results and problems from Chinese BOTs. 
Chapter 6 Discusses the objectives and contextual factors influencing the 
implementation of Chinese BOTs, and attempts to describe the 
approach to implementation addressing contractual matters in 
particular.    
Chapter 7   Brings together the findings and discussions, analysing the 
relevance of the UK and China BOTs and identifying the lessons 
that could be learned to develop Chinese motorway and water 
projects.  
Chapter 8 Provides nine strategic rules for Chinese governments, to manage 
Chinese BOTs in future, drawns upon the transaction cost theory. 
Chapter 9 Presents the conclusions drawn from the research and provides              







PART TWO    Literature Review  
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Chapter Two The Build-Operate-Transfer in China: A literature Review  
2.1 Introductions  
As discussed in chapter one, private participation in infrastructure is not a new idea in 
China. The first wave use of private capital to develop China’s infrastructure can be 
found in the late 19th century. China’s Ministry of Railway (2009) stated, in 1867, a 
British private company (Jardine Matheson Ltd., Shanghai) designed, built, financed 
and operated the first railway in China. Other forms of private financed infrastructure 
were also created in China at the beginning of the 20th century. Most of these were 
concession-based contracts and applied in the public transport sectors, e.g. railways and 
shipping. At that time, over 10000 kilometres of railway had been built in China by 
Chinese contractors with investors from the UK, France, Germany, Belgium, Russia and 
the United States by the start of the ‘First World War’ (The MOR, 2009). In those days, 
private participation in infrastructure in China was named ‘Government-regulated, 
Private-managed Scheme’ (in Chinese speaking ‘Guan Du, Shang Ban’), a kind of 
concession-based project  commissioned by the government in China.  
The second wave of public-private cooperation was used in China between 1956-1961, 
under the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) administration. A ‘Chinese Nationalization 
Programme’ was set up by the Chinese government to gradually eliminating the private 
economy in 1952. In this way, the government purchased majority stakes in Chinese 
private businesses, or paid a ‘lease charge or interest’ to capitalists for use of their 
factories and/or equipment. Through this kind of ‘cooperation’ between the government 
and private business, China’s private economy was gradually nationalised by 1961. This 
Chinese nationalization scheme was called the ‘Public-Private Partnership 
(Cooperation)’, if translated into the English language directly.  
The third wave of applying private participation in China’s social infrastructure and 
public service started in 1986 (Wang et. al, 2000), when the first power station Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract (Sha'jiao Power Station B plant BOT in Guangdong 
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Province) was finalized with a private investor from Hong Kong (Hopewell Ltd.). In 
this project, Hopewell Ltd. was responsible for designing, building, financing and 
operating a power generation plant, while the Guangdong provincial government 
promised to buy all ‘output’ through a BOT contract. When this 10 years contract was 
finished, Hopewell transferred the power generation plant back to the governments for 
‘free’. From 1986, government in China started to use the BOT model to attract foreign 
private capital investments urgently needed, and also began to explore new approaches 
to develop Chinese infrastructure and public services (Handley, 1997).  
To date, China has been the world leader in the use of private finance in infrastructure, 
in terms of signed PPP and BOT projects and capital values, according to the Private 
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) department (2010) of the World Bank’s statistics. 
However, the application of BOT in China met many challenges (Fu, et.al , 2006, Qin 
and Yu, 2005, Wang and Ke, 2008). This chapter reviews the BOT development in the 
China since 1986 based on previous reports. It hopes to explore the following questions: 
How BOT is defined and organised in China?  
What are the objectives or rationales of utilising BOTs in China's infrastructure and 
utilities industries?  
What is the history and the background of using BOTs in China?  
What have been the experiences of implementing BOTs in China to date?  
What debates and problems have arisen in the implementation of Chinese BOT 
programmes?  
This chapter is organized into four sections. Section 2.2 interprets the basic concepts, 
models, arrangements and policies of Chinese BOT in order to compare them with 
British PFI in later chapters. Meanwhile, it also looks at the basic structure, frameworks 
and stakeholders of Chinese BOT programmes. Section 2.3 reviews the history of the 
uses of BOTs in China since 1986. It emphasises the ideologies, contexts, rationales and 
problems of applying BOTs in China, as well as the key facts related to the BOTs. 
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Section 2.3 also looks at the earlier use of BOT in the period of 1986-1994, 1995-2001, 
to find out the history, rationales and background surrounding the implementation of 
China's BOT programme. Then this chapter concentrates on the applications of BOTs in 
China between 2002 and 2008. In Section 2.4, the main debates and arguments 
surrounding BOTs in China will be reviewed, although a limited number of studies have 




2.2  Explaining BOT in China: Definitions, Models and Arrangements 
2.2.1  The definitions and models of Chinese Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
and BOT 
Build-Operation-Transfer is one popular method of Chinese ‘Marketisation’ or 
‘Socialisation’ reform of public infrastructure and social services. ‘Socialisation’ was 
defined by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, the former 
State Planning Commission, SPC, 1995) as, ‘the social investments or non-government 
capital (investments) in unrestricted infrastructure, public welfare, and other (public 
service) fields’ (NDRC, 2004, Chapter 2, Clause 5
1
). It includes various models, such as: 
‘solely funded undertakings, joint ventures, cooperatives, joint management projects 
and financing modes’ in infrastructure projects that included investment by the private 
sector (NDRC, 2004, Chapter 2, Clause 5).  
Private capital and investment are welcomed into Chinese public welfare undertakings 
and infrastructure projects by the government, unless there are clear restrictions on 
private investments in the Catalogue of Investment Projects Authorized by the 
Government (Ministry of Construction, MOC, 2002, NDRC, 2004). The ‘Marketisation’ 
was often used in the Ministry of Construction’s documents. As the Ministry of 
Construction suggested in the Opinions on Acceleration of Marketisation Process of 
Public Facilities 2002 (MOC, 2002),  ‘Local governments should accelerate the 
progress of marketisation on public utilities industries, to encourage social and foreign 
capital to participate in the public utilities’ projects, through varied use of models, such 
as BOT, Transfer-Operation-Transfer (TOT), joint venture and other forms of 
cooperation between public and private sectors, for instances, the Asset Back/Based 
Securitisations (ABS) model.’  
The statements above show that the concepts of ‘Socialization’ and ‘Marketisation’ in 
                                                 
1English Version can be accessed at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policyrelease/t20060207_58851.htm 
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China are quite similar to the British PPP, which involved all kinds of cooperation and 
collaborations between private and public sectors. Therefore, the term PPP is also used 
in some recent Chinese academic studies (Qin and Yu, 2005, Fu, et. al., 2006). This is 
because the authors believed the concept of the PPP from the UK can be used properly 
to define and interpret all the activities of private participation in the infrastructure 
industries in China. 
The most popular model of private participation in Chinese public infrastructure is 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). It was defined and explained in the BOT Circular in 
1996 (The State Planning Commission, 1996) as follows:  
‘BOT projects as used in these Provisional Regulations shall refer to the 
infrastructure projects built, financed and operated by foreign investors. A 
government authority may, through a franchise agreement and within a specified 
period, authorize a BOT project to a project company established by a foreign 
investor particularly for such BOT project, and have the project company 
responsible for its financing, construction, operation and maintenance. After the 
expiration of the franchise period (normally no more than 30 years), the project 
company shall transfer the entire facilities of such BOT project to the government 
authority in good condition and without any claim’.  
BOT was also similarly defined by the Ministry of Construction (MOC) in 2002 and 
2004. However a notable change associated with BOT policy was that the Chinese 
domestic investors were allowed to build, finance and operate the infrastructure projects 
from 2001.  
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2.2.2 The structure of the BOT in China  
The Chinese BOT model seems more complex than the traditional public-funded 
projects in China. This is mainly due to the complex contractual relationships between 
the private contractors and public clients, as well as the complicated relationships 
between the members of the Project Company (called a Special Purpose Vehicle in the 
UK). A BOT project normally includes a number of stakeholders from private and 
public bodies such as, project contractors, construction sub-contractors, operation and 
maintenance subcontractors, lenders, suppliers and finally the financial and legal 
advisors. Therefore, there are big challenges for both the public authorities and the 
private contractors to manage these complicated relationships in complex mega-projects. 
As Wang and Ke (2008) commented, a critical success factor of a BOT project is 
whether the public client and the project contractor can properly manage the 
complicated relationships and integrate the different people together. Although few of 
the official documents mention how a BOT should be exactly organised, some case 
studies of the Chinese BOT presented the basic structure of a BOT (Wang and Ke, 2008, 
the World Bank, 2003, Qin and Yu, 2005). The structure of a Chinese BOT has been 
presented in diagram 2.1 on next page. The case is from a power station BOT project—
the Lai’bin City Power Station in Guang’xi Province. It was the first pilot BOT project 
and was organised and directed by the State Planning Commission (central government) 
in the mid-1990s. This project was undertaken by the joint venture of Electricite De 
France (EDF) and GEC Alsthom and the senior debtors were also two French banks and 
the EIB (European Investment Development Bank). In this project, at least 13 
stakeholders from China and France participated, and more than 15 contracts and 
guarantee arrangements were involved between the different stakeholders. The Lai’bin 
BOT model was a flagship and this standard model has been used in other BOT projects 
in different industries in China. In addition, another two pilot projects designed and 
managed by the State Planning Committee also adopted similar BOT frameworks.
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Sources: Wang and Ke, 2008 
Diagram 2.1 The Structure of Lai’bin B Power Station BOT project, Guangxi Province, China, 1995 
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The complexity of BOT projects in China also stems from the complicated approval and 
procurement procedures, see page 40, table 2.2. The BOT projects with capital value over 
US$30 million required three levels of government approval and review, which included: 
State, Province and City government. According to the World Bank (2003), Chen and 
Messner (2003) and Zhang’s (2007), before 2005, a proposed foreign-privately-financed 
BOT project would be required to get at least 30 approvals from various departments at 
the central and local government and each approval required a different criteria to be met, 
such as macroeconomic planning, foreign-investment policy, commercial registration, 
sector regulation, foreign exchange, taxation, land administration, sanitation and 
environmental protection, customs, and construction etc. 
Meanwhile, Chen and Messner (2005: 927) argued that ‘each regulator operates under 
different and sometimes conflicting policy constraints.  This made the project approval 
procedure difficult and full of uncertainties either to the sponsoring government agency 
or to bidders/concessionaires’.  To resolve these issues, the government (the NDRC) in 
China simplified and decentralised the right of approval for BOTs to local governments in 
2004, in order to reduce the time and expense of the private investors’ BOT applications. 
However, the experiences in the post-2004 period showed that local governments in 
China could not perform these roles very well. The reviews and evaluations on BOT 
cases, proposals, and applications were managed poorly which, led to many unqualified 












Table 2.2 The process of implementation of BOT 
Steps to for BOT projects 
 
Details 
1. Clarify objectives by 
establishing business 
     
      
An initial feasibility study report should be designed to: 
Study feasibility of the projects; 
Identify objectives and scales of the project;  
NOT include project’s details, e.g. technical matters, project cost-
benefit analysis and possible Return on Investment 
 
2. Approval  
 
(by the 12 departments at 
provincial level, if international 
investors, need further 12 
departments at central 
governments) 
 
Above two steps need 6-12    
months 
 
To gain the BOT approvals from the provincial governments (and 
the central governments if needed), the procuring authorities at city 
and county level need submit: 
Outline business cases; 
And the report of initial feasibility study. 
For the BOTs proposing to use international investments, the 
application should be approved by the governments at national 
level, e.g. NDRC 
For Chinese domestic investors, application should be approved by 
the provincial governments.  
 




             4.5 months 
Assemble tendering office and team, include: members and experts 
from the procuring departments, planning, finance, tax, land 
management, price management, construction department etc. 
Introduce consulting firms (financial, legal and technical); 
Detailed study on technical issues, identify technical standards 
(engineering problems, equipments, technical standards and 
environment protection); 
Design project structure and indentify relevant conditions for 
implementation of projects; 
Design pre-qualification documents and standards; 
Prepare tendering documents, identify tendering evaluation 
standards and key clauses of BOT contract (output specification); 
Invite bidding through  advertisements on three national media 
4. Prequalification of 
bidders  
 
              1-1.5 months 
 
Identify bidders 
5. Preparing bidding 




               5 months 
 
The bidding documents should include: 
The detailed descriptions on BOT facilities, product or services;  
Construction arrangements and plans; 
Production or service unit price;  
Contract standards: quantity, quality and life cycle costs 
Possible Return on Investment and financing structure; 
Foreign exchange arrangement  (if international investors); 
 force majeure arrangement; 
maintenance plan; 
Risk identification and allocation 
6. Select bidders 
 
                1 month  
Financial and NPV analysis  
Taxation arrangement and inflation consideration 
Risk transfer and allocation 
 
7. Negotiation with 
preferred bidders 
 
            At least 4 months 
Financial arrangements (financiers) 
Subcontractor: construction, Hard facility and soft facility 
Suppliers 
Insurance 




               3-4 months 
Bidder’s Full Business Cases, 
Final agreement with stakeholders, 
Final BOT contract 
9. Project design, 
construction and 
operation  
Implementation of project (with the government evaluation) 
Source: Da Yue Consulting Firm, 2009; Zhongyi Consulting Firm, 2004, Zhang, 2007, Qin and Yu, 2005 
2.2.3 The Policies and governing frameworks on China’s BOT  
Up to 2010 only a few strategies, policies and regulations governing BOT had been 
issued by China’s government. The current BOT policies and regulations may be 
classified into different levels according to the matters they concern. The first level of the 
Chinese BOT policy was actually the interpretation of the official ideologies and 
strategies, like the State Council’s official policies (the State Council, 2005, 2010) on 
developing the private economy in China. These documents did not contain the detailed 
instructions of the BOT programme, but instead the central government officially 
acknowledged the ideologies, opinions and national strategies of the government on 
developing public infrastructures and services through private finance. At the second 
level, the key policy and official documents addressed the guidance of the BOT schemes, 
upon the ideologies and strategies of the State Council set out in the first level. These 
policies or regulations concern: what the BOT model is and what are the principles of 
using private financed programmes. They also look at what the key arrangements and 
mechanisms in developing a BOT contract are etc. These documents were usually issued 
by the NDRC (The SPC, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) to define the basic concepts and 
arrangements involved in a BOT framework, including a few detailed guidelines on the 
BOT in practice. The third level of China’s BOT policies are issued by the national 
ministries in central government and concern matters of implementation, in terms of the 
industries and sectors. Some guidelines on using BOT methods in public utilities 
industries have been published by the MOC in 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005.  
Finally, at local level, the provincial, cities’ and counties’ authorities can also issue their 
own regulations on developing BOT projects, such as the BOT Regulations and the 
Opinion Letters issued by Beijing, Hebei, Guizhou and Xinjiang Provincial governments 
after 2005. The local government as the main procuring body and inspector of public 
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infrastructure and services has  addressed a number of issues when a BOT is adopted, 
such as  procurement and tendering,  performance of construction,  output of the BOT 
projects’ operations, and the reviews  of  private contractors’ performance.  The structure 
of China’s BOT policies and government framework is shown in diagram 2.3.  
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Diagram 2.3 The structure of the China’s BOT policies and governance’s framework 
 





The State Council of China 
(BOT strategy and ideology) 
The Ministry of Construction 
(Industrial BOT policies and 
guidance) 
The National Development and Reform Commission 
(The principle policies, strategies, mechanisms and 
frameworks of BOT) 
The Ministry of Transport 
(Industrial BOT policies) 
Provincial government and 
its departments 
(Local BOT regulations) 
Other related Ministries at 
central governments …. 
Cities’ and counties’ 
government and its 
departments 
(Local BOT procurement 
bodies) 
Provincial government and 
its departments 
(Local BOT regulations) 
 
Provincial government and 
its departments…. 
(Local BOT regulations) 
 
Cities’ and counties’ 
government and its 
departments 
(Local BOT procurement 
bodies) 
 
Cities’ and counties’ 
government and its 
departments… 





2.2.4 The policies of Chinese BOT  
The earliest official policies on China’s BOT were issued by the State Planning 
Committee in 1995 and 1996. The most important BOT policy in China—The BOT 
Circular (1996) was designed by the State Planning Commission and enforced in 1996 to 
define and explain the important arrangements and mechanisms of BOT projects in China. 
This circular included the payment mechanism, the approval process, the procedures and 
methods of procurement and tendering (international competitive tendering), formats and 
contents of the BOT contracts, the roles and responsibilities of public procuring bodies 
and the BOT project company (Special Purpose Vehicle), and finally the risk sharing 
arrangement. The BOT Circular (SPC, 1996) has been treated as the basic legal document 
for the Chinese BOT projects, as it was originally prepared as the draft of  China’s BOT 
Law at the time.  
However, the BOT Circular (SPC, 1996) received strong (political) opposition and 
suspicion at the wider consultation stage in the People’s Congress (the Parliament) in 
1996. Also, the Circular only allowed foreign investors access to the Chinese power 
station, motorway and water supply markets, and excluded Chinese domestic investors. 
Finally, there were some serious flaws and arguments detailed in clauses of the BOT 
circular (The World Bank, 2003). Therefore, the State Planning Commission quickly 
withdrew this draft proposal, instead of issuing it as an administrative regulation. 
However, two big modifications have been made in the last ten years to the BOT 
strategies and policies: Firstly, Chinese domestic investors have been permitted to invest 
in BOT projects what used to be foreign investor only (SPC, 2001, Circular of Committee 
of Planning concerning promotion and instruction of private investment). Therefore 
Chinese domestic private investors started to explore the PPP and BOT markets as new 
entrants and competitors. In recent years, they have already become active in a large 
proportion of the Chinese PPP market as discussed below.  
Secondly, there was a big reduction and simplification of the procedures for BOT 
application and approval, by decentralising to provincial and city governments in 2004. 
The approvals and reviews on Chinese BOT’ applications are not conducted by central 
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government any more, as the NDRC (2004, Chapter 2, Clause 1) explained: ‘(Central) 
Government approval will no longer be required for projects not funded by the 
government. Instead, the systems of ‘Authorization’ and ‘Record-filing’ will be used 
where appropriate. Projects not using state funds will only need governmental 
authorization for important and restricted investment projects relating to public or social 
interest (e.g. national defence). For other projects without state funds, no matter how 
large the scale, the applications only need to be put on record. And enterprises will make 
decisions on market prospects, economic benefits, source of capital and product planning; 
and take on risks themselves.’ 
Also, in 2005, the State Council (2005) issued guidelines for developing the private 
economy in China, (the so-called ‘36-clause on the non-public sector’ 2005) officially 
allowing private companies (including domestic and foreign enterprises) to invest in 
previously restricted sectors dominated by SOEs. In Clause 3 of this document, the 
central government suggested that public authorities should allow and actively encourage 
non-public capital into the public utilities and infrastructure fields, especially urban water 
supply, gas supply, heating supply, public transport, and sewage treatment. This policy in 
2005 primarily removed the market restrictions on public utility industries for Chinese 
and international private investors.  
Moreover, the most recent policy related to the private sector participating in public 
infrastructure and social welfare was issued by the General Office of the State Council of 
China in 2010 (Several Opinions of State Council on Encouraging and Guiding Healthy 
Development of Private Investment
2
). This fundamentally widened the fields and scope of 
the use of private finance in all industries and public service sectors in the country. This 
document removes entry restrictions on public health, education, social housing, railways, 
high-speed railways and defence completely for Chinese domestic private investors and 
partially for international investors. Although the detailed policies and regulations have 
not been published by the related ministries or provincial governments yet, it can be 
predicted that the scope of applications of BOT in China will be much wider than before. 
                                                 
2 English version is available at: http://www.lpacn.com/news/details.aspx?id=2010613110643  
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The main areas opening to the private sector are shown in table 2.4.   
Table 2.4 The fields and industries open to Chinese private investors and Foreign investors after 2010 
(General Office of the State Council, China, 2010) 
 
Source: Several Opinions of State Council on Encouraging and Guiding Healthy Development of Private 
Investment, English version at, http://www.lpacn.com/news/details.aspx?id=2010613110643 
 
Through a review of the related policies of the Chinese government since 1995, it can be 
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seen that the  market entry restrictions on private financing of infrastructure and welfare 
service projects have been continually reduced. More and more social infrastructure and 
public service fields have opened up to Chinese domestic investors. Meanwhile, the 
devolvement of BOT approval and application from central to local government  in China 
simply reduced the time and costs of implementing BOT projects. The government, 
including the General office of the State Council, MHURD (Ministry of Construction) 
and the NDRC, have clearly shown their reference for market-based, efficiency-focused 
and competition-dependent approaches in a number of their guidelines and official 
interpretations on the policies, see Table 2.5, page 49.  
However, for BOT policies in China, the big issue is that detailed guidelines have not 
been designed and published by related ministries and local governments on how to use 
these programmes in practice. Although the broad framework of BOT policy is clear, 
detailed guidance on implementation is still vague. Only the Ministry of Construction 
(2004) has issued some basic guidance to local authorities who want to use BOTs for 
projects. For instance, five Standard BOT Contract Models for urban utilities projects 
were designed and issued by the MOC in 2004 and 2006. However, when reviewed the 
BOT contract models designed by the MOC are 34 pages or less. Although these models 
covered basic areas and arrangements of the BOT transactions, they are too simple and 
too ambiguous to use in practice. At the same time, the Ministry of Construction are 
aware of the matters regulating BOT projects in previous cases (MOC, 2004). Therefore, 
the MOC (2004) required that local authorities should regularly review the performances 
of BOT contractors every two years, and recommended that the results should be open to 
the public. However, this is not a compulsory requirement for local governments, 
therefore no such performance review reports on BOT projects, have been issued by local 
authorities so far. In addition, the MOC’s policy is too vague to implement, since it  
neither explained or presented details of regulating problems previously experienced in  
projects, nor did it give detailed standards on conducting evaluations on BOT project' 
performance. 
Finally, there are no guidelines for  power and transport BOT projects, issued by the State 
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(Electricity) Grid Corporations (Former, Ministry of Electricity) and the Ministry of 
Transport (Transport BOT projects), although the BOT projects in these two industries 
made up over 70%  of the overall market in China. 
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Table 2.5 Chinese PPPs and BOT Policy Framework and the adjustments between 1995 and 2010 
Date  Title  Content relevant to PPP/BOT 
1995 Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation: Concerning 
Absorption of Foreign Investment by Means of BOT (Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation, 1995)  
 
These are two particular policies to regulate BOT. These two policies are 
the legislative platform for the first BOT project in China: Laibin B 
Power project.  1995 Circular concerning approval of foreign investment concession project 
(promulgated by State Planning Commission, Ministry of Power, Ministry of 
Transportation, 1995)  
1996 The BOT Circular: Temporary measures of foreign investment in concession 
(BOT) project (the State Planning Commission)  
Particular regulation for BOT, but it was developed and based the two 
Circulars issued in 1995 
2001 Circular of concerning promotion and instruction of private investment (the State 
Planning Commission, 2001) 
This policy showed that the domestic private sector is permitted to invest 
in sectors where foreign investors have rights to invest in, thereby the 
Chinese domestic investors were allowed into China’s infrastructure 
markets.  
2002 the Opinions on Accelerating the Marketisation of Public  Utilities (Ministry of 
Construction, 2002) 
 
The government officially kicked off the marketization reform of public 
utilities sectors; it was emphasizing the importance of the market and 
expecting to bring in much needed investment to increase efficiency 
through the involvement of private sector.  
 
2004 Catalogue of Investment Projects Authorized by the Government (National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2004)  
Outlines the list of industries which foreign investors are encouraged, 
limited or forbidden to invest in. Most of the urban utilities industries, 
power station, road industries are in the list of. 
2004 The method of managing urban public utility concession (BOT) (Ministry of 
Construction, 2004)  
Specified policy for urban public utility. Set up the range of concessions, 








Decision on reforming the public investment system (2004) (the General Office of 
The State Council, but implemented by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2004) 
 
Encourage private investment for infrastructure, public facilities and 
other sectors which are not forbidden by law. Encourage private 
participation in profitable public infrastructure projects by way of own 
investment, joint venture and project finance (BOT). The private 
investments in form of BOT model do not need the approvals of the SPC 
(NDRC).  
2005 The opinion of the State Council regarding the encouraging and support for the 
development of non-state-owned economy (privately-owned economy) (Non-
government-owned economy, old 36 clauses) (State Council, 2005). 
First central government policy allowing the entry of the private sector 
into the area of power, communication, railway, airline and petroleum. 
Furthermore, the opinion asked for the improvement of legal aspect to 
support the private sector’s investment, construction and the operation 
(BOT) in the public infrastructure. Non-governments investments did not 
need the approvals from the NDRC anymore.  
2005 
 
Opinions on Strengthening Regulation of Public Utilities (Ministry of 
Construction) 
Urging public authorities to strengthen regulations and reviews on the 
performance of public utilities’ projects, mainly focusing on the BOTs 
projects. The governments were required to issue performance review 
reports regularly and disclose  these to the public.  
2010 Several Opinions of State Council on Encouraging and Guiding Healthy 
Development of Private Investment (this policy also contained 36 clauses and 
focused on the private economy development. It was called the non-government-
owned economy policy, new 36 clauses) 
First central government policy allowing the entry of the private sector 
into the fields of social housing, education, health and defence industries, 
especially for Chinese domestic investors, Almost all of infrastructure 
industries and welfare services markets will be opened to them.   
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2.2.5 The official rationales for the BOT programme  
By reviewing the official strategies and policies related to China’s BOTs, some keywords 
often appeared in these official documents, such as ‘Marketisation’, ‘Private Economy’, 
‘Created Competition’ and ‘Improving Efficiency’. Although the government has not 
clearly recognised the objectives for the Chinese BOT programme, based on the 
interpretations and claims of the official policies, the main aims of these schemes can be 
summarized as follows: 
Firstly, The Chinese government hoped to introduce private investments into public 
infrastructure and utilities to accelerate the development of public infrastructure and 
services that currently had under-investment (NDRC and State Planning Commission, 1995, 
1996, 2004, MOC, 2004, State Council, 2005, 2010).  Secondly, by mobilizing private 
investment capital, the government in China expected to diversify the source of, and 
options for,  public investment areas that were solely dominated by the state in the past 
( NDRC and the State Council, 2004, 2005). Thirdly, through the private financed 
infrastructure and utilities projects, the government claimed that private investments could 
break the monopoly of the state in the infrastructure and utilities’ sectors, thereby 
increasing efficiency and improving performance in the public service. Fourthly, private 
financed projects introduced competition in these markets and ultimately promoted the 
constructional operational performance of public projects (NDRC and the State Council, 
2004, MOC, 2002, 2004). Fifthly, by using BOT schemes such financing methods based on 
the market mechanism improved resource allocation and  investment decision-making in 
public infrastructure and services investments (NDRC and the State Council, 2004, MOC, 
2002, 2004).  Finally, the uses of BOT can directly improve the living conditions of local 
people and indirectly create new commercial opportunities for local markets (MOC, 2004, 
The State Council, 2005, 2010).  
By reviewing the government’s claims for Chinese BOT initiatives, it can be seen that 
earlier BOT documents and policies put more emphasis on introducing private finance into 
public infrastructure and services projects before 2004 (i.e. the first of the  rationales 
mentioned above). However, the focus of the government has gradually changed to the 
efficiency of the BOT projects from 2004. There are still some questions that have not been 
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discussed in previous BOT studies in China and need to be clarified by the government as 
important condition for using BOTs: 
 Are the marketisation strategies suitable for the public infrastructure projects, 
given  their natural monopoly status?  
 Did it  improve the efficiency and responsiveness of delivering public facilities 
and services as the government anticipated?  
 How could competition be introduced into the public infrastructure industries 
by the BOT programme?  
 Given that the current regulation and supervision system for BOT projects has 
not been fully established by central and local authorities in China, how could 
the government assure that public interests will not be damaged by the 
implementation of BOT projects? This may be more important, as a major 
rationale for state provision of services is that private markets allocate resources 
inequitably in a market economy, BOT in China adopted an idea of ‘you get 
what you pay for’. This matter may be more vital in health, education and 
housing services, which may be still deemed as the ‘responsibility’ of the state 
in China.  
In addition, the government in China needs to consider or identify if there are favourable or 
unfavourable circumstances to  success of BOTS in China: 
 Are there sufficient qualified investors, constructors, banks and consulting firms in 
China able to finance, operate and maintain the public infrastructure and services 
projects?  
 Do the local authorities in China and their staffs have enough capability, 
experiences and skills to carry out BOT projects?  
The next two sections will review the rationales, context and histories of implementing 
Chinese BOTs in the period 1986 to 2008. It will discuss the performance of the BOT 




2.3 Application of BOTs in China: Contexts and histories in the period of 1986-2008 
2.3.1 An introduction: the political, economic and social contexts of China’s BOT 
programme 
Before reviewing the history of the implementation of Chinese BOT, it is better to look at 
the changes in China’s political, economic and social spheres in the three last decades, to 
understand the contexts and circumstances of how BOTs operated. Broadly speaking, the 
inception and development of the BOT programme in China has been inevitably affected by 
Chinese economic and public sector reforms, and social changes since 1979. Notable 
examples are the Chinese ‘open door policy’ (from 1979),  ‘Chinese Socialist Market 
Economic Strategy’ (from 1992), and a series of Chinese public sector reforms in the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s (e.g. China’s fiscal and taxation reform in 1994, China’s public SOE 
reform since 1997, China’s investment reform in 2004, Chinese public utilities 
marketisation since 2004). Meanwhile, the great changes in Chinese society were also main 
drivers of applying BOT, such as the extremely fast urbanisation, increasing demands on 
basic public facilities (e.g. electricity, water, gas and road), and worsening Chinese 
environment. However, successfully utilising BOT in China is a difficult task for the 
government and private contractors, since BOT itself is a complex method of financing 
infrastructure. A number of contextual variables may be the obstacles of utilising BOT 
programmes, for instance, the under-developed Chinese legal system and poor BOT policy 
and regulatory frameworks. Finally, it has to be noted that although the policies and 
regulations of BOT have changed several times due to Chinese contextual factors since 
1986, the strategies of governments on encouraging private investment in China’s 
infrastructure and social services have never changed. The main reforms, events and facts 









Diagram 2.6: BOT Policy development in China’s context: 1979-2010 
 
Sources: adapted from Zhang, 2007, Qin and Yu, 2005, Wang and Ke, 2008, Adams, et. al.,2006, and Fu, 
Chang and Zhong, 2006 
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As many previous studies on Chinese BOTs stated (Zhang, 2007, Qin and Yu, 2005, Wang 
and Ke, 2008, Adams, et. al., 2006, and Fu, Chang and Zhong, 2006), the programmes of 
private participation in Chinese infrastructure had not developed as well as the government 
expected. The programmes were also largely affected by the international political and 
economic events, such as the economic crises in 1997 and 2008. Similarly China has 
experienced boom and recessive trends in BOTs since 1986. Considering together all of the 
domestic factors, contexts and policies, BOT development in China can be categorized into 
three stages (Wang and Ke, 2008): the first stage covers the period from 1986 to 1994, 
when BOT applications increased rapidly from 1986 at local level, especially in 
Guangdong province and the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The second stage covered 
from 1994 to 2001, and, during this period, only a limited number of infrastructure fields 
were open to foreign investors. All the BOT projects were strictly managed and supervised 
by the central government, especially by the State Planning Commission of the State 
Council in China. However, due to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and 1998, 
international investors stopped applying for new BOT contracts in China and largely 
withdrew their existing investment. Instead public funds were injected into the 
infrastructure area under the Economic Stimulation Package of China in 1999. Furthermore, 
the central government also started to cancel local ‘illegal’ BOT projects.  Illegal BOT 
projects referred to projects applied for in the form of a BOT model by provincial, city or 
countries’ governments, but had not been approved or reviewed by the State Planning 
Commission of the Central Government at the time. Negative factors on China’s 
developing BOT markets led to both the capital values and the number of the BOT projects 
declining sharply in the period of 1998-2001. Due to the contextual changes and the start of 
reforms on China’s public-owned utilities industries, BOT schemes were re-launched by 
the government in 2001. The government widened the scope and scale of using BOTs. 




2.3.2  The Application of BOTs in China (1986-1994): Open-door policy and 
decentralisation in the Chinese public sector 
 
The process of economic reform in China started in the late 1970s. By reviewing the 
development of other East Asian countries and regions (e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore), China contingently drew lessons and revised its reforming strategy in the 1980s 
(World Bank, 1993). China’s reforming strategies priorities export and foreign capital 
inflow as other East Asian countries had done (Naughton, 2007). To attract  foreign 
investment and to allocate capital in 1980s, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were built 
for using radical policies to develop the Chinese private and foreign economy. The 
emphasis of these reforms was to develop an export-oriented economy in China’s coastal 
area. From 1980, China attracted a large amount of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), 
including investments from the EU, Japan, Singapore and Korea, but Hong Kong was  main 
source of ‘foreign’ direct investments in China at this time (Hong Kong was a colony of the 
UK) (Naughton, 2007). The FDIs in China mainly focused on export-oriented 
manufacturing industries for using available Chinese cheap labour, materials and resources 
(Long, 2003). While as Handley (1997) showed, foreign capital also actively participated in 
developing Chinese infrastructure projects. A number of infrastructure projects were 
designed, financed, built and operated by FDIs. Most of these projects were located in 
SEZs and the Coast Open Cities by Hong Kong investors.   
The rationale of the use of BOT was that the SEZ governments expected to build a 
complete infrastructure system in locally to attract more and  more foreign investments. 
However, such investments were expensive and exceeded the financing capabilities of the 
government . Handley’s study (1997) of the 1980s and 1990s, showed that several Hong 
Kong infrastructure developers had actively participated in a number of BOT projects in 
China and other East Asian countries, Hong Kong’s private infrastructure developers had 
lots of  experiences financing and managing public infrastructure projects, including China 
Light and Power which has been providing electricity in Hong Kong since the early 20
th
 
Century, and more successful projects including the cross-harbour tunnels in the 1960s and 
1970s (Handley, 1997). Finally, the infrastructure developers from Hong Kong had good 
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personal relationships with a number of leaders of the governments in East Asian Countries 
at this time. Therefore, the political risks of BOTs in these countries were reduced, but 
possibilities of corruption could rise at same time (Handley, 1997). In the period 1986-2001, 
FDIs in China played an important role in Chinese BOTs and infrastructure development, 
especially the investments from Hong Kong. Therefore, China’s earlier BOT scheme 
(1986-1994 and 1994-2001) was only open to foreign investors and BOT was seem as a 
sub-sector of the ‘Open Door Policy’ rather than as an independent public financial policy 
or strategy.  
This thesis argues that the inception and development of earlier BOTs was part of Chinese 
decentralisation reform from 1980. Between 1978 and 1992, China decentralised gradually 
its reforms in rural areas. Later, this reform extended to the public sector, e.g. state-owned 
enterprises and the local governments, as Naughton (1995, 2007) commented. The reforms 
in the Chinese economy introduced some new ‘concepts’, such as ‘contracts’, 
‘responsibility’, ‘profits’ and ‘markets’. Naughton (2007) analysed that the various of 
contracts clearly identified not only farmers, managers and local authorities’ 
responsibilities’, that also defined their benefits. When farmers, managers and local 
authorities enforced the state’s ‘contracts’, they were able to retain more production, profit 
and or revenues for themselves. Prior to 1992 there was significant  the decentralisation in 
the Chinese fiscal system and public administration in SEZs and coastal open cities. The 
local governments in SEZs and open cities had more ‘freedoms’ to do what they wanted to 
do. In this way, BOT was also a result of the Chinese central government’s decentralisation 
programme. Prior to 1994, all BOTs in China were essentially developed and managed by 
provincial and local governments in SEZs and coastal cities on their own initiatives. The 
fast-growing local economy, trades and migrants forced the local governments in 
Guangdong Province to improve the basic infrastructure and facilities. Guangdong 
provincial government and Shenzhen City Council initially realised they urgently needed 
better power generation capacity. The governments primarily considered and accepted a 
proposal from a Hong Kong construction and power facility developer (Hopewell Holdings 
Ltd.) to develop a plant on a BOT basis in 1984 (Handley, 1997). Located in the Hong 
Kong border area of China's Guangdong province, the US$550 million, 700 megawatt 
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Sha’jiao B project was Asia’s first large independent power generation programme 
(Handley, 1997, Wang and Ke, 2008).  A ten-year BOT contract was awarded to the 
Hopewell Holding company in 1985 and the power plant finished construction and put into 
operation in 1986. This first BOT scheme encouraged the government in China to study the 
feasibility of using foreign investment to develop local infrastructure projects, especially 
for projects which that would directly improve the local economy and investment 
environments (economic infrastructure). Although the attitude of the Chinese central 
government on BOT was not explicit at the time, China’s BOT models had been utilized on 
56 projects by local authorities up to 1994(PPI Group, 2010). 40 of these projects were 
located in the Special Economic Zones of the Guangdong Province, concentrating on 
transport and power industries, including: highways, seaports and power stations. The 
exceptions were one water BOT and two gas pipeline PPPs (with Enron, U.S.A. and BP, the 
UK (PPI Group, 2010). Moreover, the majority of these BOT projects were sponsored by 
Hong Kong companies which had good relationships with the officials in the government 
of Beijing and Guangdong Province (Handley, 1997).  
In the period 1986-1994, BOT schemes were implemented as local financing policies in a 
few coastal provinces. However the programme was controversial, since the Chinese 
central government was dissatisfied with the fundamentals of the BOT process that totally 
excluded the central government’s administration. Handley (1997) and Wang and Tiong 
(2000) explained, the central government’s ideological objections reflected in part by 
disagreements over whether the state or private sector should control local infrastructures.  
Also, the ministries at centre of decision making, e.g. the State Planning Commission (the 
SPC, later NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation (The MFTC, later Ministry 
of Commerce), Ministry of Electricity and Ministry of Transport believed that they should 
step into governing the BOT schemes. These ministries believed that through uses of BOT 
schemes, China’s local authorities tended to evade the approval, regulation and supervision 
of the central government. Furthermore, the central government was not happy that the 
private contractors gained high profits from the earlier local BOT projects, although it was 
not clear what the average profit level of these 54 BOT projects was in this period. In the 
case of the Sha’jiao B BOT project, Hopewell Ltd. had at least a 30% return on their 
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investments (US$ 165m in 1990s) (Handley, 1997: 228). Wang and Ke (2008), Blackman 
and Wu (1998) argued that it was common for  provincial governments to accept very high 
fixed rate on returns for the projects and a very early payback timescale from the sponsors, 
in return for the latter’s commitment to provide  rapid development of the new power 
capacity. The risks associated with the BOT projects were, however, largely retained by the 
local governments, as previous research has shown (Wang and Ke, 2009). In the Sha’jiao B 
BOT, a government-owned investment unit became a significant equity partner (a finance 
guarantor), and another state-owned entity guaranteed power purchase payments and 
foreign exchange risks. Wang and Ke (2008) and Handley (1997) argued that all major risks 
of the BOT were retained by the Guangdong provincial government, while offering 
disproportionate rewards to Hopewell Ltd. The criticism of using BOT also focused on the 
government’s investment decision-making process, as the major pre-1994 BOT projects in 
China were developed on the basis of Hong Kong’s private investors’ and their good 
relationship with government officials and state enterprises in central and Guangdong 
province. This was instead of many transparent, competitive and standard public biddings 
(Handley, 1997). Finally, Handley (1997) suggested the primary interest of private investors 
appeared to be recovery of capital costs as the construction contractor rather than as a 
public service operator was taking a long-term risk on the income from the projects’ 
operations and maintenance. Indeed, in 1995-1996, Hopewell was reported to be willing to 
consider the sale of the Sha’jiao B project along with its other power projects in China, 
suggesting it never intended to be a long-term participant in the Chinese power generation 
industry (Blackman and Wu, 1998). The earlier lessons from the Chinese local government-
dominated BOT projects showed that without clear objectives and regulations, BOT might 




2.3.3 The booms and busts of Chinese BOTs: 1994-2001—centralised BOT 
management, the Fiscal and Taxation Reforms and the Asian Economic Crisis 
There is little evidence of the earlier local BOT projects in China (1986-1994) having been 
examined and regulated by central government. The absence of supervision and regulation 
by Chinese central government, had raised some major concerns from the centre. The 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation (Now, Ministry of Commerce), the State 
Planning Commission, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Electricity (Now, the 
National Electricity Grid Company) had to publish two official Circulars in 1995  urging  
local authorities to carefully consider the use of BOTs in local infrastructure projects. The 
major issues of the central government and the ministries concerned were  the approval of 
BOT applications, and the guaranteed high rate of return of BOT projects (at the time, 
many power generation BOT projects were paid for by the local governmental budgets). 
The Circular from the State Planning Commissions, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of 
Electricity (SPC, 1995) suggested that ‘the local authorities should be very careful when 
using BOT schemes and foreign investments in local infrastructure projects, due to the lack 
of experience  and knowledge available in China at the present. The central government  
was carrying out some pilot studies  on a small number of BOT projects in power station, 
motorway and water supply industries. The local authorities were advised to consider and 
study the results and procedures of the pilot BOT projects, and then make their 
decisions’.Based upon these two Circulars issued in 1995, the State Planning Commission 
formulized The BOT Circular 1996: Temporary measures of foreign investment in 
concession (BOT) project (PSC, 1996).  
For solve the issue of higher profits levels of local BOT projects, the Chinese central 
government and its ministries required local authorities to review and re-negotiate the rate 
of returns in dozens of BOT projects between 1994 and 1995. For new BOT applications, 
the rates of return on investment were limited to 12% by the State Planning Commission. 
Blackman and Wu (1998) and Handley (1997) showed that the government tried to cap the 
higher rate of return of foreign investor sponsored BOT projects, and so stopped approving 
projects with rates of return in excess of 12%. Handley (1997) commented that the 12% 
figure is the estimated costs for the state to invest and build its own plants. This looks like a 
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quasi-Public Sector Comparator evaluation which has been applied in British PFIs. 
However, a 12% rate of return on BOT made many foreign investors lose interest 
completely, due to the disproportionate relationship between lower returns and higher risks 
in the Chinese BOT markets. The restrictions on the BOTs’ rate of return were gradually 
abolished by the governments after 1996 (Handley, 1997). In the period 1994-1996, the 
central government rapidly centralised the management and approvals of Chinese BOT 
projects. As a result, a BOT approval system was established at the national level by 1995 
and was in consistent use until 2005.  
Meanwhile, the central government in China started to implement some pilot BOT projects 
in power stations, motorway and the water supply industry, trying to offer some standard 
models or best practices for applying BOTs. The pilot projects were conducted by the 
central government from 1996. Wang and Ke (2008) reviewed four projects that were 
selected by the State Planning Committee as BOT pilot projects: Laibin Power Station B 
BOT, Chengdu No.6 Water Supply Factory BOT, Changsha Power Station BOT (disrupted 
in 1997), and the Shanghai Dachang Thames Water-Bovis BOT project (the project was 
purchased-back by the government-owned Shanghai Water Company in 2004). However, 
Da Yue Consulting Firm (2008) identified two other BOT projects that were also directed 
by the State Planning Commission in 1990s, the Guangdong Dian-bai motorway BOT and 
the Wuhan Junshan Bridge BOT projects (disrupted in 1996). All these pilot projects had a 
series of problems when they were made operational after 2000. The major problems 
included  
 over-estimated market demands and unexpected market changes (Chengdu Water 
BOT, Shanghai Water BOT, Lai’bin power generation BOT, Changsha power 
generation BOT),  
 the affordability of local governments due to ‘expensive’ contract (Chengdu Water 
BOT, Shanghai Water BOT),  
 And the political opposition and national security concerns on privately controlled 
public bridges (Jun’shan Yangtze River Bridge BOT, Wuhan City). 4 out of 6 central 
government directed BOT pilot projects were finally interrupted or purchased back 
by the governments. Only the Chengdu water BOT and Dian’bai motorway BOT 
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projects are still in operation at present.  
The central government strongly recommended that local authorities should carefully and 
prudently use BOT in practices in 1995 and 1996. However, the local governments paid no 
heed to the central government’s suggestions and warnings. On the contrary, they had been 
more than eager to attract private finance in local infrastructure areas since 1995. The 
underlying reason for this was the institutional change in the central-local government 
fiscal relationship after the 1994 tax sharing reform (Naughton, 2007). World Bank (2003), 
Cheng and Wang (2009), and Wang and Ke (2008) believed that the major reason for the 
application of BOTs was the change in the central-local government financial relationship 
since 1994.  
Prior to 1994, China adopted a ‘revenue contracting system’, in order to encourage local 
authorities to develop a regional economy and collect revenues (Naughton, 2007). The 
basis spirit of the Chinese ‘revenue contracting system’ was that provincial governments 
remitted a fixed amount of local public revenue to the central government (according to the 
‘revenue contract’), whilst the rest of the revenue could be retained by the provinces. Under 
this system, China had no standard for allocating tax income between central and provincial 
governments, which resulted in the central government negotiating separately with each 
province (Kuhn, 2010: 90). An example is, Guangdong Province had a ‘fiscal revenue 
contract’ was made with the central government in 1980 whereby Guangdong promised to 
remit RMB 2.274 billion of its tax revenue to central government every year. The rest of 
Guangdong’s fiscal revenues could be managed itself, no matter how much they collected 
locally (Wang, B, 2008). Beijing, Shanghai and another 28 provinces signed similar 
contracts with the central government at this time (Su and Zhao, 2010). Under the Chinese 
Revenue Contracting System, relationships between central and local governments were 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, with each provincial government given a revenue target 
and long-term sharing contracts tailored to that province’s economic conditions(Naughton 
2007).  
During the period 1980-1993, the contracting fiscal system gave provincial governments a 
certain freedom to decide their own affairs (a kind of fiscal deregulation and 
decentralisation), encouraging them to develop a regional economy and collect tax 
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revenue(Su and Zhao, 2004). However, the disadvantage of the Revenue Contracting 
system was also clear: Central government revenue had been consistently reducing since 
1980, due to China’s rich provincial governments trying their best to hide their real 
financial revenues and remit less fiscal revenue to the central government, i.e. keeping 
more funds at the local level. As a consequence, in the 14 years between 1980 and 1994, 
total government revenue increased slowly, and central government revenue barely held 
constant at 1978 levels(Wang, S., 1997:1), see Table 2.7 Chinese government’s budgetary 
Share of GDP (1979-2005) on next page. Finally, central government was in the midst of a 
great financial crisis! It had almost no money and had no capacity to exercise 
macroeconomic( Kuhn, 2010). The Ministry of Finance estimated in 1993 that the central 
government would be bankrupt in 1999 or 2000, if the fiscal revenue and expenditure 
policies were not changed (Wang, B, 2008). Furthermore, the Revenue Contracting system 
also widened the fiscal gap between different regions of China (Su and Zhao, 2004). This 
also led to other political problems for central government with the 17 rich provincial 
governments and their strong fiscal capabilities (especially, Guangdong) often challenging 
the authority and decisions of central government (Wang, B., 2008). If the central 
government had lost control on ‘taxation’, it would have lost power.  
To solve this financial crisis and to improve relationships between central and local 
governments, the fiscal and taxation reforms were conducted in 1994 under vice-premier 
Zhu Rongji’s leadership (1991-1997, later, the Premier of China, 1998-2003). The new 
system assigned different categories of taxes to central and local governments, similar to 
the federalist system used in many Western countries. It included three crucial elements 
(Cheng & Wang, 2009, Kuhn, 2010, Naughton, 2007, Su & Zhao, 2004):  Firstly it 
introduced takes to increase central government’s revenue (e.g. Value-Added-Tax, VAT, and 
Corporate Tax). Secondly, it adopted a new tax income assignment and sharing system to 
clarify the fiscal relationships between central and local governments (the share rate 
between the centre and local is nearly 50:50). Finally, it established a new central 
government taxation agency to secure central governments’ fiscal revenue without erosion 
by local governments, see Appendix 1.  
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Table 2.7 Chinese government’s budgetary Share of GDP (1979-2005) 
 




The structure of taxation income between the central and local governments was largely 
changed after 1994. Central government kept over 50% of total tax revenues and allocated 
less than 50% to local governments. These were then divided up amongst provincial, city, 
county and township bodies. Moreover, the central government retained the power to set 
rates and define bases for all taxes, giving the central government pervasive control over all 
budgetary processes in the country. From 1994, because of the newly introduced tax 
assignment system, the ratio of provincial provinces’ governmental revenue to total fiscal 
revenue gradually declined from 77.98% in 1993 to 45% in 2002 and to 44.6% in 2010 (Su 
and Zhao, 2004, China Tax News, 2010).  
Although the central government took over control of the country’s fiscal revenues, the 
1994 fiscal and tax reform in China did not address fiscal expenditure allocation matters 
between the central and the other four levels of local governments. The allocations of fiscal 
expenditure remained the same as in the system in place before 1994. China’s local 
governments (at provincial, city, county and township levels) took in less than 50% of all 
tax revenue, but spent directly about 70% of all expenditures (Naughton, 2007). Finally, the 
central government also ignored the re-distribution matters between the central, provincial 
and lower level governments in 1994. Although a tax income re-distribution system was 
built in 2001, the research of the Ministry of Finance (2004) indicated that the ‘inter-
government transfer payments system’ in China was more beneficial for the rich provinces 
and the poorest minority ethnic regions (provinces) in order to support the minority area’s 
economic development (like Tibet). In practice, except for the six rich coastal provinces, 
the rest of the provinces’ transfer payments were steadily declining since 1994. In addition, 
the second level of provincial government in China was claiming as much of the ‘inter-
government transfer payments’ from the centre, as it could, resulting  in China’s city, 
county and township governments sharing only a very small portion of inter-government 
transfer payments (Tong, 2008). The steadily decline of local governments’ revenue, 
resulted into a new financial crisis for local governments, especially at city and county level. 
The Ministry of Finance investigated that the expenditure of local governments (provincial, 
city, county and townships) had been steadily increasing to 80% of total national 
expenditure in 2009 (Ministry of Finance, 2010). Inevitably, the expenditure 
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responsibilities of local governments have become excessive and unsustainable since the 
1994 fiscal and tax reforms. Since 1994 there has also been a steady decline in the 
proportion of urban infrastructure investment financed from direct budget spending or 
operating surplus (Ministry of Finance, 2004). The Ministry of Finance (2004) showed that 
the proportion of total urban infrastructure construction financed by budgetary funds 
decreased from 50 per cent in 1991 to 29 percent in 2001. Meanwhile BOTs, other 
marketisation finances, and government’s extra-budget finances’ (e.g. the charges and tolls 
on uses of public services and facilities, penalties on road parking, the sale of local publicly 
owned properties and lands) share in total public infrastructure investments rose from 
nothing in 1986 to around 30% in 2002. 
With weakening fiscal capabilities and increasing demands on local infrastructure projects 
since 1994, China’s local authorities actively introduced foreign investments into local 
infrastructure projects ignoring central government warnings and suggestions. With 
shortages of public financing resources, mobilising private investment became popular in 
many provinces of China, as it was deemed as the ‘cheapest’ and ‘easiest’ way to attract 
capital investment. The local government itself did  not need to do anything more than 
provide some policy guarantees (Cheng & Wang, 2009).  This led to the number of BOT 
projects sharply increasing in 1996 and 1997, 121 BOT projects had reached financial 
closure and construction had started in these two years (PPI, 2010) During the period 1995-
2000, BOT and other forms of PPP projects had been applied in around 225 projects, most 
of them large-scale power stations, motorways, bridges and airport projects at local levels, 
undertaken by investors from Hong Kong, Europe and America. Only seven projects were 
water and sewage treatment BOTs according to the PPI Group’s statistics (PPI, 2010). Two 
of them were pilot projects organised and directed by the State Planning Commission.  
However, the development of China’s BOT had seriously slowed down by 1998-2000, due 
to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 1998. A number of scholars revealed (Fernald & 
Babson, 1999, Naughton, 2007, Duan, 2009) that China’s economy did not suffer from the 
crisis as much as other Asian countries and regions. However, as the main financial sources 
of China’s BOTs, Hong Kong was largely affected. The willingness to investment in BOTs 
was damaged during this period, due to the ‘chaotic capital and currency’ markets in Hong 
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Kong and other Asian countries (Fenald and Babson, 1999). At the same time the central 
government of China adopted a ‘pro-active’ fiscal policy (a Keynesian style policy) to 
stimulate Chinese economic development during this period 1998-2004( Duan, 2009). 
About a RMB 900 billion ‘Construction Treasury’ had been borrowed by the Ministry of 
Finance during this time. In 2001, over 6000 infrastructure projects had been developed by 
the government with a total capital value of RMB 1.51 trillion between 1998 and 
2001(Xiang, 2001). The direct effect of China’s economic stimulation package in 1998 was 
that a large number of potential BOT applications were finally funded by government’s 
budgetary and debt finances. This led to private finances being ‘crowded out’ of China’s 
power generation, motorway, seaports, airports and urban water supply industries (Duan, 
2009). Therefore, the numbers of signed BOT contracts in 1998, 1999 and 2000 was around 
26 projects a year without any significant increase. Many BOT proposals had been 
withdrawn by central and local authorities. The Changsha City Power Station BOT project 
which was conducted by the State Planning Commission in 1997 was an example of this. 
Meanwhile, the central government restricted BOT applications in China between 1998 and 
2000, resulting in a large number of local BOT projects that had no the approval from 
central government being cancelled (Cheng and Wang, 2009).  
The second stage of implementation of China’s BOTs ended in 2000. The overall effects of 
the utilisation of BOTs in local places in the period of 1986-2000 were not clear since so 
few studies have been conducted. Most of the studies focused on China’s first BOT project 
in Shenzhen City and the other four pilot BOT projects organised by the State Planning 
Commission: e.g. 
 Shajiao B plant BOT project (Blackman and Wu, 1998 , Handley, 1997),  
 Chengdu city No.6 Water Factory BOT (Qin and Yu, 2004), 
 Shanghai Thames-Bovis Water BOT (Fu, et. al. , 2006),  
 Lai’bin City power station BOT (Wang & Ke, 2008).   
However, compared with the total number of BOT projects (282 projects) in this period, 
only four BOT pilot cases were comprehensively and properly examined by either the 
government or scholars, leading to few lessons and experiences learnt.   
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2.3.4 The Application of BOT in China (2001-2008): Deregulations and marketisation 
reforms in public infrastructure, and the Financial Crisis since 2008 
In the period between 2001 and 2008, Chinese BOTs entered their golden age (on a par 
with PFI in the UK). 628 BOT contracts worth $ US 59.31 billion capital value were signed 
by the local authorities and approved by the central government’s departments, table 2.8 
(PPI, 2010).  
Table 2.8 Chinese BOT and PPP’s development in the period between 2001 and 2009, by capital values 




2000 847 5,653 1,559 72 8,131 
2001 997 325 538 242 2,103 
2002 1,351 1,430 1,787 918 5,486 
2003 4,679 0 4,055 662 9,396 
2004 1,390 1,140 783 603 3,916 
2005 1,706 0 6,629 1,007 9,342 
2006 1,198 0 8,351 604 10,153 
2007 2,199 0 4,494 1,902 8,595 
2008 679 0 437 974 2,089 
2009 3,095 0 2,513 512 6,120 
Source: PPI Group, the World Bank 2010 
As presented in Table 2.09, BOT and PPP models involve the major Chinese public 
infrastructures areas, including: energy, transportation, telecom, water and waste 
management, according to the PPI’s statistics in 2010. As a result, private investment 
accounted for almost 20% of the infrastructure funds in China, as the PPI Group of the 
World Bank estimated in 2009 (PPI, 2010).The Chinese transport industry, which includes 
BOT projects for roads, bridges, ports, undergrounds and tunnels, has absorbed nearly half 
of all total private investments in the last two decades, in terms of capital value. However, 
the water and sewage treatment sectors have the largest number of BOTs to date. However, 
as this study reveals the data of the PPI group of the World Bank is contradictory to the data 
collected in later primary research. According to an internal review report by China’s 
Ministry of Construction in 2009, China has built and operated over 1792 sewage treatment 
plants so far, and other 1977 sewage treatment facilities are under construction. At least half 
the number of these projects were built by the private sectors in forms of BOT, TOT, BT 
(Build-Transfer) and Joint-venture models. That means at least 1875 sewage treatment 
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projects have adopted PPPs by mid 2009 in China. 
Table 2.9 PPPs in China: Industries and Numbers 
Financial 
Closure Year 
Energy Telecom Transport Water and 
Sewage 
Total 
1990 0 0 1 0 1 
1991 0 0 2 0 2 
1992 2 0 4 0 6 
1993 10 0 7 0 17 
1994 11 0 18 2 31 
1995 8 0 6 1 15 
1996 18 0 29 4 51 
1997 30 1 33 6 70 
1998 8 0 19 10 37 
1999 12 0 11 3 26 
2000 11 1 8 6 26 
2001 30 1 4 10 45 
2002 49 1 9 18 77 
2003 47 0 9 25 81 
2004 26 0 10 28 64 
2005 31 0 16 42 89 
2006 22 0 18 43 83 
2007 31 0 12 60 103 
2008 10 0 5 46 61 
2009 12 0 3 31 46 
Total 368 4 224 335 931 




In the transport BOT and PPP markets, Hong Kong investors accounted for over 90% of the 
share in terms of capital value and number of projects (the PPI, 2010). Four investors 
dominated the markets of motorways, tunnels, bridges, underground and seaports, they 
were: New World Development Co. Ltd., Hopewell Holdings, Hong Kong MTR 
(underground), and Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. (and its subsidiary company, Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure Holdings Ltd ). In the Chinese water and sewage BOT markets, there is no 
such concentration and monopolization as there is in the transport market. A number of 
private players from Europe, mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore and the United Sates 
were involved in different projects.  However French Companies have a larger share of the 
market than others; they include SUEZ, Veolia Environment (PPI, 2010).  In the Gas and 
Electricity PPP and BOT market, the Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd (Hong 
Kong), contractors from Europe and the United States,  Xin’ao Gas (China), China Gas Ltd. 
(a Chinese government-controlled Hong Kong Plc), and Wah Sang Gas Holdings Limited 
(Hong Kong) have the majority shares of the market.  
Assuming the PPI Group’s data is correct, it showed that international and Hong Kong 
investors have the largest share of the Chinese BOT and PPP market at present.  The data 
(PPI, 2010) also shows that Chinese domestic investors have been playing a more 
important role since 2001, owing to their growing share and increasing number of projects 
in the sewage treatment and gas supply BOT markets. However, one study conducted by 
Braadbaart, Zhang and Wang (2009) found that many of the sewage treatment BOT 
contracts (in 37 projects) they examined qualify as public-public-partnerships rather than 
‘public-private-partnerships’, due to the fact that the BOT contractors are actually 
commercialized SOEs (public-owned public listed companies). 
The increase in BOTs from 2001 is due to  the central government, especially the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) re-launching the programmes, in order to 
encourage Chinese domestic investors into public infrastructure fields. The key industries 
of BOT were still power generation and transportation. However, from 2002 onwards the 
attentions of the government has gradually been transferred to the publicly owned utility 
industries, especially the water supply, sewage treatment, gas supply, heating supply and 
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solid waste treatment sectors (MOC, 2002). Under the central government and its ministries, 
local authorities in China actively and continually expanded the scope and scale of the uses 
of BOTs and other private financing infrastructure programmes locally (Ho, 2006). The 
main objectives of the use of BOT has changed since 2001. BOTs and PPPs were used not 
only to ‘introduce private investments’ for developing China’s underinvested infrastructures, 
but also aimed at ‘reforming the public investment system and improving the efficiency of 
public infrastructure construction and operation’ (NDRC, 2004).     
The changes in China’s opinions on using the domestic private economy indicated that the 
government had started to deregulate private investments in public-owned infrastructure 
and service’ industries. As the State Planning Commission (2001, para 1) stated that  
 ‘due to a number of restrictions, Chinese domestic private economy has developed slowly 
over the last decade… to promote the development of the private economy in China, the 
central government decided to offer some suggestions: that the public authorities and 
agencies should fully understand the individual, private and other non-public economies 
are an important part of the Chinese socialist market economy. The governments should 
assist private and non-government investments and create a fair and good environment for 
the private economy’s development… the Chinese domestic private sector should be 
permitted and encouraged to invest in sectors where foreign investors had rights to invest 
in, especially for the urban public infrastructure industries, such as, water supply, sewage 
treatment, road, bridge etc.’  
Meanwhile, in 2002, the government officially kicked off the marketisation reform of 
public utilities by promulgating the Opinions on Accelerating the Marketisation of Public 
Utilities (MOC, 2002). This circular emphasized the importance of the market and was 
expected to bring in vital investment and increased efficiency through the involvement of 
the private sector. Furthermore, the State Council and the National Development and 
Reform Commission (2004, 2006) decided to reform the existing approval system on public 
investments. The central government declared that the non-government investments (e.g. 
BOT and PPP funded by Chinese domestic investors) did not need approval from the 
National Development and Reform Commission, except where projects involved national 
security and where current legislation had clearly prevented private participation. As a 
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consequence of this, the approval and management of BOTs were essentially decentralised 
to the provincial governments.   
By reviewing the key policies that had been issued by the central government of China in 
2001, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2010, one can see that the strategies of the Chinese reforms on 
public infrastructures were ‘pro-market’, ‘pro-competition’ and ‘efficiency-emphasised’, 
which underpinned the ideas of the New Institutional Economics and the practice of NPM 
reforms in western countries. Firstly, the central government was trying to create 
competition in the provision of public infrastructure and social services by introducing 
‘new private entrants’ into the markets and at the same time diversifying the investment 
sources with different ownership’ investors. ‘This (marketisation of Chinese public services) 
usually involves encouraging multiple suppliers to establish themselves alongside state 
agencies as an alternative source...’ (Wong and Flynn, 2001:9). Moreover, the government 
claimed that the state monopoly on these industries should be broken, as the State Council 
and the NRDC stated in a series of official documents in 2004, 2005 and 2010. The State 
Council (2004) declared that the public investment system should be reformed. Public 
resources and investments should be allocated more efficiently according to ‘market’ 
mechanisms rather than administrative orders. Through embracing ‘marketisation’ 
approaches and creating more competition between the state-owned and the private 
providers of public infrastructure and services, the government anticipated that ‘efficiency’ 
improvements could finally be achieved in these fields.  
The rise of BOTs in China was also driven by the abnormal urbanisation and the worsening 
environment from 2001. China is the largest countries in the world measured by 
populations, and third largest by the national land area. The total Chinese population is 
about 1,300 million. The total number of Chinese cities is was 333 in 2009. Major cities in 
China include Shanghai (10 million inhabitants), Beijing (7.9 million), Tianjin (5.1 million), 
Guangzhou (4.7 million), Wuhan (4.6 million) and Chongqing (4.2 million). There are at 
least 49 cities’ with a population over 1 million. Following the economic development and 
urbanization in recent decades, the total urban population of China reached to 683 million 
in 2009 (46% of the total population) from 170 million in 1978 (17%). Also, tens of 
millions people who lived in the countryside moved to the cities every year (the basic data 
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and profile of China presented in Appendix 2). The massive urbanization of China put 
serious demands on public infrastructures and affected social issues in, for example, 
employment, education, health and social security. However, the current standard of public 
facilities and services is relatively low, compared with OECD countries, as shown in table 
2-10. Thus, substantial improvement is required to meet practical needs.  
Table 2-10 Comparative Infrastructure Indicators of China 
Indicators China 






GNI per capita, Atlas method 
(current US$) 
2,010 2,111 2,042 33,470 
Access to electricity (% of 
population) 
99 63 67 .. 
Electric power consumption (kwh 
per capita) 
987 1,230 929 8,769 
Improved water source (% of 
population with access 
77 75 83 99 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of 
population with access) 
44 60 68 .. 
Total telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
57 28 37  
 
Source: PPI, World Bank, (2009) 
At same time, the urbanisations and economic development in China caused serious 
environmental problems (Naughton, 2007). For sewage treatment industries, existing 
facilities for treating urban domestic wastewater were seriously deficient and the 
construction of new ones lagged behind. By the end of 2001, the rate of primary treatment 
of urban domestic wastewater was merely 36.4% of the total amount produced, of which 
only 18% received secondary treatment, as Chang (2008) investigated. China will need 
hundreds of billions of RMB to construct treatment facilities for urban wastewater. Adams, 
et. al, (2006), Fu, et. al, (2006) predicted, under the current investment mechanisms and 
capabilities, it will be very difficult to meet these demands, for some local areas, and the 
problem of insufficient funding for the construction of urban environmental infrastructure 
will be very serious. Studies done by the World Bank (2008) revealed water pollution 
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represents a growing constraint on national development objectives in China. The growing 
awareness on Chinese environments problems has forced both central and local 
governments in China to make larger investments in sewage treatment and solid waste 
treatment industries, as the Ministry of Construction declared in 2002 and 2004. As a 
consequence, Chinese BOTs have rapidly increased since 2003, and reached a peak in 2005, 
2006 and 2007(PPI, 2010).  
Finally, in November 2008, due to the Financial Crisis, the Chinese government declared a 
huge ‘public infrastructure and economic stimulation plan’ worth 4 trillion RMB in 2009 
and 2010 (£400 billion in 2008). This  package has been spent in 10 major areas, such as 
low-income housing, rural infrastructure, water, electricity, transportation (2 trillion RMB 
on the Chinese High-speed Railway Network Infrastructure), the environment, and 
technological innovation and rebuilding from several disasters. The effects of China’s 
stimulation plan in 2008 on the Chinese BOT programme were clear in 2009, Signed 
contract numbers fell to 46 projects and 17 in 2010, having been 106 in 2007. However, the 
strategies of the government on encouraging private participation in infrastructure has  not 
changed.  
Although the BOT and other ‘marketisation’ methods have been widely utilised in China’s 
infrastructure industries, one aspect has not been sufficiently addressed by both central and 
local governments and that is the measurement of the performance of these privately 
financed projects. A performance measurement system of BOTs had still not been 
established by the government by 2010. It is not clear which departments or ministries at 
central and local government levels are responsible for the inspections of the BOT project’s 
performances and little information has been released by central or local governments so far. 
There have only been a few attempts to examine BOT project’ performance, such as, the 
Ministry of Construction (2005) requiring local authorities to evaluate the performances of 
BOT projects and private contractors every two years. These review reports on BOTs and 
their private contractors should be disclosed to the public. However, detailed guidance on 
how to conduct such evaluations had not been issued by the Ministry of Construction. Due 
to inadequate BOT evaluations over the last few decades, some basic data and information 
on BOT implementations is not clear, such as, the numbers of BOT projects that have been 
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adopted, the performance indicators of China’s BOTs, the efficiency and the effectiveness  
of BOT in practice, and lessons from the previous uses of BOTs.   
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2.4 Debates and arguments concerning the implementation of China’s BOT  
Much of the debates of China’s BOTs have been raised in the previous studies. These 
include:  
 The overall effect of the implementation of BOT in different industries (efficiency 
and effectiveness) (Qin and Yu, 2005, Jong, 2008, Li, 2009, Fu et. al. 2006). 
 Competition in BOT procuring, tendering and post-contract stages, the risk transfer 
and allocation (Fu et. al., 2006, Wang, 2000, 2009),  
 the absence of BOT’s legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks (Adam, et. al., 
2005, Jiang, 2009; Ho, 2006). 
 The weakness capabilities and lack of experience of the public sectors(Fu and 
Zhong, 2007, Wang and Ke, 2008, Ho, 2006) 
 Poor contract practice and management (Fu and Zhong, 2007) 
 The low transparency of relevant information about BOTs.  
In this part, by reviewing over fifty studies that have been published in Chinese and English, 
the debates and the arguments about China’s BOT programmes can be summarised here.  
 
2.4.1 The overall effect of the implementation of BOTs in China 
Due to lack of detailed data, only a few of studies have assessed and measured the 
performance of BOT projects at present. The findings of previous studies on the overall 
effects of the implementation of BOTs are mixed. These covered China’s road, 
transportation, water and power generation fields.   
Most of the BOT proponents emphasised the ‘effectiveness’ of BOT policy and its primary 
objective; i.e. the introduction of private investment capital in infrastructure. From this 
view of point, BOT is an effective programme which realised the government’s basic claim 
aimed at injecting private capital into the infrastructure and public services. Jong (2008) 
thought the overall experience of China’s highway BOTs has been positive. This study was 
based on seven motorway case studies and the interviews with the decision-makers in the 
provincial governments. Jong’s (2008) findings indicated that the decision-making 
processes of the BOTs were speeded up and the costs in the application and approval 
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process were reduced. More important, Jong showed that professional and skilled BOT 
contractors were selected and appointed by the public procuring authorities through  
‘competitive bidding’, thereby improving the management and efficiency within public 
transportation. Although some problems have been observed in BOT practice, e.g. the 
absence of BOT legislation, the lack of standard assessments on environmental matters and 
some problems with risk allocation, the overall effectiveness of the transportation 
(motorway) BOT programme is positive (Jong, 2009). Qin and Yu (2005) also examined 
the results of the Chinese utilities BOTs. The findings of Qin and Yu commented that BOT 
is an innovative approach to developing public utilities in China under the present Chinese 
public financing system. Great benefits have been achieved by the implementation of BOTs, 
in terms of the number of projects and the project capital values channelled into the public 
utilities sector. Qin and Yu (2005) believed that the uses of BOT in China’s water, sewage 
treatment, solid waste treatment and heating supply have improved overall efficiency of 
utility services, even though the BOT legislation and regulatory frameworks still need to be 
improved. 
Zhang (2007) also expressed a similar point of view with Qin and Yu (2005). Based upon 
his studies on seven water BOT, TOT, joint venture and privatisation projects, Zhang (2009) 
found that the marketisation reform on the Chinese water sector has been ‘successful’ and 
effective. He believed that the most important points are the large amount of private capital 
injected into the water sector, the strategic investors and private contractors that have been 
introduced, and the significant improvement in the  management of water facilities.  
However, not all scholars agreed with the points of view  mentioned. Most debates 
emphasised the efficiency of BOTs’ as a public financing scheme, as well as being 
individual projects. The arguments mainly concentrated on the water and the transportation 
BOTs. For instance, Fu and Zhong (2006) challenged the view points that the BOT model is 
suitable for developing Chinese water facilities. Using evidence collected from over 40 
water BOT projects and the 12 water BOT cases studies, Zhong and Fu (2006) believed that 
the overall result of the implementation of BOT in the water sector is negative. Firstly, the 
local governments always got the big contracts, due to the public sector managers’ poor 
knowledge and skills in the BOT planning, contracting and negotiating stages. Secondly, 
78 
 
the governments and the contractors often overestimated market demands, leading to high 
operating costs and some losses for the BOT contractors. In many water BOTs, the 
governments still have to make a subsidy to the contractors and provide a guarantee on the 
return of private investments . In those cases, a number of commercial risks have not been 
transferred to the private sector (e.g. demand risks, exchange risks and inflation risks), 
thereby, the governments often made the ‘bad’ deals. Finally, the evaluation on the 
performance of BOT contractors were not properly conducted by local governments which 
led to the output and performance of the BOT project being unknown. As Zhong et. al. 
(2006) argued the overall efficiency of BOTs in the water sector is low, since the substantial 
risks have not been transferred, the transaction costs are higher and there were poor post-
contract evaluations. BOT did introduce private capital investment to the water sector, but 
contracts could be very expensive.  
In addition, Li (2009) has studied eight Chinese transportation BOTs and PPP pilot projects 
in four cities (bus and underground projects). He concluded that market-oriented reforms 
were completely inefficient and ineffective. His findings showed that the marketisation 
reforms, included BOT and PPP projects in the underground and bus sectors failed to solve 
traffic problems in the cities. Also, there is no significant improvement in public 
transportation service quality. Some bus PPP contractors keep making losses. In the 
meantime, some serious accidents and technical problems frequently occurred in the 
constructing, contracting and operating of underground BOT projects, though penalties on 
contractors are seldom made. Li (2009) argued that the welfare aspects of public transport 
services are being challenged by profit-seeking private capital. At the end of his study, Li 
(2009) found that in some BOT and PPP cases, the government has already ‘stepped in’ and 
the private contractors ‘stepped out’. Moreover, Li recommends the governments should 
consider the alternatives to BOT and PPP.  
Meanwhile, some research into BOT offered contrasting conclusions on the effect of the 
use of BOTs in China’s infrastructure projects. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
of the World Bank (2004) commented that BOTs brought both benefits and costs to China. 
In terms of the experience of Chinese road, water and power generation BOTs, the IFC’s 
report revealed BOTs and PPPs are good alternatives for Chinese publicly-funded projects. 
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However, the main barriers of implementation of Chinese BOTs are the contextual 
constraints, e.g. the lack of a BOT legal framework and the underdeveloped Chinese 
banking, financial and capital markets. Wang and Ke (2009) stated that the  BOT model is 
not suitable for all infrastructure projects and it depends on the characteristics of the 
infrastructure fields, the risks of BOT projects differed from case to case. Wang and Ke 
(2009) suggest that the key success factors of BOTs in China are overall managerial 
capabilities and competence of the governments, the skills and experience of the 
contractors, the profitability of the individual project and the risk control management.   
 
2.4.2 The competition, efficiency and the implementation of BOT 
As one  rationale to use BOT, the central government of China claimed the application of 
BOT schemes could create competition among suppliers of public services, and ultimately 
achieve greater efficiency within the public sectors (State Council, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
Ministry of Construction, 2002, 2005). However, as Fu and Zhong (2007) argued that the 
central government did not offer detailed guidance the creation of real competition in BOT 
practice, except for the compulsory competitive bidding identified in the 1996 BOT 
Circular from the State Planning Commission (1996).  Fu, Chang and Zhong  (2006) and 
Wang and Ke (2008) agreed that strong competition was found in seven large water and 
power generation BOT pilot projects which were organised by central government in the 
1990s and another five large water BOTs at local level after 2000s. However, the 
competition in medium and small size water BOT projects is unclear. Zhang (2009) 
mentioned that in these water projects, non-competitive bidding was also allowed by the 
public procuring bodies. As Zhang (2009) pointed out the degree of competition in the non-
competitive BOT procuring and tendering process is weaker than the ‘competitive bidding’. 
Zhang went on to say that it is not clear that how many water projects adopted the ‘non-
competitive bidding’ approach in China.  
Fu et. al. (2006) also noted that in the post-contracting stage, the degree of competition was 
not sufficient. This was due to the fact that most of the infrastrucuture projects (e.g. water 
and motorway) were providing public goods and services and were usually a monopoly. In 
such cases it is difficult to create competition throughout the lifetime of the BOT’s contract 
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(Fu, et. al,2006).  
Since all Chinese BOT projects were implemented at local levels by provincial or city 
public authorities, there are few studies that have assessed the degree of compeitition for 
BOT programmes at provincial and city level. However, the evidence from some studies 
(Ho 2006, Adams et. al., 2006) reveals that Chinese local authorities may not always have 
emphasised competition and efficiency improvement. Ho (2006), Adams et. al. (2006) and 
Qin and Yu (2005) explored the provincial and city governments’ emphasis was on 
attracting BOT investment from the private sector, whilst paying little attention to creating 
market competition and achieving greater efficiency improvements. These researchers 
argued that Chinese central and local governments should increase their focus on creating 
‘competition’ and improving efficiency in the public infrastructure and service’ 
fields.  Adam, et. al., (2005), Zhong et al, (2006) and Chen & Messor (2003) expressed 
similar opinions, while contesting that the efficiency promotion in Chinese BOTs cannot be 
easily achieved in practice so long as the government does not translate these objectives 
into detailed executive policies, regulations and procedures, in the absence of the Chinese 
BOT regulatory framework.   
Finally, the degree of the competition may also depend on  how the contract is designed. In 
Chinese BOT practice, ‘non-competitive clauses’ in BOT contracts were found in many 
cases. These clauses may secure a private monopoly share in the local infrastructure market, 
as Fu, et. al, (2006) argued. As reviewed in China’s official BOT Circular in 1996 (SPC, 
1996) and the four Standardised BOT Contracts (Water supply, sewage treatment, waste 
treatment and gas supply) issued by the Ministry of Construction in 2004 and 2006 (MOC, 
2004a, 2004b, 2006a, 2006b), it can be found all these documents promised private BOT 
operators a non-competitive position in local markets. Such ‘clauses’ in BOT contracts 
were known as ‘non-competition clauses (guarantees)’. The clauses defined that local 
authorities should not build similar infrastructure projects locally, if a BOT project had 
already been set up. The intention behind the ‘non-competitive clauses of BOT contracts 
may be that the private contractors need a kind of guarantee from the governments to 
secure their return on investment. On the other hand, the government wanted to attract 
private investors through this arrangement and prevent overlapping investments in public 
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infrastructure projects (Wang and Ke, 2009). However, the real effect of these clauses is 
clear, as Fu and Zhong (2007) explained. The BOT private operators aimed to achieve a 
monopoly positions in local markets as soon as they closed the deal, and these non-
competitive guarantees secure that the private investors and operators could cover their 
returns on investments within the lifetime of the BOT contract. When the competition 
became very weak at ex post contract stages, the government’s regulation and supervisions 
on the performance became very important to ensure that efficient and effective services 
would be produced by the contractors. However, such evaluating system and method on 
BOT have been established yet (Qin and Yu, 2005 and Fu. et. al., 2006). Other potential 
problems surrounding non-competitive clauses in the BOT contract have not been fully 
discussed in previous studies, e.g. ‘lock-in’ problem, the risk transfer and allocation, and 
interactions with other infrastructure projects.  
 
2.4.3 The debates on the BOT contract and management  
Ho (2006) argued that the local authorities in China do not always concentrate on the 
design, formulation and negotiation of good BOT contracts. In his view, Ho (2006) 
believed that the local procuring bodies largely underestimated the importance of the 
contract. Fu and Zhong (2007) did note the importance of the BOT contract in practice. 
They believed that in general, the service regulation of BOT projects or other relies mainly 
on the BOT contract. In this sense, the items and conditions defined in a contract are  
critical for regulating the performance of the private operators. Of course, as the important 
measure to manage the risks associated with BOT, the BOT contracts and agreements aim 
at identify and allocate the potential risks and benefits in the future (e.g. Wang and Ke, 
2009, Qin and Yu, 2005, Zhang, 2009).  
However, the empirical evidence of the Chinese water sector marketisation reforms that had 
private sector participation shows there were organised no contracts. According to the 
‘MOC survey of 2005, less than 50% of the (BOT and PPP) projects signed the concession 
agreement and the relevant contracts [between the procuring authorities and the 
contractors]. As it was, over 50% of the reformed [marketised] wastewater projects were 
without agreements or contracts which might cause hidden problems for future 
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management and regulation.  However, this  is inconclusive at this moment’ (Fu & Zhong, 
2007: 6). It is really difficult to imagine why and how BOT projects were conducted 
without the contracts between public authorities and private contractors, Fu and Zhong 
(2007) provided no detailed explanation for the absence of  BOT contracts in these water 
projects. By reviewing all the private financing models in the world, there is wide 
agreement that the contract is the foundation of  a privately financed project.  
Considering  the problems linked with BOT contract issues, the MOC has made some good 
progress to improve things. Four standardized  BOT contract models have been designed, 
drafted and issued by the MOC in 2004 and 2006 (MOC, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a). 
These included  
 the Urban Waste Disposal (Rubbish) Treatment BOT contract model (23 pages), 
 the Gas Supply BOT contract model (17 pages),  
 the Urban Water Supply BOT contract model (37 pages)  
 the Urban Sewage Treatment BOT contract model (50 pages).  
The MOC’s BOT contract models offer a general framework and guidance on designing 
and drafting the BOT contracts for local authorities. However, there is no literature 
available  in the uses of these contracts so far and the subject  needs further study.   
Meanwhile, there are still no standard contract models for motorway and power generation 
projects.  Few of the existing literature addresses the contracting problems of BOT projects 
in China, although the piecemeal information about the BOT contracts and their 
management has been found in a few studies. The possible reason may be low transparency 
and poor accessibility of BOT information. Current studies seldom address the contracting 
practice in the BOT projects, except for the studies on the risk management. A number of 
contracting problems have not been covered by the previous studies, such as, the 
transaction costs, the relationship of both sides of the BOT contract etc.  
 
2.4.4 The risk transfer and allocation in the BOT arrangement 
Wang (1999, 2000), Wang and Ke (2009) debated that official documents had rarely 
addressed the ‘risks’ involved in BOT projects. At the same time, risks transfer and 
allocation between public client and BOT contractors had not been set out as one of the 
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objectives in China’s BOT policies. In a few the government’s documents and policies 
analysis of risk was looked at in very simple terms. One example of this was, in 1996, the 
BOT Circular issued by the State Planning Commission (1996) had stated that the political 
risks (policy change risk) and commercial risks associated with BOT projects should be 
shared between public clients and private contractors. However, the State Planning 
Commission did not interpret which risks should be allocated to which parties of the BOT 
contract.  
At the same time, the four Standard Models of BOT Contract (MOC, 2004) also did not 
identify all the risks related to BOT projects. They did mention two common risks 
associated with the utilities BOT projects, i.e. the risks of policy and law changes and the 
force majeure risks. However, the Ministry of Construction did not give any guidance as to 
how to allocate these two risks between the public procuring authorities and private 
contractors. The application of a BOT cannot proceed without considering the risk 
allocation between local authorities and private contractors. In practice, the academics and 
practitioners have noted that risk management of China’s BOTs is crucial for the success of 
the projects (Wang, et. al., 1999, Wang, et. al., 2000, Zeng, et. al., 2008, Chen, Xuan and 
An, 2010). For the governments, the risks associated with BOTs may bring more costs and 
financial burdens and ultimately have a profound impact on the public services delivered by 
the BOT. For the private contractors various risks would have large major influences on the 
project’s profitability and on the extra costs of raising capital (Zeng et.al., 2008). As 
Handley (1997) and Wang and Ke (2009) explored the BOT model has brought greater 
opportunities for both the project contractor and the government who are going to develop 
the infrastructure project. At the same time it has also  brought bigger risks to both parties 
within the contracts.  
The early study (Wang, et. al., 1999, 2000) of China’s BOT risks focused on the political 
risks and foreign exchange risks related to the projects from the private contractors’ point of 
view. This was because all the earlier BOTs (prior to 2001) were funded by FDIs, and 
foreign investors who were unfamiliar with Chinese BOT regulations, approval processes 
and legal frameworks. The foreign exchange risks of BOTs were high in those days because 
the investments on BOTs were mainly by foreign currencies, usually U.S dollar. Therefore 
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the risks of foreign exchange rates’ changes and the risks of converting Chinese RMB to 
foreign currencies was more significant to private contractors (Qin and Yu, 2005). 
Furthermore, Wang (2000) showed that private contractors in China’s Power Station BOTs 
may have paid more attention to the risks that had real effects on the their return of 
investment, such as the risks of the government guarantee on purchasing contracts, the 
tariff adjustment risks  and dispatch constraint (of their services) risks.  
Following the BOT models’ expansion in China from 2000, studies on the risks associated 
with water and power generation BOT projects paid more attention to identifying what kind 
of risks have most often been involved in BOT models in China (from the perspectives of 
the private contractors). As Wang (2000) and Zeng et. al. (2008) identified the six main 
sorts of risk related to China’s BOT projects, broadly classified as: political risks, 
construction risks, operating risks, market and revenue risks and finally legal risks.  Greater 
detail showed that there might be over 30 different kinds of risk associated with China’s 
BOT projects. However, as Zeng et. al. (2008) showed there are several risks that were 
more critical to the private contractors involved in water project:  
 the risk from a change in tax policy, the risks from fluctuation of loan interest rates,  
 the risk from variation of the water resources price,  
 the risk from the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates,  
  the risk from government promise and guarantees.  
By reviewing the journal articles on Chinese BOT over the last ten years, nearly 30 of the 
45 studies focused on the risks related to BOT. However, these past reports usually 
concentrated on the identification of the risks related to the projects from the private 
contractors’ perceptions. The risk of BOT for the public procurement authorities was not 
sufficiently addressed. Very little information was available in studies by Handley (1997, 
Blackman and Wu, 1998). They found that the majority of demand and exchange rate 
change risks for the Sha’jiao B power station BOT were actually undertaken by the public 
authorities rather than the private sponsors. Fu and Zhong (2007) explored that the 
overestimated demands for water service lead to Chengdu city council purchasing the 
oversupplied service from the BOT contractor. It is not clear to what extent these risks had 
been allocated between the public and private sectors under the BOT schemes. However, 
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the danger is that the government seems not to have been aware of possible risks that have 
been brought on by the BOT models. This is because few studies and evaluations have been 
done by the governments and by academics. In terms of the sectors and industries, most 
previous studies concentrate on the water and power generation BOTs.  Few studies explore 
the risks transfer and allocation in Chinese BOT projects.  
 
2.4.5 Under-developed Chinese BOT legal, regulatory and governance framework 
BOT is a sub-sector reform of the Chinese marketisation of infrastructure and public 
services, and the implementation of a BOT is constrained by these environmental factors 
too. A number of scholars and organisations argued (ADB, 2003, Adams, et. al. 2006, 
Zhong, 2008, Fu, et. al, 2006) that in contrast to the growing number of BOT projects in 
China, the BOT regulatory and legal frameworks had developed slowly in the last two 
decades. 
The report of the IFC (World Bank, 2003) and Jiang (2009) presented the BOT legislation 
frameworks by analysing  the laws associated with BOT. These may include 
 China’s Constitution (1982, 1983, 1999, 2004),  
 The Budget Law (1994),  
 The Guarantee Law (1995),  
 the Tendering and Bidding Law (1999) 
 The General Principles of the Civil Law (1986),  
 The Contract Law (2000),  
 Administration of Land Law (1999). 
 The Investment Catalogue issued by the NRDC (2004, 2010) 
 Company laws (1994),  
 The Security Law (1995),  
 The Bidding Law (1999) 
 The BOT Circular (1996) 
 The specific-sector laws, e.g. The Road Law (1997, 1999, 2004), The Water Law 
(1988, 2002) 
To date, China has not implemented any special legislation needed for BOTs, although the 
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central government attempted to publish a BOT law in 1996. At the time, the draft BOT law 
was submitted to the National People’s Congress. However, the ideological and technical 
debates on this draft in the congress forced the government to withdrew it immediately. The 
BOT Law draft was finally issued by the State Planning Committee as the BOT Circular in 
1996.    
In addition, 15 governmental policies and circulars created in the 1990s are the rudiments 
of China’s BOT laws. To some extent, these Circulars still act as a legal guide in the 
operation of China’s BOT projects, although there has been big changes in Chinese BOT 
practice, e.g. the domestic investors allowed into BOT market in 2001 and the 
decentralisation of BOT approval to provincial governments in 2005 (China International 
Engineering Consulting Corporation, CIECC, 2004).  
However, the existing policies to regulate BOTs are not perfect (Jiang, 2009), and have 
conflict with other Chinese laws, e.g. China’s Constitution, The Budget Law, The 
Guarantee Law, the Bidding Law etc. For instance, in BOT contracts, the public authorities 
usually need to offer a number of guarantees, e.g. operation period guarantees, project 
service guarantees non-competition guarantees, foreign exchange and outward guarantees, 
etc. to private contractors. These guarantees are in direct conflict with China’s Guarantee 
Law, since Article 8 of the Guarantee Law stipulates that, ‘state organs (governments and 
its agencies) shall not be guarantors’. As the World Bank, IFC (2003:9) argued that China’s 
approach to BOT legislation was piecemeal and lack clarity with the regulatory framework 
confusing investors on answers to the basic question: ‘which laws are applicable, and what 
are the legal effects of the various notices, circulars, and approvals? ’ For the BOT contracts, 
there is a lot of uncertainty with legislation and regulatory framework. 
Another matter is that a clear BOT governance framework has not been setup to formulate 
and design Chinese BOT policies at central and local levels(Ho, 2006). During the period 
of 1995 and 2005, the State Planning Commission (later, State Development and Reform 
Commission) appeared to dominate China’s BOT policies’ design and formulation process 
with assistance from other ministries in central government, Ministry of Electricity, 
Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Cooperation. The governance framework of BOTs was extremely complex, but incomplete 
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and ineffective. A BOT application had to be approved by 16 different agencies at central 
government level and by the same numbers of agencies at local government level (IFC, 
2003, Chen and Messor, 2003). The original purpose of this complex regulatory framework 
was that the central government wanted to ensure that local governments had the well-
defined plans and well-drafted contracts. Also the central government hoped to cap the high 
rate of return to private contractors and ensure that substantial risks would be ‘shared’ with 
the private sector, e.g. foreign exchange risks and demand risks (Handly, 1999, World Bank, 
2003). However, in practice, the approval and regulatory procedures were too complex, 
very time-consuming and had high costs (World Bank, 2003).   
From 2005, the BOT management was devolved from the NRDC at central level to 
provincial governments, leaving no central ministry responsible for the policy’s design, 
formulation and application approval. This particularly affected the motorway, power and 
energy and other infrastructure projects. Only the Ministry of Construction took over some 
responsibilities of formulating BOT policy and guidance in the utilities sectors. However, 
Fu and Zhong (2007) found that water BOT schemes actually involved a number of public 
sector reforms and sub-reform. In the case of the water industry, implementation of BOT 
involved new ways of land use, the public assets-management matters of public water 
companies, the public financing and investment mechanism reforms in public sectors, the 
public accounting system and taxation’s adjustments, water tariff’s adjustments etc. 
However, the existing authority of the Ministry of Construction was insufficient and 
incapable of making these reforms. The reason for the decentralisation of BOT 
management from the centre to provinces was that the government want to simplify the 
approval procedures and speed up the decision-making process (Jong, 2009). However, 
what were the effects of this decentralisation? Do the provincial and city governments have 
sufficient capabilities, skills and resources to regulate BOTs? The former question has no 
an answer as yet. However, some scholars have addressed the later question.  
 
2.4.6 The Lack of expertise, experience and skills of BOTs in the public sector 
The previous studies (IFC, 2004, ADB, 2003, Fu, et. al, 2006, Zhong, 2008, Zhang, 2008) 
argued that BOT programmes are a relatively new experience to government officials, and 
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that there is an apparent lack of experience on the commercial, technical, and legal aspects 
of BOTs in China. Qin and Yu (2005), Adam et. al. (2003) and Ho (2006) pointed out 
neither the central nor local government have sufficient experts, knowledge, experience and 
skills to apply BOTs. As Wang and Ke (2009) commented to properly implement BOTs, the 
governments at central and local levels need the financial, legal and technical professionals 
to do this work. The public authorities need the inter-disciplinary talents of people who not 
only understand the public sector and project management, but also have in-depth 
knowledge of finance, legislation and English fields. Wang and Ke (2009) commented few 
of these inter-disciplinary experts have been found in the public sector. According to Ho’s 
(2006) study, even the officials in the central and local authorities did not have the basic 
knowledge and skills about BOT. Ho (2006) indicated that, in some cases, the public sector 
managers cannot distinguish the difference between the BOT model and privatisation. 
Cheng and Wang’s (2009) study showed that the governments and the decision-makers in 
China believed that with the use of the BOT model, the authorities do not need to do 
anything more than provide some policy guarantees. In these cases, the governments in 
China may underestimate their supervisory responsibilities and also the complexity of the 
BOT projects. This is mainly due to officials and public sector managers not having 
sufficient knowledge and understanding of  the  BOT model.    
Meanwhile, some BOT managers and directors have lot of experience in managing large 
publicly funded infrastructure and utilities projects. However, in practice, some of these 
experiences and skills are not transferrable to the implementation of BOTs in many cases 
(Cheng and Wang, 2009). The findings of Fu and Zhong (2006) indicated that BOT 
managers on the public sector sides essentially do not have sufficient commercial 
knowledge and skills in contracting, financial and legal matters, resulting in contracts 
always being  expensive. At the individual project level, shortage of experience and skills in 
public procuring authorities are common, leading to the local procuring authorities being at 
a disadvantage when dealing with highly skilled and ‘smart’ international and Chinese BOT 
contractors (Fu and Zhong, 2006).  
In some water and power generation BOTs, notably the 7 BOT projects directed by central 
government, the public authorities introduced a large number of technical, legal and 
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commercial advisors from the UK, France and Australia into the contract tendering and 
negotiating stages to ensure the contract was well-drafted (Fu and Zhong, 2006, Wang and 
Ke, 2009). The introduction of external advisors largely improved the BOT contracting 
practice in these cases and temporarily filled the shortage of experts and experience in the 
public sector. Fu and Zhong (2006) argued that these consulting costs were very high. The 
literatures into Chinese BOTs (Qin and Yu, 2005, Wang and Ke, 2008) suggest that the 
government need the assistance of interim and external advisors’ in BOT practice. Although 
the consulting costs were necessary, qualified advisors were able to  ensure the government  
reached a ‘good’ deal  in the end.   
 
2.4.7 Transparency of Information and the implementation of BOTs 
Although BOTs have been utilized in China for 25 years, little of the information and data 
about their utilization has been released by the Chinese government. Researchers(Ho, 2006, 
Handley, 1997, Fu et. al., 2006) complain that the most difficult problem researching 
Chinese BOTs is the extremely low accessibility and availability of relevant data. China’s 
BOT policies were not unable to accessible  through the government’s websites. There are a 
limited number of sources offering Chinese BOT project information, except  the World 
Bank’s PPI database.  
It is notable that the Chinese government, as the BOT policies’ designer, regulator and 
practitioner still has not published any comprehensive report about results and 
performances of BOT programmes. However there are two auditing reports produced by  
China’s National Auditing Office in 2007 and 2008 (CNAO, 2007, 2008): ‘Auditing Report 
on 34 Highway Road Projects’ Construction, Operation and Investment Returns’ (in 
Chinese) , and the 2nd Auditing Report in 2008: ‘Investigation Report on Toll Road 
Projects’ Construction, Operation and Management in 17 provinces’ (in Chinese).  Only 
these two reports involved and mentioned the BOT project’s implementation in China’s 
motorway industry. Instead they mainly focused on the motorway projects which were 
funded by the government, rather than the projects sponsored by private capital. Meanwhile, 
the CNAO (2007, 2008) neither clarified how many BOTs were included, nor specifically 
addressed the performances of the private funded projects.  
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There were some attempts to require the governments in China to disclose more 
information about the implementation of BOTs. For instance, the Ministry of Construction 
(2005) required local authorities to establish regular performance measurement and 
assessments for the BOT contractors, reviewing the projects’ output every two years, and 
publishing  a report in order to respect the public’s ‘right to know the truth’ (MOC, 2004). 
There have still been very few reports published by local governments to date. Low 
transparency of BOT information means that few lessons can be learnt from the past failure 
and success of the use of BOT. The knowledge transfer between different government 
levels and public agencies was restricted by the low accessibility and availability of BOT 
data. At the same time, the public lose the opportunity to know and evaluate the 
performance of the government and BOT contractors. By reviewing all the studies 
associated with Chinese BOTs, it can be found that a large portion of the research focused 
on the identification of risks of BOT through surveys of the private contractors. Only a few 
pieces of research (Qin and Yu, 2005, Fu and Zhong, 2007, Wang and Ke, 2009, Wang, 
2009, IFC, 2003) addressed the detailed problems in the ‘real’ BOT practice, due to these 
authors being officials in the governments or working as the ‘think tank’ and experts within 





2.5 Summary  
By reviewing the literature concerning Chinese BOTs, it is noticeable that China’s BOT 
studies were focused on a limited area and included very limited information on the 
practice and implementation of BOT projects. The major findings of the research into 
Chinese BOTs revealed that China has a number of debates and problems in developing 
BOTs (World Bank, 2003, ADB, 2003, Yu and Qin, 2005, Zhang, 2007 Fu et. al., 2006, 
Adams et. al., 2006) including:  
 the debates on the overall effect of the BOT’s implementation, 
 the degree of competition in the BOT contracting process,  
 the risk transfer and allocation,  
 the design and management of BOT contract,  
 the underdeveloped regulatory and legal frameworks surrounding BOTs have not 
yet been established and developed in China, the insufficient experts and experience 
of managing BOT projects in the local governments, 
  the low transparency of BOT information.  
The results and effects of utilizing BOTs in China are not conclusive. In addition, the 
government has released only a limited amount of data. As the prior research (Yu and Qin, 
2005, Fu et. al., 2006, Adams et. al., 2006) has suggested, in order to make the best use of 
BOTs in China, the authorities should study carefully their past lessons and experiences. It 
is necessary to conduct further studies of the implementation of Chinese BOTs, especially 
on the questions. Such as:  
 Why do the authorities in China want to use BOTs in practice?  
 Under what kinds of contexts and conditions will they be used?   
 What have been the results of utilizing BOTs during the last few decades?  
 What are the main problems and obstacles to utilizing and managing BOTs in the 
contexts of road and water industries at present,  
 How can policies and the implementation of Chinese BOTs be improved?  
The literature on China’s BOTs (Adams, et al., 2003, Qin and Yu, 2005) commented that 
the Chinese government and private sector both need to learn how to properly adopt and 
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manage BOTs. The Chinese government, policy makers and practitioners in the public 
sector have to make either a proper study of BOT-related theories or use the lessons from 
other countries. The  World Bank (2003), IMF (2003), Barrett (2007), Qin and Yu, (2005), 
Adams et. al, (2006) and Chan (2010) all advocated that the UK had a well-developed PPP 
(PFI) system with the largest number of signed PFI contracts in the EU. The UK not only 
had a complete set of PFI development goals and procedures, but also a wide experience of 
applications within the social infrastructure. The integrity of the legal system, a 30-year 
history of PFI operation experience, as well as mature and well-developed capital markets, 
private sectors and government public management capacity are the factors as to why 
meant that British PFI development led the World. The next chapter will explore how 
British PFIs were developed and what experiences and lessons have been learnt in the UK 
during the past decades. It will also initially compare the PFI in the UK and China and 





Chapter 3 The Literature Review: a Critical Evaluation on the British Private 




The last chapter presented the ways in which marketisation and the various models of 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) were identified and actively promoted by the 
government as strategies for delivering public infrastructure and services in China. The 
major findings of the existing research into Chinese BOTs revealed that China has a 
number of problems and difficulties in developing BOTs (World Bank, 2003, The Asian 
Development Bank, ADB, 2003, Yu and Qin, 2005, Zhang, 2007 Fu et. al., 2006, 
Adams et. al., 2006). The literature on China’s BOTs (Adams, et al., 2003, Qin and Yu, 
2005) commented that the Chinese government and private sector both need to learn 
how to properly adopt and manage BOTs. The Chinese government, policy makers and 
practitioners in the public sector need to make a proper study either of BOT-related 
theories or of the lessons from other countries. This chapter aims to examine PFI as 
used in the UK, and considers what lessons China can learn from the development of 
the British Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  
 
3.1.1 The increasing communications between China and the UK’s PFI industries 
In fact, as Holden (2009) explains, China has already begun investigations into the 
British PFIs and Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs). Officials and delegates from China 
were sent to the UK in 2002 and 2005 to attend programmes organized by the UK 
Ministry of Health. The Chinese authorities, including the Ministry of Health along with 
the governments of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, are particularly interested in the 
National Health Scheme (NHS)’ ‘modernization’ reforms and they are ‘exploring 
further the UK models of healthcare including PFI’ (Holden, 2009). Meanwhile, the 
major private participants in the British PFI market are enthusiastically exploring the 
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Chinese BOT market, thereby indirectly enhancing communication about how to 
implement BOTs and PFIs in China and the UK. The pioneers who introduced PFIs into 
China are also heavily involved in the British PPP and PFI market, including: Thames 
Water (water and sewage treatment sectors with Bovis) (Zhang, 2007, The Global Water 
Intelligence, 2010), Balfour Beatty (Gammon in Hong Kong, a railway and transport 
infrastructure contractor) (Balfour Beatty HK, 2010), the ‘Big Four’ Accounting firms 
(e.g. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young) and 
Pinsent Masons (legal advisor) (Pinsent Masons Website, 2010). All of these have 
already participated in a number of Chinese BOT projects.  
It is clear that the communication and commercial activities associated with BOTs and 
involving the UK and China have been strengthened in recent years. On one hand, the 
British government and private firms believe that China is a target market for exporting 
the British PFI policy, because of China’s large population, stable political environment, 
good economic performance and rapidly-increasing social demands (Holden, 2009). On 
the other hand, the government in China has shown its interest in the British PFIs, due 
to China's limited history as a market economy and as a user of BOTs.  
 
3.1.2 The structure of chapter three 
This chapter focuses on how PFIs have been used in the UK since 1992. Section 3.2 
reviews and discusses the basic definitions of PFIs in the UK emphasising those 
mentioned in chapter one. Furthermore, section 3.2 compares and contrasts the 
differences between PFI and traditional forms of procurement. In addition, it looks at 
the key players, the governing bodies and frameworks behind the British PFI 
approaches. Finally, it reviews three different narratives about the British government’s 
programmes of PFIs, introducing and explaining the concepts of value-for-money and 
Public Sector Comparators ( PSCs).   
Section 3.3 reviews the history of private participation in public infrastructure since 
1979. It also concerns the contexts, ideologies, institutions and the objectives of 
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utilizing PFIs in the UK in recent years. It divides into three parts: part one looks at the 
background of PFIs, with a brief history of British privatisation of infrastructure and 
utilities since 1979. Part two reviews the early history of using PFIs in the UK between 
1992 and 2000. And part three focuses on the development and progress of PFIs after 
2000. By looking past research, the changes of contexts, conditions and policy relating 
to the British experience of PFIs can be traced, and any common factors and differences 
between China and the UK identified. In section 3.4, the problems arising from and 
attempted solutions on the uses of British PFIs are analysed and evaluated. In this 
section, the evidence for, and consequences of, using the PFIs are reviewed. The 
strategic and practical debates and arguments on implementing PFIs in the UK are also 
presented. Section 3.5 summarizes the key lessons and experiences of using PFIs in the 
UK and discusses what lessons potentially can be learned and what experiences can be 
borrowed by China. Meanwhile, some key factors and conditions for successfully 
implementing PFIs in the UK and investigated in previous studies are considered.  
 
3.2 The British PFI model  
The terms 'PPP' and 'PFI' were often used inter-changeably in the practices and the 
research in the UK (Yescombe, 2007: 4; Hall, 1998). This often leads to difficulties 
when comparing, evaluating and measuring the effects of the implementation of BOT in 
China and PFI in the UK (Akintoye edit., 2003). Hence, it is necessary to identify in the 
UK, meanings of the key concepts of the PPPs and PFIs.  
 
3.2.1 The Private Finance Initiatives in the UK 
The ‘Private Finance Initiative’ was launched by the British Conservative government 
in 1992 (Spackman, 2002). It is the principal model for using private finance to deliver 
public infrastructures and services in the UK (NAO, 2009a: 3). Reviewing the earlier 
studies on the PFIs, it can be found that the PFI involved a range of activities with 
private participation in infrastructure projects prior to 1997, e.g. DBFO model and 
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joint-venture model (Froud and Shauol, 2001, Sussex, 2001). The concept of PFI was 
normally used as the exchangeable idea of Public-Private-Partnerships. The definition 
of PFI is given by the government from different perspectives and those have been 
discussed in chapter one.  
Although PFI is a policy originally created by the Conservative Government in 1992, 
the change of government in 1997 did not alter government commitment to it. 
Consequently, the Labour Government embraced and re-developed the policy into a 
wider concept, the Public Private Partnership. It is a policy involving the private and 
public sectors in government initiatives on very generic terms (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2004). PPP is broadly defined by Treasury (2000: 3) as ‘a long-term partnership which 
can bring public and private sectors together for mutual benefits and PPPs are 
arrangements typified by joint working between the public and private sectors. In their 
broadest sense they can cover all types of collaboration across the private-public sector 
interface involving collaborative working together and risk-sharing to deliver policies, 
services and infrastructure’. The fundamental difference between PPP and PFI is that 
PPP is a generic concept, while PFI is a sub-sector of PPP, with the specific purpose of 
delivering a service based on publicly-managed assets using private capital. Since the 
principal model for private participation in the public infrastructure in the UK is the PFI 
model, this whole thesis mainly focuses on the concepts and models of the PFIs. 
Meanwhile, the discussions on other forms of PPPs, such as joint ventures, will also be 
included in the following sections. 
3.2.2 The structure of the PFI and the responsibilities of the private contractor 
The private sector partners in a PFI are usually a consortium of a number of 
stakeholders from the private and public sectors, a so-called special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). The SPV consists of the main project contractors, construction contractor 
(subcontractors), lenders, hard (e.g. building fabric) and soft facility (e.g. catering, 
cleaning, security, mailroom, and health and safety) operators and maintainers, project 
insurance firms and, finally, financial, legal and technical advisors, see Diagram 3.1 
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below.   
Diagram 3.1 The structure of PFI and SPV 
 
Source: Grimsey and Lewis, 2004 
Through a long-term PFI contract between the public sector and its private partners, the 
SPV is responsible for meeting contractual obligations (Yescombe, 2007; IMF, 2007; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). These include: producing and delivering the defined 
services to the standard required by the PFI contract; designing and building or 
upgrading the infrastructure asset; raising funds for the capital needs of the project; 
focusing on government objectives; responding, in cooperation with the public procurer, 
to variations in the project environment; returning the assets in the specified condition, 
or retaining the facilities, at the end of the contract.  
The different functions of design, construction, finance, operation and maintenance are 
integrated in the PFI projects, therefore, when adopting a PFI and for ensuring it can be 
successfully implemented, the capabilities of the private contractors are crucial. As 
Barrettes (2007) explains: firstly, private contractors should have the necessary 
experience and capabilities to carry out the project, especially for the large 
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infrastructure projects. Due to the characteristics of public infrastructure, the private 
parties in a PFI need strong and stable financial capabilities in order to cover the huge 
amount of long-term investment, whilst, the complexity and specificity of public 
infrastructures requires private contractors and sub-contractors to have comprehensive 
experience, technologies and expertise for managing large projects. 
Despite the debates around the PFI contractors’ roles and performance in the UK, 
almost all major players in the PFI market in the UK have long histories of providing 
infrastructure and large projects. Most of them are operating businesses in a number of 
countries with rich experience and capabilities for carrying out PFI projects, while 
although these capabilities were deeply weakened by the financial crisis in 2008 (PUK, 
2009, NAO, 2009 a). Compared to other countries in the world, the PFI market in the 
UK is well-developed. The related PFI industries and markets offer the transnational 
companies the opportunities to participate in the PFI programme (e.g. the second largest 
banking and capital market in the world, world-class project construction contractors, 
subcontractors and advisory industries). According to PUK (2007) investigations in the 
period 2004-2007, there is a broadly-based group of top private sector participants in 
the British PFI market. These are shown in table 3.2.   
Table 3.2 The major private participants in the British PFI market 
Sector and Roles in the Projects  The main participants in the Market  
Project Sponsors (Investors) 
 
AMEC, Balfour Beatty, Bilfinger Berger, Barclays, 
Bank of Scotland, HSBC, RBS, Innisfree, 
Equion/John Laing, Skanska. 
Lenders and Banks 
 
RBS, Bank of Scotland, SMBC, Dexia, NIB capital, 




Balfour Beatty, Skanska, AMEC, Carillion, Bovis, 
KBR, Laing O’Rourke, Taylor Woodrow, Costain, 
Interserve. 
Hard Facility Management 
Contractors 
 
Balfour Beatty, Skanska, AMEC, Carillion, Taylor 
Woodrow, Interserve, Mitie, Amey, Thames Water, 
Sodexho.  
Soft Facility Management 
Contractors 
Balfour Beatty, Carillion, Interserve, Mitie, Amey, 







PwC, Deloitte, Grant Thornton, KPMG, Ernst 
&Young, Robson Rhodes, Quayle Munro, Abros, 




Pinsent Masons, Addleshaw Goddard, Bevan 
Brittan, Eversheds, Shepherd & Wedderburn, 
Nabarro Nathanson, Denton Wilde Sapte, Dundas & 





Mott Macdonald, Turner & Townsend, EC Harris, 
Cyril Sweett, Currie & Brown, Gleeds, Faithful & 
Gould, Davis & Langdon, WS Atkins, Appleyards 
Consulting 
Insurance Companies  Willis, Aon, Marsh, JLT, Heath Lambert 
Source: adapted from the PUK, 2007, PFIs: The State of the Market,  
3.2.3  The roles of government and the public sector in the PFI  
The roles of government and the public sector also changed when the PFI approach was 
adopted. PFI differs greatly from traditional procurement methods, since the 
government does not participate into building the assets and facilities. It is adopts the 
role of a ‘buyer’ and ‘provider’ of public services as defined in the PFI arrangements. 
Under the traditional public sector procurement approach, the projects are usually 
funded from tax revenues or public borrowing and government adopted a model, known 
as ‘Design-Bid-Build’ (Yescombe, 2007: 4). In this way, the government has to fund the 
full cost of construction, including any cost overruns, in other words, the government 
and the public sector accept all risks related to the projects. At the same time, the 
operation and maintenance of the projects or facilities also remains in the public sector. 
The private contractor is only responsible for the quality of the facility during the 
specified construction-warranty period.  
However, as the government argued (Allen, 2003), the use of PFI does not mean that the 
government withdraws from the management of public projects. As Grimsey and Lewis 
(2004) and the OECD (2003) pointed out, the public sector remains accountable for 
many aspects of PFI projects. In principle, the government and public sector parties 
have to clearly define the services required and specify the outputs. In addition, as 
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procurers and clients of public services, the public sector has to make sure they have the 
resources (e.g. budgets for PFI payments) available to pay the private contractors. 
Secondly, for selecting the best contractor, the government, as the project's organiser, 
also has to carefully design and plan the procurements of PFI projects. Furthermore, as 
regulators and inspectors of the PFI, the government needs to determine the 
performance regime by setting and monitoring safety, quality and performance 
standards for those services and manage the contract by enforcing these standards, 
whilst taking action if they are not delivered. Finally, the public sector, as both the 
partner of the private sector and as an agent of the people, has to manage the local 
community and other social expectations of the projects and secure public satisfaction.  
3.2.4 The procedures and the complexity of the British PFI contracts  
Thus, the government plays different roles in the PFI arrangements and a number of 
stakeholders from the public and private sectors are involved in the projects. From the 
public sector’s perspectives, normally there are at least fourteen stages, involved in the 
implementation of a PFI can be itemised as follows (Allen, 2003, De Lemos, et. al., 
2003): establishment of business need, appraisal of options, development of business 
case, expression of interest, bidding/design/short list development, negotiation/final 
evaluation, contract award and financial close, construction/development, operation 
(servicing, monitoring, maintenance), contract management, end of contract.  
Compared to the traditional procurement route for public infrastructure, PFI is more 
complex, due to its complicated procedures (e.g. the value-for-money tests), 
complicated contracts, subcontracts and agreements and the complex relationships 
between the PFI contractors, subcontractors and other stakeholders. Notably, the 
complexity of a PFI contracts lies not only in the main contract between the authority 
and the contractor, but also in the other parallel contracts that have to be signed among 
the private parties and their advisors (De Lemos, et. al., 2003). There are a number of 
other types of legal agreements that have to be signed in addition to the PFI main 
contract (NAO, 2008): for instance,  
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 The contractor contract (the agreement and legal documents defines the SPV as 
the new, autonomous, legal entity, wholly independent of its parent companies);  
 Sub-contracts between contractor and subcontractors; loan agreements with 
financial institutions and lenders;  
 Direct agreements between the authorities and senior lenders;  
 Shareholder agreements; 
 And consulting services agreements with legal, financial and technical 
consultants. 
3.2.5 The British PFI governing structure and institutions 
To handle the PFI programme as a whole, and to deal with individual projects 
case-by-case, PFI policy and implementing bodies at both central and local levels have 
been developed, see Diagram 3.3, page 102. By 2008, several kinds of institutions had 
been established and involved in managing PFIs in the British public sector, such as the 
PPP unit in H.M. Treasury, Partnerships UK and the related PFI departments in the 
government ministries, the local authorities and the 4Ps (now taken over by Local 
Partnerships, 2009). The taskforce and policy team in H.M. Treasury are responsible for 
managing PFI policy as a whole. In the last two decades, the Treasury has published a 
range of key policy, guidance and statistics on PFI and provided advice to those 
undertaking or wishing to undertake PFI projects (Treasury, 2009). Also, the PPP 
department in the Treasury (Project Review Group, PRG) oversees the approval process 
for any PFI projects at local level which receive government support (Treasury, 2009). 
Partnerships UK was established in 1999 to implement PFIs and PPPs through a form of 
joint-venture between the government and the private sector, to support and provide 
advice for the public and private sectors involved in the PPPs (PUK was disbanded in 
later 2010). Also, PUK are charged with research, and regulatory roles and may even 
participate directly in some PFI projects, such as BSFs (Building Schools for the Future) 
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(PUK, 2010). Finally, unlike the Chinese BOT auditing system, the UK has independent 
organizations to evaluate PFI and PPPs’ performances and operations for local 
authorities, such as the National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee in 
Parliament and the Audit Commission (restructured and contracted out in 2011). From 
1997 over 80 reports were produced by the NAO, focusing on the value-for-money in 
various Private Finance activities including PFI and PPP. The evaluation by the NAO 
involved not only the individual PFI project, but also the PFI as a whole programme of 
development for infrastructure and services. The NAO looked at operational 
performance, financing, the tendering processes and benchmarking, good practice and 
negative lessons (NAO, 2009a, 2010).  
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3.2.6 Three different narratives on the British PFI programmes 
Since the introduction of the PFI in 1992, there has been a wide discussion on this 
programme based on both theoretical and pragmatic narratives. Although PFI has been 
in operation for more than a decade, much of the evidence as to its impact is still 
contradictory and inconclusive (NAO, 2009a).  
First of all, the government has argued that PFIs have been adopted as pragmatic 
solutions to a number of practical difficulties in developing the infrastructure in the UK 
(Treasury, 2003, Allen, 2003, Parker, 2009). The PFIs were developed in the UK, 
because the governments at various periods had been faced with difficult choices, 
especially the fiscal challenges of the 1990s and 2000s. Under the Conservative 
administration, there was a pressing need for investment in infrastructure after years of 
capital starvation and there was a belief that the introduction of private capital into the 
financing of public sector projects and service delivery would help reduce public 
borrowing (Clark and Root, 2000). Kerr (1998) revealed that PFIs were favoured by the 
Conservative government (1979-1997), since it was keen to limit tax-rises and increases 
public investment in infrastructure.  
The PFI programme was also attractive to the Labour government, although they had 
opposed it before coming into office. The official document (Allen, 2003) explained 
that the major reason for expanding this programme was that PFI enabled the Labour 
government to get closer to balancing their fiscal budget without a large increase in 
either taxation or borrowing. At the time, two fiscal rules were introduced in 1997: the 
Golden Rule and the Sustainable Rule, the aim of which were to restrict the government 
borrowing to investing only in the projects that will benefit the future. This was instead 
of funding current spending over the economic cycle, and limiting public spending and 
debts to a certain level (forty percent) of the GDP.      
However Quiggin, (2002), Dawnson (2001), Heald (2003), Edwards, et. al. (2004), and 
Hellowell and Pollock (2009) argued that private finance is more expensive than public 
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funding, due to their costs of capitals and the higher transaction costs. At same time, the 
use of PFI as governmental off-balance sheet financing is just a ‘fiscal illusion’. PFI still 
would influence the government’s fiscal situations in the future for the future 
generations, although it may balance public spending and significantly cut public debts 
at present.   
The second narrative believed that PFIs on a kind of liberation and marketisation on the 
public infrastructure. Both Conservative governments (1979-1997) and Labour 
government (1997-2010) actively deployed the PFI programmes because of their 
pro-market and pro-private beliefs. The assumptions of the governments are clear as 
discussed in the official documents of the Treasury (2000, 2003a): as the private sector, 
with profit motive incentives, is more efficient, the private provision of public services 
will lead to increased efficiency and wealth from which all will benefit. Public sector 
construction and infrastructure projects have traditionally had a reputation for being 
poorly managed, leading to cost and time overruns and long-term technical problems 
(Dixon et. al, 2005; MacDonald, 2002). Since this ideology was identified by the 
politicians in the UK, marketisation of public infrastructure is unavoidable. The 
governments and proponents of the PFI claimed that this policy could achieve ‘value for 
money’ in public services through competitive bidding in PFI procurement, transfer 
‘operational and financial risks’ to private contractors and introduce the skills of 
‘advanced management, expertise and innovation’ to the public sector (Treasury, 2006). 
Value-for-money (vfm) is a concept originally used in accounting as a measure for 
performance-auditing in economics. However, it is often used by governments and the 
public as ‘an examination designed to determine whether the organization is performing 
economically, efficiently and effectively in its use of resources, operations, procedures 
and the pursuit of objectives’ (De Lemos, et al., 2003). When the PFI was introduced 
into the U.K., the concept of VFM was reinstated by the Conservative government at 
the same time. The government claimed that the introduction of efficient private 
management into the public infrastructure would achieve VFM through the application 
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of PFIs (Treasury, 2003a) . In 1998, the Labour government’s PFI programmes also put 
the emphasis on the concept of VFM, and introduced a way of testing VFM, the 
so-called public sector comparators (PSCs). In the British PFI appraisal processes, the 
PSC was defined as: a hypothetical, risk-adjusted costing carried out by the public 
sector as a supplier, to an output specification produced as part of a PFI procurement 
exercise. The purpose of the PSC is therefore assumed to provide a benchmark against 
which to form a judgment on the VFM for PFI bids in the PFI procurement process 
(NAO, 2003:45). In principle, PSC is a theoretical test to identify if the government 
should produce the public services and build public facilities ‘in-house’, or just ‘buy the 
services’ from the private contractors in the market. By calculating and estimating the 
price of private provision (PFI) and the costs of the ‘in-house’ production of public 
services and projects (in terms of Net Present Value, NPV), the government would make 
a decision on the adoption of PFI or not. The ‘cheaper’ method (between the PFI and 
conventional approach) would be chosen, see Diagram 3.4.  
Diagram 3.4: PSC in the PFI appraisal process 
 





PSCs have been attracted considerable debate concerning their reliability, accuracy and 
relevance in the contexts in which they have come to be used (Coulson, 2005; 
Shaoul,2005, NAO, 2009a). This was seen in cases where the PSC has been incorrectly 
used as a pass or fail test. In cases when there is an absence of any public funding for 
the government, the PFI deal is always calculated as a ‘cheaper’ option than the 
conventional approach (NAO, 2003, 2009a). As a result, the PFI had to be ‘the only 
game in town’ (UNISON, 1999). Thereby, for the authorities in the UK, it has become 
the only option to develop public infrastructure projects, especially for the health and 
education sectors (Economic Affairs Committee, 2009) . 
Another key principle behind PFI is claimed by the government and its supporters (H.M. 
Treasury, 2003, Grimsey and Lewis, 2004) that it encourages the allocation of risks to 
those most able to manage them. By doing so, PFI hopes to achieve the better risk 
management so as to achieve overall cost efficiencies and greater certainty of success. 
The optimal allocation of risk is a key determinant of the value for money of a PFI 
project. It can be identified in the standard contracts and the due diligence work done by 
lenders, who may resist some elements of the risk transfer (NAO, 2009). However, the 
critics such as Heald (1997b), Froud (2003), Edwards et al. (2004) , and Shaoul (2005) 
provide evidence that the public sector may be paying an extremely high price for this 
transfer of risk, in terms of the implementations of the PFI in health and road sectors. In 
some cases, the risks were essentially transferred back to the government. The risks and 
uncertainties associated with PFI projects over a period of thirty years are difficult to 
identify in practice, because of the nature of incomplete contracts as revealed by the 
‘contract theory’ (Flynn, 2007).    
A third narrative treated the PFI as a policy controlled by the private sector and with 
benefits to the private sector. Shaoul et. al. (2007) debated that everyone may notice the 
privatization (including the PPPs and PFIs) of large-scale industries and utilities, but 
few people have noticed that policy formulation itself was privatized. A few authors 
(Farnsworth and Holden, 2006, Shauol, et. al., 2007, Ruane, 2010) showed their deep 
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concerns on the increasing roles of the private sector on formulating and shaping public 
policies. These researchers explored that the ongoing expansion of the British PFI 
programmes was the result of ‘private sector control and domination over public 
policies’ (Shauol et. al, 2007). The related analysis of the PFI markets in Britain (Shaoul 
et. al, 2007, Ruane, 2010, PUK, 2009) looked at a small number of accounting 
businesses (e.g. the Big Four) and on how multi-national companies have increasing 
influences on design, formulate and shape the British public policies via various formal 
and informal channels.  
The study of Shaoul et. al, (2007) revealed that the use of private sector advisors in the 
British public sectors (mainly from the Big Four accounting firms) in order to develop 
and manage the government’s Public-Private Partnerships policy, has led to the 
privatisation of policy formulation and implementation. The PFI policy and appraisal 
procedures, individual appraisal projects, and advise to both public and private sector 
clients were developed by financial advisors from within the industry. Meanwhile, 
policy evaluation also was conducted by the same group of personnel. Notably the 
senior positions in the PPP department in HM Treasury, the Partnerships UK, the NAO 
and the Audit Commission, were occupied by former employees of the Big Four firms, 
the businessmen and bankers who originally were from the private sector and still 
keeping tight relationships with the major companies in the British PFI market (Ruane, 
2010 and Farnsworth and Holden 2006). Ruane (2010:10) argued ‘the implementation 
of British PFI is potentially and essentially transferring the public fortune from the state 
to private sectors in the next twenty or thirty years: Thereby PFI is a policy making 
‘private profits from the public purse’. The report of PAC (2011) showed that the private 
contractors benefits more from PFI than the taxpayers. By considering other difficulties 
and problems of utilising PFIs in the UK, Farnsworth and Holden (2006) argued that 
these programmes and policies are fundamentally wrong.  
By reviewing the literature and the three different narratives about utilizing PFIs in the 
UK, it can be seen that the PFI is one of the most controversial programmes of the last 
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decade. However, the British experience and lessons on utilising PFI are still useful 
references. And what may offer some positive and negative examples to Chinese BOTs. 
The next two sections review the history of the British PFI since 1979. 
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3.3 The history and background of developing PFI and in the UK 
This section reviews the history and context of private participation in public 
infrastructure since 1979. It is divided into three parts. Part one looks at the background 
of PFIs, and the campaign for the privatisation of British infrastructure and utilities 
since 1979. Part two reviews the early history of using PFIs in the UK between 1992 
and 2000. Part three focuses on the developments of PPPs and PFIs after 2000. By 
looking at their history, the change of contexts, conditions and policy of the British 
PPPs and PFIs in the last decades can be examined. 
 
3.3.1 Privatisation on the British Public Industry and Infrastructures  
For most of the post-war period, like many other countries in the world, the government 
and state-owned enterprises have been the principal providers of infrastructure in the 
UK. The earliest initiatives to marketise the infrastructure in the UK were the 
privatisation of the public utilities and infrastructure. A number of elements of the 
public infrastructure were sold-off or privatised by the Conservative governments of 
Thatcher (1979-1990) and Major (1990-1997) (OECD, 1998). With the massive scale of 
privatisation in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s, the state no longer directly participated 
in providing public infrastructure for these industries, Instead, the government sought to 
regulate the prices of the services delivered by the private sector. The changes in British 
public infrastructure industries since 1980 have largely reflected on the changes of 
contexts and ideology (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Martin and Parker, 1997; Parker, 
1999; the OECD, 2003). Due to the ‘oil shock’ of 1973, followed by a period of high 
unemployment, high inflation, low GDP and productivity growth, the UK economy had 
been deeply weakened by 1979 and given the name of ‘the sick man of Europe’ (Parker, 
2003). The state-owned enterprises and industries in Britain were widely criticized as 
being inefficient and over-staffed (OECD, 2003). Martin and Parker (1997), Pollitt 
(1999) and the OECD (2003:20) summarized these debates on the state-owned 
enterprises highlighting its poor management and incentive schemes, poor design and 
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monitoring and evaluating system, strong influences from the ‘self-interested’ Trade 
Unions, their monopoly structure, insufficient consumer-oriented and with ineffective 
regulations. Meanwhile, the ideological changes in the ‘welfare state’ system and the 
theoretical support from the New Institutional Economics made the UK actively 
promote the privatisation of British infrastructure industries in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Therefore, the rationale behind the British privatisation programmes was to reduce 
government involvement in industries, weaken the public sector unions, reduce public 
sector borrowing and debts, raise revenue through asset sales within the public 
industries and introduce competition and improve efficiency and productivity in the 
related industries.  
A large number of studies have been conducted on the effects of the deregulation and 
privatisation of SOEs in the UK over decades. The findings and results are mixed, as 
presented in the previous studies. Based on the survey of Pollitt (1999), the overall 
impact of privatisations in the UK is that it did reduce government ownership of 
industry (from 11% of British GDP in 1979, to about 2% of GDP in 1999). Second, as 
the OECD (2003) showed, a huge amount of privatisation revenue was raised from the 
selling-off of public assets. In the short term in the UK, it did help the government's 
fiscal problems, especially when the large privatisations of the telecom, gas and water 
industries took place in the late 1980s. However, this policy of privatisation in the UK 
was criticized as ‘selling the family silver’ since, although privatisations may raise 
money in the short term, they will also influence the government's future, long-term 
revenue. In addition, Parker (2003) revealed that ‘the empirical evidence (of 
privatisation in the UK) is that…ownership change (privatisation) on its own does not 
appear to have a significant effect in terms of improving economic performance where 
there is market dominance. This is especially in terms of welfare gains to consumers. 
Management in monopolies may seek an ‘easy life’ whether in the private or public 
sectors since the private-sector monopolies' management can meet investors’ 
expectations of profits by simply raising prices'. The studies by Pollitt (1999), Parker 
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(2003) and the OECD (2003: 45) indicated that ‘in general the UK evidence is 
consistent with the economic theory that competition is the best method of reliably 
generating economic efficiency gains, followed, in the absence of competition (in some 
natural monopoly industries) by effective regulation, and lastly privatisation.’ 
Furthermore, the OECD (2003) and Parker’s (2003) studies showed that in the early 
days, the largest beneficiaries of privatisation in the British utilities industries were: the 
government and also some shareholders and investors of firms. This was until 
competition or regulatory pressures became effective in the late 1990s. This was also 
because very high privatisation revenues and very high rates of return were generated 
after the privatisations of the gas, water and telecom SOEs.  
The most important experience of the UK’s privatisation(OECD, 2003, Parker, 2003) 
revealed that the role of government in regulatory governance, the method of 
developing regulatory frameworks, and the development of regulatory tools, notably the 
‘price-cap’, are crucial for ‘efficiency improvement’ and public industries’ reforms, 
especially for ‘natural monopoly industries’, e.g. water, sewage, electricity and 
railways.  
From the early 1990s, marketisation and privatisation in the UK’s infrastructure have 
not been limited to the ‘infrastructures’, such as telecoms, ports, water, electricity and 
railways, but also involved the IT, education and health sectors where more ‘soft 
services and products’ are involved. The forms of marketisation of the public 
infrastructure in the UK also changed from privatisation to PFI. 
3.3.2 The introduction of the PFI in the UK: the British Experiences and Lessons in 
the period of 1992-2000 
As Broadbent et. al. (2004:6) reviewed, ‘to the Conservative government, privatisation 
is the ideal solution to the infrastructure problem, but the majority of the state 
enterprises that could be privatized had been, left the government needing new ideas to 
involve the private sector in the public sector’. Consequently, from 1992 the emphasis 
of the government had arguably shifted to using the private sector to design, build, own 
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and operate government facilities and provides public services: The PFI, a new type of 
programme was created by John Major’s government in the UK. By considering the 
rationales behind the policy and the socio-economic contexts at that time, a number of 
authors agreed that the original utilization of the PFI was due to the government facing 
serious fiscal challenges and increasing demands on public infrastructure investments. 
See, Figure 3.5 below, the Conservative government claimed the use of PFI, would 
introduce additional private finance without increasing public spending and debts 
(Willets and Goldsmith, 1988).  
Figure 3.5 Net Public Investments as a Percentage of GDP, 1948–2000 
 
Source: Clark et. al., 2001 
The Conservative administration of the early 1990s was keen to limit the size of public 
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), and keep tax-rises to a minimum. Under the 
Maastricht Treaty’s limitations (the country’s fiscal deficit should remain under 3% of 
the GDP, and the public debts should be controlled under 60% of the GDP) (Sawyer, 
2006). However, the attempts of the government to control public spending and deficits 
at the time were challenged by  
 the British economic recessions between 1990 and 1992 (Clark, et. al., 2001): 
the falling GDP (-1.4% in 1990 and 0.2% in 1992);  
 the increasing deficit ratio with the GDP (-1.6% in 1990, -7.9% in 1993);  
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 the increasing unemployment level (10.2% in 1993, with a total of over 3 
million).  
Therefore, there was an urgent need to increase public investments, but, to do this the 
government had limited financial options. The PFI was arguably created by the 
government, to raise the investments on public infrastructure and social services, whilst 
not increasing public spending. The initiator was Willetts and Goldsmith (1988) (now, 
the Minister of state for Universities and Science, in 2011). Based upon these 
controversial beliefs, the PFI was implemented by the Conservative government in 1992. 
It claimed that ‘the Government would actively encourage the private sector to take the 
lead in joint ventures with the public sector; the public sector would have greater 
opportunity to use leasing where it involved significant transfer of risk to the private 
sector and offered good value for money’ (the speech of Norman Lamont, quoted from 
Broadbent, et. al, 2004: 4).  
The intentions of the 1992-1997 conservative government was that PFI would improve 
the provision of public services and infrastructure through:  
 ‘better allocation of risks;  
 better incentives to perform;  
 close integration of service needs with design and construction;  
 a clearer focus of responsibilities of public and private sectors which more 
clearly reflects the strengths of each;  
 a continuing commercial incentive for efficiency throughout the design, asset 
creation and operation of the project;  
 more potential for efficiencies’ (Private Financial Panel, 1995, cited from the 
Sussex, 2001:26).    
As Parker (2009) revealed, in some cases, the PFI had been seriously considered by the 
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government prior to 1992. However, only two projects were finally approved by the 
government who signed a contract with the private sector in 1988 and 1992: the 
Dartford Crossing Bridge PFI, which included a DBFO bridge and two tunnels; and the 
second Severn Crossing PFI, which is also a bridge project connecting England and 
Wales. Many applications on using private finance at the time were rejected by the 
government, because they did not conform to the ‘rules’ and/or ‘conditions’ of using 
private finance in public industries. These rules were mainly formulated by a senior 
official, Sir William Ryrie, and became known as the ‘Ryrie Rules’. The Ryrie Rules’ 
mainly covered two concepts: Firstly, ‘a project funded by the private sector should go 
ahead only if it could be demonstrated as more cost effective than a comparable 
publicly funded project; and secondly, it should result in a corresponding reduction in 
public spending (this rule was subject to individual exceptions by Ministers and was 
abolished in 1989)’ (The Treasury Committee, 2000, Allen, 2003). Due to the 
government being able to borrow money at a lower interest than private firms, the first 
Ryrie rule required the net yield of a PFI project should be greater than if it were 
publicly financed. This would have to be at least enough to cover the increased cost of 
raising risk capital from the financial market (The Treasury Committee, 2000). In other 
words, ‘the gains ( and benefits of PFI) would have to more than offset the additional 
cost of raising finance from the private sector, compared with gilt sales, if the proposal 
was to be approved’ (Parker, 2009: 3). The second rule defined that private finance 
should be used only as an alternative, and not in addition to public finance. This rule 
was designed to ensure that private finance was not used to circumvent public 
expenditure constraints by government departments. So when private financing was 
used, the public expenditure would be reduced pound for pound correspondingly 
(Ruane, 2010, Pitt et. al., 2006). The effects of the implementation of the Ryrie Rules, 
was that a number of proposals using private finance were rejected by the Treasury, 
because the applications did not meet their requirements (Parker, 2009). At the same 
time, the government departments involved had little intention of using private finance, 
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owing to the fact that private financing would not bring ‘extra funding’ to their 
departments (Palma, et. al., 2009).  
The Ryrie Rules attracted a number of debates and critics, mainly from the supporters of 
private participants in public industries in the government. Some claimed that ‘Ryrie 
Rules’ are so tight as to make them inoperable and ‘no pound of private /public 
investment was allowed through under the Ryrie Rules’ (Parker, 2009:3). As Willets 
argued in 1993: ‘the notorious Ryrie rules were a tease — the conditions they set for 
privately financed projects were never likely to be met in practice’ (Hall, 1998:3). 
Meanwhile, as the designer and regulator of the rules, the Treasury was criticised to 
prevent private finance into public projects (Clark and Roots, 1999). Given these 
debates, the Ryrie Rules were gradually retired in 1989 and then completely abolished 
by the government in 1992, so removing the ‘barriers’ to the introduction of private 
finance.  
While, the abolition of the Ryrie Rules are also controversial, as Parker (2009:3) 
debated that with careful guide, the PFI scheme demonstrated that the Ryrie rules were 
not the formidable barrier to private financing of public infrastructure, e.g. the Dartford 
PFI in 1986. Moreover the abolition of the Ryrie rules was also argued that some 
safeguards for the public purse were removed (Ruane, 2010).  
However, in practice, with the abolition of the Ryrie Rules and the launch of the PFI 
programme in 1992, these initiatives did not lead to as much private finance as the 
government anticipated. According to the data of PUK, H.M. Treasury, NAO (2009a) 
and Greenway et. al. (2004), only ten PFI contracts had been signed by 1993, and the 
majority of these were small, such as a student accommodation project in Greenwich, 
two prisons projects in Bridgend and Frazakerley (Liverpool), a waste treatment plant in 
Dundee, and a small health project in North Lanarkshire etc (PUK database, 2009).  
Furthermore, immature PFI met a number of challenges in terms of the policy’s 
implication from the institutions of government. Through interviews with senior officers 
who had participated in the PFI at the time, Greenway et. al. (2004) revealed that the 
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PFI programme progressed slowly in the earlier years, due to the fact that the policy 
was launched across all government departments rather than within a single one. It 
therefore had to involve people from different areas of the public sector with potentially 
dissimilar views and approaches. As Greenway et.al., (2004) revealed, PFI is a radical 
change in the way the public are delivered goods and services, and requires that the 
working practices and dominant culture of public sector procurers at the grass roots 
level need to change. PFI may bring fundamental changes to organizational culture, 
echoes and values in the British health system. Thereby the implementation of PFI was 
received with suspicion and considerable opposition in the public sector, particularly the 
health sector. Finally, the policy had been rather rushed into, without much 
consideration being given to the technical issues in practice, as an official who had 
worked in the Ministry of Health at the time commented that ‘…when it (PFI) was 
launched, then we had to solve the problems as they came up ... there was not an 
appraisal of what [the policy] meant and a financial [appraisal] as to whether it was 
the best way of doing it. It just looked as if that was a solution’ (the interview with Yates, 
by Greenway, 2004: 512). There was a big gap between the ideologies of the policy 
decision-makers and the practice of policy implementation. 
In terms of the institutional and technical difficulties experienced in implementing the 
PFI, the Private Finance Panel and Executive was created within the Treasury in 1993, 
comprising personnel from both the public sector and private sector. They were 
responsible for encouraging, providing case-specific advice, and producing general 
guidance documents on the PFI programmes. However, PFI was still slow to start and 
the evidence showed that, only three projects were signed in 1993 and 1994 (The 
Treasury Committee, 2000). Up until the mid 1990s, PFI failed to produce the levels of 
investment planned (Fitzsimmons et. al., 2008).  
For promoting and increasing the uses of PFIs, the Treasury declared a ‘universal 
testing rule’ in 1994, which meant the Treasury would not approve any further capital 
investment projects without a primary exploration of the use of private finance. This 
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meant that public sector bodies and local governments were eventually forced to work 
with the PFI if they needed any form of capital investment. Although the launch of the 
universal testing rules led to an increasing numbers of PFI contracts (39 in 1996) 
(Spackman, 2002), these rules have been argued by a number of researchers.  
Broadbent et. al. (2004: 7) stated, the ‘universal testing’ policy did not consider the 
costs involved and the effects of this change. It was an ideology of the Conservative 
government that the private sector could solve the problems within the public sector. 
Institutional problems also came with the launch of the ‘universal testing rule’. The 
public sector, such as the Treasury, line ministries and local authorities were not ready 
to deal with sharply increasing numbers of PFI applications. Especially at the level of 
individual projects, they lacked the specialist knowledge and skills needed initially to 
carry out the PFI process through to completion (Fitzsimmons et. al., 2008). Because of 
the absence of standard procedures and processes to carry on the projects, Greenway et. 
al. (2004) showed that huge differences were found in PFI projects by different 
departments and local councils. For several similar PFI NHS projects with common 
features, they had quite different terms in the contract, since PFI standards were absent. 
By recognizing the difficulties and problems in the PFI practice in the earlier years, 
some policy and technical guidelines on the programme were published in 1995 and 
1996. These included: how to design the contract of PFI (PFP, 1996a, 1996b) and how 
to conduct a procurement process in the PFI contract (PFP, 1996c). Meanwhile, the 
Public Private Partnerships Programme (4Ps) in began 1996 with the aim of bringing 
about increased investment in local services through PFIs (Broadbent et. al., 2004, 4Ps, 
2007).  
The review on PFI’s earlier history indicated some lessons: It was noted that the UK 
was experiencing a severe recession at the beginning of 1992. In those days 
privatization as a major substitution policy (of PFI) was already attracting and 
absorbing a huge amount of private capital from the markets within the UK. Private 
investors were not ready to make other big investments on public infrastructure and 
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services (for the PFI), after consideration of the conditions of the capital market and 
private sectors in the UK. In addition, as Sussex (2001) suggested the slow progress of 
PFI programme in 1990s was also because the major private investors were unfamiliar 
with PFI policy and public infrastructure industries, especially the NHS PFIs. Sussex 
(2001) believed the private sector tried to avoid investments on unfamiliar projects, due 
to the investors not fully understanding the operation of public industries, e.g. the health 
sector, but also they could not identify the risks and their position associated with PFI .   
Meanwhile, the PFI as an immature public financing policy covered all major sectors in 
public industries. The Conservative government at the time probably underestimated the 
difficulties and resistances in the government, public sector and the industries. The PFI 
was launched without good preparation, for example, there was no evidence that any 
pilot studies or wide consultations had been done before the uses of PFIs in 1992. And 
thus there was insufficient consideration given to possible problems after the policy’s 
implementation as explored in this section. The adoption of the policy in road industries 
might be acceptable, as the industry was more familiar with using a ‘contracting 
approaches’ and had more experiences on dealing with the private sectors. However, it 
was too early to expand the immature programme to other industries, such as the public 
health industries, where the organizational cultures and values were in sharp contrast to 
the ideas that underpinned the PFI.  
The government was too rushed and too subjective in introducing the ‘universal testing 
rules’ in 1994 to promote the PFI’s implementation within public infrastructure and 
social services. The Conservative government did not conduct a wider consultation on 
the public. It is arbitrary that the government was so anxious to introduce the immature 
PFI programme into all major public infrastructure and social services, without 
convincing evidence that the PFI could improve things. The government might have 
concentrated initially on one two areas or sectors and then rolled out to other sectors 
later.   
Historically, there is some evidence that showing that the public infrastructure and 
119 
 
social service SOEs in the UK did not perform well. However, this does not prove that 
the private sector could do any better in these fields (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004). 
There is no solid evidence that the PFI were performing well at the time. Moreover, it is 
arguable that ‘the Conservative governments of 1979-1997 were not enthusiastic about 
mounting large-scale evaluations of their management reforms. Ministers tended to take 
the line that reform was essential and self-evidently desirable, and that formal, public 
evaluation might prove a delay and distraction’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 296). 
Based on this thinking, there was no evaluation or proper examination of the various 
claims made by PFI’s in practice e.g. value-for-money and risks transfer. Since the Ryrie 
Rules were abandoned by the government in 1992, private finance continued without 
any comparison to similar public projects which might show they were a better option 
to conventional projects.  
After the Labour Party came to office in 1997, the successive Labour governments 
strengthened, and re-developed the PFI programme. An evaluation was conducted by 
Malcolm Bates, and a report with 29 recommendations to improve the implementation 
of PFI’s was issued (Allen, 2003). As one consequence of the Bates Review in 1997, a 
Private Finance Taskforce was created inside the Treasury as a substitute for the Private 
Finance Panel in September 1997. It provided technical advice to government 
departments concerning the design and approval of specific projects. The taskforce 
consisted of eight middle-ranking executives from the private sector (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2004). The department also was responsible for publishing a series of 
guidelines, policy statements, technical notes and case studies at the time.  
The Private Finance Taskforce had been appointed for a two-year period and, as it 
neared the end of its projected lifespan, Malcolm Bates was reappointed to undertake a 
second review in 1999. Consequently, upon the suggestions of the second Bates Review, 
the Partnerships UK and the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) were established 
in 1999. Some of responsibilities of the Treasury Taskforce were transferred to 
Partnership UK in 1999 and thereafter the PUK managed and reviewed the specific 
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projects over the whole country until 2010. However, unlike other public bodies, the 
PUK largely relied on the private sector and was eventually managed by personnel from 
private finance institutions. As a public-private joint venture, the majority interests in 
PUK (51%) are held by the private sector and only a minority of non-executive directors 
from the public sectors represent the government interest (PUK, 2010). At the same 
time, the OGC was established in 1999 to formulate and develop policies and guidance 
on the PFI (although the private finance unit in the OGC was transferred back to the 
Treasury in 2003).   
The PFI rapidly expanded under the Labour government, between 1997 and 2000 and 
there were nearly 250 projects that reached a financial close, from all major 
infrastructure and public service industries. The Blair Labour government actively 
promoted the PFI and PPP programmes (H.M. Treasury, 2000), as Gordon Brown stated 
in 1997: ‘Through the PFI, the private sector is able to bring a wide range of 
managerial, commercial and creative skills to the provision of public services, offering 
potentially huge benefits for the government’ (Sussex, 2001:30).  
Meanwhile, the new Labour Party claimed commercial know-how would be needed to 
meet social goals, in order to find a ‘third way’. However, the major Labour Party 
policies on PFI eventually followed the same ideas to the Conservative party: the 
‘pro-market’, ‘pro-competition’, ‘efficiency-emphasis’ (value-for-money) and 
improving relationships with private businesses. These were policies which were very 
different to the traditional values of the Labour Party (Shaw, 2004, Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2004). An alternative interpretation was put forward by Shaw (2004) who 
stated that the Labour party claimed to use pragmatism in making public policies (what 
matters is what works), for solving the practical issues that the government faced. This 
resulted in a number of policies and ideologies of the previous Conservative 
government were kept by the new Labour government after 1997, e.g. the PFI and some 
fiscal policies.  
The concept of ‘Partnership’ was also introduced by the Labour Government in 1999 
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(Treasury, 1999), leading to the creation of a new programme, known as the 
Public-Private Partnerships. In the period 1997-2000, another emphasis of PFI policy 
was on their VfM and the Treasury focused on how to introduce a practical method to 
evaluate VfM in PFI’s appraisal, procurement and financing. Finally, the government 
offered quantitative guidance in detail in 1999 ( known as Public Sector Comparators, 
PSCs), to judge the value for money for all PFI appraisals.  
Since 1997 there has been ‘an ever-expanding level of centralization and 
standardization in the development of thinking about PFIs’ (Broadbent, et. al., 2004). A 
number of initiatives were made by the Labour Government at the time. However, these 
were  covered a few of areas:  
 the first focus of the government was to establish strategically  the new 
institutions associated with the PFI and PPPs ( e.g. the PFFT, PUK and OGC) to 
develop the detailed policies, frameworks and provide assistance on individual 
project development, with the experience of professionals from the private 
sectors.  
 Secondly, the government practically paid more attention to formalizing the 
appraisal and procurement processes in the PFI transactions (e.g. a series of 
documents such as guides on ‘how to conduct a public sector comparator’ and 
‘step to step guidance to the PFI procurement process’). They also worked on 
standardizing contracts for implementing PFIs and PPPs (Standardisation of PFI 
Contracts Version I, in 1999). 
 Thirdly, the government addressed some important arguments, such as 
accounting issues on the PFI (e.g. Technical Note 1, How to account for PFI 
transactions, in 1999) and the related employee arrangement in the NHS PFIs.  
Following with creating a central PPP unit and the publishing of a range of technical 
notes and standardised PFI contract models, the PFI entered into its blooming stage in 
2000.   
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3.3.3 The rapid expansion of PFI programmes in the UK: the Experiences and 
Lessons in the period of 2000-2008 
 
In the period 2000-2008, PFIs entered what could be described as their ‘golden age’, 
607 PFI and PPP contracts worth £57 billion capital value were signed by the 
departments of the central government and by local authorities. 424 of these projects  
had been built and were operational by 2009 (PUK database, 2010), as is shown in 
Figure 3.7 The Private Finance Projects development in the UK.  
Figure 3.7 The Private Finance Projects development in the UK   
 
Source: NAO, 2009a 
In this period, the H.M. Treasury continually developed the main policies within the 
programme (Treasury, 2003, 2006, 2008) and resolved some implementation issues 
surrounding PFI, such as updating the standard contract model associated, the revision 
on the Green Book and the adjustment on the Value for Money Tests (Treasury, 2006). A 
series of policy and implementation guidelines were also developed and published by 
the Treasury since 2000. These covered a range of areas of PFI policy and 
implementation: e.g. the policies and documents for explaining and reviewing PFIs in 
the UK, and the PFI guides on how to provide value for money. In addition, the 
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associated PFI guidance on financial, technical and operational problems and improved 
standardized contracts for the PFIs were offered by the Treasury (see the table below, 
Table 3.8 UK PFI and PPP policy and guidance frameworks).   
Table  3.8 UK PFI and PPP policy and guidance frameworks 
Policies and Guidance Name of Policy and Documents  
 




PPP: the Government approach, 2000 
PFI: Meeting the Investment Challenge, 2003 
PFI: strengthening long-term partnerships, 2006 
infrastructure procurement: delivering long-term value, 2008 
 
 





VfM assessment and guidance  
 
 
Technical guidance  
 
Note 1: How to Account for PFI Transactions  
(Note 2: How to construct PSCs)  
 Note 3: How to Appoint and Manage Advisers to PFI Projects 
 Note 4: How to Appoint and Work with a Preferred Bidder  
 (Note 5: competitive dialogue)   
Note 6: How to Manage the Delivery of Long Term PFI Contracts 







Note1 : Interest and Inflation Risk 
Note2: the IRR uses in the PFI contract 
Note3: Preferred Bidder Debt Funding Competitions 
Note4: refinancing  
Note5: SPENS  
Note6: Credit guarantee finance 
 
 
Operational policy and 
guidance 
 
                                             
Note 1: benchmarking and market testing  
Note2: project transition guidance 
Note 3: Variations Protocol for Operational Projects 
Note 4: contract expiry  
  
 
Contracts’ standardsations  
                                                         
Continued…      
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SoPC Version 4 and Guidance  
 
 





Review on project’s OBCs submitted by local authorities 
 
a) Affordability  
b) Design Quality  
c) Output Specification 
d) Risk Allocation 
e) Commercial Interest 
f) Compliance with Standard Form  
g) Value for Money Analysis  
h) Suitability of Advisors  
i) Indicative Timetable  
j) Project Team  
k) Commitment of Sponsors, Stakeholders, and Users  
l) Statutory Process  
 
 
Source: The websites of PPP unit, H.M. Treasury, accessed at 2009  
 
During this increase in PFI’s, some operational matters were explored at the time. The 
Treasury (2003a) reported that the overall performance of PFI projects was good, in 
terms of the construction time and budgets. At same time some problems were also 
revealed by the NAO (2009a), the Committee of Public Account (PAC) (2003) and 
academics (Edwards et. al, 2004), including, lack of competition, high bidding costs, 
long procurement times and a number of issues relating to the PSCs as an inaccurate 
appraisal tool. The Treasury (2003a) showed that implementation of PFIs in I.T. projects 
and the small-size PFI projects were problematic, due to the frequent changes in I.T. 
technology, the difficulties on specifying requirements by the public bodies and the high 
transaction costs incurred in the small projects. This meant that I.T. and individual small 
projects with capital value less than 20 million pounds may not be suitable for a PFI 
approach (Treasury, 2003a). In addition, the government decided to expand the PFI 
programme into other industries such as the waste, social housing and prisons. 
Furthermore, with increasing debates on the PSCs and the Green Book (H.M. Treasury, 
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2003b), the government revised them in 2003 and 2004 (the principal document of 
public investment appraisal).  
In addition, since a large number of public projects have adopted PFI models, both of 
the governments and researchers also began to study the performance of the PFI 
projects and to examine if the implementation of PFI achieved the results the 
governments originally claimed and expected. These included including: the process 
and effects of procurement and tendering, the construction performances, the 
operational performances and if ‘value-for money’ (e.g. risks transfer) has been 
achieved in the various stages (Arthur Anderson & LSE enterprise, 2000, and the NAO,  
2009a, 2010; IPPR,2001; Mott Macdonald, 2002, ACCA, 2002, Pollitt, 2005, the PUK, 
2006, 2008, Treasury, 2003a, 2006, 2008, Pollock et. al., 2007, UNISON, 2003, The 
Audit Commission, 2003, PAC, 2003, 2008, 2011, Edwards, et. al, 2004, UNISON, 
2008a, 2008b, 2009, the Economic Affairs Committee , 2009). The findings of these 
studies are mixed, and inconclusive. Some of these studies and their arguments are 
shown in the in appendix 4.  
Despite rapid growth, PFI projects accounted for only 10– 15% of local authority 
capital investment over the last five years (Committee on Economic Affairs, the House 
of Lord, 2009). However, PFI’s share of investment is clearly and notably higher in two 
industries than others: ‘... 70% of hospital schemes have been delivered by PFIs; and 
round about 60% of new schools have been delivered through the PFI route’ 
(Committee on Economic Affairs, the House of Lord, 2009, volume I, Para 19). It may 
be argued that the financing strategies of the government rely on the PFI approach too 
much, especially in the health and education sectors. In many cases, the public sector 
has no choice, but to use PFI. Before widely introducing and utilizing private finances 
to develop public infrastructure and services within all industries and sectors on a huge 
scale in the UK, the Labour Government was criticized for carrying out insufficient 
studies on the PFI programmes. However, they under-estimated the practical problems 
and costs and risks of the application of the PFI approach. The policies have been 
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continually refined over the last ten years under the Labour Government. By reviewing 
the history of the PFIs between 2000 and 2008, the government has largely improved 
the governance and regulatory frameworks of PFI through their centralization, 
institutionalization and standardization.  
Meanwhile, the government has been aware of and studied the arguments and debates 
surrounding the programmes, and revised their regulations and policies. However, as 
the researchers argued (such as Shauol, 2005, Edwards, et. al. 2004), there are some 
unique problems associated with PFI that are not easy to solve by the government. Due 
to the large number of the PFI projects enforced to date, the costs of the lessons learned 
and errors corrected are too expensive and painful for the government. Some problems 
and mistakes could not be corrected, except by terminating a contract. Notable cases of 
this are IT PFI projects (NAO, 2001) and the London Underground PPP projects (NAO, 
2004a, 2004b).   
Since a large number of public projects adopted the PFI model and have been put into 
operation between 2000 and 2008, both the government and the researchers have paid 
more attention to studying and examining the applications and performances of these 
privately financed projects to see if they achieved the results the governments originally 
claimed and expected. The governments and some official-commissioned studies (HM 
Treasury, 2003, Macdonald, 2003, NAO, 2009, PUK, 2006) believed that PFI usually 
realized or potentially achieved their original claims. However, many studies presented 
the PFI as not performing as well as the government expected. There are still a number 
of issues associated with the programmes’ planning, procurement, construction and 
contract.   
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3.4 The British PFIs in practice: the debates and lessons  
 
3.4.1 The debates on PFI in the UK 
The review of the history of PFIs in section 3.3, revealed that how British government 
had introduced new measures to improve PFI implementation in the recent years, such 
as the provision of standard contracts, the creation of support groups, the publishing of 
guidelines etc. However, despite these measures, problems still existed in a number of 
areas. Much of the criticism of PFIs focuses on their value for money, costs and 
affordability (Price et al. 1999; Ruane 2000, Ball et al. 2000; Akintoye et al. 2003; 
Shaoul, 2005), accounting and off-balance financing matters (NAO, 2009, Committee 
on Economic Affairs, 2009, Allen, 2003), transparency and measurement of PFIs (Pollitt, 
2005, Pollock, et. al., 2009, Shaoul, 2005, Committee on Economic Affairs, the House 
of Lord, 2009), the risk transfer and allocations (Akintoye et al. 1998; Froud 2003; Bing 
et al. 2005, Edwards, 2009),  lack of competition in the PFI procuring and tendering, 
the nature of contract, the contracting methods and the transaction costs (CIC, 2000, 
Froud, 2003, Heald, 2003, Edwards, et. al., 2004, PAC, 2001, Lonsdale, 2005, Flynn, 
2007, Yescombe, 2007, Shaoul, et. al., 2008, Pollock and Rice, 2010, Committee on 
Economic Affairs, the House of Lord, 2009), finally, the PFI interaction with other 
policies (Ruane, 2002, Greenway et. al.,2004, Broadbent, et.al., 2003). The strategic and 
practical debates around PFIs in the UK have challenged all the fundamental ideas of 
the programmes at both the central and the individual project levels, including: the 
objectives of the programmes, the policies’ formulations, the institutional arrangements, 
the scope of the programme, the procurement and tendering mechanisms, the 
contracting methods, the contract monitoring and evaluation systems and its wider 
effects on the public finances and social fields. Looking through the debates and 
arguments about the PFIs since their inception, some lessons can be learnt, particularly 
when the private sector is unable to finance PFI projects after a Financial Crisis like in 
2008.  
Based upon past experiences as well as the painful and expensive PFI failures, there are 
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a growing number of studies looking into the lessons learned from the implementation 
of the British PFIs, e.g. Spackman (2002), Pollitt (2005), Dixon et. al. (2005), the NAO 
(2008, 2009a, 2010), the PAC (2009, 2011) and the Economic Affairs Committee of the 
House of Lord (2009). This research showed that compared to conventionally financed 
procurement, PFIs brought both benefits and costs. However, ‘the balance of 
advantages against drawbacks (of the PFI) was still unclear, and at the strategic level 
the main drivers still appeared to be ideology and accounting. However in its practical 
application many useful lessons had been drawn and applied’ (Spackman 2002:1).This 
section focuses on the debates about British PFIs and the lessons that were leaned from 
the utilization of the programmes in the UK since their inception.   
 
3.4.2 Is PFI a transparent and measurable policy?  
The first strategic policy matter about the PFI addressed here is the transparency of 
information associated with the projects. Because both the supporters and opponents of 
the policies complained there were not sufficient data about how the PFI was 
implemented in the UK (Committee on Economic Affairs, the House of Lord, 2009, 
NAO, 2010, PAC, 2011). The PFI proposals, full business cases and contracts were 
never fully disclosed to the public. Even the most basic data showed that the number, 
size and real costs of PFI projects are difficult to know (Shaoul, 2005). Given the lack 
of data, it is difficult to prove whether the benefits of PFIs that the government 
promised were actually achieved in practices. Full evaluations and comprehensive 
measurements from the application of PFI projects was impossible within this context.  
The low transparency of data from PFI contracts and projects’ has led to obstacles in 
evaluating their real effects. It is difficult to gain details and performance of the 
contracts, from both the public bodies and the private contractors, due to the 
confidentiality of commercial contracts and information (Edwards, et al., 2004, Shaoul, 
2005 and Pollock et.al., 2009). The applications of PFIs demonstrated that the quality of 
decision-making (value-for money tests) and evaluations of the programmes seemed to 
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have problems with regard to transparency. 
At the same time, the results of PFIs could not be fully evaluated, since many outputs, 
benefits and costs of the programmes were difficult to quantify and not measurable 
within public infrastructure and services contexts. As Pollitt (2005) argued the PFI can 
only work if outputs and inputs specified in a contract can be measured accurately. 
However, the reality of the PFI approach is ‘…problematic for public services because 
they are often multi-dimensional and quality is difficult to assess. Thus the ‘output’ of a 
prison or hospital represents a measurement challenge. Similarly it is not easy to assess 
the quality of the asset created (as distinct from the service that it creates). For example, 
can the quality of a road be measured easily?’ (ibid:17-18)  
The government may hope to use PFIs to clearly define performance requirements and 
outputs that in the future will contribute to better decision-making and project 
management, and be driven by value-for money in private financed projects (Arthur 
Anderson & LSE, 2000). ‘but this is not guaranteed, [because] PFI programmes 
introduce new challenges with respect to transparency, accountability and democratic 
legitimacy’(Koppenjan, 2008: 203). The real difficulties concerned with accurately 
defining outputs for projects led to obstacles when making decisions about PFI and 
measuring their implementation. As the NAO (2009a:19) argued that ‘using private 
finance brings benefits, but these cannot be counted on…’. This is due to the many costs 
and benefits that have been incurred by the PFI projects that could not be quantified and 
valued, or that were considered in the PFI evaluations (Coulson, 2005). Therefore, 
many previous studies could only emphasis specific aspects and address the common 
lessons and failures that could be learnt.  
3.4.3 Is PFI mobilising private investments and off-balance sheet financing?  
The official statistics of the Treasury (2010) and the PUK (2010) indicated that a large 
amount of the private investment (£72 billion) had been used to develop the public 
infrastructure and services in the UK to date. The short-term economic effects of the 
PFI are clear as the government were able to raise the investment capital in a short 
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period of time. But, it was argued that the government may use PFIs as a ‘mega credit 
card’ and as a financing tool to ‘buy now, pay later’. The PFI seemed to bring in the 
private capital the government urgently needed, while the policies also created a huge 
amount of debts or liabilities for the government in the future (Economic Affairs 
Committee, 2009).  
A number of researchers (Chesson and Maitland-Smith, the ONS, 2006) believe that the 
government in the UK prefers PFIs because most of them have not been included on the 
public authorities’ balance sheets. The majority of private finance projects have 
previously been off-balance sheet and not recorded in Government statistics of the 
Public Sector Net Debt. The NAO (2009:36) indicated that 78% (£22 billion) of 
operational PFIs in England by capital value are not recorded on the balance sheet of the 
public sector financial accounts, and 95% of local PFI projects by capital value were 
also off-balance sheet.  
The Treasury claimed accounting treatment should not drive decisions to use private 
finance (Treasury, 2003:10). However, the criticisms still raised questions about 
accounting because PFIs were off-balance sheet financed, and they offered substantial 
impacts on the overall economic and financial situations for the government. PFIs when 
excluded from the public accounts, will give a misleading picture of overall liabilities of 
the country (Economic Affairs Committee, 2009). The real barrier to bringing the PFIs 
into the national accounts and public sector net debts is the government’s fiscal rules, 
especially under the Labour government (1997-2010). They insisted that the total public 
debts should be maintained at under 40% of the GDP. Therefore, in practice, some 
departmental guidance for local projects has historically emphasized the need to specify 
projects so they would be off-the balance sheets. ‘Numerous project and programme 
managers have told us that keeping debt off-balance sheet was a driver behind their 
projects’ use of private finance’ (NAO, 2009a: 8). Meanwhile, this made funding and 
budget mechanisms for on-balance sheet projects less attractive, due to the pressures of 
maintaining control of public spending. This suggested that the PFI could be made to 
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‘work’ only through ignoring IFRS (Ruane, 2002). Institutional bias in favour of private 
financing of public procurement was created in the public sector and was observed in 
many sectors, specifically in hospitals and schools (Ruane, 2000, Economic Affairs 
Committee, 2009).  
It is notable that central government departments were required to issue accounts using 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) in 2009. Under IFRS, the British 
PFIs which are substantially controlled by the public sector should be brought on to the 
departments’ balance sheets. This differs from the UK GAAP (Heald, 2009). These 
changes in public sector accounting standards caused conflict between the department 
accounts which adopted IFRS and the National Accounts which adopted UK accounting 
standards. In order to solve this conflict, the Treasury put forward a compromise 
solution that required the departments to produce a second set of accounts in line with 
the old UK GAAP which would be consistent with the National Accounts. 
Consequently, the NAO (2009) demonstrated that the majority [of PFIs] would still not 
be included in the statistics of the Public Sector Net Debt.  
Finally, as suggested by the Economic Affair Committee’s report (2009), there should 
be greater clarity about financial liabilities arising from PFIs. The government may use 
PFIs as a ‘credit card’. However, at least, ‘brief statistical information should also be 
supplied as to the distribution of these liabilities across a series of separate categories. 
This should reflect the differences in the extent of risk transfer away from the public 
sector’ ( Economic Affairs Committee, 2009:18). Otherwise there would be a danger 
that the governments would lose control of their public financial management.  
The NAO’s (2010) recent findings stated that, in late 2007, market confidence in the 
providers of this form of credit insurance collapsed, leaving PFI projects in the United 
Kingdom without access to the capital markets. As a result, a number of the PFI projects 
were delayed and had to be finalized by the government and private contractors. 
Furthermore, following the continued Financial Crisis in 2008, the debt finances of PFI 
were not readily available and were strictly accessed. Finally, the Treasury had to build 
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the Infrastructure Finance Unit in 2009 to help private contractors finalise and enforce 
the PFI contracts by providing ‘public finances’. The worst case is the Metronet’s 
failure, according to the NAO (2010), due to a number of mistakes in contract design 
and management. Eventually, the government has to cover 95% of the billions lost in 
the project value. 
 
3.4.4. Value-for money: the myth of the British PFI? 
 
The Labour government (Treasury, 2003a, 2009a) claimed that the ultimate objective of 
the PFIs was to achieve value-for money. Although the concept of value for money was 
first used as a management tool by the government of New Zealand (De Lamos et. al., 
2003), Britain may be the first country in the world to require their PFI programmes and 
projects to demonstrate value-for money. This was very different element that from 
BOT and other forms of PPP models in the developing countries, such as China. 
Therefore, a number of studies and research (Qin and Yu, 2005, Leigland and Shugart, 
2006) were interested in this concept and its real implementation in the UK. While it 
can be seen that the majority of debates surround value-for money by looking at past 
studies in the UK, a large amount of the research and reporting done on this concept and 
its application, included asking some key questions: e.g. what is value for money? How 
do the British PFIs ensure value for money can be achieved and by what means, and 
under what conditions? Whether value for money was achieved in the British PFIs?   
First of all, it can be seen that ‘value for money’ is an absolute concept (as a 
performance audit), as the Treasury claimed that ‘The central proposition should always 
be that PFIs should only be pursued where they deliver value for money (VfM), and 
where VfM is the optimum combination of whole life cost and quality (or fitness for 
purpose) to meet the user’s requirement…’ (H.M. Treasury, 2004: 3). It required that 
private contractors deliver the services and outputs that had been clearly defined in the 
PFI contracts, in terms of costs, time, qualities and quantities. The government was 
aware of the importance of these clear outputs and other requirements for the PFI 
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projects. A list of favourable preconditions were set out when the PFI option was 
considered, because the Treasury required that the proposed PFI projects should have 
clear boundaries and measurable output performance (Treasury, 1997). The structure of 
the service should be appropriate, allowing the public sector to define its needs. Service 
outputs can be adequately contracted for in a way that ensures effective and accountable 
delivery of public services into the long-term, and where risk allocation between public 
and private sectors can be clearly made and enforced (Treasury, 2004, 2006b). Although 
this intention of the government is good, the practice of PFIs made it difficult to realise 
in practice, given the measurement challenges on specified outputs within public 
infrastructure and services (Pollitt, 2005).   
At the same time, value for money is also a relative concept in the British PFI (as a 
benchmark or comparative tool of management accounting). The NAO stated: ‘It also 
requires demonstrating, as a relative concept that better value for money is being 
achieved than through other forms of procurement. That comparison depends on 
identifying a counter-factual or comparator project’ (NAO, 2009a: 9).  
The analysis on the PFI’s framework and procedures showed that the implementation of 
the PFI heavily relied on the comparisons with conventional procurement in the public 
sector (PSCs or quantitative tests in value for money tests). It is a good idea in principle 
to compare and clarify the costs, risks and benefits of private finance projects with that 
of the public funded cases (PSC). However, the major flaw of the PSC is that it is too 
heavily dependent on hypothetical, risk-adjusted costs (Ruane, 2004).  
PSCs have undergone considerable debate concerning their reliability, accuracy, 
complexity and relevance in the contexts in which they have come to be used (Coulson, 
2005; Shauol, et al., 2005, NAO, 2009a): Firstly, the PSC’s calculations on costs are not 
accurate, it is impossible to precisely estimate all costs (whole life costs) of running a 
project over a thirty year period. Secondly, identifying and valuing the risks that could 
happen in the next thirty years is not feasible and will be discussed in the next section. 
Thirdly, there are wide arguments about the discount rate used in the PSC calculations 
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(Pollock, et. al, 2007, Sussex, 2001). Fourthly, the results and costs of the PSC can be 
manipulated and adjusted subjectively (PAC, 2003). PFI deals can always be ‘cheaper’ 
(PAC, 2003, 2009). Finally, the uses of PSCs are expensive and time consuming, but not 
easy to understand, as the Audit Commission (2003) found in many school PFI cases. 
Given much data was not available, the low-transparency of the contractual information 
and arrangements and the subjective error-ridden financial modelling in the quantitative 
tests, the government found it difficult to achieve the precise value for money 
judgements. A little mistake may lead to a wrong decisions by the authorities. It was 
argued there are a number of flaws and matters (e.g. discount rates and the costs of risks 
transfer in PFI proposal’s evaluations) that would impact on the fairness and accuracy 
of the value-for money tests in practice (Sussex, 2001, Broadbent et. al, 2004).  
The Treasury inserted qualitative tests in the value for money assessments based on 
previous lessons, trying to improve the decision-making processes in their PFI’s 
appraisal (H.M. Treasury, 2003b, 2006b). However, this still cannot fundamentally 
change the drawbacks of the value for money tests that are currently applied in the UK. 
Factors that make the value for money tests in the PFI programme lose relevance with 
real practices include: the institutional bias on the conventional procurement methods, a 
number of costs and benefits in PFI, and non-PPP procurement that cannot be quantified, 
and the problematic and complex financial models.  
Bult-spiering and Dewulf (2008) argued that value-for money is politically easy to sell 
but hard to quantify. Even the advocates of PFIs worldwide, the PPIAF (Leigland and 
Shugart, 2006) are not suggesting that developing countries copy the value for money 
assessments and PSC’ practice of British PFIs, instead of addressing the ideas and 
principles. Therefore, it can be seen the ideas of value for money and PSCs are good, 
but the problem is how to put them into practice and reach the right decisions.  
Official studies and evaluations produced by the Treasury (H.M. Treasury, 2003, PUK, 
2006, 4Ps, 2008) have always claimed that value-for money has been widely achieved 
in the majority of PFI projects in the past. However, negative experiences and evidence 
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were still found in a number of studies (Gaffney and Pollock 1999; Price et al. 1999; 
Ruane 2000, Ball et al. 2000; Akintoye et al. 2003; Shaoul, 2005). Even, the NAO 
(2009a: 20) reported that about 20% of the projects they had examined had clearly 
failed to achieve VfM, normally due to poor tendering or contract management. 
Finally, if value for money could be achieved in the PFI, it largely relied on other 
factors and arrangements of the programme and project: such as the risks transfer and 
allocations, contracts management and monitoring, the competition in the tendering 
phase and the capabilities of the public and private stakeholders. These are discussed in 
later sections in more detail.  
 
3.4.5. PFI and the Risks Transferred   
Since the first PFI was instigated in 1992, one of the important claims of the 
government is that PFIs should transfer risks from the public sector to the private 
contractors. The Private Finance Panel (1995a) commented that a PFI has to meet only 
two requirements to be approved: the public sector needs to secure value for money and 
also transfer the appropriate risks to the private sector. Many researchers and the 
government identified that value for money and risk transfers are interconnected. ‘Risk 
transfer has been considered the linchpin of value for money in PFI schemes and it is a 
key criterion in testing value for money’ (Gao and Handley-Schachler, 2003: 28). As 
discussed in section 3.1, under British PFI arrangements, private contractors are were 
usually responsible for project’ design, construction, finance and operation, so the 
government claimed many risks had been transferred from the public sector to the 
private sector. 
However, in practice there are some obstacles to transferring risks in a PFI. The first 
problem is to identify and quantify the risks relevant to the PFI project. The private 
Finance Panel (1995) identified six principal risks associated with PFI projects in 1995. 
However, later studies conducted by Gaillimore et. al. (1997), Akintoy et. al. (1998), 
Akintoy et. al. (2003) and Bing et. al. (2005) demonstrated that many more risks were 
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involved in PFI projects following the programme’s wider implementation in the UK. 
Gaillimore et. al. (1997) investigated and classified ten risks in PFI projects, Akintoy et. 
al. (1998) found twenty-six principal risks that had been observed and reviewed in a 
PFI’s planning, procurement and operation; and Bing et. al. (2005) listed forty-six risks 
in the private finance projects from macro to project levels. Earlier studies on the risks 
associated with PFI projects showed that both the public client and the private sector 
had limited knowledge and understanding of risk allocation and management, and for 
the public procurement bodies, such commercial skills were generally weak across all 
central departments (PAC, 2009, NAO, 2009). Although the Treasury had issued 
guidance on such topics in the Green Book (Treasury, 2003 b) and other departmental 
documents. There were also risk management and evaluation tools based on the 
guidelines (H.M. Treasury, 2006b) from the government. Despite there are still some 
risks that were not easily identified, allocated and priced by the public client and private 
contractor, and problems arose. Evidence from the transport industry showed that both 
the public procurement authorities and the private contractors had difficulty accurately 
examining and predicting the major risks in long-term projects (Shaoul, et. al., 2006, 
Edwards, et.al., 2004, NAO, 2006). In the Channel Tunnel PPP project, the demands 
and revenue of the project was overestimated and, the actual passenger numbers were 
only about one third of what was forecast (NAO, 2006). In some shadow toll road PFI 
projects, the demand risks were underestimated, public authorities needed to raise a 
large amount of money from the private sector (Edwards, et. al., 2004). At the same 
time, due to the fact that most risks should be identified and allocated in the 
procurement and negotiations phase before the PFI contracts were finalized, both the 
public and private sector may not have enough data and information about the risks they 
faced in the lifetime of the contract. It is extremely difficult to predict and quantify the 
value of risks over a thirty year period (incomplete contract matter). Akintoye et. al. 
(1998) found that some private contractors had debated that 30 year (PFI) contracts are 
not workable and that, there were too many risks that cannot be predicted, identified and 
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valued in advance. These included predicting interest rates over a period which is not 
feasible but it is directly related to the contractors’ financing risks.  
The second issue is the allocation of the risks. The government claimed that not all risks 
can be transferred to the private contractors under the PFI contract. Instead, PFIs aim to 
allocate risks to the parties best able to manage them. As preconditions for applying a 
PFI and achieving value for money, the government required ‘risk transfer to the service 
provider to be commercial in nature and controllable’ (Spackman,2002), ‘…risk 
allocation between public and private sectors should be clearly made and 
enforced, …risks are capable of being costed on a whole-of-life, long-term basis’ 
(Treasury, 2006b: 6). Bing et. al. (2005) reviewed the risks mentioned in previous 
reports about PFIs, suggesting that the allocation of the risks in a PFI is not an easy task. 
The study (Bing et. al. 2005) revealed there are still a number of risks that cannot be 
clarified and allocated between the public and private parties of the contract, it 
considered case by case, for instances, the risks associated with level of public support, 
project approval and permits, contract variation and lack of experience. Debates 
surrounding risk transfer and allocation are also explored by other researchers, Froud 
and Shaoul (2001: 252) argued how much risk should be transferred (to the private 
contractor in the PFI) is a matter of some ‘ambiguity’, even when very little risk has 
been transferred and/or ‘a very narrow concept of risk’ has been defined.  
Moreover, as Akintoye et. al. (1998) found the public sector client may overestimate the 
willingness and capabilities of the private sector on sharing the related risks of a PFI 
project. The findings (ibid, 1998) suggested that the private sector are also averse to risk, 
and try to minimize as much as possible in the PFI project. They are only able and 
willing to manage (and value) the risks under their control. There are many risks that lie 
outside the control of the contractors, and are not transferable. The authors found 
private contractors only focus on the risks that threaten their profit levels (e.g. design 
risks, construction costs, cost overrun risks), while the client may pay more attention  
to those risks which threatened the timing, availabilities and performance of the asset 
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and the commissioning risks. In other words, the public client and private contractors 
have different incentives and interests on sharing the risks in the PFI. Therefore, risk 
allocations are often not clear and can become a point of controversy between the two 
parties in the PFI contract.   
Which risks have been genuinely transferable in current PFI projects and which have 
not? A recent study (Economic Affairs Committee, 2009) demonstrated that the 
construction and maintenance risks are usually seen as suitable for transfer to the private 
sector, whereas activities over which the private contractor is seen as having little or no 
influence have not. This is because the private sector is usually better placed to manage 
construction risk (to secure their profits), such as building on time and on-budget and 
the risks involved in providing maintenance over the asset’s lifetime. In addition, 
Coulson (2005) argued that if the government only wanted to deal with the risks 
associated with the project’s cost overrun and construction delays, then a short-term 
‘fixed price contract’ should be chosen, rather than a long-term costly PFI contract.  
The report and evidence from the Committee on Economic Affairs, the House of Lords 
(2009) also noted that besides construction and maintenance, it is unclear what other 
risks the public sector seeks to transfer and to what extent. The study indicated that 
some important risks are still retained by the public sector clients. It is significant in a 
number of road, transport, hospital and school cases, that the public procurement 
authorities usually retain major risks related to demands (Economic Affairs Committee, 
the House of Lord, 2009, volume II: 281). As explored by some studies (Edwards, et. al., 
2004, Flynn, 2007, NAO, 2009b), the ultimate and major risks in PFIs were kept in the 
public sector in many cases, given that annual payments and unitary charges were 
guaranteed by the public procurement bodies. Meanwhile the public clients of PFI 
contracts were not always fully aware of the issues until the whole PFI project had 
become inoperable, such as the London Underground PPPs, the Metronet collapse, the 
Benefits Payment Card Project, National Insurance Recording System (NIRS2) etc. 
Pollock and Price (2008) debated that the evaluations on the relationship between risk 
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transfer and risk premium in PFI contracts was not well conducted during post-contract 
phases by the public sector. In principle, if private contractors assumed more risks, they 
would get higher returns (risk premium). However, Edwards, et. al., (2004) and Shaoul 
et. al. (2005) found that the public sector paid too much premium to the PFI contractors 
for just transferring construction and cost overrun risks in road projects. By reviewing 
the reports of the NAO in the last few decades, the post-contract risks management and 
evaluation were only addressed in the financial inquiring into ten projects (Pollock and 
Price, 2008). Even with these ten cases, only three of them examined the relationship 
between risk transfer and risk premium. The government, including central 
governmental departments and the auditing bodies have no clear data and information 
on what risks have been transferred to what extent and in what ways in PFI projects. 
This is due to the absence of proper and accurate risk evaluation and control in PFI 
operational phases. A recent study on risk transfer and management in defence PFI 
projects was undertaken by the NAO (2008) endorsing the conclusions of Pollock and 
Rice (2008): underdeveloped robust systems to monitor and manage ongoing risks were 
found in five of eight projects with the government having insufficient means and tools 
to identify and measure what risks were transferred and to what extent.  
NAO (2009a, 2008) also commented that risk allocation and management are not easy 
tasks, and will often involve a number of techniques including financial analysis, 
negotiation and the following of best practice and guidance (see the guidance of the 
H.M. Treasury). The NAO (2009a) believed that delivery of real risk transfer depends 
on a good contract. It suggested (NAO, 2008), that both the public clients and the 
private contractors needed to follow the Treasury’s Standardisation of PFI contracts 
(SoPC) Version 4 which was the latest version of the standard wording and guidance to 
be used by public sector bodies and their advisers when drafting PFI contracts. However, 
due to the incompleteness and the long maturity of the PFI contract, effectiveness on 
allocating and controlling risks is in doubts. Another problem is that real PFI contracts 
were rarely open to the public due to commercial confidentiality. Academics and 
140 
 
researchers cannot access these documents at all, which seriously restricts the 
information available relating to risk identification, valuation and transfer. Finally, the 
public client does not pay enough attention to new risks that may be created by the use 
of PFI, such as ‘opportunistic behaviour of the private contractors’ and ‘the lock-in 
effects’ of the long term contract’. This will be discussed in the next section. The NAO 
(2009a: 54) admitted ‘there is no simple checklist of things to do to manage such 
commercial risks (introduced by PFI contracts)’. 
 
3.4.6. The British PFI as a contracting method: the lessons from the UK  
There are a number of the strategic and theoretical issues surrounding the 
implementation and management of PFIs in terms of contract design, negotiations, 
management and monitoring. The first question is why and when a PFI contract could 
be used? In other words, why not use conventional procurement in a similar situation? If 
the PFI is no better (value for money) than the conventional procurement, why would 
the government use a PFI? Therefore, the value-for money tests were introduced into 
the PFIs’ appraisal and evaluation to judge if the PFI is better than the public 
procurement approach. The flaws and drawbacks of the value for money tests and PSCs 
have been discussed in previous sections. However, putting these arguments aside, there 
are still several matters related to the contracting PFI that need discussion. 
 
3.4.6.1 PFI is an expensive contracting method to develop public infrastructure and 
services in the UK: the considerations on the transactions costs and other extra cost 
As the theory of the Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1996) indicates 
contracting is a complicated method, which needs to be concerned with the transaction 
costs incurred by the preparation, tendering, bidding, and negotiating, enforcing, 
monitoring and evaluating processes. In the cases of British PFIs, these costs were 
presented as consulting fees for legal, financial and technical advisors by both the public 
and private sectors. They include the extra financing and interests costs of private 
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finances, the insurance charges related to the PFI projects, costs of enforcing and 
monitoring the contractual promises, and the costs associated with breaches of 
contractual arrangements etc. If these transaction costs associated with the PFI projects 
are much higher than the benefits brought in by the PFI, the project will not be worth 
the expense.  
The reviews of Economic Affairs Committee, the House of Lords (2009, Volume II) 
showed that the average transaction cost (the financing costs, consulting and negotiating 
costs etc.) in a British PFI project is around 8%-10% of the contract defined as capital 
value (similar with the findings of Edwards et. al., 2004). This is much higher than that 
for a conventional public funded project. Given the high transaction costs in the PFI 
approach, ‘value for money’ can only be achieved by reducing costs of similar services, 
or providing an improved service at the same cost, or a combination of both. Therefore, 
one key question is whether or not the extra costs associated with private finance in a 
PFI have been offset by the improvements in performance of production. In this respect, 
the existing evidence is inconclusive, unclear and very controversial in some cases. The 
Audit Commission (2003) reviewed cases from school PFIs and non-PPP projects. They 
found there was not much difference between privately financed and conventional 
public funded projects, in terms of construction time, quality and design. However, PFI 
projects may be more complicated and expensive. Based on the British road PFI 
projects’ studies, Edwards, et. al.(2004) argued that the relevant transaction costs of the 
PFI are much higher, although some risks in the construction phase have been 
transferred to private contractors. The authors also questioned if it was worth paying too 
much risk premium to private contractors just for transferring construction risks. Shaoul 
et. al. (2008), Pollock and Rice (2010) and BBC (2007) also argued that the high 
interest costs and huge long term debts of PFI hospitals caused financial difficulties and 
budget inflexibilities for the public authorities. In the cases of Norfolk and Norwich 
Hospital PFI, Edinburgh Royal Infirmary PFI and University of Coventry Hospital PFI, 
the costs of the PFI were much higher than conventional routes. The Treasury (2003a) 
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also discouraged small projects with a capital value of less than £20 million for adopting 
the PFI approach, due to the high transaction costs (Treasury, 2003a). Therefore, 
researchers questioned if PFIs are too expensive to adopt. In addition, the high 
transaction costs in the PFI projects may make on impact on other perspectives of PFI 
procurement, for example, the high bidding and negotiating costs with the public sector 
may scare away potential bidders. This could lead to weak competitions amongst a 
smaller number of companies that are able to afford these costs (PAC, 2003). 
3.4.6.2 The incompleteness of British PFIs contracts 
The secondary problem with the PFI contract is the incompleteness of the contract itself. 
From both a theoretical and practical perspective, the effectiveness of the PFI contract 
was limited when it was applied to managing public services or infrastructure 
development, because of the incomplete contract and such a long timescale included 
(Flynn, 2007). The central and theoretical debate is that neither side in the PFI contract 
are able to make complete optimal decisions for the contract’s negotiation and design, 
due to a lack of information. It is also impossible for them to take account of all the 
information available in some areas during in the decision process (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). As the Transaction Cost Economics (Ménard and Shirley eds., 2005) 
suggested: PFI differs from ‘spot’ contract (cash and carry contract) or short-term 
contracts, because the duration of a PFI contract is long and the future is difficult to 
predict, it becomes absolutely impossible to create a complete contract and very costly 
to achieve coverage of all foreseen contingences. The PFI contract generally lasts about 
thirty years, but is impossible for both parties to define all possible events or 
contingencies and risks for this period. In fact, a number of studies addressed the issues 
of the incomplete contract for the British PFI at an earlier stage. The Construction 
Industry Council (2000) noted, ‘Because PFI contracts are of such long duration, they 
must necessarily be incomplete, to the degree to which we cannot draw up, in advances, 
a complete set of clauses dealing with every set of circumstances that might arise. Even 
if we could, it would be very costly to do so’ (CIC, 2000: 18). The Treasury (2006), and 
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that the PAC (2008), NAO (2008) and Shaoul et. al., (2008) also noticed the 
incompleteness of the PFI contracts, the way of the government was to standardise and 
made contract ‘relatively complete’, depending on the lessons and experiences learnt in 
previous PFIs. In the last ten years, three big adjustments to the PFI Standardized 
Contracts (SoPC) models have been made by the Treasury. Some lessons and detailed 
explanations on the specific clauses were introduced into the new versions of the model 
contract. The numbers of pages of the SoPC increased from under 100 in its first version 
in 1999, to 349 pages in the fourth version in 2007. The improvements of the SoPC in 
the last ten years indicated the incompleteness of PFI contracts. However, many 
resulting events and contingencies may still not be realized by both the public and 
private sector.  
 
3.4.6.3 PFI contract: introducing new risks for public projects  
The success of the PFI projects largely depends on the design, content and quality of the 
contract. In a British PFI contract, the risk allocations, the specific requirements and 
outputs, and the payment and pricing mechanisms were written into the contract. The 
three purposes of the PFI contract as claimed by the H.M. Treasury (2007) were: ‘First, 
to promote a common understanding of the main risks which are encountered in a 
standard PFI project; secondly, to allow consistency of approach and pricing across a 
range of similar projects; and thirdly, to reduce the time and costs of negotiation by 
enabling all parties concerned to agree a range of areas that can follow a standard 
approach without extended negotiations’ (H.M Treasury, SoPC 4, 2007:1). However. as 
mentioned in the last section, since the PFI contract almost by definition will be 
incomplete, not all risks and outputs were essentially and clearly inclusive and written 
into the PFI agreements. Therefore, when the PFI was adopted, it was argued that new 
risks relating to the contract may be inevitably introduced at same time (Froud and 
Shaoul, 2001). 
The first risk is the opportunism within both parties of the PFI contract. Opportunism 
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refers to ‘the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially with 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse’ 
(Williamson, 1985: 47). Both parties in the contract may keep their own ‘information 
private’ and this leads to ‘information asymmetry’, ‘adverse selection’, and ‘moral 
hazard’. Self-interested mis-behaviour is made possible by both parties’ lack of certain 
knowledge (Williamson, 1985). The incompleteness and long maturity of a PFI contract 
and the information asymmetry between the client and contractors, could finally result 
in private contractors’ using opportunistic behaviour in the implementation of the 
contract at both  pre and post-contractual stages. Examples of this opportunism include 
raising charges, reducing the quality of the service provision, cutting down on 
maintenance, and avoiding investments in uneconomic project components (Koppenjam, 
2008). In fact, the principal-agent theory also examined opportunism in the contracting 
process. The theory suggested that it is difficult to measure the performances of the 
agent (the PFI contractor), since the day-to-day management information is not known 
by the public clients. The incomplete contracts, flawed clauses and transfer over of staff 
who used to work for public agents, make it almost impossible to clearly regulate and 
monitor PFI contractors’ performances and operations. PFI contractors may only focus 
on their interests and behave opportunistically, to get a higher return on their 
investments. The NAO (2009) and the Committee of Public Account (2009) found that 
the PFI project managers and public clients did not usually test the ongoing services 
delivered by the private suppliers under PFI arrangements and that performance 
measurements were actually absent in some cases. As Lansdale (2005: 73) commented 
‘Opportunistic suppliers are always looking for circumstances that will allow them to 
generate higher returns from a relationship. In the PFI context, the higher returns could 
come from the passing back of risk. The scope for suppliers to do this will be increased 
if the governments have been unable to sign complete contracts.’  
The second risk of contracting is where the public sector are ‘locked-in’ to the PFI 
agreement with the private sector, due to the long maturity and inflexibility of the PFI 
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contract. As Lonsdale (2005:70 ) argued ‘In many PFI projects, the public body 
becomes asymmetrically locked-in to the private sector provider extremely quickly – 
sometimes even before the contract is signed – and is in no position to enforce the risk 
transfer arrangement. A situation of asymmetric lock-in exists where one party is 
locked-in to a relationship to a much greater extent than the other party.’ As the author 
commented further (ibid, 2005), although the ‘lock-in’ may often happen in  
conventional projects too, the long maturity of a PFI contract makes this problem worse. 
Since almost all of the British PFIs are guaranteed and paid for by the public procuring 
bodies through annual payments and unitary charges that were defined in the contracts. 
Heald (2003) revealed that the public sector was actually locked into long-term 
payments for services which may later not be needed. The University Hospital of 
Coventry PFI is a typical case of this. Froud’s (2003: 582) also commented that ‘. . . the 
PFI contract reduced the ability of the public sector to deal with uncertainty, by locking 
the state into contracts typically over 20 or 30 years (or longer) and reducing the 
flexibility to respond to a dynamic environment’. NAO (2009) noticed it is inevitable 
that changes will be required during the life of a private finance contract. However, 
making changes requires negotiation to change the contractual specification. 
Contractors often use such negotiations as a way of enhancing their profitability which 
leads to further risk for the government in PFI contracts.  
The third challenge for using the PFI contracting model is hold-up issues. In PFI 
projects, if the government has made asset-specific investments with private suppliers, 
then an asymmetrical dependence relationship develops, making it difficult to allow the 
public sector to change the contract conditions to its advantage after the contract is 
signed. Even supporters of the PFI (Pollitt, 2000, p19) revealed that it would be 
expensive to break PFI contracts even if they were proved to not be meeting social 
needs. It may also be difficult and expensive to renegotiate service delivery terms. 
Therefore, under PFI arrangements, both the private sector and the government face 
potential hold up problems where one party can take advantage of the changing 
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circumstances to increase the cost to the other party if situations arise which was not 
specified carefully in the original contract. The NAO (2009a) reported that most private 
sector PFI partners charged an additional management fee of 5-10 per cent for changes 
(of the contract clauses or specific requirements) which was not justified by the work 
needed to process them. Even, smaller changes were relatively expensive and took 
longer to process than in non-PFI projects. 
In addition, private parties can threaten bankruptcy or actively aim for it. Since the 
government ultimately has an interest in a completed project which will be operated 
properly, it will feel compelled to intervene in order to save the project. The course of 
events regarding the bankruptcy of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link in the UK is an 
example of this (Lonsdale, 2005). Both the government of the UK and France had to 
provide financial aid to complete the projects.  
3.4.6.4 The cooperation between government and the private sector within PFI 
contracts  
From Transaction Costs Economics’ perspectives (Williamson, 1985, 1996) suggested 
that the government should establish ‘relational contracts’ with private partners. In PFI 
cases, the UK’s government claimed (Treasury, 2006) it would build and ‘strengthen 
long term partnerships in their PFIs with the private sector, these attempts can be 
deemed as the authorities’ trying to build a ‘long term’ relational contract but with an 
‘incomplete contract’. The public sector expected to build a ‘relational contract’  to 
achieve ‘value for money’, risk transfer, innovation and effective management skills 
from the private sector in the long term, say 25-30 years for a PFI contract rather than 
develop ‘an adversarial relationship’.  
However, there is no simple solution for building such a relationship in practice. In 
many failed PFI projects in the UK, opportunistic behaviour at ex-ante and ex-post 
contracting phases were found (a form of adversarial relationship) (Ruane, 2002). The 
NAO (2009a: 55) explained this phenomenon as: ‘A traditional customer-supplier 
relationship (in the PFI) which often leads to decision-making which is not focused on 
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the business as a whole. This type of behaviour can lead to missed opportunities to 
achieve wider objectives’. The 4Ps (2005) claimed that the good relationships have been 
widely formed in a number cases they observed. However, as the NAO (2009a) found 
that in many PFIs, the relationships between the authorities and private contractors were 
just ‘us and them’ rather than relational contracting built on ‘trust’ and ‘cooperation’ for 
the long term. The NAO (ibid, 2009a) and the 4Ps (2005) also believed that the right 
contractual framework and working culture, and alignment incentives of client and 
contractors are important for partnership working. However, these conditions are still 
absent in many cases. Yescombe (2007) argued the difficulty in forming a good 
partnership between the public sector and the private contractor in a PFIs is the 
mismatched ‘interests’, expectations and incentives. Under the PFI framework, the 
private sector’s interests are always to get their payments and make profits with 
minimum risks, through fulfilling contract required ‘out-put’ rather than achieving 
‘value for money’. It is difficult to form such close relationships between public and 
private sectors under PFI framework.  
 
3.4.6.5 Managing and monitoring the PFI contracts  
The NAO (2009: 2) argued that public authorities need to improve management of 
contracts, because there exists: ‘A culture of focus on making the deal rather than 
thinking about contract management is still, prevalent in many quarters of the public 
sector’. This is especially true for public procurement authorities that need to ensure 
that they get the quality of assets and services that they specified in the PFI contract. 
Differing from the price regulations of the fully privatized industries in the UK, the 
British PFI is regulated by the contract in principle. In theory, PFI contracts are 
essentially a performance management ‘checklist’ where the contractors report their 
own performance against the set of performance indicators specified. Monitoring and 
managing the performances of the PFI are important means and incentives to drive the 
suppliers and contractors to perform well. The authorities need to make payments or 
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charge penalties to private contractors based on their performance, claimed the 
government (Robinson and Scott, 2009). The PFI contract should make financial 
incentives to encourage suppliers to improve performance in theory. The suppliers 
surveyed also agreed that incentives did encourage them to perform (PAC, 2009). 
However, the Committee of Public Accounts (The PAC, 2009: 5) found that central 
government does not pay sufficient attention to contract management. The committee 
suggested the government needs to ensure that service levels and value for money are 
maintained over the duration of the contract. As PAC (ibid, 2009) reviewed, in most 
cases, central government regularly collects performance information and discusses 
performance with suppliers, but key performance indicators are not always updated to 
keep pace with the changing business requirements. The NAO (2009) added that project 
managers in PFI projects were not always reporting the faults and under-performance 
information, thereby very few penalties were applied to contractors. Public clients do 
not always enforce the contract and sometimes they fear that applying penalties will 
harm their relationship with the contractors and cause further performance issues. The 
Office of Government Commerce (OGC) also admitted that there would also have been 
instances where penalties had not been applied but should have been (PAC, 2009).  
Furthermore, by reviewing the performance and management of hospital PFI contracts, 
the evidence of NAO (2010) showed nine of the 76 PFI contracts (12%) had no one 
assigned to contract management. The effectiveness of PFI contracts monitoring and 
management also suffered from this transparency and availability of associated data 
from both the PFI and non-PFI projects. As a part of value-for money tests in a PFI, 
public authorities need to conduct ‘market tests’ or benchmarking at post-contractual 
stages. This is crucial for PFI service pricing and measurement. However, in hospital 
PFIs it becomes impossible because the NHS stopped collecting relevant data in 2008.  
Robinson and Scott (2008: 181) questioned the complexity of the performance 
measurements and the inadequate resources for performance monitoring. The 
difficulties in the interpretation of the output specification raised questions as to 
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whether the low level of deductions truly reflected the actual level of services delivered 
by the PFI contracts. Given this evidence, if the government and public clients do not 
enforce the contract and monitor the performance of the private contractor carefully, the 
PFI contract would be pointless and the value for money will be at risk.  
In fact, the poor evaluations and performance measurements of PFI contracts at the 
post-implementation stages had been argued by the PAC (2001). Their main questions 
about the post-contract management of a PFI included:  
 Has value for money been declined after the contract-letting?  
 Has benchmarking been done properly?  
 Did the private contractors get an extra high rate of return from the PFI projects?  
 Are there any risks that have been transferred or not to private contractors?  
In 2001, the PAC had already suggested the government department should pay 
attention on these issues. However, later studies (NAO, 2009, Committee on Economic 
Affairs, the House of Lords, 2009, PAC, 2009) found the problems are still there 
without significant improvements.  
3.4.6.6 Lack of expertise, experiences and skills in the public sector in operational 
phase 
As the NAO (2009a) showed, a large number of technical, legal and commercial 
advisors were brought in to the contract tendering, negotiating and finalizing stages, to 
ensure that the contract is based on the right commercial terms, and negotiating properly 
carried out. However, after the contract-letting, the majority of the expertise and 
advisors were withdrawn and only a small portion of the expertise (less than a quarter) 
stayed to manage and monitor the contract (PAC, 2001). ‘A lack of staff continuity 
from the tendering to the contract management stages made it harder to achieve a high 
standard of contract management, and caused loss of technical and commercial 
knowledge. A change in staff made it harder to establish effective relationships between 
the public authority and the contractors’ NAO (2009a: 59). By reviewing privately 
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financed projects since 1997, the PAC (2009) found that the procurement authorities 
often underestimate the amount of resources needed for contract management. Some 
public authorities do not employ a full-time contract manager, leaving key risks 
unmonitored and unmanaged. There is a shortage of commercial and project 
management skills needed to manage private finance and other major complex projects 
across government. There is insufficient training for contract managers across 
government, and also limited career structures. 
In addition, NAO (2009a) found that public authorities often over rely on external 
advisors to fill this gap in the short-term. This may bring many benefits, e.g. the spread 
of skills between projects. However, it also incurred higher transaction costs. 
Meanwhile, departmental staff will not be taking responsibility for commercial 



















3.5  The General lessons of the PFI applied in the UK  
The PFIs have been used in a wide range of social and infrastructure projects since 1992, 
but there are conflicting views on the uses of private finance in the public infrastructure 
and social services. The supporters (H.M. Treasury, 2000, 2003, 2006, PUK, 2007) say 
that private capital at risk has brought much-needed vigour and efficiency to building 
and maintenance of the public infrastructure and delivered more than would have been 
possible without them. However, the opponents (Gaffney and Pollock 1999; Price et al. 
1999; Ruane, 2000, Ball et al. 2000; Akintoye et al. 2003; Shaoul, 2005, Pollock and 
Rice, 2010) argued PFIs are expensive and inflexible, and a drain on conventional 
public service budgets. They are a policy for the governments to evade public spending 
rules and fudge national accounts by excluding PFI liabilities. They also debated that 
real risk transfer takes place in the PFI projects (Committee on Economic Affairs, the 
House of Lords, 2009). Several criticized the increasing powers of the private sector 
leading to benefits to themselves rather than to the taxpayers. Finally, there is also a 
compromise view point offered by the IPPR (2000), Spackman (2001), Pollitt (2005) 
and NAO (2009),  where they explained that ‘Private finance can deliver benefits, but 
is not always suitable at any price nor in every circumstance’ (NAO, 2009a :5). The 
IPPR (2002), the think tank of the Labour Party believed that, the PFI is not suitable for 
all industries, but it seems they performed well in the road and prisons industries, rather 
than in health and school sectors. Spackman (2002) and Pollitt (2005) recognized there 
are some issues and obstacles in the applications of PFIs, however these can be 
corrected and improved in any proposed projects in the future.   
Based upon the debates and issues of the PFI, experiences and lessons can be drawn, 
covering both the central programmes and the individual project’s levels. Firstly, 
judging whether the government can get what they have claimed from the PFI’s 
application. The experience from the UK shows the government uses PFI like a super 
‘credit card’ to develop public infrastructure and services, but paying for them in the 
future. PFI does bring private investments, but this is not additional to the government’s 
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budget, since the costs of PFI are substantially and entirely funded by the public sector, 
in the form of annual payments or unitary charges to the private sector over the next 
thirty-years. PFIs were also widely criticized as off balance sheet finance may produce 
future problems and put public financial management at risk. It was suggested therefore, 
that the potential debts and liabilities raised from the use of PFIs should be present in 
the government’s financial statements, in order to maintain transparency and better 
management of the public purse and assets.  
Secondly, the government hoped to achieve ‘value for money’ in delivering public 
facilities and services by utilising PFI schemes. This expectation was not easy to realise 
in practice. The higher cost of private borrowing and high transaction costs associated 
with PFI procurement and contracts. Plus the high premiums for risk transfer resulted in 
PFI deals being less economic than expected. It is also a good idea to set up a public 
sector comparator when evaluating whether a PFI proposal should be accepted or not in 
the planning and appraisal phases. However, the government needs to establish reliable 
value for monetary assessments to enable valid comparisons between the performance 
of a PFI project with a conventional procurement. The value for money assessment of 
PFI in the UK usually justified the project on very narrow criteria at the very earlier 
stages of procurement. Some costs and risks brought in by PFI were not fully addressed 
and properly valued in the decision-making process. In addition, the public client of the 
PFI seemed to lack sufficient measures to secure value for money in the post-contract 
and operational stages. There is a greater need for increased transparency in the way 
that value for money is tested, especially in the allocation and valuation of risk transfer 
from the public sector to private contractors.  
Thirdly, it is widely agreed that PFI is a long-term contract involving construction, 
services and facilities maintenance and operation. The uses of the contract can bring 
benefits, as well as extra costs and risks. It was suggested by the Transaction Costs 
Economics, especially in public infrastructure and service sectors where they is usually 
a natural monopoly, that inputs and outputs are difficult to measure accurately. Due to 
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the incompleteness and longevity of PFI contracts, the uses of PFI may be expensive 
and bring some hold-up and lock-in risks to the public sector. The PFI contract is also 
inflexible, even small adjustments to the clauses or requirements of the contracts may 
be expensive for the public sector. The TCEs suggested that the relationships between 
public client and private sector should be strengthened to form a relational contract 
when the PFI is adopted. However, the evidence from the UK proved such relationships 
have not been built between the public sector and private contractors in most cases. 
Finally, public authorities were recommended to improve the management and 
monitoring of the PFI contracts in operational phases, to ensure that the private 
contractors delivered quality assets and services as required and specified in the  
contract.   
Most importantly, the success of PFI is dependent on retaining and recycling expertise 
within the public sector, particularly project management skills. Awarding authorities 
can then operate from a position of equal strength with their private sector partners 
when negotiating contracts and operating facilities. There is a need for improved 
sharing of experience, lessons and expertise within the public sector across 
organisational and departmental boundaries, especially for the post-contract 
management and measurement phases.  
Finally, it is still difficult to draw any conclusions about whether PFIs in the UK were 
implemented successfully or not. The government’s original claims and expectations 
were that (H.M. Treasury, 2000, 2003, 2006), the PFI would introduce and mobilise 
private capital investments, achieve value-for money, and transfer and share certain 
risks relating to provisions of infrastructure and public services. If these benefits had 
been achieved through the utilisations of PFI schemes in the UK, then based upon the 
analysis of this chapter, the answer is inconclusive.  
Many developed and developing countries in the world are going to learn, study and 
even copy the PFI programmes to improve their own countries’ infrastructure and public 
services (H.M. Treasury, 2000, Holden, 2009, Committee on Economic Affairs, the 
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House of Lords, 2009, volume II). It is doubtful that the UK’s model is suitable for 
other countries. However, its successes and failures and the various negative lessons 
could be learnt by other countries to avoid making the same mistakes as the British PFIs 
did.  
 
3.6 The lessons learnt from the PFIs in the Road and Water Sectors 
Although a few studies on the road motorway PFIs produced by the NAO (1998, 1999, 
2003), the PAC (2011) and the scholars (Edwards, et.al., 2004, Shaoul, 2005), the 
British road PFI, namely the DBFO model, has some important lessons for the other 
industries in the UK.  
 The high cost of professional fees and private finance, inaccurate traffic volume 
forecasts,  
 poor quality of planning works (in the cases of the M25), 
 ineffective measures on the performance of PFI projects’ construction and 
operation,  
 Misuses of advisors as well as the shortage of experience and skills in the public 
sector were revealed by the NAO (1998, 1999, 2003) and the PAC (2011).  
One unique aspect of motorway PFI’s in the UK is the its higher returns on investment, 
along with the fewer risks were transferred as Edwards, et. al., (2004) and Shaoul (2005) 
disclosed in their studies.  
The water sector is not a targeted PFI market in the UK, because all major water 
companies in the UK were privatised in the 1980s, except for these in Scotland. As the 
data from the PUK (2010) indicated, only 7 water and sewage treatment PFIs have been 
developed in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Another 9 water BOT contracts with 
21 sewage treatment plants were developed in Scotland. There were few reports or 
information covering the performance and implementation of water PFIs so far 
(European Commission, 2006). However, the recent evidence from the Sunday Herald 
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newspaper (Edwards, 2011) exposed that there were serious issues on the Scottish 
sewage PFI projects in which the BOT model was applied. The local media revealed 
that almost all of the Scottish sewage treatment plants had not worked properly over the 
last ten years, suffering a series of mechanical failures, leaks and bad smells. Their 
performance have been so poor that Scottish Water has imposed financial penalties 
totalling £7.5m on these operators. A string of problems and operational failures were 
observed by the Scottish Water, a government-owned company, acting as public client 
of these sewage treatment BOT contracts. According to the internal review of Scottish 
Water investigation revealed that almost all of the sewage treatment BOT schemes had 
encountered some form of pre- and post-commissioning difficulties in the last ten years 
(2001-present) (Edwards, 2011). It is notable that the French water multinational 
contractors in Scotland were involved in some of the cases researched and also had 
similar operational issues in China.  
 
3.7 The BOT in China and the PFI in the UK: the potential to learn 
 
In chapter two and three, the previous studies of Chinese BOTs and British PFIs have 
been reviewed. The key points and factors from chapter two and three are classified and 
summarized in Table 3.9, page 157. This is done in terms of definitions, models, 
objectives, contexts, histories, development levels of the markets, development of 
private industries associated with private financed projects, the facts surrounding BOT 
and PFI implementation to date and finally implementing issues and lessons. Based on 
research from China and the UK, some facts about the implementation of BOT and PFI 
in these two countries can be compared here.  
Although, there are major differences between the political, economic and social 
systems in China and the UK, it was found that similar ideologies underpinned the PFI 
in Britain and the BOT in China: such as Neoliberalism and pro-market thinking. These 
ideologies are controversial, but have profound influences on the decision-makers and 
politicians in both China and the UK. Following large scales privatisations and public 
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sector reforms at the time, both China and the UK started to use private capital to 
develop infrastructure and public services in their countries in the 1990s.  
According to the PUK (2010) and the PPI’s (the World Bank, 2010) statistics, both 
China and the UK are top leaders in developing and utilising private investments in the 
public infrastructure in the world, in terms of projects numbers and capital values. To 
date, there are 920 private financed projects with a capital value of £72 billion used to 
develop public infrastructure and services in the UK. Meanwhile, China has already 
implemented varies forms and models of PPPs in 931 projects, with the capital value 
having reached about £70 billion (USD 111 billion) by 2010. Therefore, the scales of 
the Chinese and British PPPs’ implementation are quite similar and comparable.  
From this analysis, it can be seen that the Chinese BOT is similar to the British PFI 
programme. The experiences and lessons of the British PFI could be studied and applied 
to the Chinese BOT schemes, especially in the areas of how PFIs were contracted, how 
project risks were transferred and allocated, and what kind of practical problems have 
been met in the UK. For China, the experiences and lessons of British PFI may offer 
some valuable ideas and insight into how to improve its BOT policies, particularly in 
the fields of contract management, risks transfer and allocations. Finally there are still 
some areas of the Chinese BOT that need to be studied further. Existing research did not 
fully discuss questions: such as, why do the authorities in China want to use BOTs in 
practice? What have been the results of utilizing BOTs in China over the last few 
decades? What are the main problems and obstacles to utilizing and managing BOTs in 
the contexts of motorway and water industries in China at present? How can policies 
and implementations of Chinese BOTs be improved, based on the lessons learned and 
the experiences of British PFIs? By studying these questions in detail, this study 
ascertains what lessons China can learn from the development of the PFI in Britain and 





Table 3.9 The Facts of PFI in the UK and BOT in China 
(Based upon the literature from the UK and China) 
 
Items and Factors 
Definitions (PFI and BOT) 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Concession Contracts Yes Yes 
Maturity of Contract  About 30 years No more than 30 years 
Bundling Design or Not Yes No (appears in recent case) 
Payment Mechanism Governmental Annual 
Payment or Unitary Charges 
(Direct Tolls were also found 
in a few of road and bridge 
cases) 
Direct Tolls, ‘pay-as-you-go’, 
(In some cases, the public 
sector paid, while need further 
investigations) 
Definitions of PPPs 
 British PFIs Chinese BOTs  
 Yes, all partnerships and 
cooperation between public 
sector and private sector 
 
Not found, exchangeable 
concepts were found in official 
documents, such as, 
marketisation  
Models of PPPs    
 British PFIs Chinese BOTs  
Concession/contract based Yes (PFI) Yes (BOT) 
Joint-venture  Yes Yes 
TOT/Sale-lease-back Not popular, in some cases  Yes 




 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Mobilizing private investments Yes Yes 
Risks Transfer Yes Not specified, need to see the 
contract arrangements  
Value-for-money Yes Not specified  
Private management, skills or 
advanced technology 
(Innovations) 
Yes Not clear, in some earlier 
projects, need to study this 
further 
Contexts and Backgrounds since 1979 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  





Large scale of privatization Yes Yes, but only on medium and 
small SOEs at local levels 
Fiscal difficulties and shortfalls Yes Yes (but, only for local 
governments) 
Increasing powers and lobby of 
private sectors 
Yes Not clear 
Urbanizations Not significant Very high speed (the real 
extent needs study) 
Increasing social 
demands/updates on aging 
facilities/maintain pressures 
High Very high (the real extent 
needs study) 
Other alternatives   
- Budget finance Yes, but there is institutional 
bias, especially in NHS and 
Schools  
Yes, but difficult to apply 
- National Development 
Bank 
No. (But, The Infrastructure 
Finance Unit was built) 
Yes, in experiments, need 
further study 
- Local Government Bonds No. Yes, in pilot tests, the effects 
need study 
Development Levels of PFI markets and private industries 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Capital Markets Well-developed overall (but, 
severely weakened in 2008) 
 
- Corporate Bond market Well-developed Not Clear 
- Stock market Well-developed Developing 
- Insurance market Well-developed Not clear 
Banking Industry Well-developed Well-developed (state-owned) 
Construction Industry Well-developed Well-developed (state-owned) 
Consulting Industries   
- Financial Well-developed Not clear 
- Legal Well-developed Not clear 
- Technical Well-developed Well-developed (state-owned) 
Capabilities of private 
contractors 
Relatively strong Not clear 
Facts of the Implementations - Scales (2010) (The PUK and The World Bank’s Data) 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Number of Projects (2010) 920 (PPPs) 931 (PPPs) 
Capital Value (2010) GBP 72 billion About GBP 70 billion (USD 
111 billion) 
Scope Central and Local Level Local Level only 
Industries  Economic and Social 
Infrastructures  
Transport, Power, Water and 




Procedures  14 Steps 10 steps  
Specified and unified PPP units 
in the central government 
Yes (PPP Unit, H.M. 
Treasury) 
Not found at central level, 
Not clear at local level 
Policy and Regulation 
Framework  
Relatively complete A few policies and regulations 
have been issued 
Standard Contract Models Yes Yes, but only for Water supply 
Sewage treatment and Solid 
Waste Treatment sectors 
Complexity High Not clear, not studied 
Issues, Results and lessons related to Implementation  
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Degree of Transparency Low, but higher than China’s Very low 
Degree of Measurement Low Not studied, not clear 
On-balance sheet  Not yet Not clear, need further studies 
Achieve Value for Money  Controversial and 
inconclusive, but failed in 
many cases 
Not clear 
Risks Transfer, allocations and 
premiums 
Controversial, probably a 
few of risks transferred, but 
with high premiums 
Not clear, a few risks were 
studied in literature 
Transaction costs  High Not clear, few studies 
addressed 
Incomplete Contract Found in many cases Not clear, not studied 
Contracting risks Found in many cases Some studies addressed from 
the private perspective 
Relationships/Cooperation Poor or inconclusive Not clear, not studied 
Contract Management and 
Monitoring 
Poor or inconclusive Poor, mentioned in some 
research 
Expertise, skills and Training Insufficiency in public sector Insufficiency in public and 
private sectors, but effects and 
influences not fully explored 
Degrees of competitions in 
procurement and tendering  
Seems to be weaker, poor 
competitions 
weak, but not fully discussed 
in the existing literature 
Overall performance and effects Inconclusive and 
Controversial 
Not known no official or 
independent evaluations have 
been done yet 
Private capital concentration and 
increasing control over the 
infrastructure market 
Controversial, only a few 
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
At the end of the last chapter, the lessons and experience of PFIs were examined and 
presented. However, the result of the application of BOTs in China still remains unclear, 
due to insufficient studies into this topic. This study aims to explore how BOT has been 
implemented in China and fill in some the gaps in the literature.  
The research process used in this study follows a common path of PhD research. It starts 
with a literature review, then moves forwards to the derivation of a methodology and its 
application and eventually to data analysis and writing up. However, a more extensive 
pattern is employed in this thesis. A brief literature review on British PFIs and Chinese 
BOTs led to some initial pilot fieldwork in 2006.Based upon the fieldwork, this research 
went on to produce a further literature review associated with PFIs and BOTs. Research 
questions were formulated, judging to the fieldwork which processed to  study the 
BOTs in motorway and water sectors in China’s six provinces in 2008. A follow-up of 
22 interviews, a focus group and two observations, this research followed which 
highlighted the results of the implementation and development of BOTs in China’s 
water and motorway industries. This was followed by data analysis and writing up.  
This chapter describes and explains the methodology, research approaches and design of 
this study.  It provides justification for the approaches taken and the research methods 
adopted.  The methods of data collection, as well as the sampling strategies are 
presented and justified here. In the last three sections of this chapter, the adopted data 







4.2 The formulation of research questions: literature review, pilot studies and 
secondary quantitative data analysis  
The research questions of this thesis were subject to considerable reformulation as a 
result of a literature review and a pilot study in China. Both deductive and inductive 
approaches have been employed in the research process to explore the implementation 
of PFI in the UK and BOT in China.  
Following a brief literature review, the data from existing research into PFIs and BOTs 
was retrieved and analyzed at the beginning of this study. An initial finding of the 
literature review indicated a ‘trend’ that both governments in the UK and China 
advocated the use of PFI and BOT in their country in the last three decades. This is an 
interesting ‘phenomenon’ that both the UK and China adopted a similar policy to 
develop their public infrastructure and services, while the social-economic contexts of 
these two countries significantly differed. This phenomenon led to a simple question: 
why have the governments in the UK and China both moved towards the use of private 
financing and contract-based methods (PFI and BOT) to develop their public 
infrastructure and service over the last three decades?   
Guided by the theories of public choice, principal-agent and transaction cost economics, 
and with the help of the literature review on new public management, a deductive 
analysis offered the theoretical examination and explanation of PFI and BOT (chapter 1, 
1.3). In addition, based upon a critical evaluation, this study drew on the lessons and 
experience of British PFIs, in terms of the extensive and readily available literature from 
the UK. However, why and how have BOTs been developed in China? The existing 
literature cannot fully answer these questions. Thereby, this research conducted an 
initial field work study in China during 2006  
4.2.1 The pilot study  
A pilot study was designed and conducted in 2006 in order to explore areas concerning 
the application and development of China’s BOT. At an earlier stage of this research, 
the question was too broad for a Ph.D study. Therefore, it had to be ‘narrowed down’. 
Another purpose of the pilot study was to re-formulate the research questions, as well as 
to justify whether a qualitative (or quantitative) approach was appropriate to this study. 
A qualitative semi-structured interview method was employed in the pilot study, in 
order to enhance understanding on other practice and context of Chinese BOTs. Seven 
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pilot interviews were arranged with the research participants from the provincial and 
city governments and the BOT contractors. Assistance was given by the author’s friends, 
previous colleagues, school friends and relatives in China. There were 18 interviewees 
available on the shortlist at first, compiled by considering their working experience, 
careers and job positions associated with BOTs. Five officials from the provincial and 
city councils and two project managers from two BOT contractors were finally selected.  




(PL: Pilot Study) 
The Interviewees’ 







W Provincial Government 
J city ( Motorway BOTs) 
 















  K City Council, W Province 
K city ( Senior officer Motorway 
BOT) 
 
K city (Water BOT) 
 
 
















K city, Gas Joint-Venture Project 
(70% share in the SPV) 
 









Total 7  
 
A question schedule was used in the interviews based upon the research question, as 
well as literature (see appendix 7).  These questions covered a wide range of topics: 
background of interviewees, jobs and experience with BOTs, implementation of the 
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BOT, outcome and performance of the BOT, plus feedback and suggestion (see Table 
4.2). The pilot interview questions were broad, since the author attempted to give more 
time to interviewees to talk about their experience on implementing motorway and 
water BOTs.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Pilot Study: Interview Questions Guide 
Question Areas 
A Background of Interviewees 
B Jobs/Experience with BOTs 
C The Organisation/institute and BOT 
D Implementation of the BOT  
E Outcome/performance of the BOT 
F Feedbacks and Suggestions  
 
Every pilot interviewee was given the introduction and information letter about this 
study by email, before agreeing to participate (see appendix 5). Once they had agreed, 
they were given a consent form for this study, at the beginning of the interview 
(appendix 6). The consent form reminded them that they had volunteered to take part in 
the study without any recourse to any form of payment or gift. They had the right to 
refuse to answer any questions they did not want to. Furthermore, they were free to 
withdraw from interviews at any point without giving a reason.  
During the period of September-November, 2006, these seven pilot interviews were 
conducted in Chinese (Mandarin) and at the interviewees’ offices during the lunch or 
work time. All interviews lasted between one and two hours, which was much longer 
than the author had expected. As these interviews were part of a pilot study, the 
interviewer tried to ask as many questions as he could. All research participants 
cooperated very well, and the answers they gave were detailed. The interviews were 
recorded using a Samsung MP3 player which could record over fifteen hours of 
conversation.  
The analysis of the pilot studies’ data led to the view that this research was better 
approached through an analysis of how the BOT model has been applied to Chinese 
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infrastructure and public services and in what context. In addition, the initial study 
findings indicated that the Chinese provincial and city governments took over 
management and governance of BOTs from 2004, since the National Development and 
Reform Commission decentralized BOT approvals. Thereby, this suggested the 
subsequent research needed to focus on how BOT operated at provincial and city level. 
The target interview participant groups were the policy-makers, project managers and 
practitioners (legal, financial and technical BOT experts) in the governments and public 
agencies. They were a rich source of BOT data and information. The 5 pilot 
interviewees suggested the researcher that the in line departments at provincial and 
city’s governments (e.g. motorway and urban utilities), the local Reform and 
Development Commissions, and the governor and mayor’s offices of local councils had 
more information and BOT experts than other departments. Furthermore, the pilot study 
revealed that motorway and water industries were key sectors of implementing BOT in 
China in the last ten years. This informed the research should pay more attention on the 
BOT projects in the water and motorway sectors. Finally, most BOT projects located in 
the central and eastern China from 1999, due to the strong economic performance in 
these areas. Last but not least, the pilot study indicated that the qualitative approach was 
appropriate for this study. Rich information collected from these seven interviews, it 
was helpful to enhance the interviewer’s understanding on China’s BOTs.  
After the pilot study in China in 2006, the author moved to the further literature review 
related to BOTs and PFIs. During the period of 2006-2008, the author also considered 
other methods to conduct his research, e.g. by means of quantitative postal 
questionnaire. But, the quantitative survey was not employed in this study finally, due 
to its fairly low response rate in pilot tests, the limitation of this method (e.g. ignorance 
on the contextual variables related to BOTs) and the complexity of the BOT practice 
(the complicated interaction and relationship between public and private sectors).  
 
4.2.2 The Quantitative Data from Secondary sources  
During and after the course of the initial pilot fieldwork in China (2006-2008), 13 
unpublished governmental documents associated with Chinese BOT were collected 
from the research contacts at governments between 2006 and 2008. Ten of these thirteen 
unpublished reports were in relation to Chinese BOT’s policy, implementation and 
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performance. These reports were produced by the different levels of the governments of 
China in 2005, 2006 and 2008. Those internal BOT documents of the governments 
covered a large amount of information about Chinese BOTs, such as, the number, 
contract value and location. Four research reports produced by the central government 
what focused on the Chinese motorway and water BOTs and other forms of PPPs. One 
annual report about the infrastructure in a province was collected from a research 
contact at the provincial government. Furthermore, eight BOT related documents were 
gathered from government departments and agencies at city level. Permission was to 
use these documents for the academic purposes (see table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3 The Quantitative Data and Their sources 
Sources/BOT 
Data 





2 BOT Reports were collected 
in 2006/07  
 
 










5 official documents  were collected (Cross-sectors and not specified 




   
3 documents were collected in 
2009 
 
Although, a detailed analysis of these reports is presented in the next chapter, discussed 
here are some key point and findings that reshaped and re-formulated the research 
questions and approach. The quantitative analysis on these secondary documents 
indicated that over 60% of Chinese BOT projects ( in terms of the numbers of projects) 
were motorway and water projects. Most of these projects were located in eastern and 
central provinces. These two indicators complied with the results of the pilot interviews. 
In addition, the statistics within the two of governments’ research reports presented that 
over 90% of Chinese water BOT projects ( in terms of project numbers) were medium 
and small size projects with a project value of under RMB300 million (£28 million) and 
production (or treatment) capability were under 120,000 tons per day. Finally, Chinese 
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domestic BOT contractors occupied a large portion of Chinese water and motorway 
BOT markets at the expense of international investors since 2002. Through the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis on these 13 reports collected from the central, 
provincial and city’s governments, the initial findings informed that the subsequent 
research needed to focus on  
 
 How BOT was developed and applied in motorway and water sectors at 
provincial and city levels located in central and eastern China?  
 
Also, this study needed to pay more attention to the medium and small size water 
projects, since these kinds of projects are the majority of water BOTs in China. In 
addition, the Chinese domestic BOT contractors need to be addressed, due to more and 
more BOTs being undertaken and commenced by this group of private investors. 
Meanwhile, the initial findings of the pilot study and document analysis also indicated 
that there were some similar problems that had occurred in the application of the British 
PFIs (e.g. poor contract management, lack of skills and experts in the public sector). 
This finding suggested there is a certain similarities that between PFI and BOT. It is 
possible to consider the view that China could learn some lessons from the uses of PFIs 
in the UK. However, more robust evidence was needed through subsequent research.  
 
4.3 Methodology  
This research is typical of that used within social science and employs a qualitative 
approach. However, this study also includes some elements of the quantitative research 
(e.g. a quantitative analysis on the secondary data and even on the primary qualitative 
data). The ‘public policies’ in the UK and China, both of BOT and PFI, can be analyzed 
following the sociological traditions based upon a ‘phenomenology’ (otherwise referred 
to interpretivism). Phenomenology refers to ‘a philosophy that is concerned with the 
question of how individuals make sense of the world around them and how in particular 
the philosopher should bracket their own preconceptions in his or her grasp of that 
world’ (Bryman, 2008:45). In contrast to phenomenology, another paradigm of research 
philosophy is positivism (or quantitative or objectivism), which refers to an 
epistemological position that advocates the application of methods of the natural 
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sciences to the study of social reality and beyond (Bryman, 2008, Denscombe, 2007, 
Remenyi et. al., 1998). These are two different epistemological frameworks. The 
methodological underpinning of this research primarily lies on the phenomenology, but 
is supplemented by thoughts of positivism. The quantitative analysis on the literature 
review and the unpublished government’s reports essentially inspired the researcher. 
The design of the research brings together the thoughts of two research paradigms: one 
(positive analysis) informs another (phenomenology). 
The most important reason for preferring the qualitative approach in the work presented 
here is that the research questions used need in-depth information which cannot be 
achieved through quantitative means (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) provide a helpful definition of qualitative research, ‘By the term ‘qualitative 
research’ we mean any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by 
statistical procedures or other means of quantification’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1994:11) 
Secondly, flexibility is the key advantage of a qualitative approach. The procedure of 
qualitative data gathering is much more open as it does not require predetermined 
procedures and pre-tested instruments. As Blaikie (2000) puts it, ‘They (qualitative 
researchers) see research as a learning process and themselves as the measuring (data-
absorbing) instrument. They will want to allow concepts, ideas and theories to evolve 
and they will resist imposing both preconceived ideas on everyday reality and closure 
on the emerging understanding’ (Blaikie, 2000: 243). Thirdly, a qualitative approach 
has advantages as a method of gaining detailed information with limited resources. For 
instance, new issues can be identified and probed during a flexible interview process. 
However, this study is not ‘purely’ qualitative research. It is in the field of public 
financial research, and inevitably it includes a large amount of quantitative data from 
secondary and primary sources that needed to be analyzed. Through the quantitative 
analysis on data of Chinese BOTs and British PFIs, this study identified a ‘phenomena’ 
that both the governments in China and the UK actively promoted the private 
participation in their infrastructure projects. The ‘trends’ of the development of BOTs 
and PFIs in the last three decades were also discovered via the quantitative analysis. 
Without all of this analysis, the research was not able to proceed. In other words, the 
results of the ‘quantitative analysis’ informed subsequent ‘qualitative research’ 
(Denscombe, 2007, Bryman, 2008). Secondly, quantitative data analysis also allowed 
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this study to identify the location and distribution of BOT projects in China. The 
quantitative analysis on the governments’ reports and documents indicated that a large 
portion of BOT projects were located in eastern and central provinces. This finding 
largely reshaped the research questions of this study. The method of research used is a 
mixed method which brings together the qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
 
4.4 Conducting the research: the data collection methods 
In order to understand Chinese BOT’s implementation in motorway and water sectors, 
three methods of data collection were adopted in order to obtain the different types of 
data needed for this study. These include: interviews, a focus group and observation.  
 
4.4.1. Interviewing as a data collection method 
The interview was one of the important means of collecting qualitative data, to access 
people’s experiences and their perceptions of reality (Bryman, 2008). An interview is 
not just a conversation, since the scholars plan a certain agenda for the discussions, and 
attempt to guide the interviewing process (Denscombe, 2007). These opinions, 
perceptions and experiences of research participants usually cannot be gathered and are 
difficult to access by other quantitative data collection means. Interviews can be divided 
into three categories: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Denscombe, 2007). 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were employed to collect data about the 
implementation of BOT schemes in China’s local infrastructure projects using different 
interviewee groups. Semi-structured interviews offered a number of advantages for this 
study. As Denzin and Lincoln (2000) , Denscombe (2007), and Bryman (2008) stated, 
the interviewer can gain valuable insights based upon the depth of the information 
gathered and the wisdom of key informants. The interview is flexible in the research 
practice and can achieve high validity, since the data collected can be checked directly 
with the research participants. The semi-structured approach enables a rich level of data 
to be gathered while avoiding the difficulties of data analysis, categorising, and coding 
of unstructured interview (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). As noted in chapter 3, interviews 
have been widely used in studies in the UK to explore the problems and difficulties of 
implementation of the policy in the PFI (such as, Greenway, et. al., 2001, Ruane, 2002, 
Edwards, et. al, 2004). However, interviews were not a popular data collection method 
170 
 
in the studies surrounding China’s BOTs, since it was difficult to recruit key informants 
and interviewees. It was important to use the interview as a method to collect data in 
this study to investigate the perceptions, experience, opinions and attitudes of the BOT 
policy-makers, project managers and other practitioners.  
 
Purposive sampling strategy and interview recruitment  
For this research, there was another important: who should be selected from where. This 
involves the organisation of sampling in the research. Sampling strategy in this project 
is purposive sampling, which aimed to recruit people who had participated in at least 
two BOT projects. The goal of the research was to find a group of BOT experts who 
could provide direct and important information about how BOTs were implemented in 
Chinese water and motorway projects. Creswell (2007:127) explained, the ‘purposive 
sampling means that the researcher selects individuals and sites for study because they 
can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central 
phenomenon in the study’.  
Furthermore, snowball sampling method was also adopted in this research, since the  
BOT experts was difficult to access. The snowball sampling was probably the only 
feasible way to select more research participants in a limited time period, when there 
was no adequate list available for this research. As Bryman (2008) commented, in the 
ways of snowball sampling, the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of 
people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contact 
with others. By implementing the ‘snowball sampling’, three pilot study interviewees 
and one previous colleague of the author offered great help to suggest and arrange 
potential research participants. The other 16 semi-structured interviewees were selected 
in this way.   
From another perspective, this study also employed a stratified sampling strategy, which 
is a technique in which a population is divided into mutually exclusive groups (called 
strata) and then a systematic sample is selected from each group. In this case, it was 
considered that people in different ‘professions’ may have different points of view on 
the implementation of BOTs. By reviewing the profiles of interviewees, it was possible 
to identify research participants in terms of their professions i.e.2 policy-maker 
(decision-makers), 9 project managers, 5 financial managers, 4 contractors and 3 
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consultants of BOTs. The researcher noticed that the ‘weight’ of project managers and 
financial management participants from the government are high in the sample. This is 
because the research questions explore the outcomes, results and problems of BOT’s 
implementation from a public sector’s perspective. A major portion of the sample (17 
research participants of 26) were from the local governments and public agencies in 
China’s 6 central and eastern provinces, this was informed by the pilot study and initial 
findings from the document analysis, see the profiles of the interviewees (Table 4.4, 
page 172). 
Finally, all research participants and the projects involved were located in the six 
provinces of central and eastern China. The challenge of sampling strategies used in this 
research may be the ‘generalisation’ issue. For qualitative studies, the ‘generalisation’ 
(external validity) is a disadvantage, since the population of the sample is small 
(Creswell, 2007, Bryman, 2008). It is difficult to say that the findings of this study 
could be adapted and generalised to others. For this study, the sample selected is not a 
typical case, but an extreme case in terms of locations of the ‘population’. In this 
research, six provinces and their governments are the most active advocators of BOTs in 
China. Hundreds of BOTs have already been developed and implemented by the 
governments. Therefore, the development and application of BOTs in these six 
provinces may be extreme cases in China. The practice in these six provinces cannot be 
deemed as representative of ‘typical BOT practice’, but as ‘best practice’. The problems 
and best practice explored in this study may be applied to other projects in China where 
similar problems can be found. 
Interview process  
All of the interviews were carried out in the period August-October, 2008, by the 
researcher in the Chinese language at the participants’ offices face to face. A week 
before each interview took place, the interviewee was given or emailed an introductory 
letter (Appendix 5) on the research topics to be covered and a consent form (Appendix 6) 
declaring they are happy to attend the interview on a ‘voluntary base’. The interviews 
were tape recorded. The question schedule used in the interviews was developed based 
upon pilot interviews. One was for managers from the public sector (see appendix 8)  
and another for 2 private BOT contractors (see, Appendix 9). These questions covered a 
wide range of topics: for instance, procedures and mechanisms of implementing BOTs, 
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outcome, performance, problems of the BOTs, the relationship of BOT client and 
contractors with suggestions. Seventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted in 
the offices of the research participants during this period. Since the interviewees had 
accepted the invitations of this study, participants were given different choices of time 
and place for the interviews, similar to the pilot study. All preferred to be interviewed in 
their own offices, except for two cases, where the interviews were conducted in homes 
of the two interviewees. Furthermore, all interviews were carried out during evenings of 
working day or at weekends. This was usually out of working time, because the 
researcher and the interviewees needed enough time to conduct the research.  
Table 4.4 Semi-structured Interviewees by professional history, job position and level, 









INT 1  Project 
Manager 








INT 3 Project 
Manager 
Government Manager Mixed  






INT 5 Finance Bank Manager Mixed 
INT 6 Finance Government Manager Mixed 
INT 7  Finance Bank Manager others 
INT 8 Finance  Bank Manger Mixed  
INT 9 Legal Government Director Mixed 








INT 12 Consult (Fin.) Consulting Director Mixed  
INT 13  Project 
Manager 
Government Director Mixed 












INT 16 Legal  Consulting Manager Mixed  
INT 17  Project 
Manager 
Private Manager Motorway  
INT 18 Project 
Manager 
Private Manager Water  
INT 19 Policy 
research 
Government  Manager  Mixed 
INT 20  Policy 
research 
Academic  Manager  Motorway 
INT 21 Project 
Manager 
Government Manager Mixed  
 
The interviews usually started with simple questions about personal information, 
professional and career histories. When both the researcher and the interviewee had 
relaxed and were more familiar with each other and their environment, the interviewees 
were asked to explain their own understanding, experiences and stories concerning 
BOTs. Then, depending on their responses specific topics were selected and questions 
prepared to get further information. Most of the time, the researcher directed the 
conversation in the interviews. All interviews usually lasted between one and two hours, 
the research participants cooperated very well, and the answers they gave were detailed. 
The sensitive questions, such as the ‘corruption’ issue in BOT, were answered by 20 
interviewees, but one interview participant refused.   
At the end of the interviews, 12 interviewees showed their strong interests in the British 
PFI programme. Therefore, a number of questions had arisen on the implementation of 
motorways, as well as the privatisation of water industries in the UK. These 
interviewees are very interested in learning lessons and gaining experience on using 
motorway and water BOTs.  
4.4.2 conducting focus groups: sample selections and gathering qualitative data  
Focus groups can be used for many purposes. In this research it was used to diagnose 
the potential for problems within BOT projects, particularly the interaction among BOT 
team members from public sector. Some research methodologies advocate the use of a 
focus group or group interviewing. Combined with other research instruments, e.g. in-
depth interviews, the focus group can make important contributions to the research, 
enabling the researcher to explore views, perceptions, and motives through group 
interaction (Creswell, 2007). 
By reviewed the literatures of  PFIs in the UK and BOTs in China, there are not many 
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studies who used focus groups in their research, excepted for a few of studies conducted 
by Hall, et. al. (2000) and the NAO (2008) in the UK. Since the BOT scheme is 
complex in practice, a project usually involves a number of stakeholders and 
participants from different departments of governments and private contractors. The 
focus group was designed and carried out to explore the relationship (partnership or 
cooperation) and interaction between different participants of a BOT project from the 
public sector. This focus group was designed to explore the implementation of BOTs at 
project level, to look at the different thoughts and interests among the different 
departments in the public sector. Furthermore, it considers the organisation structure, 
power structure, incentives and efficiency matters within a public BOT team. Finally, 
this focus group was carried out to supplement the interview data. The focus group was 
organized in a city’s Urban Development and Investment Company (a Local 
Government Financing Vehicle), using BOT contract clients who represented the 
interests of the city council in central China. 
  
Focus Group Recruitment  
The focus group was organized, recruited and assisted by a research participant who 
worked in the company. The 8 participants took part in the discussions after a meeting 
held at that company. They included people from the mayor’s office of a city council, 
the urban planning and management department, the construction committee, the local 
Development and Reform department and the local Urban Development and Investment 
Company.  
The participants of the focus group were selected purposively and opportunistically. 
Firstly, the members of the focus group included the directors and managers from 7 
departments of the city council, involving the decision-making department, BOT 
approval, and management, legal and financial departments. In other words, the 8 
members of this focus group comprised a ‘typical’ BOT expert team from the local 
council which representing the 7 departments’ interest. Secondly, this focus group was 
conducted opportunistically. The author was undertaking his observations in the city’s 
Urban Development and Investment Company during the period of August-October, 
2008. Then a BOT project manager (BOT contract client) in this company informed the 
author that a BOT progress review meeting was being held in the company in 
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September 2008. The author was allowed to attend the meeting and conduct a focus 
group afterwards (launch time, 12:30-14:30). Finally, the author attempted to organise 
another focus group by himself in October 2008, with several managers working in 
BOT private contractors and consulting firms. However, time schedules of the proposed 
members of the focus group meant it was not possible to organise. Base upon the 
experiences and lessons of this study, it was better and easier to conduct the focus group 
study on an ‘existing BOT team’ rather than the author try to organise one by himself.  
  
Conducting the focus group  
The information and introductory letters for this study were sent to the research 
participants before the start of the focus group. The focus group took place in a quiet 
meeting room in the Urban Development and Investment Company. The author was 
introduced by a senior officer who worked in the city council (one of the participants of 
the semi-structured interviews) and the research participants quickly introduced 
themselves. Then the discussion topics were  circulated allowing the participants to 
discuss, challenge and argue freely within the processes of the discussions. The 
discussions were mainly based upon the 4 motorway and water BOT projects (but not 
limited to them) which this BOT team had worked on. The questions covered a number 
of areas, but specific questions which differed from the interviews were designed: such 
as,  
 Which department should direct the BOT team on the public side?  
 What are responsibilities and commitments for the BOT team as a whole and for 
the different team members represented and their departments?  
 Given this team is temporary, what benefits or costs will it bring to the team 
members? What will happen when arguments arise between team members?  
 And what arguments are often raised?  
The focus group discussion lasted about 2 hours. During the process of the group 
interview, the questions were discussed by different participants from the different 
departments of the local council. Some participants argued and challenged each other 
over the course of the focus group.  
 




Observational research has a long history in social sciences (Crowther and Lancaster, 
2009, Denscombe, 2007). Observation is usually defined as a data collection method 
through looking and noting. The data is collected not based upon what people say or 
claim, but what they do or what actually happens. Therefore, it is clear that observation 
is a quite different data collection method, compared with interviews and focus groups 
which are based on the research participants’ feelings, perceptions, attitudes and 
experiences. The observations were adopted in this study to look at the relationship, 
collaboration and conflicts between BOT clients and contractors. Meanwhile, the 
progress and performance of the BOT projects in the procurement, construction and 
operational stages were studied.  
 
Recruitments on the observational projects and samples  
Two observations were held in two phases, firstly, in a city’s two BOT projects, during 
the September-November, 2006 and secondly between August-October, 2008. One 
observation was of a motorway BOT project located in W province (75 km from a 
provincial capital city to an international airport, the project capital value was over 
RMB 3 billion, £300 million). The other was a medium-size BOT sewage treatment 
project located in a city, W province (processing capacity was 160,000 tons/day, capital 
value was RMB 230 million, £23 million).  
These two projects were chosen for a number of reasons: the researcher was familiar 
with the research participants (BOT project managers) and the projects over a long time, 
therefore, a relationship of trust had been built. Secondly, these two projects had many 
features typical of Chinese BOTs in the motorway and water industries. So, these two 
projects could be treated as representative cases of China’s motorway and water BOTs. 
At the same time, the local city and provincial governments where the projects were 
located, are active promoters of BOTs in China, and were treated as examples of ‘good 
practices’ by other local authorities. Finally, in the period August-October, 2006, the 
water BOT project’s plant A  finished the construction work and was put into operation. 
Plant B was still in the procurement process (negotiation). The motorway BOT was also 
preparing for the procurement work at the same time. Therefore, the observations on the 
project managers’ activities and behaviours, as well as the progress and process of the 
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BOT projects in this period generated valuable primary data on how motorway and 
water BOTs were prepared and procured. Furthermore, in the period of August-
November 2008, the water projects were finished construction and commenced into full 
operation. The water BOT projects therefore offered a good example on the operations 
of the China’s BOT project. The motorway BOT project finished the procurement work 
and was still in construction in 2008.  
These two observations were encouraged through personal contacts, and assisted by one 
water BOT project manager from the public client (the governmental department), and 
one senior director who worked in the city council (the motorway BOT team director). 
The permissions for the observations had been given by these two project managers and 
their superiors and leaders. The managers of private contractors were also informed that 
a student studying in the UK was taking observing their projects and collecting his data. 
Therefore, the research participants (respondents) knew they were observed. The project 
managers of BOT contractors agreed and welcomed the researcher to do his 
observations, and promised any assistance if it be needed. There were certain 
disadvantages of using revealed observations in theory, for instance, the research 
participants may change their behaviours or activities if they know they are being 
observed. At the same time, unrevealed observations may involve more ethical issues. 
From the Chinese cultural and contextual perspectives, unrevealed observations may be 
treated as ‘peeping activities’, and are regards as very impolite to the research subjects. 
Therefore, the managers and staffs of BOT projects were informed in both cases of the 
observations. And in these two observations, the researcher did not take part in any of 
the research participants’ work, but stayed just as an outside observer. This is because 
this study and the observations intended to understand the processes of developing 
motorway and water BOTs by the ‘natural organisation’ under real situations or 
circumstances. It was also studying the behaviours and activities of the BOT project 
managers and the real relationship between the BOT project’s clients and contractors.  
 
 
Conducting the observations    
The non-participative observations were conducted in the periods August-October, 2006 
and August-November 2008. The researcher regularly visited two BOT project 
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managers every week (3 days a week) and attended at the construction-sites (once every 
month). The author was also allowed to attend the projects’ progress meetings. To keep 
track of observations, several techniques were used: simple note-taking, on observation 
diary and a simple checklist were recorded and prepared. These notes on what was seen 
and heard were used to refresh the author’s memories about what took place. The 
observations focused on two broad categories: firstly, the behaviour and action of the 
managers from the BOT clients (included, frequencies of the meetings with private 
contractors, the relationships/collaborations/conflicts with private contractors and other 
public departments related to the BOT projects), secondly, the performance/progress of 
the BOT projects (involving the key progress/performance indicators and events). By 
using this method, the processes of procurements, constructions and operations of BOT 
projects and the complex relationships between the BOT clients, private contractors and 
other stakeholders were explored. The frequency of the number of meetings between 
private contractors and the public clients present the amount of the communication and 
cooperation between them.   
 
4.5 Analysing data  
A general qualitative data analysis consists of three steps: firstly, the data collected from 
the primary sources is prepared and organised. In this step, the interview data or focus 
group data should be written in transcripts for analysis. Secondly, a researcher needs to 
divide and reduce the data into themes through a process of coding and then condensing 
the codes. Finally, data needs to be presented in figures, tables, or a discussion 
(Denscombe, 2007, Creswell, 2007, Humberman and Miles, 1994). Although there are 
different suggestions on organising data for analysis in different research approaches, 
these three steps are basic components of a qualitative data analysis.   
In this study, the qualitative data gathered through semi-structured interviews and the 
focus group was transcribed by the researcher in mandarin Chinese at first. The majority 
of the interviews were transcribed from audio-recordings, while in three cases notes 
were made in terms of the interviewees’ responses. During the process of data 
preparation and organisation, the author had to translate a large amount of data in the 
Chinese language into English to be used in coding and analysis. It is difficult work 
translating Chinese interview responses and records into English and very time 
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consuming. Differences in the Chinese and English languages, made it difficult not to 
avoid misunderstanding and misusing words produced in the translations. However, the 
author found that Chinese data did not have to be translated into English, due to the new 
version of the computer software Nvivo which was able to process and code the data in 
Chinese language and characters. Therefore, the researcher was able to analysis the 
readily available data in Chinese, then translate the final results into English. All 
transcriptions in Chinese were filed as Word documents, then saved as electronic copies 
into a database. For a better understanding of the content of the qualitative data, the 
author read and re-read the interview transcripts for avoid missing key information, and 
to identify ‘critical instances’, highlight key passages of transcripts or make notes on the 
transcript, all with the assistance of Nvivo.   
The second stage of data analysis focused on data selection, simplifying, abstracting and 
transforming the information. It went on to identify and compare cases and themes, in 
order to find connections between the categories and define their properties e.g. the 
objectives, context, pre-conditions of Chinese BOTs. The final step is ‘selective 
coding’s which will identify a core category and themes to eventually generate a theory 
for the work. Via coding and indexing raw information, the various pieces of data about 
Chinese BOTs were classified into conceptual units and categories. Finally, all the data 
together is displayed in a diagram.  
Through qualitative data analysis, it was possible to classify data themes. These 
categories (themes, sub-themes, and sub-sub-themes) can be used to explain and 
identify the main aspects of the subject matter under study. Finally a core is found in 
order to develop new suggestions and policy recommendations for the Chinese BOT 
policies’ development in the future. Informed by the theoretical framework of Rose 
(2007), the data analysis concentrates on five key and broad themes, including: external 
circumstances (Context), institutional context (capabilities), BOT model and their 
arrangements, outcome and problems, following with analysis of the interactions and 
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outcomes and problems existed for implementing motorway and water BOTs. At the 
same time, by considering the institutional contexts, resources and capabilities of 
Chinese governments, this study can identify the relevant lessons to be learnt from the 
British PFIs.  Finally, the connection and interaction between different themes were also 
identified.  The process of the data analysis as presented in the Chart 4.6:  
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Bryman (2008) and Descombe (2007) recommended that the ethical issues in social 
sciences should be considered by researchers carefully. In the case of this study, the 
researcher met some ethical problems, during the period of collecting data in China. 
Crowther and Lancaster (2009:55) outlined some possible ethical dilemmas, including: 
confidentiality, conflicts of interest, issues concerning honesty and integrity, 
discrimination, responsibilities toward on organisation, responsibilities toward people, 
individuals, and issues of competence. In this study, only some of these ethical 
dilemmas were evident, as well as other ethical issues specific to this research 
experienced during data collection. Three issues directly related to this study, such as 
informed consent, confidentiality and honesty (in the observation) were met by the 
author.  
Research ethics were considered throughout the whole period of study. Firstly, the 
ethical approval had to be gained from the university in terms of the requirements of 
research ethical guidelines of the Leicester Business School, De Montfort University 
(See appendix 11). Secondly, before each interview, a letter and consent forms were 
given to interviewees to explain the research objectives and processes and any other 
detailed information. Thirdly, all participants and their responses would remain 
confidential and anonymous in the research, and all interview data was to be used 
exclusively for academic purposes. Fourthly, during the interview processes, three 
research participants refused to have their conversations taped, so note taking was made 
instead. Fifthly, in the two on-site observations, the researcher introduced himself to the 
research participants in the observations. The research participants in the observations 
were informed avoiding any ethical issues which can happen in ‘unrevealed’ 
observations. Finally, due to this study being cross-national research, some cultural 
differences were experienced in the research work (Smith, 2005). Some interviewees 
were unhappy about signing the ‘consent forms’, because this arrangement made them 
feel very uncomfortable (e.g. ‘loss face’ or ‘distrust’). Therefore, in three cases, the 
consent forms were not signed. However, the researcher read it to the interviewees and 
oral permission were made. The second matter was that some interviews were 
conducted at lunch time with the researcher paying for the research participants meals 
which in China is basic polite and social rule. However, this might be restricted by the 




4.7 Reliability and Validity  
 There is a wide debate on qualitative studies about reliability and validity (Becker and 
Bryman, 2005, Bryman, 2008, Black, 2002, Denscombe, 2007), because of the sample 
size, possible bias and misunderstandings in qualitative data collection and analysis. 
Compared with quantitative data, qualitative data and its analysis is more unstructured, 
subjective and usually based upon small size samples. This can lead to the data being 
misunderstood, misinterpreted and difficult to generalise (Denscombe, 2007). Crowther 
and Lancaster (2009) pointed out the central issue for qualitative research is that the 
researcher has to ensure the findings and conclusions generated through the analysis and 
interpretation of qualitative data, are reliable and valid. Reliability refers to how 
consistent and replicable are the results of the research. It is important for a particular 
data collection method to achieve the same results in different occasions with different 
research (Denscombe, 2007, Crowther and Lancaster, 2009). Validity means whether a 
study actually investigates what is intended to be investigated. The concept of validity 
considers the accuracy and precision of the data collection and analysis done by the 
researcher. It is argued that the qualitative approach is not so ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ 
(Bryman, 2008). This research adopted the mixed research methods, while the 
qualitative approach is dominated. Therefore, the discussion on the reliability and 
validity of this research focused on the issues related a qualitative method.  
4.7.1 Validity  
Creswell (2007) commented that there are a number of techniques to improve the 
validity of a research, e.g. triangulation, peer review, refining the working hypotheses as 
the inquiry advances, clarifying researcher bias from the outset of the study, checking 
with research participants on the credibility of the findings and interpretations, rich and 
detailed description and external audits.   
Validity requires checking results via further interviews or in some other way such as 
triangulation. Triangulation in qualitative research is necessary, and it will give much 
more reliable results than concentrating on one perspective. The aim of triangulation is 
to give a more holistic and contextual portrait of the subject matter under study as well 
as providing a way of validating initial observations (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Since 
a mix of data collection methods were used in this study, the researcher triangulated the 
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data constantly via multiple sources, e.g. primary data, secondary data and archival data 
from the governments in China. Although the main data of this study came from semi-
structured interviews and the focus group, the related quantitative data from the 
literature review and the official statistics of the Chinese governments often were 
checked, to ensure the validity of this research. In addition, in the process of data 
collection, analysis and writing up, the researchers checked often the findings with the 
research participants, in order to make sure their views, opinions and interpretation were 
not misunderstood. In this way, the research participants were able to judge the accuracy 
and credibility of the account.  
 
4.7.2 Generalisation  
Generalisation refers to the findings of research if it is transferable to other social 
settings (Crowther and Lancaster, 2009). In the case of this thesis, the question is the 
findings of this research whether they are able to be transferred to other provinces in 
China. The generalisation meant a research should involve a large number of samples 
and representatives of a large population. The qualitative research approach was often 
criticised because of its small sample size, which cannot be generalised. In this study, 
the generalisation (external validity) is a crucial issue, since the sample is selected 
purposively. The ‘population’ of the sample is small and includes a number of ‘extreme 
cases’ rather than typical cases of BOT practice. In this study, all data was collected 
from the 6 provinces of China, thereby it is difficult to ‘empirically generalise’ the 
findings and conclusions. However, as it has been discussed in the previous chapter, the 
location of China’s BOTs is concentrated in a few eastern and central provinces. To 
study Chinese BOTs, this study inevitably needs to focus on the provinces which have a 
large number of BOT projects and with extensive experience of BOTs. The six 
provinces and their governments actively developed over 380 motorway and water BOT 
projects in the last seven years. The experiences of these provinces were highly 
advocated by the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transportation. The 
lessons or best practice explored in this study may be applied to other projects in other 
Chinese provinces where they are going to adopt BOT models and where similar 
problems may be found.  
4.7.3 Reliability  
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In qualitative research, the reliability often refers to the stability of responses to multiple 
coders or data sets (Crowther and Lancaster, 2009:80). In this study, reliability should 
refer to the ‘consistency and replication’ in qualitative research processes. Denscombe 
(2007:298) explained the ‘reliabilities’ as ‘If someone else did the research would he or 
she have got the same results and arrived the same conclusions?’ Therefore, in this study, 
the goal of reliability is to minimise the errors and bias.  
To minimise the errors and bias in interviews, the researcher carefully designed research 
process and procedures. In this way, the researcher follows a certain standardised 
procedure in every interviews to ensure the reliability (e.g. a standard process of 
interview includes: consent procedures, greeting, warming questions, as well as the 
steps of asking questions in depth questions). However, with semi-structured interviews, 
certain flexibility should be retained, in order to explore the different experiences and 
opinions of different research participants. In addition, the researcher designed the 
interview questions explicitly, for reducing misunderstanding of questions, errors and 
bias as much as possible. During the course of the interviews, the researcher raises the 
questions explicitly, and carefully listens to what interviewees say without interruption. 
The bias in the interviews may be minimised in this way. Finally, at the beginning of the 
data coding process, two pilot codings were conducted with two friends, to identify and 
avoid potential bias in the subsequent coding processes.  
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the methodology about this thesis. It presents how it possible 
to combine both of the quantitative data from the documents and the qualitative data 
from the multi-means of qualitative methods to study the implementation of Chinese 
BOT programme in the contexts of motorways and water sectors in China.  
The next three chapters present analysis on the data collected from official documents 
interviews, group discussions and observations (chapter 5 and 6). Then this leads to a 
discussion of key issues what have been explored and conclusion will be drawn (chapter 




















Chapter 5 Data Analysis I: an Overview of the Implementation of Built-Operate-
Transfer in Chinese Motorway and Water Sectors: The Development and Results  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to provide the reader with an overview of the development and 
implementation of BOT in China’s water and motorway sectors. Firstly, the development 
and implementation of BOT at national level is presented with an analysis on the 
governmental reports that were collected from the central and provincial governments. 
Secondly, the BOT development in China’s six provinces will be presented. Thirdly, the 
results of the implementation of BOT in these six provinces are explored and discussed, in 
terms of the data collected from interviews, a focus group and two non-participant 
observations. This chapter is an attempt to answer the following questions: 
 What BOT projects have already been applied in Chinese motorway and water 
sectors at central, provincial and city levels?  
 How successful have BOTs been applied at provincial and city levels?  
Section 5.2 provides an overview of the Chinese motorway BOT market to explore what 
BOT projects have been applied, where and, to what extent. Section 5.3 reviews the 
development of the Chinese motorway, water and sewage treatment BOT in the six 
provinces. This section presents the 96 projects which were studied detailed in field work. 
Section 5.4 to Section 5.10 explore the BOT’s implementation in China’s six provinces. 
From the original objectives of BOT set by the central government, this study will reveal if 








5.2 An overview of BOT in China’s motorway and water sectors 
5.2.1 BOTs in China’s motorway and water sectors: an underestimated scale of 
application 
The first question of this study is how many BOTs have been implemented in China? The 
only accessible database (the World Bank, PPI databases, 2010) has shown 31 motorway 
BOTs and 303 water and sewage PPP projects were undertaken by private contractors 
between 2001 and 2009.   
However, during the pilot study and the analysis of the government’s internal reports, this 
highlights that the scale of use of BOT in China’s motorway and water projects is fairly 
underestimated. There is piecemeal information have been collected from some central and 
local authorities.  An internal report (Document Code: QU1) from a department of central 
government indicated that at least 35 motorway BOT contracts had been signed, with 9 
provincial and city governments, between 2001 and 2004. Meanwhile, the internal reports 
gained from W provincial government show that at least 24 motorway BOTs had been 
applied in W province in the period 2003-2007.  
Contradictory statistics by the World Bank, the central and the provincial governments 
were also found in the water and sewage BOT sectors. For instance, the World Bank (PPI, 
2010) indicates 303 water and sewage PPP projects were undertaken by private contractors 
between 2001 and 2009. However, an interviewee from the department of the Ministry of 
Construction noted that the actual number of Chinese BOT and joint-venture contracts in 
the water and sewage treatment sectors had been over 1100 by the end of 2008. 
Furthermore, as one internal report from a central department (Document Code: QU3) 
revealed, 27 provincial authorities reported 273 water supply and sewage treatment BOT 
applications (not including other forms of PPPs) by the end of 2005.    
Therefore, it becomes necessary to present an analysis of the data collected from the 
government and interviewees in China, to find out how many BOTs have been applied in 
Chinese motorway and water projects.  According to the 8 internal reports collected  from 




at least 195 motorway and over 480 water BOTs were developed all over the country in the 
period 2001-2009. 
The three interviewees from the central and provincial governments mentioned that there 
are some possible factors contributing to these contradictory statistics. First of all, the 
decentralisation of management and approval on BOT in 2004 led to provincial 
governments not always report their BOT deals to the central government. Secondly, the 
boom stage of China’s BOT concentrated on the period of 2003-2008, when a large number 
of BOT contracts reached financial closures. It is possible that the BOT contracts signed by 
the city councils had not been sent to the provincial and central governments yet. Finally, it 
is also possible that some city councils actually developed the projects by using a BOT 
approach with private contractors, but without a BOT contract. These projects were called 
quasi-BOT projects by a research participant from the central government. Those kinds of 
projects were often found in small-size water cases. The city councils may not report these 
projects to the central government excluded them from their statistics.   
5.2.2 The implementation of BOTs in motorway and water projects: the regional, 
economic and industrial difference  
Four reports from central governments (Report Codes: QU1, QU2, QU3 and QU4) 
indicates that some regions and provinces in China attracted much more private capital and 
developed more BOT projects than others. By analysing this data, it can be seen that the 
central, eastern and coastal area in China had a large number of BOT projects and 
introduced much more private capital investment than the western regions. This is because 
of the rapid economic development, the large population and the large demands on the 
social and economic infrastructure in these areas, which attracted more BOT investors 
(QU1). By the end of 2008, the following provinces were the main leaders in Chinese 
motorway development based on completed length of motorway: Henan, Guangdong, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei and Hebei provinces. These seven provinces’ (out of a 
total of 34) motorways make up nearly 40 per cent of the total completed length in 2006, 
and had increased to over 50 per cent of the network by 2008 according to the interviewees 
from the central government. The updated information can be seen in the table 5.1 and a 




Table 5.1 The motorway network in China’s 30 provinces at the end of 2009 (ranked by 
length) 
Rank Province Length (Km) Rank Province Length (Km) 
1 Henan 4800 16 Shanxi 1950 
2 Shandong 4333 17 Fujian 1895 
3 Guangdong 3800 18 Inner Mongolia 1890 
4 Jiangsu 3745 19 Gansu  1296 
5 Hebei 3304 20 Chongqing 1203 
6 Hubei 3282 21 Xinjiang  1075 
7 Zhejiang 3110 22 Heilongjiang 1053 
8 Liaoning 2758 23 Ningxia 1003 
9 Shaanxi 2526 24 Guizhou  975 
10 Anhui 2514 25 Jilin 877 
11 Yunnan 2429 26 Tianjin 840 
12 Jiangxi 2206 27 Beijing 784 
13 Sichuan 2190 28 Hainan 660 
14 Guangxi  2113 29 Shanghai 578 
15 Hunan 1992 30 Qinghai 210 





Two interviewees at central government level estimated that the private investments on 
motorway BOTs were less than 20% of the total motorway investment in China up until the 
end of 2008. However, in some provinces, such as Guangdong and Henan, motorway BOTs 
reached a 50% share by project numbers and capital value in 2006 and 2007. More 
provinces from the central and western China were considering more applications of BOT 
in their motorway projects.  
In contrast with the motorway industry, Chinese water and sewage treatment infrastructure 
heavily relies on private financing methods (mainly BOTs), which accounted for 60-70% of 
the total water investment in China in 2005, 2006 and 2007. It is notable that BOTs plus 
privatisation accounted for nearly 85% of the total number of wastewater treatment projects 
in 2007.  
5.2.3 The BOT in China: increasing demands and the national plans on developing 
motorway and water services 
The analysis of this research also indicates there is huge demand on the motorway and 
water service in China. Seven interviewees from the central and provincial departments 
explained that on the one hand, local demands on infrastructure facilities and water service 
sharply increased in the last ten years. On the other hand, the local governments at 
provincial and city levels, are apparently in a race with each other in building 
infrastructure.  This competition among local governments contributes to the persistent 
‘investment hunger’ visible in China’s economy.  
5.2.3.1 Development and implementation of BOT in China’s motorway sector 
By the end of 2008, the total length of the Chinese motorway system had reached to 60302 
km, which is the second longest motorway network in the world, as the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China showed (China Year Statistics, 2009). Compared with other developing 
countries, China has a leading position in developing motorway networks, in terms of total 
investments and length of motorway. As five interviewees from the central government, W 
province and Y provinces commented, two national plans for developing the Chinese 
motorway network have played important roles in the last two decades: They were the ‘5 
Horizontal and 7 Vertical National Motorways Plan’ and the ‘7,9,18 National Motorway 




Box 5.3 China’ motorway development plans 
In 1990, the State Council of China approved 12 national motorway projects (nearly 35,000 
km) to improve the poor Chinese road system at that time. 12 motorways across the country 
were separately financed and built by 31 provincial governments by the end of 2007. The 
total length of Chinese motorway completed by 2007 was over 53,600 kilometres. A 
network composed of five horizontal and seven vertical national motorways was 
established by the central and local governments.  
 
In 2005, a new plan for improving China’s national motorway network ( named  the ‘7-9-
18 Scheme’, 34 projects, 85,000 km) was designed by the Ministry of Transport and 
approved by the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Council. 
The ‘7-9-18 Motorway Network’ is to be completed by 2020. Incorporated into and 
expanding the present National Motorway Network, it will add 85,000 km of high-grade 
expressways consisting of 7 capital (Beijing) radials, 9 major highways north-south, and 18 
east-west corridors.  
 
The ‘7-9-18 Motorway Network’s design goal is: to reach more than 1 billion people in 
China by connecting all provincial capitals and large cities of more than 500,000 
inhabitants with cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants. It is intended that people in eastern 
areas should have access to an expressway within half an hour, the central provinces within 
an hour, and the western areas within two hours. In addition, it will improve the 
communications between economically developed areas, such as the lower Yangtze River 
Region in central China and the Pearl River Delta in the southeast, and the mid-west and 
northeast areas. The new motorway network will also enhance connections with western 
China, and will promote the economic growth of central and south-eastern provinces. Total 
Investment was estimated at 2,200 billion RMB in 2006: East-China 430 billion RMB, 
Central China 570 billion and Western China RMB 1200 billion. 
 
 
Box 5.3 emphasises how China is building a large motorway network. However, it also can 
be seen that, eastern and central provinces were allocated less funding support from the 
national government, since the local governments in these regions have stronger financial 
capabilities than western China. The governments within central and eastern provinces have 
to raise the motorway funding by themselves and BOT is an important financing 
mechanism.  
However, compared with other developed countries’ road systems, Chinese motorways still 
need to be improved further. When compared with other countries, motorway density in 




Table 5.4The Comparison of Density of Motorways for some Developed Countries  
 U.S.A  Germany UK China 
Total Length (000s Km) 88.7 11.5 3.4 53.6 
Density of Motorway 
(Km/ 00s km2) 
1.75 2.22 0.8 0.56 
Source:Ministry of Transport, 2006 
The biggest challenge for China’s road and motorway construction is the shortage of public 
funding, since they have been mainly funded by local governments with local budgets or 
financial resources rather than by central government. Investments using central budgets 
and grants only covered about 15% of China’s motorway investments from 2002 to 2007 
(interviewee U from the central government). Therefore, a number of provinces, attempted 
to raise motorway investments from the market, such as BOTs, bank debts financing and 
the capital market. Motorway infrastructure in Henan and Guangdong largely relied on 
BOTs, which had a share of over 45% of the total motorway investment in these two 
provinces during the period of 2002 to 2007. Motorway BOTs in Guangdong province had 
reached a 50% share by investment value in 2005. Motorway BOTs in He’nan province 
also kept a 48% share in terms of the number of the motorway projects since 2003.The 
experience of Henan province concerning motorway finance were strongly advocated by 
the Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Construction of China (2007). As a central 
province in China, without a good economic base and specific policy support from central 
government, the total length of He’nan’s motorways increased from 1,231 km in 2003 to 
4,500 km by the end of 2007, a sum of 50 billion RMB was raised by BOTs in He’nan 
province up to 2007. This is the longest section of motorway network in the 34 Chinese 
provinces and regions. The experience of He’nan is deemed more transferable by other 
central and western provinces in China, whose situations are similar to those in He’nan. 
Si’chuan, Shaan’xi, Shan’xi, Hu’nan and Hu’bei provinces are planning to build more BOT 
motorway projects in the near future. Furthermore, Guangdong is another pioneer of 




most of the earliest BOTs in China were located in this province. However, due to 
Guangdong’s good economic base and the special national policies’ support, e.g. Special 
Economic Zones, the development of BOTs in Guangdong is ‘excellent, but not as 
impressive than Henan’ (An interviewee from the central governments). However, 
Guangdong’s experience and pilot projects of BOTs have had also fairly informed another 
19 provinces in central and eastern China.  
 
5.2.3.2 Development and implementation of BOTs in China’s water sector 
The huge population, economic growth, urbanization challenges and ongoing 
environmental issues in China have significantly increased the demands for water and 
sewage services. In response, a large amount of public finance has been invested in the 
water industries since 1992. In the 21
st
 century, the state wanted to promote its new 
ideologies, which aimed to fulfill the increasing demands of the Chinese people on public 
services and at the same time build an environmentally friendly society. The government 
believed China should build a ‘sustainable’ development model, in order to minimize 
damage on the environment. The water sector, including the developing sewage industry, is 
a major part of China’s development strategy. In 2002, the State Council, the National 
Development and Reform Committee, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of 
Construction, and Ministry of Water Resources jointly published policy and compulsory 
requirements on local waste water treatment. Cities with a population over 300,000 had to 
build their own waste water processing plant before 2008 (an interviewee from the 
provincial government). At the same time, the government wanted to make the state-
controlled water sector ‘more efficient through a series of reforms’, involving: 
 ‘restructuring and incorporation of the public water utilities’,  
 ‘reforming public utilities’ investment systems’,  
 ‘adjusting the laws, regulations and governance’  
 and finally by encouraging various forms of private participation in the water sector.  
Water consumption has increased with further urbanization and industrialization in the last 
ten years, and is expected to continue to increase as the economy grows. By the end of 




billion tons per year to 200 billion tons. Urban and rural residential water consumption is 
projected to increase from the current 50 billion tons to 110 billion tons, as the Ministry of 
Construction estimated (2007). There are many new factors influencing the growth and 
changes in China’s water and water treatment market. They include, but are not exclusive 
to,  
 changes in environmental regulations and their increased enforcement,  
 increased priority given to water projects by governments,  
 international financial organisations’ lending,  
 a move to market pricing for water, changes in water project financing 
 and a growing awareness and public concern related to water pollution.  
However, the most important question is where will all the funding come from? The report 
from the central government (Document Code QU4) explored that in the 17 Chinese 
provinces, local demand for water supply and sewage treatment services are extremely high, 
while the coverage rate of water supply and sewage treatment networks at county and 
township levels are extremely low. This is because only 30% of local population in these 
places are able to use tap water in 2007. The in-depth studies in 7 counties in a central 
province revealed in further that none of these counties had built sewage treatment facilities 
and pipelines by the end of 2006. By considering the external contexts and practical 
barriers of developing water projects in these counties, the government (QU4) 
recommended that BOTs would be a major and feasible way to develop water and sewage 
treatment projects in China’s small counties, since other financing could not be possibly 
obtained in the short-term.   
The investigation from the central government (Document Code QU3) presented that 
BOT’s implementation covered all regions of China, but were concentrated in the eastern 
and central provinces. From 2002, 80% of 1075 newly developed water supply and sewage 
treatment plants were developed by private capital investments, and nearly 500 projects 





5.3 The BOTs involved in this study 
By narrowing down the research questions and scale, this study focused on 94 BOT 
projects from information obtained from 8 government reports and with 21 interviews in 
China’s six provinces. The interviewees gave their answers and opinions based on the BOT 
projects on which they had worked or were involved in. These covered different industries, 
but were mainly focused on the motorway and water sectors. These projects included 54 
water and sewage treatment BOTs, 26 motorway BOTs, 4 rubbish treatment BOTs 
(DBFOs), 4 urban river bridges BOTs, 2 power station BOTs, 1 underground BOT, 2 urban 
river tunnel BOTs, and a Sport Facility PPP project (See Table 5.5) . Almost these projects 
have been built in six provinces and 10 cities where the research was conducted.  
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* In October, 2007, 1 British Pound=15 Chinese Yuans (RMBs); However, in October 2010, 1 British 
pound=10.18 Chinese Yuans (RMBs). This has caused problems on exactly valuing these projects in British 
Pounds (Sterling). Furthermore, the exchange rate is still changeable. Therefore, the RMB has been chosen 
as the currency unit to measure these projects’ value rather than changing them to British pounds or US 
dollars.  
** The interview with the director of key and large project management office at W Provincial 
Development and Reform Committee. This director is in charge of all W province’s water and waste water 
treatment project construction and operation. Discussions here are about 32 BOT  water projects at city level 
rather than county level in W province. 
*** Value accounted for 19 BOT projects, with 26 highway projects from W Province.   
The majority of these projects were put into operation on or before 2008, except for 15 still 
in the construction phase. Furthermore, there are 12 of 96 BOT projects that had been put 
into operation before 2000, see table 5.6 on next page.   
Meanwhile, it was noticed that all 87 motorway and water BOT projects were managed and 
implemented by the local transport, urban management and urban investment and 
development departments at city level. However, these BOT projects also had to be 
approved or reviewed by provincial governments, such as the Provincial Development and 






Table 5.6  The BOT projects in order of commenced operations dates 
Year commenced 
operation 
Number of Projects Numbers of projects by 
Sectors 
2008 towards 15 (10 contracts were 
cancelled by the 
governments in 2008) 
Motorway (4)  
Water supply (2)  
Sewage (8)  
Tunnel (1) 
2001-2008 69 Motorway (23) 
Water supply &Sewage 
(38) 
Rubbish Processing  
Facilities(4) 
 Bridges (1)  
Underground(1) 
Sport(1) 
1995-2000 12 Water supply and Sewage 
(8) 
 Urban Bridges (3)  
Urban Tunnels(1) 
 
In terms of capital value, the BOT projects involved in this study cover a wide range. All 
motorway BOT projects’ investment can be classified as ‘large projects’ as defined by the 
central government, since the capitals investments are over RMB 200 million (or US$30 
million). However, over half of water and sewage treatment BOT (TOT) projects can be 
classified as small projects, since their capital value was lower than RMB 200 million, and 








Table 5.7 The Size and Capital Values of the BOT projects 
BOT Project Size and 
Capital Value 
No. of  
Projects 
Sectors 
Large and Medium BOT 
Projects with a capital 
value over RMB 200 






Motorway  BOT 




Small BOT projects where 
investments under RMB 
200 million (or US$ 30 
million) 
37 Water Supply and Sewage 
Treatment 
 
The analysis from the local government’s reports shows that BOTs have been widely 
applied in developing local motorway and water infrastructure in the six provinces where 
the interviews carried out. However, W province is an extreme case in the implementation 
of BOTs. The provincial and city’s governments in the W province attempted to use BOTs 
finances motorway and water infrastructure as much as possible. As the data collected from 
the W province showed, in terms of the number of projects over 30% of motorway and 
60% of water infrastructure were built, financed and operated by private contractors. 
Through applying BOTs in motorway and water infrastructure: 18 private BOT contractors 
have operated and maintained 1800 kilometre of motorway so far. Meanwhile, 109 
(including 75 BOTs and joint-ventures) sewage treatment plants have been built in all 108 
cities and counties, serving over 40 million people in W province by the end of 2007. 
Furthermore, based on previous experience on implementation of BOT, W province urged 
all motorway BOTs to adopt the standard contract model designed by the International 
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC contract). However, this study also looked at 





5.4 Have BOTs in Chinese motorway and road sector lived up to the governments’ 
expectations  
The empirical results of this study reveal that the use of BOTs in China’s motorway and 
water sectors was fairly under-estimated by previous studies and reports. However, through 
the interviews and investigations in the six provinces of eastern and central China, this 
study found that the problems and difficulties of applying BOTs in China’s motorway and 
water projects was also under-estimated by the previous research.  
Firstly, the outcome, performance and results of the implementation of BOTs was not the 
same as the government claimed and previous studies suggested (for instance, the World 
Bank, 2003, Qin and Yu, 2005, etc.), despite this the positive results and benefits of using 
BOTs were significant in some cases and locations.  
Secondly, practical difficulties of applying BOTs in China’s motorway and water sectors 
was caused by not only the poor design mechanisms of BOT programmes, but was also 
deeply affected by China’s rigid and under-developed public and private industries. Finally, 
the primary investigation showed that more challenges had been raised by specific Chinese 
environments and circumstances, e.g. political, economic, cultural and social factors. In the 
following sections, two questions needed to be studied: has BOT in practice borne official 
claims and fulfilled official expectations? And, what practical difficulties have assessed or 
have been encountered in the BOT process. This study examines whether the 
implementation of the BOT programme in China’s motorway and water sectors fulfills the 
official objectives to help learn lessons. These included: 
 Have BOTs brought private investments into China’s motorway and water 
infrastructure projects, increasing the availability of local public infrastructure 
funding?  
 Have BOTs accelerated the development of the local motorway and water 
infrastructure at provincial and city levels?  
  Has the monopoly of the state in the motorway and water sectors been broken, now 
that new suppliers have been introduced?  
 Has competition and efficiency in these industries been strengthened and improved 




 Has the investment decision-making on developing local motorway and water 
industries been improved as the government stated by applying BOT models?  
 Finally, has the infrastructure developed by BOT models ultimately improved living 
conditions of the local residents, fulfilling the local demands for public services and 
creating more job opportunities for the local markets?  
 and have new technologies and technical innovations been introduced as a result?  
5.5 Have motorway and water BOTs improved the availability of finance for public 
infrastructure? 
Seven local decision-makers were interviewed, such as provincial governors’ assistants, 
city’s mayors, vice-mayors and leaders of local Development and Reform Committees. 
They believed that BOTs do have an important role and effect on improving public 
financial shortages and boosting local motorway and water infrastructure development in 
the short term.  
 
5.5.1 Shortages of local public funding in the motorway and water sectors: the use of 
BOTs for 'extra extra-budget financing' 
In this study, almost all interviewees from local authorities (at provincial and city levels) 
complained that the local government in China had inadequate revenue for meeting the 
heavy expenditure responsibilities to develop motorway and water infrastructure projects. 
Indeed, the biggest challenge for developing infrastructure and services in China was the 
availability of public finance at city level. The local public financial shortage is a serious 
problem that has not been solved since the 1994 reform and restructure of China’s fiscal 
and taxation systems. As shown in chapter 2 and in interviews with officials from the six 
provincial governments, Chinese local authorities at city levels only received 40 percent of 
the taxation revenue in 2008, while  having to budget for nearly 80 percent of public 
expenditure. As a director from the financial department of a city council, commented, 
 
‘… Insufficient public finance and budget is a common issue for Chinese city and 




thousand county councils (over 50% of the county councils in China) were unable 
to pay their staff on time in 2003…’  
The interviewees from local authorities and local financial departments at city level pointed 
out that current local budget finance and funding just covers the basic expenditures for city 
council operations, local education expenses and local pension’s schemes. If local 
authorities did not increase their revenues from other sources, it would be impossible for 
them to develop and finance local infrastructure and public services. Additionally, the 
sources of local public revenue are very limited, since all tax bases, rates and categories are 
tightly controlled by central government. Furthermore, under China’s public accounting 
and budgeting regulations, local governments were not allowed to borrow money from 
commercial organisations and banks, except when the Ministry of Finance agreed. In China, 
Government and public service units implement a special accounting system, called Public 
Administration and Public Services Units Accounting and Budgeting Standards, which 
largely differed from Chinese Enterprises Accounting Standards (based upon International 
Financial Reporting Standards). There should also be no ‘deficits’ in the local authorities’ 
post-budget and financial reports. This meant that China’s local authorities were receiving 
insufficient finances from their share of tax revenues, and were not allowed to raise 
finances through borrowing or debt. Under this circumstance, BOTs and extra-budget 
finances were introduced, and made available to local public finances. Extra-budget activity 
(expenditure or revenue) refers to ‘sets of government transactions that are not included in 
the annual budget presentation. These may not be subject to the same level of scrutiny or 
accounting standards as the annual budget’ (IMF, 2007).  
 
 ‘…local government had many attempts to gain capital [from] delivering local 
infrastructure and public services developments, such as raising capital from selling 
local public land to property developers, and establishing local urban investment (or 
development) companies. These were controlled by local authorities, and would attract 
varied social investments and finally there were BOTs.’ 
                 





As a director from the government pointed out, the biggest portion (about 50%) of local 
extra-budget financing revenue is the revenue raised from selling local public land to 
commercial property developers. This is often called ‘Land Financing’ in China. Land 
financing is not included in the annual budget presentation. However the land financing at 
city level has to be put into a separate account to be scrutinized by the provincial and 
national government. Due to public land being limited in local regions and not sustainable, 
the local governments at city level cannot entirely rely on land financing. Therefore, city 
governments need to raise capital funding from other sources.  
BOT is another way to raise local infrastructure financing. BOT is not included in the 
budgetary reports of local governments, therefore it is an extra-budgetary finance. However, 
BOT is not put into a separate account by local governments either, and so it becomes an 
extra extra-budget finance, which is totally unscrutinized by the provincial and central 
governments. BOT has no clear definition in terms of accounting standards, due to the 
obsolescence of China’s public accounting and budgeting regulations, which did not 
address these problems at all.  
By creating diverse ‘extra-budgets’ financing and accounting methods, local authorities 
avoided breaking Chinese government accounting and budgeting regulations, raising 
considerable capital. A substantial amount of debts were borrowed from various local 
government-controlled businesses (so-called, Local Government Financing Vehicles) and 
banks. The four decision-makers from W province, Y province and S province stated that 
extra-budget finances and BOTs allowed local authorities to improve the local financial 
situation in the short term, but in the long term it would damage the stability and safety of 
local public finances. These four interviewees from both central and provincial government 
believed these BOTs and Local Government Financing Vehicles were time-bombs in the 
Chinese fiscal system. A governor’s assistant (director at vice-governor level) of W 
provincial government and two interviewees who working in the banks revealed, the use of 
local extra-budget financing has already been 
‘out of the control of  the central government… it is not clear and it is difficult to 




However, as a vice-mayor and several decision-makers worked in different city councils 
responsible for urban infrastructure and management pointed out, if the government at 
provincial and city levels stopped using land financing, BOTs and local government 
financing vehicles immediately, they would not be able to find alternative funding or 
financial sources. The vice-mayor from the K city of W province also stated further that,  
‘as I know, the local decision-makers in other city councils are also faced with the same 
financing issues. We clearly understand the potential drawbacks and problems of extra-
budget financing and borrowing in the future. However, we have to use them since we 
have so few choices.’  
Pilot Study Interviewee 5, A vice-mayor   
5.5.2 Applying BOTs in motorway and water projects: increasing the finance available to 
local government  
By considering BOTs as an extra extra-budget finance, the officials from eight different city 
governments explained that BOT arrangements allowed the public sector to consider 
otherwise unaffordable projects. From this perspective, BOTs help to fill the so-called 
infrastructure gap between what the government can afford and what local people need. 
Thus,  
 
‘…BOTs allow the local public sector to achieve more financial resources by using the 
private sector in the short term. This has enabled the local government to allocate 
limited public financial resources to worthy projects…’ 
Pilot Study Interviewee 4, A general director of Mayor Office  
 
BOTs were introduced as one of the extra-budget finance and a complementary option to 
develop public infrastructure and service in local areas when public finances were not 
available or inadequate.  
 
‘Financing capabilities and the situation of local authorities have had a significant 
effect on introducing and implementing BOTs. The local councils [that] have [a] big 




and adopt BOTs’.  
the focus group in the Urban Development and Investment Company  
The findings also revealed that the local officers were forced to raise a large sum to self-
finance the development of motorways, the construction of the water supply infrastructure 
and improvements in sewage treatment services, without central financial support. China’s 
city and county councils were compulsorily told to build sewage treatment factories in 
every city and town by implementing the ‘environmental strategies’ of central government, 
while the largest portion of the funding needed to be collected by the local authorities. In 
this study, almost all of the local officials, from ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ provinces alike, 
complained about the shortage in local fiscal budgets for developing motorway and water 
infrastructure projects.  
 
‘The local governments must meet the needs of financing local infrastructure and 
public services, while we have to ensure that we have adequate resources to do that.’  
 Pilot Study Interviewee 4, A general director of Mayor Office in the K city, W province 
 
5.5.3 BOT accelerates the development of local infrastructure—evidence from W, Y and 
V provinces  
The evidence from the six provinces showed the ten city councils have raised a large 
amount of investment capital through BOTs. Without private contractor and investor’ 
participation, these projects could not be constructed and operated in such a short period. 
As Mr. P who is working in the transportation department of W province estimated that,  
‘without BOTs, and if (the government) just relied on the public investments, loans and 
funding, these 19 motorway projects might have been postponed for 5 to 10 
years…BOT is the available and easiest way to develop motorway projects at present'   
a leader of the Transport Department at provincial level 
 
As Mr. P stated in 2008, the current public funding and, the MOT revenue and operating 
expenditures on the W provincial motorways, can only cover the maintenance works and 




governments in W province were able to complete the motorway networks originally 
planned to be finished in 2015.  
The empirical findings from Y province and V province also presents BOT as an important 
approach to financing local transport infrastructure projects. In V province, two BOT cross-
river tunnels had been financed, constructed and operated by the contractors in 1995 and 
2009, which largely improved V province’s urban road and transport system. Meanwhile, in 
WU city, the capital of Y province, three cross-river BOT urban bridges had been financed, 
built and operated by private contractors from Hong Kong in 1995, 1997 and 1999. The 
interviewees from Y and V provinces stated that the BOTs had brought a significant amount 
of capital investment to local infrastructure projects.  
 
5.5.4 The Difficulties of Attracting Private Investment: the Application of BOTs in Small 
Water and Sewage Treatment BOTs 
The empirical findings from the six provinces showed that not all BOT projects are 
attractive to private investors and contractors. This is true of the small water supply and 
sewage treatment projects with a capital value under RMB 200 million. These small 
projects usually are less-attractive to the large or multinational BOT contractors, as the 
interviewees from the Ministry of Construction stated.  
Firstly, the profitability of small BOT project is not high, but transaction costs and 
operating costs often are similar to those of medium size BOT projects, as Mr. U 
commented. Mr. U and Mr. K stated that the investigation by the Ministry of Construction 
showed, in some super-large sewage treatment and water BOT projects in V province (daily 
treatment capacity over 1.4 million tons/day), the average/unit treatment cost is just RMB 
0.23-0.35/ton (2-3 pence/ton) (an interviewee from V province). However, for medium-size 
sewage treatment BOT project in W province (over 100,000 tons/per day), the unit cost is 
about RMB 0.4-0.65/ton (data taken from the on-site observations in 2008, given the 
facility operated at its full design capacity). Therefore, small-size sewage treatment BOT 
projects have relatively higher transaction and operating costs, while the profitability is 
lower due to their smaller scale. The data from the six provinces showed over two-thirds 




average daily processing capacity of only 35,000-40,000 ton/day. This created difficulties 
in attracting BOT contractors to the water sector.  
Secondly, although China’s domestic investors are actively participating in these small 
sewage treatment BOT projects, the financial, managerial and technical capabilities of the 
Chinese BOT contractors are in doubt. At least 17 small sewage treatment BOT contracts 
had been terminated by the government in W province and Y province, after the private 
contractors met a series of financial and operational problems. These will be addressed in a 
later chapter.  
 
5.5.5 Motorway and Water BOTs were undertaken by state-controlled businesses: should 
this be a Public-Private Partnership or Public-Public Partnership 
When reviewing all BOT projects involved in this thesis, it was found that the contractors 
of 5 Motorway, 5 Water and Sewage Treatment, 2 Tunnel BOTs and 1 underground PPP 
were not private businesses or companies, but rather government-owned/controlled 
businesses.  
In the five Motorway BOT projects in W province, two government-controlled publicly 
listed companies were project contractors. Three governments controlled Plcs had 
undertaken five water supply and sewage treatment BOT contracts in V, W and Y provinces. 
In addition, a government-controlled Tunnel Construction Plc won two Tunnel BOT (TOT) 
contracts in V province. Finally, Hong Kong Underground Plc as a government-controlled 
company defeated other bidders from Germany, Canada and Singapore, to win an 
underground PPP project in U province.  
The interviewees from the local procuring authorities stated they do not mind if the 
contractors are ‘government-controlled’ or privately-owned. The key criteria for selecting 
the BOT bidders are their overall capabilities in designing, financing, constructing and 
managing the infrastructure projects. The interviewees from the W, Y and V provinces 
showed that the government-controlled BOT contractors have distinct advantages in 
financing and managing super-large infrastructure projects, such as strong financing and 
technical capabilities, and wide experiences on developing large motorway and water 




between private investors and state-controlled businesses was not fair, since the latter could 
get more financial supports from the state-owned banks, the central and local governments.      
A director from the Department of Transportation in a provincial government commented 
that there no regulation mentioned that the state-controlled businesses cannot join the BOT 
bidding. The procuring authority would like to see that state-controlled businesses and 
private contractors compete against each other under the BOT framework. He also stated 
that the state-controlled companies did not always win BOT contracts in the competitive 
bidding, as witnessed from the motorway projects in W province.  
5.6 BOTs in Chinese Motorway and Water sectors: monopoly, competition and the 
diversifying investment strategy 
All interviewees from the central and local authorities believed that competition was 
essential for the success of the application of BOTs in both motorway and water projects. 
As the government claimed, through introducing private investment capital into China’s 
motorway and water projects, the central and local governments in China expected to 
diversify their public investment’ sources and options (areas that had been solely dominated 
by them  or public-owned enterprise), indirectly improving the operational efficiencies of 
public services. Using privately financed infrastructure and utility projects, the government 
claimed that private investments could break the monopoly of the government in these 
sectors, introducing multiple and diverse ownership suppliers in these markets. The results 
of interviews with the decision-makers working in the Ministry of Construction, National 
Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Transportation showed the central 
and provincial governments was that they tried to adopt the ‘pro-market’, ‘pro-competition’ 
and ‘pro-efficiency’ strategies when developing motorway and water infrastructure projects 
in the last ten years.  
 
 
5.6.1 Encouraging competition in China’s motorway and water BOTs: the official 
strategy and approach 




competition in China’s BOT market was to introduce new competitors into the market. In 
2001, Chinese domestic investors were allowed and encouraged into the water, motorway 
and power generation BOT markets which used to only be open to Hong Kong or 
international investors.  
 
In this way, we hoped to increase the numbers of suppliers/contractors for the  
motorway and water BOT market; and at the same time, we also expected the new 
entrants to the BOT market to re-shape the motorway and water market structure  
which at that time was dominated by a small number of Hong Kong, French and 
British contractors.    
A manager from the NDRC at provincial level 
The second step to enhancing competition in  China’s BOT market was to decentralise the 
BOT approvals and reviews from the National Development and Reform Commission to 32 
provincial Development and Reform Commissions in 2005. Through this management 
decentralisation, the times and costs of obtaining approval on BOT project applications had 
been greatly reduced. The procedures of approval had been simplified.   
In practice, the decentralisation (on BOT approval and review) largely reduce the 
approval costs and speed up the decision-making processes.     
A manager from the NDRC at provincial level 
 
Finally, competition was also introduced with the adoption of a competitive bidding 
approach in the BOT tendering and procurement processes, as Mr. P and Mr. A suggested. 
However, the interviewees from central government pointed out that (compulsory) 
competitive bidding had been widely applied in conventional publicly funded projects all 
over the country. Competitive bidding is not a compulsory requirement for all BOTs, 
because this kind of bidding is expensive for medium and small size projects, although the 
central government did advocate it.  
The interviewees from the public procuring authorities in W, U, Y and V province 
confirmed that in the 14 motorway, 10 large size water BOT projects and 10 small sewage 




cases, the small size projects failed to attract sufficient bidders (at least 3), thereby one-to-
one non-competitive negotiations were allowed.  
 
5.6.2 Increasing the number of BOT contractors and changes to the BOT market 
structure: evidence from W and Y provinces 
The evidence from W and Y provinces showed, that the number of BOT contractors had 
grown rapidly since 2001 when China’s BOT market was opened to domestic investors. At 
same time, in the motorway and urban transport BOT markets, Chinese domestic investors 
had already achieved the majority share, which used to be dominated by Hong Kong 
private infrastructure contractors.  
The examples from W province showed, before 2000, the provincial transportation 
department and highways agency were responsible for designing, financing, constructing 
and operating all roads and motorways. During the period of 2001-2008, about 26 private 
motorway contractors had been introduced, managing 19 BOT projects in W province, 23 
contractors were from different provinces and regions of mainland of China, with 3 
contractors from Hong Kong. Interviewees from Y, V and  X provinces also verified that 
the Chinese domestic investors had a dominant position in their motorway, bridge and 
tunnel BOT markets in 2008. However, motorway BOT projects in China were still 
restricted to international contractors.  
Although the water supply and sewage treatment markets have been open to foreign 
investors from as early as 1995, the number of Chinese domestic contractors grew very fast 
during the period 2002-2009. However, the data collected from the six provinces and the 
reports from the Ministry of Construction revealed that Chinese domestic BOT contractors 
mainly concentrated on the small size water BOTs, depending on their financial and 
technical capabilities. The large and medium size BOT contracts were normally won by the 
foreign investors from France, the UK and Singapore. Two French water multinational 
companies especially have continuously expanded their share of the networks in Chinese 
water supply and sewage treatment BOT markets in the last two decades.  These two 
French water companies have a small share of the market, in terms of the number of BOT 




controlled by these French companies. The information gathered from the six provinces 
showed that a small number of multi-national companies had obtained a more concentrated 
share (over 10%) of China’s water market over the last five years.    
 
5.6.3 Weak competition in the bidding phase of BOTs 
By reviewing the process of procurement and by discussions with the participants, it can be 
shown that the level of competition in many Chinese BOTs was often weak. However the 
degree of competition in the BOT procurement and bidding stages differed, depending on 
the industry (motorway or water) and the tendering mechanisms implemented (competitive 
or non-competitive). Most unsuccessful BOT projects (cancelled projects or the expensive 
BOT contracts) often were let out without competitive biddings. 
As the participants revealed, most problems came from water and sewage treatment BOT 
procurements with the local councils receiving very few expressions of interest in response 
to their initial advertisement for the procurement. Nine out of the forty-five water BOT 
projects had experienced problems in the procurement phase because too few investors 
showed sufficient interest. In five cases, competitive bidding had been adopted initially and 
a few of the bidders entered into the second round of bidding but then quickly withdrew 
leaving no bidders for these procurements. A director explained that: 
 
‘… we tried to create stronger competition in the procurements by using competitive 
bidding… the lessons showed that the bidding costs and risks were higher in this kind 
of bidding to the potential bidders, specially for the small and medium size BOT 
projects…’  
A Vice-Director of provincial Development and Reform Committee 
 
As mentioned by the research participants, in the earlier water BOTs projects, the central 
government required all projects to adopt competitive bidding for the procurement of BOTs 
in 2002. However, the high bidding costs for both the procuring authorities and private 
investors in the water projects, forced the central government to change its attitude. And as 




water BOTs interviewed such negotiations were conducted with a single investor. A non-
competitive negotiation to expand a contract would not be regarded as the best route to 
achieve competition and value for money in BOTs. The directors and managers that have 
participated in these negotiations commented that:  
 
‘…we clearly understand the disadvantages of non-competitive negotiation in BOTs, 
these negotiations have a low degree of openness and transparency, [easily] producing 
corruption and ‘under the table deals’, past experiences confirmed that … also, local 
councils were often at a disadvantage in these negotiations, due to their poor 
negotiating skills and capabilities. The key output specifications and the requirements 
for private contractors were often compromised in this process, like risk allocations, 
pricing equations and some responsibilities…’  
A manager, the city’s Urban Management Department 
 
Through non-competitive negotiations, the local authorities procured and contracted out the 
projects to private contractors. However more trouble occurred during later operational 
phases, such as the contractors being unable to deliver satisfactory performance and outputs, 
plus conflicts caused by poor risk allocations and opportunism, which occurred on both 
sides of the BOTs. The experiences from this practice showed that: 
 
‘In many cases, the contractors [who were successful in] non-competitive negotiations 
[found it] easy to form a monopoly position in the local markets and get excessive 
profits…’ 
Mr. L, the regional managers, a policy bank of China 
 
Competitive bidding is more likely to be successful in selling the major stocks of publicly-
owned water companies and in the motorway BOT projects. Stronger competition was 
found in the procurement when bidding for the major stocks of public-owned water supply 






‘…joint-venture (or joint-stock) model based water projects with the governments have 
lower risks because the local governments and the contractors share the revenues and 
risks; they work on the same side… The profitability of the motorways was usually 
good and the cash flow of the motorway BOT projects is stable in many cases… the 
projects with lower risk and higher return always are the favourites of investors. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that there is stronger competition during these BOTs’  
procurement …’  
A manager, from a Motorway Investment Company 
 
Finally, in the whole of China’s BOT market, especially for the water and sewage treatment 
sections, there is a trend for a small number of private investors to dominate the market. 
The interviewees had noticed that:  
 
  ‘…two French companies always won the bidding and got the contracts for the 
procurement. They already held and controlled nearly seventy cities’ water supply 
markets in China. These less-competitive and monopolistic signs have already been 
noticed by the central government…’  
A Director, Ministry of Construction 
 
 
5.6.4 Regional Monopoly of Motorway and Water BOTs in China: Exclusivity of BOT 
Contracts and Weak Competitions at Post-contract phases 
Most of the interviewees believed that public bidding is an effective, transparent and fair 
way to select the appropriate investor or operator. However, as discussed in the last section, 
about two-thirds of water supply and sewage treatment projects had adopted non-
competitive negotiations rather than compulsory competitive bidding. About half the 
number of Motorway BOTs investigated in this study applied competitive bidding in their 
procurement and tendering processes. Although very successful/strong competitive bids 




competition in China’s BOTs is weak.  
Furthermore, one notable point was raised by an official from the Ministry of Construction 
in his interview, which is that in most motorway and water BOTs,  
 
‘the BOT bidders competed for [monopolizing] the [local] market rather than [several 
suppliers competed] in the market… it is like a game of the winner takes all… The 
competitions are strong before the contracts have been awarded in some cases. But, 
when the BOT contract has been signed by the government, the private contractors 
gain a monopoly position in the local market’ 
Mr. K, a director from the Ministry of Construction   
 Two interviewees from local authorities who worked in the front-lines argued that the 
water supply and sewage treatment industries featured had a natural monopoly and huge 
costs for pipeline networks construction. Strong competitions were therefore difficult to 
create in practice. It is an inevitable result that the private contractor has a monopoly 
position in the local market. Mr. A who was from the local Development and Reform 
Commission commented, 1 water supply and 2 sewage treatment BOT projects have been 
built and operated by three different private contractors in K city of W province in 2007. 
However, there is no competition between them at all, due to the fact that these three BOT 
contractors provide services for three different districts of the city.  
Finally, primary studies of China’s BOT contracts discovered, that almost all of the BOT 
contracts, granted exclusive and monopoly powers to the private contractors over the 
contract period of 20-30 years. In this way, the profitability of the BOT contractors had 
been secured, but it was also clear that the competition had been prevented.  
5.7 Have BOTs improved the constructional and operational efficiencies of Motorway 
and Water Projects 
 
5.7.1 Debates on inefficiencies in the public sector and criticisms on publicly funded 
motorway and water projects 




were adopted in Chinese motorway and water sectors, due to the reforms of the Chinese 
public investment system and public service SOEs. The government wanted to try out a 
new approach in providing public services and the development of the public infrastructure.  
  
‘…the obsolete Chinese traditional models for developing, operating, provisioning and 
managing public services, which followed the command economic system, were not 
feasible and  capable of  developing some infrastructure industries. BOTs are an 
innovative way and market-emphasised approach that could be used to solve the local 
public financial problems, and improve efficiencies by transferring private business’ 
practices.’  
A governor assistant, at the provincial council 
 
In the  focus group , a director working in a local council mentioned that, based upon past 
experience, a substantial portion of China’s economic resources are devoted to these public 
agencies and SOEs, while their outputs and performance were really poor. In the past, the 
government at central and local levels have made large additional funds available to public 
infrastructure and services industries in the hope of building new infrastructure and 
improving public services. 
However, the evidence provided by the interviewees on publicly funded highways and 
water projects showed many signs that pointed to these additional resources being 
increasingly captured and used by their related public agencies and SOEs to increase 
employment and wages rather than for their investment in the public infrastructure and 
services. As a deputy-mayor complained: 
 
‘The city councils want to develop more public projects and improve public services in 
local areas and we have put a large amount of financial and technical resources into 
these industries. However, public service SOEs and departments always paid more 
attention to increasing employment, improving working environments (luxury offices 
and company cars, even built the hotels) and personal benefits (like, basic wages, 




large departments were built for themselves’  
 a Vice-Mayor from a city council 
 
‘… in many cases, when local departments and SOEs received infrastructure funds 
from central or provincial government, the first thing they did was to pay back 
previous debts, such as unpaid staff salaries, pensions, health allowances etc., the 
second, was to build offices and buy new company cars and finally, the rest of the 
funds would be invested in the new public projects’ 
A vice-director, the city’s Development and Reform Committee, city level. 
 
Only a small portion of public funding was invested to develop public projects and improve 
the quality of public services, this phenomenon is especially significant and popular at the 
lower levels of government, like city and county levels.  
 
‘…two popular problems with China’s local public service SOEs and quasi-agencies 
are their over-staffing and self-interest... leading to inefficient investment results. The 
government put scarce resources into public services but would not get [the] good 
results that they wanted. Of course, this [is] largely caused by some historic and old 
command economic reasons… ’ 
 
 Pilot Study PL3, at provincial council. 
The publicly funded projects are often subject to cost overruns, delays, poor operation and 
management and staffed with rude customer service operatives. The public sector took up a 
large quantity of public resources yet had poor outputs and performance. Some decision-
makers at local level interviewed showed that they had lost confidence and patience on 
reforming the infrastructure SOEs: 
 
‘Under [the] current system, even though more resources are put into SOEs and 
public service’ businesses, the government finds it difficult to achieve the 




Pilot Study PL4, the general director, the mayor 
office, a city council 
 
5.7.2 The quality and efficiency of publicly funded projects and BOTs 
Evidence from the government’s documents (QU5-QU10) and responses of interviews from 
W and Y provinces showed that the publicly funded motorway and water projects had 
serious problems in their construction, operation and financial management. In the cases of 
motorways and urban bridges in W and Y provinces, the quality of a number of them is 
really poor. The quality inspections in 2004 conducted by W provincial Transportation 
Department and the W provincial People’s Congress discovered, nearly 25% (7 in 28) of 
the government-funded motorway projects had very serious quality problems. In a city, the 
capital of Y province, the city council conducted a quality and safety inspection on 10 
cross-river bridges (including 3 BOTs) in 2006. The results revealed 9 of them had some 
quality and safety problems. In 3 of the publicly-funded projects developed in the past five 
years these quality issues were fairly serious. The exception was one mega bridge built in 
the 1950s, it still maintained the best quality conditions and standards. The comment in the 
inspection report said this bridge (built in the 1950s) is able to be used for another fifty 
years. The quality of the three BOT bridges was good and above average in terms of 
China’s technical standards, from the results of these inspections.   
In contrast to the publicly funded motorway projects, the government-sponsored water and 
sewage treatment projects involved more operational matters. The investigation by the 
Ministry of Construction in 2007 showed, about 60% of the 300 conventional publicly 
funded sewage treatment projects were not operating to capacity. This was due to the 
sewage treatment pipeline networks in the local areas not being developed and completed 
by the local governments.  
Finally, several managers from local public service SOEs argued that inefficiencies in 
public institutions or enterprises resulted from distortions caused by government 
intervention in SOEs as well as the government’s organizational structures, which were 





‘… directors and managers in SOEs are directly appointed by local 
government… these staff were usually treated the same as government 
officials…’  
A regional manager, the National Development Bank of China. 
 
“Public service SOEs are not purely commercial businesses. They often suffer 
[because of] political decisions, public interest and public benefits. Therefore, 
we cannot fully operate the business by following the market rules. Does the 
government allow water SOEs freely to decide [the] prices of public services? 
No, it is impossible…”   
 
A manager, the city’s Urban Management Department. 
 
There are arguments on the inefficiency of SOEs and many officials in local and central 
government believed that BOTs are necessary to allow them to respond to market forces, 
becoming more competitive and finally improving efficiency.  
 
5.7.3 Construction Performances of Motorway and Water BOT projects 
5.7.3.1 Construction performance of BOT motorways: the evidence from W province 
The empirical findings on construction performance of motorway BOTs indicated they are 
not as good as the government and the officials expected, in terms of time for construction, 
construction quality and construction costs of the projects.  
The evidence from the 19 motorway BOTs in W province showed 10 of 19 projects were 
delivered over four months late. Two motorway BOTs reported delays of 2 years and 5 
years in 2008, due to the resistance of local residents and the financial difficulties of the 
contractors. In these two cases, penalties were not made by the governments. In the latter 
case, the risk (financial difficulties) were included in the contracts, but did not clearly 
defined how much penalty the government should make. However, the rest of the 9 




earlier than originally planned. Two projects completed construction 8 and 10 months 
earlier than the time specified in the contract. As an interviewee who worked in the 
Department of Transportation W province pointed out, the main reason for the construction 
delays in the 10 motorway BOTs is that the private contractors and SPV companies 
experienced financial difficulties, although several other factors have been observed such as, 
poor project management, geographical conditions, land acquisitions and technical matters.   
Meanwhile, as this interviewee commented not all BOT projects were constructed with 
high quality standards. 8 (of 19) SPV companies and 15 BOT construction sub-contractors 
were publicly condemned by the Department of Transportation, in W province, due to their 
poor quality control and quality management relating to the BOT projects during the 
construction periods. The poor quality of motorway BOTs is mainly due to the unqualified 
construction sub-contractors that were selected and the lack of sufficient experience, skills 
and expertise in the BOT contractors. This will be referred to in the next chapter. 
5.7.3.2 Construction performance of water BOTs: the evidence from W, Y and V 
provinces 
The construction performance of the water supply and sewage treatment BOTs is much 
better than the motorway BOTs. Fifty of 56 water and sewage treatment BOTs (excluding 
the water and sewage pipeline constructions) completed construction works on time. The 
exceptions were 6 large projects that reported a range of delays from 1-8 months. As noted 
in the first section of this chapter over two-third of water supply and sewage treatment 
BOTs are small-size projects at city or county level and the initial investments on these 
projects was not large, usually between RMB 60 million-150 million. The private 
contractors did not have many financing pressures in the construction stage, therefore, the 
projects usually could be completed on time as Mr. A explained. However, the total 
operating expenses and costs are relatively higher than the initial investments for the water 
and sewage facilities and equipments. 
The construction quality and investment in water and sewage treatment largely relied on the 
equipment and machines the project used. However, all the construction work associated 




defined in the contract.  The quality of the BOTs’ construction was usually tested in the 
trial operating periods. The findings from the interviews and on-site observations revealed 
that during the trial operations of the water BOTs, most of the projects reached the 
technical standards defined in the contract, as measured by the procuring authorities and 
their experts.   
In addition, the interviews with 7 project managers from the water supply and sewage 
treatment BOTs discovered that the construction costs of BOTs were significantly lower 
than the costs of conventionally funded projects which were developed by the governments 
in most cases. The project managers from the W ,Y and V provinces stated that the actual 
construction costs of water BOTs were even lower than the private contractors reported to 
the governments.  
5.7.4 Operational Performance of Motorway and Water BOT projects 
5.7.4.1 Operational performance of motorways: the evidence from W province  
Compared to the water BOTs, the motorway BOT projects are more asset-specified/based 
projects. In W province, the Provincial Highway Agency of the Department of 
Transportation unified and controlled the operation of the motorways network, rather than 
leaving it to the BOT contractors. Most of their operational works were done by the public 
sector, such as tolling services, motorway traffic management, services’ station 
management, emergency/disaster management and motorway signs management. The 
private contractors/subcontractors was only responsible for the main maintenance works 
and general facilities management.  
5.7.4.2 Operational performance of water BOTs 
The performance of the operational water supply BOT (TOT) caused the price of tap water 
to rise and was the biggest problem for BOT models. As four officials from three different 
city councils in W, Y and V provinces discovered, if BOT (TOT) and joint-venture models 
were adopted in one city’s water supply sector, the water prices for local residents would go 




On the other hand, the performance of sewage treatment BOT and TOT projects also 
seriously suffered due to the underdeveloped pipeline networks in local areas, as 
conventional funded projects have experienced. Under current Chinese water industrial 
policy, water and sewage pipelines and networks cannot be financed and owned by private 
contractors. These pipelines have to be built by the local councils, leading to the 
development and construction of local water pipeline networks progressing very slowly, 
due to local councils having insufficient funding. Therefore, sewage treatment BOT 
projects usually could not work properly because the residential or industrial waste water 
had not been channelled into the treatment facilities and plants.  
The data gathered from K city, W province showed that none of 7 city and county councils 
had completed their sewage pipeline networks by 2008, although 6 sewage treatment BOT 
plants were completed and had been operating for several years.  
Furthermore, for technical and weather reasons, the sewage processing results of BOT 
projects were unstable in all six provinces. The main technical and performance indicators 
of sewage treatment BOTs often cannot reach the standards and requirements that the 
contracts specified. In addition, at least five sewage treatment BOT contractors were found 
to be directly discharging sewage into local rivers, lakes and seas without any treatment, to 
reduce their operating costs. One of them was a world-class water multinational company 





5.8 Have Motorway and Water BOTs met the local demands and improved local 
infrastructure investment decision-makings  
As five decision-makers from the central and local governments stated, one critical success 
factor of implementing BOTs in the Chinese motorway and water sectors is if these projects 
can be efficiently responsive to local demands.  
 
   Such as, can a motorway BOT project solve local traffic congestion problems? 
Or can a sewage treatment BOT enhance the city’s water pollution and improve 
water quality of the local rivers and lakes?  
                                                                      A  Director of a city Council 
 
5.8.1 Identifying local demands, the design and planning of BOT projects  
As two officials from the department of transportation and the local Development and 
Reform Commission stated, the most difficult task for the local procuring authorities and 
BOT contractors is how to identify the real needs of motorway and water infrastructure 
projects (the Needs Assessment). The research participants from W province and the 
Ministry of Transportation mentioned that the BOT contractors and public agencies at local 
level often could not correctly and precisely forecast real demands, leading to poor 
planning and design. Poor planning by local governments and private contractors damaged 
the quality and efficiency of BOT projects. Therefore, some motorway and water BOTs 
failed to fulfil the local demands on the public services during the project planning 
processes.  
The planning of motorway and water industry were and normally conducted by the 
Development and Reform Commission at the central governments (in the 5-Year Plan of 
China). However, at the individual project level, the planning work was undertaken by the 
city councils, and approved by the provincial Development and Reform Commission. As an 
interviewee from the central government stated the planning at central level has been 




government had more knowledge and information of local demands of road and water 
infrastructure. However, in this study, it may not be true. In the case of motorway BOTs, 
the different planning on motorway networks by different provinces often segmented the 
motorway networks on the provincial borders. It also damaged the whole efficiency of the 
national motorway system. Even in a province, it was often observed that width of 
motorways differed. For instance the G4 Motorway (from Beijing to Hong Kong), which 
has some parts as ‘double directions, 4 lines’, some parts are ‘double directions, 6 or 8 
lines’. This is because of different planning policies by different governments at local level. 
The result of this segmental planning in the Chinese motorway network is traffic 
congestion on the G4 were always regularly at certain times and in certain areas. 
At the individual project level, the planning work done by the city councils is also 
important for the success and failure of BOT projects. The robust pre-feasibility study and 
the feasibility studies at later stages are very necessary in the planning and decision-making 
process. In field studies in the six provinces, a number of planning issues were observed, 
particularly the absence of an assessment of alternatives, an objective needs assessments, a 
strong economic and financial appraisal, and an environmental and social responsibility 
analysis (for local residents who were affected by the projects). All these factors have 
contributed to project delays or cancellation at later stages.  
Meanwhile, the primary investigations on 96 motorway and water BOTs found that the 
design of the BOT projects normally had been undertaken by the governments and 
procuring authorities before the BOT bidding. As the three interviewees explained the 
governments normally found that the Chinese private investors have poor designing 
capabilities. In some BOTs, the private investors were responsible for the design of the 
projects, yet only a few private companies have the experience and capabilities to carry out 
such super-large infrastructure projects, except for several water multinationals and a few 
Chinese BOT contractors who are experienced in the water industries. This is because:  
 
‘… nearly all of the best infrastructure planning and designing institutions in China 
are state-owned companies. The private sectors have only been allowed into Chinese 




capability and resources to do that…’  
                                              A vice-director, at city’s Development and Reform Committee 
 
Therefore, a large number of private sponsors of BOTs have neither the experience, nor the 
expertise to design motorways at present. Chinese private investors still need time to learn 
how to develop BOTs. Moreover, because of the Chinese government’s decentralisation, 
many new projects, especially highway and sewage treatment BOTs, were planned and 
designed in a very short period without good preparation and study. So, the local 
governments’ capabilities for designing large public projects and facilities were widely 
debated and questioned:  
 
‘…provincial and city’s communication (transport) departments have their experts and 
advisors. But, it is true that the central government, the Ministry of Communications, 
have the best full-time (and part-time) expertise and advisors in Chinese motorway 
industries…’ 
                                                                                        A director, from a consulting firm 
Furthermore, evidence from W and S provinces showed that some project teams and local 
authorities were too over-optimistic and failed to forecast the demands of the BOT projects 
due to a lack of basic data and information. The actual volumes of traffic in 3 motorway 
BOTs have been substantially less than forecast, although these numbers were produced by 
their external experts and advisors. In these motorway projects it was found that: 
 
‘…the real traffic flows were not even over one third of the forecasts… therefore, the 
private contractor just cannot maintain the operation, and the total revenue and cash 
flows cannot cover the costs incurred…’ 
 
                         A manager, Urban Development and Investment Company, at city level  
 
This problem was even more common in the water industries, especially the sewage 




projects were not in normal operation, because of the absence of or the underdeveloped 
pipeline networks in local places. These failed to gather sufficient sewage from local 
residents and industrial consumers, as noted in the last section.  
In contrast, at least 6 motorway BOTs interviewed were found to have under-estimated the 
traffic flow.  
 
‘… in our projects, the real traffic flows of the motorway are far over the designed 
capabilities, leading to the higher depreciation and maintaining costs for the private 
contractors. This also largely limited the designed driving speeds of these roads, 
normally no more than 40 miles per hour on the road, leading to the dissatisfaction of 
road users…’ 
                                                      A Director of the Highway Agency at provincial level 
Later, as the Highway Agency found that the extra volume of traffic were not from local 
regions of W province, but from the other five nearby provinces. Although local authorities 
suggested and encouraged private contractors to extend the width of the motorways later, 
the requests were rejected, due to the private contractors’ tests showing that the costs of 
widening a motorway were the same as building a new one.  
 
5.8.2 Political and administrative interventions on motorway and water BOT projects 
  
BOTs were introduced into China’s motorway and water sectors, due to the government 
wanting to improve public infrastructure investment decision-making and reduce the 
political intervention. Nearly all participants from Chinese local authorities believed that 
developing motorway infrastructure in China at local level is not only an economic 
objective, but more importantly, a political task. The present national and local political 
objective in China is to ‘develop the economy’ (in some context, this is taken to be the 
increase of GDP). This objective meant that local governments had to show a good 
performance on local public infrastructure developments. Meanwhile, the participants from 
local authorities admitted that infrastructure development is an important indicator to 




services are more visible for both their superiors and local residents.  
 
‘The progress on developing motorway and water infrastructure is more visible. And 
the related public facilities could be developed and completed in five years (one term 
of office in Chinese government). Therefore, the progress on improvements to public 
infrastructure and services can be easily noticed by superiors and local residents. Also 
these could be treated [as a] positive track record [in an] official’s career history…’ 
                   A regional manager, from a state-owned bank 
 
Due to strong competition between (and in) different councils in China, the provincial and 
city councils often compared their infrastructure indicators to look for the best practices as 
benchmarks. Therefore, developing motorway and water infrastructure in China has often 
become a priority and a comprehensive task for local authorities. Local government and 
local leaders have to develop new public projects, facilities and services for local residents 
and communities to achieve the expected economic, social and even political benefits, or 
they will lose the competition.  
As some managers from the banks commented, in some provinces, the governments heavily 
relied on BOTs for developing motorway and water projects. The relevant decisions were 
made, not based on status of projects, degree of competition, feasibility studies or 
evidences-based investigation, but by political reasons and incentives. For instance, one 
motorway BOT had been built for connecting one city and the nearest airport as local 
leaders advocated and insisted. However, the real traffic on this motorway only reached 
one-third of forecast traffic flows.  
For a large number of water projects, the BOT model is not the optimal choice for local 
authorities. In these cases, BOT is adopted because the local governments and leaders want 
to construct them as soon as possible to fulfil the requirements of the central governments. 
For instance, China’s environmental protection strategies and plans designed by the 
Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Environmental Protection offered large 
pressure and administrative interventions for developing local sewage treatment facilities 




Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission jointly and 
compulsorily required all cities and towns with a population over 300,000 to build at least 
one sewage treatment facility. Any city council failing to achieve this task, had their 
budgets in 2006 and 2007 cut down. As a result, over one thousand of sewage treatment 
BOT and PPP projects have been applied in different provinces and regions. However, few 
of these projects addressed the absence of and the underdeveloped waste water pipeline 
networks. The BOT model was applied because of the political and administrative pressures 
from the central government.  
From this aspect, some interviewees from the local authorities believed that the Chinese 
BOT model had little difference in planning and design and construction from conventional 
funded projects, due to political and administrative intervention still being strong. The 
decisions were not based on the local demand and the local market, but by political and 
administrative intervention.  
 
5.9 Applying BOT in local motorway and water projects: boosting local economy, 
markets and job opportunities  
5.9.1 BOTs boosting local economy and construction markets 
The official objectives of the Chinese BOT claimed that diverse benefits will be brought by 
developing new infrastructure in using private investments. This would stimulate the local 
economy, drive local markets and, finally, contribute to the development of local 
communities. The results of group discussion and interviews with local officials showed 
that only when BOT was properly applied, would these benefits be realised in practice.  
Although individual experience on developing BOTs differed, the interviewees from 
different local authorities widely agreed that private investment in public infrastructure is 
required to anticipate future development and to stimulate investment in other sectors and 
future economic growth. 
 
 ‘…investing, building and improving local infrastructure directly stimulated [the] local 





                                         A General Director of a city council) 
 
This study also shows that the BOT investments in infrastructure achieved some goals set 
by the government from an economic perspective in terms of the experiences from W, Y 
and S provinces. On the one hand, large number of infrastructure investments directly made 
contributions to GDP growth which is the main performance indicator for local councils in 
China. Also these infrastructure developments allowed growth in the wider economy, as 
one director from a provincial economic planning department confirmed:  
 
 ‘ The annual GDP increases of our provinces were over 12% in [the] last three years 
(2005-2007),… a large share of this increase in GDP was contributed by investments 
in local infrastructure… large amounts of resources were put into [the] construction of 
highways, airports, energy and water projects in our province, in return, the provincial 
economy significantly rose.’  
                A Vice-Director of the Provincial Development and Reform Committee 
    
‘It was found that improvements in our infrastructure, such as national and local road 
systems, could indirectly bring positive effects on other related industries, such as 
logistics, [the] property market in certain regions and [the] motor trade market, finally, 
booming our local economy’  
                          A Director, the Mayor’s office of a city council 
 
However, the interviewees from local authorities also admitted BOTs may bring financial 
burdens for the local governments, in the cases of the terminations of BOT contracts and 
when private contractors experienced financial difficulties. The local authorities have to 
provide financial and political support to save the projects and in some cases the 






5.9.2 The economic benefits for local business and residents 
For local businesses and local residents, the well-developed BOT projects can bring 
economic benefits and provide more job opportunities. Although the individual experiences 
are different, all of the seven users from local business and communities expressed positive 
attitudes on developing local infrastructure.  
    
‘Our company is a national logistics company…… We are happy to see … big 
improvements and expansion in [the] national highway networks, because these 
improvements reduced the costs and improved the efficiency of our business 
operation…Our delivery lorry usually spent at least thirty-six hours on the road from 
the city to Beijing in 1996. Now, on the same route, we only need nine to ten hours 
because of the improvements [to the] national road system…’  
                                A  Chairman of a Logistics Plc 
 
Meanwhile, according to the on-site observations and interviews in W, Y, S, U and W 
provinces, nearly all BOT contractors interviewed stated that the local authorities usually 
required them to hire local workers and offer opportunities to local business to participate 
in BOT projects construction. Therefore, BOT infrastructure projects absorbed a large 
amount of local labour and boosted local construction markets. Furthermore, BOT would 
open and widen new markets and offer more chances for local businesses which was 
previously not something that happened.  
Finally, the evidence from W province suggested better highway networks and 
infrastructure attracted new investors and created more business opportunities, especially 
for local private businesses. In the case of W province, good investment environments and 
improved infrastructure systems attracted three world-class auto manufacturers to build 
seven car assemble factories by 2010. At same time, a super-large computing and mobile 
manufacturer also established its factories in W province in 2010, all these created at least 
150,000 new jobs for W province in 2010 and 2011.  





‘… in [the] last five years many highway projects (both of BOTs and public financed) 
were built in our region, leading to hundreds of jobs for local citizens… I joined this 
company two years ago; the company is still looking for new staff…’ 
                                   
 A staff member from a local transport SOE, the highway operator and employee. 
 
5.10 Have BOTs adopted new technology and technical innovation? 
 
The research participants from central and provincial governments believed that the 
adoption of new technology in BOT projects is important. As a manager from the city 
council mentioned,  
 
   ‘If there is no new technology introduced and implemented in the projects, why do 
we need BOTs?’  
 
However, the opposite views were also found. Several front-line BOT project managers 
from the urban management department at city and county levels argued that the BOT 
projects need the existing technologies and equipments:  
 
‘… Adopting new technologies would probably increase the costs of the projects. 
Generally, advanced technology and equipment are more expensive and the 
possible risks of implementing new technology should be considered and analysed. 
In practice, new technology and equipment are not fully tested and easily make 
problems in practice. The adaptability of our workers on new equipment is also 
important…in our factory, the new equipment brought from Canada three years 
ago… always broke down because they are too new and our staff did not know how 
to operate it … therefore, there are large risks and higher costs when introducing 





A manager, from a Water Supply Factory, the city’s Public Utilities Department. 
 
There are mixed findings on whether this objective has been achieved in current BOT 
practices in China. Evidence from some of the BOT water supply, sewage treatment, 
underground and power generation projects observed confirmed that the new technologies 
essentially were transferred by private sponsors in some super-large and technologically 
massive BOT projects, as required by the procuring authorities.  
However, negative examples were also found in this study. New technologies were often 
adopted in large water supply and waste treatment BOT projects rather than in highway 
projects. A BOT contract manager explained that: 
 
‘… This is because the water industry has more strict technical requirements on 
water processing services and quality which may be written in the BOT contracts. 
Without key technology and equipment for water processing, private operators 
could not reach the requirements of BOT contracts…’ 
 
             a manager, from the BOT contractor side. 
 
For highway BOT projects, the local public sector managers and directors are very 
suspicious of the introduction of new technology by the private sector. They thought that a 
private contractor may be good at business management rather than engineering techniques 
in highway and bridge projects. 
 
‘…they (private investors) do not know much about [how to] design highway and 
bridge projects… but they are good at highway services and advertisements [and] 
other commercial management…’  
 





5.11 A Summary  
The findings of this study showed that the applications of BOT in China’s motorway and 
water projects were not as good as the government expected or claimed and the previous 
studies suggested. Some official goals have been met, while a number of important claims 
of the government on BOTs were not achieved in practices.  
Firstly, this study shows BOTs did bring the private investments into China’s motorway and 
water infrastructure projects, increasing the availability of local public infrastructure 
funding. However, BOTs have a profound influence on the local government’s financial 
situation. The potential fiscal risks of using BOTs in the motorway and water sectors are 
critical and large, as some interviewees from the central government stated. Meanwhile, the 
poor financial capabilities of Chinese domestic BOT contractors showed that the private 
investors do not necessarily introduce the stable investment capital to public infrastructure 
projects.    
Secondly, the evidence did show that if BOT were properly applied, it did accelerate the 
development of the local motorway and water infrastructure at provincial and city levels.   
Thirdly, this study discovered that the monopoly of the state in the motorway and water 
sectors had been broken, due to the large number of new multiple ownership BOT 
contractors introduced since 2001. However, the monopoly on motorway and water 
infrastructures seems to have been transferred to the private BOT contractors for as long as 
20-30 years. Due to the characteristics of public motorway and water sectors and the 
ineffective procuring and bidding mechanisms, the competition and efficiency of China’s 
motorway and water BOTs have not been strengthened and improved in a number of cases. 
The investment decision-making on developing local motorway and water industries has 
not been improved by applying BOT models, since the BOT projects also suffered as a 
result of political and economic interventions from local and central governments.   
Fourthly, has the motorway and water infrastructure developed by BOT models fulfilled the 
local demands for public services, but not in all cases. A majority number of sewage 
treatment BOTs failed to effectively respond the local demands on environmental treating 
services.   




which was seen as an important political performance by local governments and local 
leaders. Properly developed BOT projects created more job opportunities for the local 
markets and improved the investment environment.   
 
As investigated by this study, in all 84 highway, bridge and water BOT projects, twenty-
three BOT (TOT) contracts were finally terminated/cancelled and the projects were took 
over by local authorities. Also, 25 projects were still in construction or operation but 
already had various major conflicts between the private and public sectors. Only thirty-
three achieved acceptable results where the projects are operating as normal without 
fundamental conflicts between governments and private contractors. This highlighted the 
large termination rates within China’s BOT contracts. Although this result only covered six 
provinces and ten cities, managers from both of Chinese central and local authorities 
pointed out,  
 
‘[The] high failure rate of Chinese BOT is not special in some regions or some 
industries, it existed in all industries all over China…many projects were just 
terminated in [the] first five years, projects even failed before the construction [was] 
completed…’  
                                                                                  A  Director, Ministry of Construction 
 
 
The reasons for the high termination rate of BOTs in China’s motorway and water projects 
are the poor financial capabilities of BOT contractors, poorly designed motorways and 
water projects, and the un-expected low revenues of BOT projects etc.  
However, as discusses in the next chapter, wider factors and influences from institutions 
and external environments caused the high termination rate of Chinese BOTs. The next 
chapter will discuss the conditions and emerging challenges for successfully applying 
motorway and water BOTs by addressing the institutional and other socio-economic 
environments in China. In addition, chapter 6 considers and discusses the problems of using 










Chapter 6 Contracting Public Infrastructure and Services: BOTs in China’s 
Motorway and Water Sectors—the Institutional Context and Difficulties 
 
6.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the research participants’ accounts of implementing BOTs in China’s 
water and motorway projects and focuses specifically on problems of applying the BOT 
model within China’s socio-economic context. In this chapter, it draws on data from 
interviews and the focus group. It is supplemented by the data gathered from observations 
and the perceptions of both the private contractors and bank managers.  However the focus 
of this research is on the views of the managers, directors and policy-makers of the Chinese 
governments at different levels. In the following sections, these issues are investigated: 
 opinions and values of policy-makers and executors on the uses of BOT at city level,  
  problems of the BOT as a long-term, asset-based contracting method 
 importance of China’s contextual influences,  
 availability of resources and capabilities for the government on developing and 
implementing BOT projects,  
This chapter also uses the model of ‘Lesson-learning’ (Rose, 1993, 2007). As an initial and 
important step to learning lessons from the UK’ PFIs, the problems associated with BOTs in 
China are identified. Meanwhile, the contextual and institutional matters in relation to the 
implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway and water projects are examined, in order to 
explore the feasibility and transferability of the PFI’s lessons. Richard Rose (1993, 2005) 
pointed out, that when governments consider introducing a new programme, there are a few 
conditions that have to be identified, notably,  
 opinions and values of the policy decision-makers and executors,  
 dissatisfaction with the present policy or programme;  
 complexity of the programme  




new policy;   
The research participants have noted that Chinese BOT policy has achieved positive results 
in some of the projects when the BOT model has been properly implemented. BOT has 
mobilised a large amount of investment into infrastructure projects, it boosted the local 
construction markets and increased the work prospects for other industrial markets. 
However, not all results were positive, as the research participants’ comments have shown 
in the last chapter. In practice there were many unforeseen difficulties and problems in the 
application of BOTs to the motorway and water sectors.  
 
6.2 BOTs in practice: the opinions and incentives of policy-makers and executors at 
city level 
 
6.2.1 Dissatisfaction with BOT’s performance: the perceptions of public sector managers 
and decision-makers  
Considering the evidence collected from China, the majority of the research participants 
from the public and private sectors were not satisfied with the results of the implementation 
of BOTs in developing local infrastructure projects. This was irrespective of whether their 
attitude to the policy was critical or favourable. Twelve research participants were strongly 
critical of the use of BOTs. However 5 out of 21 interviewees showed favourable attitudes 
to their use. In addition, 8 participants believed that China’s BOTs were problematic at the 
time, and still had room to improve. Although their point of views differed, they all agreed 
that the implementation of BOTs had not been as good as they had expected. The research 
participants reported a significant number of problems. This research highlighted that 23 
out of 87 motorway and water BOT contracts were finally terminated or bought out by the 
governments. These included 18 water projects and 5 motorway BOTs. The participants 
pointed out that there were various reasons that may have caused the termination and “buy 
out” of the BOT contracts by the government. Ten of the interviewees from central and 
local governments believed that there was not one specific reason that caused the contract’s 




designing, financing and negotiating stages, leading to the disruption of the whole project. 
Detailed reasons are presented in table 6.1  
Table 6.1Reasons for the Cancellation and Buy-out of BOT contracts by Governments 




and buy-out of 
BOT contracts 





1) Ignorance on BOT project selection 
2) Weak assessments of needs by public authorities 
3) Overestimated revenues by both governments and 
contractors 
4) Overlooked risks by both governments and contractors 
5) The facilities supporting the BOT projects were not 
working properly, especially for water BOTs. Complete 
pipelines had not been built as governments had promised. 
4 Motorway 




1) The local authorities failed to meet their promises agreed in 
the contracts  
2) The governments tried to transfer risks as much as possible, 
leading to expensive contracts, project failure or contract 
buy-outs.  
3 Motorway  
7 water  
2 Power 
Stations 
Major Risks  
1) Underestimating of public opposition in the local 
communities  
2) National policy and strategy changes 
3) Demand risks 
4) Increasing prices of building materials 
5) Inflation  
6) Others 
5 Motorway  
15 Water 
Financing for  
SPV dried up 
1) Contractor underestimated financing risks  
2) Poor Financial Planning and management by the BOT 
contractor 
3) Economic Crisis 
 
6.2.2Why BOT was adopted: the incentives and values of decision-makers and executors 
at city governments 
However, before discussing the contributing causes leading to the termination of BOT 
contracts, the incentives of using BOT by governments at city level need to be addressed. 
As has been noted in section 5.8, the governments at city level are the real executors of 




how they are financed. The findings of this research show that the key motivation of 
Chinese city governments still emphasizes the maximizing of the investments rather than 
improving efficiencies. The city councils and local leaders did not initially intend to use 
BOT as a long-term strategy to develop local infrastructure projects. The BOT model was 
adopted, to a very great extent, because of political pressures on the city government’s or 
by other short-term oriented targets. By using BOTs the governments at city level hoped to 
postpone their current fiscal crisis or administrative issues. BOTs were often used in many 
cases, as a ‘buffer’ to delay a local financial crisis. For instance, a vice-mayor in the city 
government mentioned,  
‘…We were experiencing lots of pressure from provincial government, and even from 
the ministries of central government. They urged us to build 7 sewage treatment 
plants in three years…However we did not have budgets to do so. Also other 
financing methods were not available… then BOT is a choice… by using BOT we 
were able to build the project first, and then we are able to consider what subsequent 
problems BOTs brought in.’  
 
Another senior officer in the city council commented that,  
‘It is not about if the BOT model is good or bad… for the council, we need to build 
the projects as soon as possible…BOT is a readily available option at that time’.  
 
During course of the interviews with other senior officers and leaders at city level, similar 
answers were given. For the leaders at city governments, BOT is a useful financing vehicle 
rather than a management tool to improve ‘value-for-money’ in developing infrastructure 
projects. This finding highlights a fundamental difference between the objectives of PFI 
and BOT’s. 
The decisions of councils leaders had a major impact on BOT project’s directors and 
mangers. Five BOT project directors and managers from four different city councils 
commented that their task was to contract out the projects as soon as possible, to avoid 
pressure from their superiors. Another four BOT frontline managers also expressed this.   




By reviewing the terminated 23 motorways and water contracts, this research discovered 
that short-term oriented BOT policy resulted in the city governments and their staffs putting 
the emphasis on attracting private capital investment, while overlooking the importance of 
project planning, underestimating potential risks and selecting low-quality contractors. 
Many projects eventually failed as earlier as the planning stage.  
Firstly, as this study reveals, important feasibility analysis is absent in many BOT projects, 
which would have included accurate assessments on demand, a good economic and 
financial appraisal, an environmental analysis and an assessment of the government’ 
affordability. A preliminary feasibility study of a BOT project should be done to help 
governments to justify if the project is suited to the BOT model and what costs and benefits 
it will bring to the project. However, this study did find out that a very brief feasibility 
analysis and outline business plan was produced by governments and project managers in 
20 cases, in order to get the necessary approval and planning permission from the 
provincial governments. Five managers from the focus group pointed out that the BOT 
project team in the government often had to prepare for a BOT project in a very short 
period of time and without sufficient information and data. Usually, the team needed to 
collect key information about the project and the local regions within six to twelve months. 
For example, for a water project, the BOT project team needs to collect and analyse some 
basic data and information, including the construction costs, the number of households in a 
local region, the number of households which are connected to the pipeline network, the 
length of pipeline, the potential costs of operation and maintenance, the financial 
availability of local governments and the potential revenues of the project etc.  
However, in 20 BOT projects, the preliminary feasibility studies and the outline business 
cases needed to be finished by the governments in two months. The public sector managers 
and directors had no time to collect relevant data. Without this necessary information and 
sufficient time, it is not possible for the governments to make good justifications on the use 
of BOTs.  
The three interviewees from the consulting firms commented that for both water and a 
motorway project, the most difficult task is to estimate the local demand and then make a 




forecasts were over optimistic and overall costs were fairly underestimated. These facts 
have all finally contributed to delays and interruptions in projects which were, finally taken 
over by the governments. In practice, the government’s BOT teams often failed to make an 
accurate assessment of demand, due to a lack of time and relevant data to do so.  
Interviewees from five city councils mentioned that they had tried to introduce external 
advisors as earlier as possible to improve the quality of BOT planning, preparation, 
procuring and negotiating work. However, there are very limited funds for the local 
councils to hire high quality advisors and for conducting good preparation work before 
starting a BOT project. Furthermore, lack of financial, legal and managerial experts in the 
government also constrained the introduction and operation of these projects. Discussions 
and observations with public sector managers indicated that the governments at city level 
focused on speed rather than quality during the preparation work. Driven by short-term 
objectives, 12 small size water BOT projects eventually failed at the project selection stage, 
due to their small scales, lower revenues, higher transaction and operation costs, 
uncompleted pipeline networks, and small number of pipelines connected rate to 
households. 
Secondly, risk analysis was rarely addressed and identified in the feasibility studies and 
contracts by the governments. Four interviewees from different city councils stated that 
risks normally had not been properly identified, valued and allocated in these BOT projects. 
In many terminated BOT projects, the governments attempted to transfer the risks as much 
as possible to BOT contractors, though, in practice, this idea is not realistic. As all four 
managers from the BOT contractors debated, private contractors are not able to take all the 
risks of the project, e.g. risks for land acquisition and government policy changes. In 12 
motorway and water projects, the termination of the contracts happened because too many 
risks were transferred to the private contractors. However the contractors were not able to 
mitigate these risks.   
Thirdly, the weak financial capabilities of the private contractors often led projects into 
financial difficulties. Twenty BOT projects were interrupted or seriously delayed, because 
the contractors’ financing dried up. 15 of them were finally taken over by the local 




two BOT projects: 
The first important lesson for the government is to select the ‘right’ contractors 
with strong and stable financial and technical capabilities. In our experiences, 
many motorway bidders met financial problems even before the contracts were 
signed.’   
Five interviewees from the city councils explained that the primary justification of using 
BOTs in China was to attract private finance and capital. If the private contractors could not 
provide the finance for the BOT projects then they were pointless. In terms of the results of 
interviews with local officials and decision-makers, a number of low-quality and 
inexperienced contractors were selected by the governments though non-competitive one-
to-one negotiations. The evidence of this research has shown that these contractors failed to 
provide long-term and stable finance to the BOT projects.   
The negative experience from 23 terminated contracts showed that the government’s short-
term oriented strategies had profound influences on BOT practices. With large political and 
financial pressures, leaders in the city councils often made short-term oriented policies and 
decisions. The executors and practitioners of BOTs, e.g. project directors and managers, 
also had insufficient time, reliable information or enough resources to conduct good 
preparation work. Three interviewees from the central governments commented that local 
governments always focused on the numbers of projects and how fast they were been built 
in local areas, but ignored quality of service delivered to the end-users. These research 
participants commented that BOT as a long-term, contract based approach is still a new 
idea to Chinese local governments. The policy-makers and executors at local level only 
concentrated on the benefits of using BOTs, ignoring the weaknesses in practice. In the next 
section, this study will present the results of data analysis by addressing the emerging 






6.3 The Implementation of BOTs in China’s Motorway and Water Projects: the 
Emerging Problems with Contracts  
 
All interviewees from the central and local governments believed that one of the major 
differences between publicly-funded conventional projects and BOTs is that the BOT 
model heavily relies on a long-term concessional contract. The BOT approach was 
expected to bring certain benefits by clearly defining the objectives of the project, and by 
identifying and allocating the risks involved in the project’s design, construction, finance 
and operation within the contract. Meanwhile, the BOT contracts were deemed as a check 
list for the performance of the BOT projects. At least 10 of the interviewees believed a 
well-designed BOT contract was critical for the success of implementing a BOT in China’s 
motorway and water sectors. Officials from the Ministry of Construction stated that in the 
last 10 years, both the central and local governments have attempted to improve contracting 
practices in the motorway and water BOTs, by issuing China’s Standardised Contract 
Models on water supply BOTs in 2004 and sewage treatment BOTs in 2006. Although there 
was still no standard contract model for motorway BOTs by the end of 2009, some 
provinces involved in this study adopted the Standardised Contract Model on motorway 
projects. They were designed by the FIDIC (the Federation of the International Consulting 
Engineers) and advocated by the World Bank. This study found that such FIDIC contract 
models were implemented in 10 motorway BOTs, 3 large water BOTs, 3 bridge BOTs and 2 
tunnel BOT projects. Following the publication and introduction of these standardised BOT 
contracts, the quality of BOT contracting practice at local level has been improved as 5 
interviewees from the local governments commented. Mr. Q pointed out,  
 
‘at least, the BOT project managers and the officials in the public procuring 
authorities have something (Standard BOT contract models) like references on their 
hands. It is much better than nothing.’  
 A direct manager from a city council  
 




realise and achieve the benefits expected by the government and its officials. The lawyers 
and managers from 5 city councils complained that the contract models issued by the 
Ministry of Construction were still incomplete and too simple and too broad. There were a 
number of contracting matters that had not been clearly identified and explained in these 
standard contract models. As 2 lawyers working for two different city councils complained,  
 
‘from the professional view points and legal aspects, these standard BOT contract 
models are too simple and broad to use in practice.  Some important matters have 
been mentioned in the contracts, but the central governments have not offered 
practical solutions to local authorities. For example, matters related to the 
identification of projects risks and their allocation between the public clients and 
private contractors, the pricing and unit price adjustment mechanisms, the 
compensation arrangement if the contracts were cancelled, and the performance 
measurement and inspection mechanisms… the core and key matters and questions 
related to BOT contracts have not been answered by the Ministry of Construction.’  
A Chief Legal Represent from a city council  
The barriers and difficulties of using BOT concessionary contracts to develop local 
motorway and water projects in China have been revealed in this study. The major ones 
include the following:  
 The higher transaction costs of the preparation, tendering, bidding and contracting 
of BOTs was a disadvantage of their application. This was pointed out by the 
research participants from both the public and private sector.  
 The incomplete nature of the BOT contracts was not able to define and identify all 
risks related to the projects, namely, that it is impossible for the written contract to 
predict all possible events, uncertainties and risks associated with the projects 
during their lifetime.  
 The uses of BOT contracts brought other risks related to the contracting methods 
because of opportunistic behaviours, e.g. the effects of ‘lock-in’ and the inflexibility 
of using a long-term contract and any delays in progress.  




the BOT contractors were discovered in two thirds of the BOT projects in this study. 
Despite this, good and close collaboration had been found in some projects.  
 Finally, the evidence collected from BOT projects in 10 cities showed that local 
procuring authorities had insufficient capabilities and resources to measure the 
performance of the BOT contractors accurately and regularly.  
 Meanwhile, independent and professional institutions, and standard procedures for 
conducting evaluations on BOTs were still missing at central and local levels, 
leading to the performance and output of the majority of BOT projects not being 
properly examined and inspected.   
 
6.3.1 Transaction costs of motorway and water BOT contracts 
As 6 of the BOT contract managers and 2 directors from the central government pointed 
out, compared with conventional projects, BOTs were more complex, since there were 
many participants from both the public and private sector involved. On the side of the 
public sector, BOT projects involved a number of approvals and complicated preparation 
work. The data collected from the on-site observation showed that medium-sized water 
BOTs needed the assistance and support from 10 different departments of the city council. 
At least 14 technical, legal, and financial documents and agreements needed to be made 
with at least 11 stakeholders of the project, for example, a purchasing agreement with the 
government, agreements or subcontracts with consultants, financial sponsors, material and 
resource suppliers, construction and operation subcontractors, technical standards and 
operational standards in terms of Chinese industrial requirements etc. The motorway BOT 
contracts were even more complicated than the water ones.  
A motorway BOT contractor’s manager mentioned that the motorway SPV where he 
worked, was composed of 2 main shareholders from two private companies, 5 to 8 
construction sub-contractors (operation and maintenance sub-contractors), 8 material 
suppliers and 2 equipment leasers (not in all cases). There were 20 managers and engineers 
needed to deal with different groups of stakeholders, including 5 provincial government’s 
departments, 7 public agencies at city level, 7 departments at county levels, leaders in 





‘It is difficult to manage such a complicated team (SPV). For instance, 4 
construction sub-contractors have different capabilities, skills and experiences in 
building large projects. They have different working procedures and quality 
standards… also, it is very time-consuming to deal with the stakeholders from 
different departments. As a team leader, I should focus on the project 
construction and management but I am actually doing a public relations job…’ 
                                                            A project director from a motorway BOT contractor 
 
Six project managers from local governments commented on how the complexity of the 
BOT contracts led to a lot of ‘extra’ work for both the government and private contractors 
and incurred extra costs and fees (transaction costs). The largest portion of transaction costs 
in the contracting process for motorway and water BOT projects was the cost of consulting 
and the work needed to prepare the tendering and bidding for the BOT. As this study 
discovered the total transaction costs for the motorway and water projects varied depending 
on the size, value and bidding methods that were adopted. The transaction costs were 
between 1% to 8%, with an average of 4% of the total capital investment of the BOT 
project. The transaction costs for motorway BOT projects were higher than those for water 
projects. Meanwhile, the transaction costs of the large-size BOT projects are much higher 
than the smaller projects. If one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms or the top legal advisors 
were chosen for the work by local authorities and BOT contractors, the transaction costs 
would be very high, since some of these consulting firms charge at a percentage of the 
contract value. Finally, the transaction costs of competitive bidding in BOTs were higher 
than the one-to-one non-competitive negotiations. This was because competitive bidding is 
a longer process needing much more time and with several rounds of bidding and 
negotiation.  
The highest transaction cost was found in a large water supply BOT project which used 
competitive bidding. The consulting fees alone for the advisors was estimated at over 
US$ 9 million which was 8% of the investment value of the project in 2001.Generally, the 




BOT contractors, the duration of debt financing as well as the financial arrangements with 
the banks. Some government-owned companies could get low-interest loans (with annual 
interests of 4.68%-5.94%, during the period of 2004-2008) from the policy banks in China 
(i.e. Chinese National Development Bank). In the cases of the loans from the Chinese 
commercial banks, the annual interests ranged between 7.85% and 15.3%, during the period 
of 2004-2008 (estimated by three interviewees from these banks). However, the loans from 
the China’s state-owned banks are difficult to obtain for private contractors. Therefore, a 
large number of BOT projects were funded mainly by equity finance. Data collected from 
five motorway BOTs showed that the equity finances ranged from 60% to 75% of the 
projects’ total investments. The equity finance in water BOT projects has a higher rate 
ranging from 70%-100% of the project’s total investment. Therefore, this study highlights 
that the financing costs of Chinese BOT projects are usually very high, since the projects 
are mainly funded by the equity finance of Special Purpose Vehicles’ (SPVs’) parent 
companies. At the same time, the financial risks for the Chinese BOTs are also high since 
the projects rely heavily on up to three private companies. As discussed in section 6.1, 20 
motorway and water BOTs found that their finances dried up because their parent 
companies fell into financial difficulties at the beginning of 2008.  
All interviewees from the 10 city councils believed that the transaction costs of BOT 
projects were very high, especially the 30 smaller-sized water BOT projects. As 7 of them 
commented the transaction costs of using BOTs were much higher than similar projects 
funded using the conventional approach. As one motorway BOT project manager from a 
local council explained, 
‘for example, in the motorway projects which were  traditionally funded by the 
governments… the transaction costs may be just the costs for preparing the 
competitive bidding… since the contract is a short-term contract, risks are 
lower… in many cases, the contracts for motorway projects are fixed price 
contracts. Therefore, transaction costs of publicly funded projects should be 
relatively lower than BOT’s’ 
These interviewees suggested that the BOT approach was not suitable for small-size water 




argued that the consulting fees for a small water project were 1 million RMB (1% of the 
investment capital of the project). They believed this to be too high for a small water 
project. Another research participant commented that,  
‘we spend over half a million to buy 300 pages [the BOT contract] from our 
consultants…is it worth it?’ 
The data from the interviews revealed that there were some attempts by local governments 
to reduce the transaction costs for BOTs.  A case from a city showed, that the city council 
tried to contract out all 5 small size sewage treatment BOT projects together in a local 
region, in order to reduce the costs incurred in the preparation, tendering and bidding 
phases. In this council, 5 small BOT projects incurred 1 million RMB in consulting costs. 
As the local BOT project manager estimated, this probably saved 1 or 1.5 million in 
consulting costs for the council. However, the major problem in this case was that one 
single BOT contractor could achieve an absolute monopoly in a local water area.  
In addition, there are also a number of water and motorway contractors (over 40 projects) 
who do not recruit legal, financial or technical advisors from outside of the governments. In 
this way, the councils want to cut down the transaction costs of BOT projects. However 
some negative experiences were found in many cases. The most common issues are serious 
flaws in contract design and the feasibility studies (as mentioned in section 6.2).  
 
6.3.2 The incomplete nature of a BOT contract 
 
Another problem with BOT contracts was that they often remained incomplete. This was 
due to the duration of a BOT contract being so long and that not all of the risks and 
uncertainties of the projects could be predicted and forecast precisely. 5 interviewees from 
central and local authorities believed it was absolutely impossible to write a complete 
contract to define all possible events or contingencies and risks over 30 years.  
All of the participants from the governments and the private contractors noticed the 
incompleteness of the contracts although their opinions on the use of BOT contracts 
differed. The five project managers from the government believed that the usefulness of a 




increase the certainty of the BOT model, one city council tried to split 1 BOT contract into 
two shorter term contracts. One was called the EPC (Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction) contract (or Turn Key Contract), using one private contractor over a period of 
3-5 years. After this, another (or maybe the same) private contractor would be responsible 
for the BOT’s operation and maintenance with an O&M contract over the next 15-20 years. 
In this way, the city council hoped to turn the long-term BOT contracts into several short-
term contracts to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the projects. However, the costs of 
these separate contracts could also be higher.  
Another 7 interviewees from legal and regulatory departments thought that the contract was 
very important and crucial, namely a ‘checklist’ for the performance of the private 
contractors, as well as a standard guidance on the allocation of the risks and liabilities on 
both sides of the contract. These interviewees, particularly the managers from legal 
departments and consulting firms believed,  
BOT contracts should be improved as much as possible. Thereby, the 
governments and private contractors should try their best to identify all the 
risks and liabilities related to the projects despite the negotiation of BOT 
contracts being very time and money-consuming.  
A legal advisor from a legal firm  
For water supply and sewage water treatment BOTs, the standardised contract models were 
published by the Ministry of Construction in 2004 and 2006. At least 25 small size BOT 
projects adopted these contract frameworks. However, a number of details and clauses were 
drafted by the legal advisors or lawyers for the government and BOT contractors, 
depending on the results of negotiations. 3 contract managers from 3 provinces verified that 
at least 18 motorway, water and bridge BOTs adopted the contract model of FIDIC which 
was widely used in China’s large and super-large engineering projects. Two project 
managers argued that the adoption of the standard BOT contract did not solve the 
fundamental problems of the contract in practice and problems existed with many BOT 






6.3.3 Difficulties on identifying and allocating risk in a BOT project  
The interviewees from the local authorities indicated that the most difficult part of drafting 
contracts and negotiating with contractors involved allocation of risk for the length of the 
contract. The most notable risks include, political and policy change risks, demand risks 
and the risks with construction, operation and maintenance matters that could be caused by 
changes in government requirements. There were also the risks in relation to the approval 
of price adjustments.  
The research participants who had taken part in the negotiation of BOT projects believed 
that the most difficult work for them was to identify, allocate and value the risk. In the 
process of BOT negotiations over 50 risks were identified by the government and 
contractors from within the BOT project teams. However, as the research participants 
highlighted they had no experience of the allocation and assigning of these risks. Their 
comments were that, 
‘both the government and private contractors do not want to give up [some risks 
allocation arrangements in the negotiating processes]… in fact, some risks 
should be shared between the governments and the contractors… but the 
governments still did not want to give substantial promises… finally, we have to 
put these issues into the re-negotiation clauses in the contracts’ 
                                                            A legal consultant from a consulting firm  
The Chinese water and sewage treatment standardised BOT models did not provide the 
answers to matters of risk allocation and valuation. In this situation, three interviewees 
from provincial governments deemed that the experiences and skills of the BOT team were 
extremely important, because experienced experts and personnel had more knowledge on 
the effects of risks. One water BOT contractor recruited three retired engineers and 
surveyors who worked in public utility industries into their BOT teams. The contractor 
believed that these experts’ wide experience and skills were very helpful in identifying 
possible technical, operation and maintenance risks in water BOT projects.    
In addition, it was inevitably that some risks would not be identified during the negotiations 
and thereby were not included in the BOT contracts. In these cases, governments and 




of the BOT’s implementation, although in practice these re-negotiation clauses were rarely 
used by the governments and contractors. Three project managers commented that  
‘if the contract revisions are not big [impact on the revenue and costs of projects], 
it is not necessary to conduct formal re-negotiation. However if there are to be 
big revisions on the contract clauses, the governments normally have a big 
advantage in the re-negotiation process … this is because of the government’s 
strong bargaining power’      
In section 6.2, this research reviewed most of the 23 terminated BOT projects who also 
suffered as a result of risk analysis and allocation. The evidence from China’s BOTs 
showed that the governments tended to transfer the risks as much as they could. In many 
cases, the local governments adopted this strategy to minimize their own risks and potential 
losses. For instance, two motorway BOTs in a province met serious land acquisition 
conflicts with local peasants. This led to the projects being seriously delayed (3 years) by 
the contractors and incurring huge losses. The contractors wanted to extend the length of 
the BOT contracts, in order to recoup their losses. However, these requests were rejected by 
the local governments.  
Similar problems were observed in another 26 small water BOT projects. The construction 
work carried out by the government on local pipeline networks was always behind schedule 
resulting in the privately owned sewage treatment plants unable to operate as expected. 
This resulted in consistent losses for private contractors, although some minimal guarantees 
were made by the governments. In this situation, the government did, neither make 
compensation to contractors, nor extend the contracts.  
In a few projects the governments did transfer some major risks to private contractors, e.g. 
demand risks. However, the contractors required more return on their investments (risk 
premium). In the two water BOTs, the water tariff rate was doubled in just five years. In 
these cases, the governments did transfer the risks to private contractors, but the local water 
service users received an expensive service. The transfer of BOT risks also involved the 






6.3.4 Opportunistic behaviours in the BOT contracts   
 
Both the local authorities and the private sector in China were aware of the incompleteness 
of the contracts. Both parties of the BOT contracts tried to gain the advantage over the 
other at both the pre and post contractual stages. This was found in observations as well in 
another fifteen BOTs studied.  
Chinese local authorities and private investors both revealed opportunistic behaviour in the 
contracting process. Each tried to take advantage of the other at ex ante and ex post contract 
stages in both the motorway and water BOTs. The findings of this study indicate that most 
local authorities tried to ‘contract out’ their projects as soon as possible, due to the pressure 
of time from their superiors. Therefore, local government and their departments usually 
overstated the project revenue and released positive information while obscuring the 
negatives in the ex-ante procurement process. Some city councils promised guarantees, 
benefits and attractive conditions to private contractors in both procurement and 
negotiations, although these may often not be realised in the future. In these cases, 
contractors would be easily ‘locked in’ to BOT transactions and find it difficult to withdraw 
from the projects. As a result, local councils would have had stronger bargaining power 
with the contractors. This led to local councils having an advantage over the private 
contractors at the post-contracting stage, when projects were initially put into operation. 
Over a period of 8 months, five local authorities fell into arrears with their sewage and 
water supply contractors. The manager of one of these contractors’ told the author 
‘In the contract, it clearly defines that if the council falls into arrears then 
penalties should be given… however, could a private company penalise a 
government in China? Joking!’    
A contractors’ manager 
Furthermore, ten sewage treatment contractors were forced to upgrade their systems and 
equipment without compensation and financial support from the city councils. This was 
because the central government raised the national standard for the disposal of sewage 
water. However, a BOT project manager working for the city council also complained that,  




standards, without any notice or consultation… they issue a policy in the 
morning and rescind it in the evening [a capricious administration]… where can 
I find the compensation for them [BOT contractors], I don’t think the council’s 
leaders will agree to them …’ 
A BOT project manager working in the city council 
Similarly, the primary investigations discovered that contractors also took advantage of the 
government through opportunistic behaviour. This was due to the lack of contracting 
experience within the government, especially when non-competitive negotiations were 
adopted during BOT procurement. One government lawyer recalled that,  
‘The contractor hired two lawyers and an accountant from Hong Kong and 
Singapore to join in the negotiations… on the government side; I am good at 
Administrative Law procedure but not Contract Law. My colleagues also have no 
background in commerce or in financial matters. We cannot really understand 
the Water Tariff Adjustment Equation which includes a number of variables, like 
CPI, inflation etc. It looks reasonable and fair… however, later we found that the 
equation always benefits private contractors…thereby the price of water is going 
up year by year’ 
 
Meanwhile, due to the incomplete credit check system in China, many low-quality 
companies provide exaggerated or fake information and documentation in order to pass the 
evaluations and win bids. Also, many of the local governments over-emphasized the prices 
and costs of projects with little regard for the quality requirements of the procurement stage. 
As a result, private companies cut construction costs but offered very poor quality and 
service later on. One example from a motorway BOT project is below. The project manager 
from the government stated that, 
‘the contractor offered a low bidding price, and the government selected them… 
however, later we found that the quality of their construction work was very 
poor … actually, we should have noticed that something was wrong at the 
beginning… since the unit cost of motorways is very transparent in China… 




 A project manager from the government 
Another water BOT project manager also talked about the private contractor’s opportunistic 
behaviour when he mentioned that 
‘Some private contractors are always tricky. We found a sewage contractor 
directly channel sewage into a local river at night without any treatment …’  
A water BOT project manager 
Meanwhile, in seven motorway BOTs and eight sewage treatment BOTs, contractors 
overstated information regarding construction and operational costs to the government at 
post-contract stages, so as to achieve longer concessions as charges on water services rose.  
 
6.3.5 Cooperation and Partnerships between BOTs and governments  
  
Because risks were not properly defined and apportioned, the specific outputs of the 
projects were not clearly identified in the contracts.  In China’s BOTs, the relationship 
between government and contractor were not always amicable. In most cases the 
government usually dominated the implementation of contracts and the contractors had 
very limited powers to bargain and negotiate with the public procuring authorities. As a 
manager from a BOT contractor commented 
‘The positions of the BOT contractor and the governments are not equal. In 
Chinese BOTs, contractors bear more risk…’   
Both parties in the BOT contract largely focused on what ‘revenue’ or benefits they could 
achieve in a short period, rather than what improvements on efficiency and quality of 
public facilities and services they could make. As responses from the interviews with the 
managers from both public and private sectors showed, the government and the BOT 
contractor were always concerned with ‘what benefits they can gain from BOT projects’, 
rather than ‘what they can contribute to the projects’. In a number of cases, this study found 
that both the government and the BOT contractor are ‘revenue-driven’ or ‘benefit-driven’. 
In these situations, there were few cases where trust had been established between public 





‘the council normally has a good relationship with the BOT contractors… but if 
the project’s revenue is not as good as the contractors’ expectation… it may be 
difficult to maintain a good relationship…’ 
In addition, with the impact of Chinese commercial and traditional cultures, most of 
interviewees who worked as contract managers believed that the BOT contract was just ‘a 
piece of paper’. They deemed that cooperation and trust between businesses could not rely 
solely on ‘a piece of paper’ but also needed goodwill, trustworthiness, resources, 
capabilities, experience, social relationships, networks and a strong history alongside their 
business partners.  
In this study, it was found that in fifty projects, this was the first time that the local 
authorities and the contractors had cooperated. In other words, local governments and 
private contractors were not aware of each other before. Due to the short history of the 
Chinese BOT market, it is difficult to carry out a complete ‘credit check’ and ‘due 
diligence’ on both parties of a BOT contract. Ten interviewees commented that trust and 
cooperation were not strong in BOT projects between local authorities and private 
contractors. In some cases, the government and the contractors of the BOTs were merely 
‘bound’ by ‘contracts’ and the ‘revenue’ that the project generated. Despite this both knew 
that the contract may be limited and difficult to enforce in practice. Once ‘major conflicts 
of interest’ started between public clients and private contractors, confrontations replaced 
cooperation and trust very quickly. As a result, this study showed that only one third of the 
BOT projects were  
‘operated normally without conflicts between local government and private companies.’           
A senior director from the provincial Development and Reform Commission 
 
Of 87 motorway and water BOTs investigated, only 20 of them were operating as normal 
without major conflicts. Although difficulties were experienced when contracting out 
public projects, this study discovered that both sides of the BOT contract started to 
understand the importance of cooperation and trust by attempting to establish relationships 
to avoid conflicts in BOT contracts. Two leaders from two city councils suggested that the 




short-term ones. Private BOT contractors also attempted to use new approaches to work 
with their clients in the form of a joint venture structured PPP with mutual benefits 
advocated by some project managers. The six managers from the public sector and the 
private contractors preferred joint venture (or joint-work) PPP so that they might directly 
combine the interests of their clients and the contractors. In the form of a joint venture 
(joint-work) PPP, the local councils could share future revenue and risks with contractors, 
build commitments together and minimize any opportunistic actions in the implementation 
of projects.  
Another form of ‘joint approach’ appeared in 3 BOT cases. Two sewage treatment BOT and 
TOT contractors offered 10% or 15% performance shares to local governments, allowing 
them to become performance shareholders and not  pay capital investments but to receive 
dividends when profit was accrued by the BOT. By doing this, the relationship between the 
local authority and the private sectors was not simply client-contractor (services purchaser-
suppliers) but changed to a ‘profit-sharing’, ‘interest-binding’ or ‘cooperation’ relationship 
with a long-term basis, as suggested by the 2 managers from private companies. Two 
managers from the public authorities also believed that  
This is a realistic way to secure the private contractors’ interests and not cause 
further damage to the unbalanced structure of the contracts.  
The second approach was based on ‘geographic relationships’ and ‘historical connections’ 
between local authorities and contractors rather than ‘purely competition’. In some medium 
and small size water BOT projects, it was explored that local authorities would like to 
choose their local contractors. These contractors had already built close relationships and 
trust with the local authorities or they had cooperated together previously. As a manager 
from the public sector explained, the main characteristics of this kind of ‘BOT contract’ 
were:  
 BOT contractors’ parent companies were local businesses;  
 contractors’ businesses were mainly operated in local regions with a long history; 
both parties of the contracts had had over ten-years of cooperation;  
 public clients and private contractors had had both a very formal and informal 




 Government and contractors’ staff frequently communicate at various levels through 
formal and informal channels; therefore both parties of the BOT know each other 
very well.  
The results of these attempts to build a good contracting relationship are still not clear. 
However, a few councils and contractors had begun to explore possible ways to establish a 
stable relationship between themselves. This study explores that when a BOT contract 
relies on the long-term relationships of trust between the government and contractor, the 
projects seems to be more sustainable. However, in a small number of cases, a very close 
relationship between the contractors and the governments may lead to monopoly positions 
for a small number of contractors. At the same time, this could easily lead to corruption, a 
problem that will be addressed later in this thesis.    
 
6.3.6 Managing and monitoring BOT contracts  
During the course of interviews, all research participants highlighted that the governments 
and their project managers both found it difficult to monitor and inspect the performance of 
the contractors. Since the contracts of China’s motorway and water BOTs included some 
key technical standards and requirements, 5 BOT contract managers and directors from two 
provinces believed, in principle, that BOTs should be regulated by the contract. BOT 
contracts were used as a performance management ‘checklist’ where the contractors report 
their own performance against the performance indicators specified. 3 officials from the 
central government suggested that the BOT contract, used as a tool to monitor and manage 
performance, was important to ensure that the suppliers and contractors performed well. 
The interviewees who worked in local authorities verified there were detailed clauses in 
their BOT contracts to define how the governments should make payments or charge 
penalties to private contractors based on performance. In a few cases, some managers do 
not really know how to accurately write down the requirements of a contract (output 
specification in the PFI). As a project manager mentioned,  
‘we know some indicators can be used to measure performance, such as quality, 
revenue, costs, price etc… but, which one is important? are we sure?’ 




standards in the attachments of the contract as the only criteria to measure private 
contractor performance.   
In addition, this study found that in at least 10 motorway and 30 water BOTs, the city 
councils and their departments did not pay sufficient attention to contract management.  
The local government did not regularly inspect the service levels and outputs provided by 
the BOT contractors, although the central government required them to do so. In most cases 
in this study (especially for water projects) the local government did not regularly collect 
performance information or discuss performance with suppliers. This only took place when 
major operational and maintenance problems had to be dealt with. In 7 sewage treatment 
projects in one province, the operating results of the contractors had not been checked by 
the local authorities in the last two years.  The project managers from both the governments 
and contractors failed to report the operating faults and under-performance information on 
time.  It was established that the governments had few ideas on what costs and quality were 
involved in the operation of BOTs. Therefore, when a number of BOT contractors wanted 
to raise a charge on water and sewage treatment services, the local governments could not 
ensure these applications should be approved or not. This was because the authorities did 
not have relevant financial and costing information available.    
At the same time, this study revealed that penalties were rarely applied to payments to 
contractors of the BOTs. 4 interviewees from a BOT consortium commented that  
the governments did not often apply penalties on the contractors, due to them 
not enforcing the contract properly. Many operational problems were caused by 
the governments, which led to the quality of services failing to reach the 
standards defined in the contracts.  
Especially for sewage treatment projects, it was very common for the city governments to 
fail in their completion of the pipeline networks, resulting in the sewage treatment BOT 
projects not working properly. In these cases, the city councils or public procuring bodies 
were unable to penalise the private contractors.   
Furthermore, the evidence from 10 city councils showed that the local governments did not 
have adequate resources for performance monitoring. In two cities, the data from 




3 BOT projects, leaving potential risks unmonitored and unmanaged. There was also 
insufficient training and skills for contract managers across government. Four sewage 
treatment project managers from the local governments complained,   
we do not understand the meaning of the data collected by the online water 
quality testing systems, due to the testing system being purchased from Canada, 
and the instruction books of the systems being written in English and French, 
not Chinese.    
 
In this section, discusses the concept of using BOTs as within long-term contracts in China. 
The analysis of the data presented showed that BOT has some common problems involving 
Transaction Cost Economics, for instance, higher transaction costs, incomplete contracts, 
opportunistic behaviours and issues with monitoring the contract. The key findings indicate 
that the use of BOTs in developing infrastructure projects in China not only brought 
benefits, but were also costly. Although some councils were aware of these costs, solutions 
were not found. When the governments consider the future use of BOTs, they need to 















6.4 Institutions and resources as the necessary means to ensure BOT projects work in 
China  
Institutions is the term used that refers to the formal organisations of government who are 
involved in implementing and delivering the BOT programmes (Rose, 1993, 2005). The 
influence of institutions on the programme is crucial, because they are an intervening 
variable in the operation of the programme. In the cases of China’s BOTs, this refers to the 
organisations that are involved in the delivery of BOT programmes, including: public 
agencies and departments, private companies, as well as the BOT related institutions and 
organisations, such as banks, consulting and construction firms. These institutions had a 
profound influence on the output and results for the motorway and water projects. In other 
words, these institutions decided if the BOT policy could be made to work properly in 
China. Rose (1993, 2005) also comments that if governments want to create and implement 
a public programme, three resources are necessary conditions, namely, laws, personnel 
(employees of governments and private contractors) and money.  
 
6.4.1 The means of implementation of BOTs: institutions in China  
According to the evidence collected, the biggest challenge for the implementation of a BOT 
are the government’s lack of institutions and institutional capacity, required to organize, 
manage and implement the projects. This study reveals that the government at provincial 
and city levels simultaneously face significant public management and institutional 
challenges as the number of BOT activities rise in many sectors and at different levels. 
Existing institutions and departments in the government did not have the capacity and 
systems able to take on the new regulatory roles of BOTs.  
At central government level, the Ministry of Construction was reported to have organized 
some research conferences on the development of BOT policies in 2003 and 2005, 
clarifying some of the legal issues, building standard procedures and improving the 
regulations for implementing a BOT. However, only 4 of these standardized contract 
models were included in current BOT policies.  
The evidence from the six provinces and ten city councils showed that they had tried to set 




this study established a public department called the ‘Major and Large Public Projects 
Office’ to plan, support, implement, review and regulate such public infrastructure projects 
in their local areas, including BOTs. The MLPPOs were involved in a BOT project’s 
procurement and review of its operations. However, its short history and the restricted 
availability of expertise and experience in managing BOT projects meant that these 
institutions were still not fully staffed and established within their authorities. 
 
       ‘Our department only has a one year history. Therefore, we need more financial, 
technical, managerial and legal expertise [with] BOT backgrounds…’  
       A Director from the City’s Key and Important Project Department, the City council 
 
         ‘…our staff is temporarily borrowed from other departments of city councils or   
provincial councils at present…’ 
   A senior director from the Key and Important Projects Department, a provincial council 
 
BOTs also involve complicated structures that require new skills and experts with BOT 
knowledge. These experts must be recruited to take part in the process of BOT negotiation, 
contracting and financing. One of the key challenges was that, instead of the traditional 
approach which focused on inputs, BOTs require skills and experts who could identify the 
outputs of a project. This involved specifications and targets that the private partner had to 
attain in order for payment to be made. It was also important to monitor the performance of 
the partner and foresee any risks that threaten the delivery of the project. However, this 
study discovered that ten local governments in China, especially in the medium and small 
cities, still did not have the necessary capacities to take on a combined approach that 
establishes new institutions and trains public officials. 
 
 ‘…Even our staffs have no confidence and skills in negotiation… especially on 
pricing, risk allocations and performance indicators…’  





For local authorities getting started with BOTs, a key condition was to have the necessary 
skills and expertise, usually by hiring consultants and external advisers.  
 
‘We understand that it is essential to bring advisors into the project early rather 
than incorporating them into the team at a later date. In particular, the right advisors 
can provide the guidance on techniques, legal issues, financial problems, project 
monitoring and due diligence.’ 
a senior director, the city’s Development and Reform Committee, city level 
 
However, the local authorities found that there were not many qualified consulting firms 
available in China. Also, there was no guidance concerning the hiring of consultants as 
advisers on BOT projects. Local authorities had no idea how to find a good advisor and 
which consulting firms were qualified to deal with BOT services. The experiences of six 
BOT contract managers expressed that it was important to ensure that only credible 
advisors with relevant experience were hired, while setting clear and binding rules of 
project governance, putting sufficient control mechanisms in place and developing standard 
contract guidelines so as to maintain a seamless integration of external advisers within 
government departments.  
 
6.4.2 Expertise and capabilities of the governments: the constraints of water and 
motorway BOTs  
 
By reviewing and analysing the personal profiles of the interviewees and their responses, 
this research found that some of the interviewees from local councils had insufficient 
information, skills and knowledge to carry out BOT projects, leading to them being at a 
disadvantage when dealing with skilled contractors. The big problems were related to the 
key decision-makers who worked in the city and provincial councils. Six decision makers at 
provincial and city levels had little working experience, knowledge, know-how and 
background specifically related to BOTs and infrastructure projects. This was despite all of 




philosophy. Related training on BOTs had not been given and detailed guidelines on 
conducting BOT projects were missing. So these decision-makers were unable to handle all 
of the matters concerning the implementation of a local BOT project. Officials and leaders 
without construction, legal and financial backgrounds often complained that they had little 
idea about what they should or should not do when adopting BOTs, especially when 
detailed guidance was absent. These factors also increased the risks of a BOT project 
leading, in some cases, to the government getting an expensive contract, or needing to buy-
out a contract.    
 
‘… many problems [that] we had never met before, we are facing in BOT 
practices,… there are no standard answers, procedures or models available that 
could be followed… All that we tried to do is learn from our own practices. Well, it 
cannot be denied that many mistakes were made in this process…’   
                      A director of Mayor Office, the city council 
 
In addition, 8 project managers from the provincial and local governments had related 
backgrounds and experience in engineering fields. However, most of them had insufficient 
knowledge and commercial experience of managing the contractual, financial and legal 
matters of a BOT project. Finally, only 5 of the interviewees working in the city councils or 
government-owned investment companies had a financial background or relevant 
experience with commercial contract law. The findings of this research suggested that some 
key figures, officials and managers in governments needed more training, due to their 
insufficient skills and knowledge.  
As 12 of the interviewees from the city councils suggested there was an urgent need for 
detailed guidance on the implementation of BOT projects at city level. Since the guidance 
on BOT models was not available to the practitioners, the leaders and officials of local 
councils attempted to gain experience and lessons by making short visits to, and studies of, 
earlier BOT projects in other cities.  
 




BOT projects to learn some experiences or lessons… also, some directors and staff 
in the councils were sent to the coastal provinces in China to study the BOT 
cases…’  
A  Director, the City’s Key and Important Project Department, the City council 
 
‘It is common for officials and directors in different councils and departments to 
communicate and discuss PPPs and BOTs to get some experience.’  
 A leader from the Highway Agency, provincial department, 
 
However, it was often not possible to get wide experience from other Chinese cities and it 
was difficult to learn procedures systematically in just a few weeks or on a month-long visit. 
Nine of the frontline officials and managers interviewed from local councils commented 
that the benefits of BOTs were always overstated by other councils and many negative 
lessons and failures of BOTs were ignored or underestimated. This led to:   
  
‘…BOTs look easy to implement and the benefits appear significant in other cities. 
However, when we adopted it we found it had many problems and [the] BOT 
became more complex and complicated than we imagined…it is easier to talk than 
to do…’  
A the vice-director, the city’s Development and Reform Committee 
 
As this study reveals, although some lessons from the implementation of BOTs had been 
learnt by provincial governments in some provinces, e.g. high transaction costs, low quality 
of facilities and services, absence of regulation. However few of them were known by BOT 
practitioners at city level. Many lessons in the application of BOTs were not separately 
discussed and studied against the publicly funded conventional infrastructure projects.   
Since there is not a local government association, no regular summaries or lessons-learnt 
analysis has been carried out by Chinese central and local authorities. This means that 
councils often make the same common mistakes when implementing a BOT.  For example, 




project in 2001 by adopting competitive bidding. This was because of the projects’ high 
transaction costs and low profitability. This lesson had not been learnt by other cities in the 
various provinces, resulting in 6 more city councils making similar mistakes in their 
sewage treatment BOT projects. A system of spreading BOT knowledge and skills had not 
been established by any of the governments.   
 
The interviews with the officials from central and local authorities explored that China had 
a short history of implementing BOTs at provincial and city levels, due to many of them 
being started since 2002. However, the institutional capabilities differed from province to 
province, as this study showed. Only one province in China had reasonably extensive 
experience from using BOTs in their motorway and water projects, since some BOT 
projects had been applied here during the 1980s and 1990s. Some provincial governments 
and their expert officials had very little experience and know-how of implementing the 
BOT models in their motorway and water systems as these had only been widely 
introduced since 2002.  
Furthermore, the large or super large cities had relatively long histories concerning the use 
of BOT projects. Data collected from six provinces shows that all 6 provincial capital cities 
with a population over 8 million had relatively longer experience of the application of 
BOTs. The interviewees from some provinces stated that, as large cities with a population 
over 8 million, they experienced greater pressure from the rapid urbanisation and economic 
developments of the late 1980s. The city councils had considered using BOTs in their urban 
motorway and bridge projects as early as 1986 and 1988. Although the majority of these 
BOT proposals were not approved by the central and provincial governments in the 1980s 
the city councils had gained some relevant experience on preparing and introducing private 
participants into public infrastructure projects. This experience involved concepts such as 
how to produce a feasibility study and how to prepare a BOT for procurement and 
tendering. However, the findings of this study also noted that some city councils were 
tackling BOTs for the first time in 2008 without any prior experience. 
‘ … BOTs are quite new things for us; they are different methods to develop 




                 A project manager from the department of Urban Utilities Department, a city 
Council,   
 
According to data from the interviews, the distribution of BOT skills and expertise were 
very uneven in different provinces of China. Large-size city councils, as well as the 
authorities in economically advanced regions had more expert officials with BOT skills and 
experience than did those of small or medium size. For example, a provincial capital city 
council has a legislation office with over 30 full-time qualified lawyers to assist BOT 
projects. However, another medium-size city council only has three lawyers with virtually 
no experience of Contract Law and the Bidding Law that are relevant to BOTs.  
As the interviewees from the 6 provinces commented, their competence and knowledge of 
using BOTs in motorway and water projects was important to the local authorities, 
especially those at city level who were executing and managing BOTs in practice. The 
experience of using BOTs had direct and profound effects on the capabilities of the officials 
during the preparation, procurement, tendering, contracting and negotiation stages. The 5 
interviewees who worked in central government stated that the local authorities should be 
very clear about their procedures and ways of using BOTs. Firstly, local authorities had to 
identify what documents and financial analysis should be produced in the preparation 
stages. Secondly, in terms of the different sizes, capital value, industries, and rate of return 
of their projects city councils needed to consider their approaches and methods of 
organising the tendering of the BOT projects to attract more private bidders. Thirdly, local 
authorities needed to think about the selection of the qualified bidders, including the criteria 
of selection, and careful due diligence on the BOT’s bidders. Fourthly, the public procuring 
authorities should decide a standard contract model to use in the drafting of the BOT 
contracts (the models of the Ministry of Construction or the International Federations of 
Consulting Engineers, FIDIC model). Fifthly, the public clients needed to calculate and 
analyse the unitary payments or charges for the BOT contractors and the duration of the 
negotiated contracts. Finally, local governments should design a system to measure and 
evaluate the performance (efficiency indicators or satisfaction rates of users, etc.) of the 




These interviewees recognised that there were many practical questions that were important 
to the application of motorway and water BOTs in local places.  However, central and 
provincial governments had not produced any detailed guidelines as yet. In this situation, 
the experience, capability and skills of the local governments and their expert officials were 
critical to the success of a BOT project. For example, competitive bidding had been 
adopted for 5 BOT motorway projects in some provinces in 2003, which was the same as 
the tendering method used in the publicly funded conventional motorway projects in China. 
However, the government in one province found that this method still did not necessarily 
select the best bidders, due to how the Chinese competitive bidding method worked. This 
was defined in the Chinese Tendering and Bidding Law, and was only suitable for publicly 
funded, short-term (no more than 5 years), construction contracts but the BOTs were 20-30 
year projects, with long-term operational and performance issues. Therefore, as the 
participants stated in later motorway BOT competitive bids, the government had changed 
their criteria on the selection of preferred bidders making the operational capabilities an 
important standard to be considered by the public procuring authorities.  
 
6.4.3 Collaboration between different departments in local councils  
At local levels, BOTs also involved many departments in the public sector such as the local 
Communication Department, Public Utilities Management Department, Water Resources 
Department, Urban Construction Planning Department, Prices Management Department 
and Environment Protection Department. The collaborations between these departments 
were key determinants of the success of BOT projects. However, current practice showed 
that local departments find it difficult to co-operate with other departments when dealing 
with BOTs. The evidence from 3 cities showed that the local BOT procurement department 
had not been fully empowered. There was insufficient authority and limited power that 
could be used to manage and co-operate with other departments.  
 
‘…many applications and plans for BOTs have to be approved in agreement with 
other departments. When the local BOT procuring department asked for our 




even cultures are different between different departments, for instance, the legal 
department want to have plenty of time to read and study the clauses of the BOT 
contracts to ensure the interests of the city council in the future. Other departments 
have little time to spend on a single project and for various reasons they have to finish 
the project as soon as possible…’  
A manager from the Key and Important Projects Department, city council 
 
The information related to BOT projects, such as costs, revenues and key contract clauses, 
was rarely released by the local councils and their related departments. This is because of 
the commercial confidentiality of a BOT contract. Therefore, not only potential investors, 
but also other departments in the city council were unable to obtain full information about 
the BOT projects, resulting in some concerns, suggestions and considerations from other 
stakeholders in the governments. In commercial practice, the confidentiality of a BOT 
contract should be protected. However, as a public infrastructure and service contract, the 
end-users and the public should have a certain degree of ‘right to know’.  A financial 
director in a city council indicated that:  
 
 
‘Our department did not know many details of the BOT projects in the city, because 
their funding [did] not [come] from the budgets… the departments [that] carried out 
the projects and did not involve us. The projects did not need our involvement…’  
Ms. C, the director, the city’s Financial Department, the city council 
 
This approach of using BOT’s as extra budget finance will affect the financial situation of 
local councils in the future. At the same time, the governments’ financial situation and 
resources would be badly affected in the case of any terminated BOTs. The outcome would 
be that buy-outs would come back onto the governmental budgets resulting in a big change 
to the local financial situation. Looking at the data collected from the focus group and two 




departments was not good. In some cases, strong conflicts between departments were 
observed and reported by the research participants. One BOT project senior director 
commented that the BOT approach involved too many departments and institutions of the 
local council, notably, a water BOT project team required the cooperation of 9 departments 
within the city council. So BOT is an even more complex and bureaucratic method than are 
the publicly funded projects.   
‘It was a hard task to make this kind of team work… the progress of a BOT project 
team was usually not fast, until higher level leaders stepped in. Meanwhile, the 
competence and experiences of the members of the team differed as well. ’  
A vice-mayor from a city council   
 
Five of the BOT project managers pointed out that the BOT programme did not improve 
efficiency in the governments, but increased bureaucracy, conflict and complexity.  
However, performance and collaboration of a BOT project team might be largely improved 
if the members and expert officials became familiar with each other. 
  
6.4.4 Corruption and illegal activities involved in China’s Motorway and Water BOT 
projects 
 
The research participants revealed that the degree of corruption in BOTs was likely to be 
lower than that in the publicly funded projects. However, ‘corruption’ issues still existed in 
the implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway and water sectors as 14 interviewees 
mentioned. BOT corruption is discussed in general terms and all examples cited here can be 
found from the published sources.   
As the participants of the interviews pointed out corruption widely existed in both publicly 
funded infrastructure projects and BOTs. The evidence from the six provinces covered in 
this thesis showed that corruption in the motorway BOTs may be more serious than in the 
water projects. As interviewees explained, water projects are normally small projects and 
revenue is not high, meaning there is a less room to ‘rent seek’.  




senior officials at provincial level were involved in corruption matters in 7 large motorway 
and water BOT projects during the last ten years. The interviewees commented that the 
corruption often occurred at the ‘tendering and bidding’ stage of motorway BOT projects. 
At this stage, few decision-makers or leaders in government could decide which company 
had won the contract. Given that the procedures and processes of BOT tendering were not 
transparent, the corruption was not difficult to instigate. The research participants from 
different city councils commented that,  
‘To reduce the opportunities of corruption in infrastructure projects, the 
transparent process, procedures and criteria to select preferred bidders are 
important. But, in practice, it is difficult to do so….’ 
In some cases, contractors already knew who would win the contract. In one extreme case 
which was in a publicly funded project, a contractor started their construction works before 
the bidding process had begun. Corruption was often observed when one-to-one negotiation 
was adopted. This was because only a small number of staff from governments participated 
and only very limited information was released about how these staff was conducting 
negotiations with private contractors. i.e. there was very little scrutiny. The interviewees 
also observed that the decision-makers and the senior directors should not participate in 
BOT projects if they had close relationships with BOT contractors, subcontractors or 
external advisors. However, despite this, in some BOT cases, contracts or subcontracts were 
won by relatives or friends of local leaders. Also as mentioned in the last section, relational 
contracting needs the public sector and private contractors to build a good and long-term 
relationship. However in practice it was found that a relational contract could lead to just a 
few contractors in one market (monopoly) and eventual corruption.  
Moreover, corruption occurred when the changes and re-negotiations on the key clauses of 
BOT contracts had been made before construction had begun. Most notably, as experiences 
from motorway BOTs in two provinces showed, the changes on original designs of the 
project, and adjustments in relation to the pricing of water and sewage services were 
affected. Finally, there is a culture of corruption in the construction industry in many 
countries, including China. In many cases, contractors may look for any opportunities to 




In this study, a public sector manager gave an example of this.  
‘When I had a periodic meeting with some BOT contractors, I told them that if 
they wanted to find me, please use the landline number of my office. This is 
because I had lost my mobile phone the day before yesterday… whilst the next 
morning, I received four brand new i-phones from four different contractors, all 
of them paid for. They even knew my favourite network is China Telecom, not 
China Mobile… what I mean is that the BOT contractors would try their best to 
build a ‘close’ relationship with public sector managers and directors, in order 
to achieve advantages in the market competition…Finally, in this case, I had to 
return all the mobile phones to them one by one…’ 
A director from a city’s council 
This study also found that, in some locations, the construction industry is deeply infiltrated 
by local gangsters. Even the gangs can monopolise the materials in the local construction 
market through ‘violent measures’.   
 
6.4.5 Financing institutions and capital markets: the ‘bias’ for China’s domestic BOT 
contractors  
 
This study identifies that China’s BOTs have a high ‘equity-financing ratio’ rather than 
debts financing. Chinese domestic private investors could not get substantial financial 
support from the Chinese state-owned banks and the Chinese capital markets.  
 
‘Chinese banks’ main clients are the SOEs and quasi-public businesses rather than 
private business. The banks in China are controlled by the government and have 
very strict limitations, procedures and requirements for applications from private 
business. Basically, it is impossible to get strong financial support for investment 
in BOT SPVs or private businesses and companies…’  
A  manager, from a state-owned bank of China 
 




private businesses was really poor, especially BOT SPVs which had a very short history 
and complex organisation based on shareholder structures. Therefore, approval of the loan 
applications from domestic BOT contractors was very strict. Another technical issue was 
that, in terms of Chinese Business and Enterprise Accounting Standards, the facilities and 
equipment used in BOT projects were not treated as the ‘assets’ of the private contractors. 
From an accounting perspective, private contractors in China could not use the BOT’s 
assets to back their own bank borrowing, and to secure their ‘debentures’ in the Chinese 
corporate bond market.   
A manager working in a bank who participated in the approvals of three BOT loan 
applications stated, if a private BOT contractor (the parent company, not the consortium) 
expected to get loans from the banks, they had to raise at least 35% of the project 
investment initially. Given that 60% of capital investment had been collected and made 
available to be used for BOT projects, the banks were able to consider these loan 
applications. The maximum amount of a loan to a BOT project was limited at 15% of the 
total capital value of the project.  
Meanwhile, as all 4 bank managers explained, since the banks had insufficient ways to 
identify and investigate the credits of private business due to the lack of a proper credit 
evaluation system in China, the government-owned banks only considered the private BOT 
contractors who were publicly listed in the Chinese stock market and with a credit rating 
over AA level (by Chinese credit rating companies). The managers from the banks 
explained that the strict management of applications from private businesses was because 
of past experiences of the bank. Bankruptcy rates for Chinese private businesses were far 
higher than for SOEs which were usually supported by the central and local governments. 
Therefore, the BOT investors in China found it was difficult to arrange finance. The 
managers from the private sector also complained that China’s banking system and capital 
markets were not open to them and that they had a strong ‘bias’ against private business.  
 
‘Chinese banks only served the state-owned companies and government, they did 
not care about us, even if we have good projects, good credit and good financial 




A manager from a BOT contractor 
In recent years, there was a sign that more and more private companies tried to raise capital 
in Hong Kong and overseas stock markets. This study shows that Chinese private 
businesses had difficulty carrying out large BOT projects, because of their limited financial 
channels and lack of financial support from the Chinese banking system and the stock 
markets. Most investment funds (60%-90% of capital investment) on BOTs were self-
financing by the private contractors themselves. Private participation in BOT arrangements 
was in relation to the financial capabilities of the private sector.  
The managers and directors from both central and local authorities interviewed believed 
that the capability and resources of the private sector had a large influence on the success of 
BOT projects. By reviewing all the BOT cases in this study, it could be found that only a 
small portion of private investment was raised from ‘debt financing’. The financial barriers 
on BOT investors had still not been removed by the government and the banks.This led to 
poor financial capabilities for private investors and high financial risks for China’s BOT 
projects.  
Compared with the Chinese private BOT contractors, the government-owned companies 
and the contractors from Hong Kong and other countries had stronger financial capabilities 
even during the Financial Crisis in 2008. Furthermore, in BOT projects funded by 
government-controlled companies, this study found that the contractors could easily get a 
30-year low-interest loan (about 5%) from different banks and without strict credit 
checking. Finally, multinational companies also had strong financial stability in most BOT 
cases. Their projects were often financed by borrowing from the international banks or 
financial organisations. The evidence showed that some British and French commercial 
banks, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Investment Bank 
had participated in 10 large water BOTs in China.  
 
 
6.4.6 Low Quality, inexperienced BOT contractors and consultants: the barriers of 
applying BOTs in China 




private BOT contractors in China, and they were operating a large number of water BOT 
projects by 2009. However, as the officials from the Ministry of Construction commented 
that only 5% of China’s BOT contractors had sufficient design and construction capabilities 
on the motorway and water infrastructure. In other words, they were not qualified 
contractors. By reviewing the profiles of BOT contractors, this study discovered over 40 
motorway and water contractors had no experience and background in relation to BOT or 
infrastructure projects. At least 7 managers reported that a number of contractors were 
‘nouveau-riches’ from other industries without any relevant experience to the BOT projects 
they operated. In this situation, these BOT contractors had to find sub-contractors to design 
construct and operate the BOT projects. However, the cases from the motorway BOTs in 
some provinces showed that the inexperienced BOT contractor could not manage and 
operate the BOT consortium properly and professionally. Evidence from at least 7 
motorway and water BOT projects showed that the main BOT contractors nearly lost 
control of the management of sub-contractors and material suppliers.  
Four interviewees from BOT contractors admitted that their businesses used to be non-
specialised infrastructure companies.  They later moved into motorway and water BOTs, 
because their companies were diversifying their investments and their core businesses at the 
time. BOT projects were a very attractive proposition to them, due to stable cash flows and 
‘good’ profitability. However, a senior director from a city council commented that the 
difficulties and the resistance encountered when developing a BOT project were largely 
underestimated by these low-quality contractors. During the course of the interviews, at 
least five public sector managers revealed a disparaging attitude to their Chinese BOT 
contractors, due to their inabilities and general poor performances.  
It was difficult to investigate the exact number of unqualified BOT contractors in this study. 
However, as the data from the central governments indicated, only a few of the contractors 
were qualified to undertake large motorway and water infrastructure projects. Some BOT 
expert officials from central and local governments were very critical about using BOTs in 
developing local motorway and water projects. One justification was that there were not 
enough qualified BOT contractors available to do the work. 




contractors from Hong Kong and other countries were much bigger organisations, had 
wider experiences and many more skills in developing motorway and water BOTs.  
Finally, the weakest parts of the Chinese BOT market were its under-developed financial 
and legal consultation industries. Few qualified firms were available that could offer the 
necessary services to BOTs. Although there were hundreds or thousands of financial and 
legal consulting firms in China, only a handful of them had any experience of BOT projects. 
Even the 3 interviewees from the BOT consulting firms did not deny this finding. As one 
associate of a BOT legal consulting firm agreed that 
  
   Chinese domestic consulting firms largely differed in terms of their                      
competence, capability, expertise and other resources. It was true that a handful of 
consulting firms were able to provide BOT advisory services, half of them being 
foreign companies.        
 A senior director from a Chinese legal consulting firm           
 
The findings of this study presented that the governments in China actively promoted the 
implementation of BOTs in motorway and water sectors. However, the governments failed 
to consider if they had the necessary institutions and resources to do so. A key finding of 
this research is that a majority of BOT contractors, the financing institutions as well as the 
consulting firms, did not have the capabilities to carry out large water and motorway BOTs 
at the time.  
 
6.4.7 The Constraints on China’s BOTs: Absence of BOT related Laws and Regulations  
The evidence from this study shows that both the public and private sectors in BOTs were 
restricted by the current Chinese legal system. The research participants who worked in top 
legal firms mentioned that when China was emerging from a command economy; the 
provision of public services by the private sector was not specifically addressed in the legal 
framework. For the private sector, the BOT contractors complained that the Chinese legal 





   ‘There are few laws to address BOT issues in China… and by current laws actually you 
could not find a clear legal framework and such arrangements for BOTs… that has 
meant that private investors had large risks when investing in BOT projects in China…’ 
                                     A manager from the legal consulting firm 
 
Chinese regulations and policies on BOTs were frequently changed, notably when the 
Ministry of Construction adjusted the national quality standards on water supply and 
sewage treatment in 2006 without a public enquiry. Affected by this change, a large number 
of water BOT projects had to be re-designed, in order to fulfil the new government 
standards. A fixed rate return on investments (usually 16-20%) was adopted by local 
governments in many BOT projects to attract private investors in the 1990s. However, this 
policy and financial arrangement was abolished by the central government in 1998. As a 
result, hundreds of BOT contracts had to be re-negotiated with regard to the pricing and the 
unitary charges.  
   
     ‘The government policies and regulations changed too quickly without any consistency, 
it caused large political and legal risks and losses for BOT contractors…it is harmful to 
long-term BOT contracts …’ 
                                   A legal consultant from a legal firm in China  
Unclear BOT legal frameworks also increased the risks and costs to private investors and 
vice versa. The 4 managers from one BOT consortium noted that they had to spend a lot of 
time and money with their public partners to maintain a good relationship. If the present 
Chinese legal and law systems could not protect the private contractor’s interests, private 
contractors could make ‘under the table deals’ with officials to guarantee that the 
contractors’ interests and rights were not damaged. As a result, corruption was inevitably 
created. The interviews with all 4 private BOT sponsors showed that the Chinese investors 
often had no confidence in Chinese legal institutions, such as the local courts and judges, 
because of the special legal systems in place. 
 




and influences on the appointments of local judges…the independence, justice and 
fairness of the judgments of the local courts in China were often under suspicion by 
private investors.’ 
                                  A director from a legal consultation firm  
 
Therefore, when conflicts happened between the private sector and their public partners, the 
Chinese legal system made it difficult to protect private rights and guarantee a fair 
judgement. At the time of the interviews, given the independence of the Chinese legal 
system, the managers from the legal consulting firms commented that BOT contractors 
could submit a dispute to arbitration in Hong Kong and Singapore. However, these 
participants added that the costs and the expense of such arbitration were very high.  
On the other side, this study found that the public sector was also bothered by the legal 
issues of BOTs. The status of BOTs had not been identified from a legal point of view. The 
related laws and Chinese governmental accounting system did not clarify whether the 
BOTs should be included in the local government balance sheet or off-balance sheet. 
Where the legal framework was inadequate and under-developed, there had been an 
increased focus on concessionary contracts as a means of enabling the government to enter 
into long-term agreements for the delivery of public services. However, this study found 
that even the local governments had no rights to sign a BOT contract within the current 
legal framework.  
Another important problem for BOTs is that medium and small city councils with a 
population of fewer than 1 million, do not have not enough legal expertise to support the 
development of BOTs. Also, many officials had no legal background and do not consider 
the importance of laws concerning BOTs projects. 
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter reveals that the implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway and water 
sectors suffered as a result of a number of problems. Within the 23 cancelled BOT projects, 




had not established the necessary institutional and policy frameworks for the programme to 
succeed. A number of local governments at city level had insufficient resources to conduct 
BOT projects properly. The majority of the interviewees from the city council complained 
that very limited support from central and provincial government had been given. Both the 
decision-makers and the BOT project managers had very little knowledge on how to 
implement a BOT in practice. Therefore, there were a number of practical difficulties 
surrounding the processes of preparation, tendering and bidding, contracting, negotiating 
and evaluating BOT projects. These study shows, at national and provincial level, that the 
government needs to set up a specific department to design, formulate, regulate and 
evaluate BOT policies and offer practical guidance on the implementation of BOT models.  
At same time, the interviews with managers from central and local governments revealed 
that the Chinese domestic BOT contractors also did not have enough finance or technical 
and managerial capabilities. The important factor for Chinese BOT contractors was the 
number of barriers and limitations between them and the government controlled banking 
and capital markets. With limited financial backing, Chinese BOT contractors often 
suffered as a result. Meanwhile, the technical, design and operational competence of private 
contractors was also in doubt. Private BOT contractors, notably, the Chinese domestic 
contractors did not have enough experience, skills, knowledge or resources to manage large 
infrastructure projects.  
The implementation of BOTs was affected by national and local issues, such as China’s 
incomplete legal framework and their industrial policy changes. Other problems arose with 
opposition from local residents and employees who worked in the public sector.  
Many of difficulties of using BOT concessionary contracts to develop local motorway and 
water projects in China have been identified in this study. The major ones include high 
transaction costs, incomplete BOT contracts, opportunist behaviour on both sides of the 
contract, poor cooperation and relationships between the public clients and the BOT 
contractors and problems measuring the performance of BOT projects. 
The lessons learnt during the implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway and water 
sectors showed that BOTs were a useful long-term contract based approach to develop the 




the potential benefits, costs and risks and the local authorities in China need to carefully 
consider and balance these factors. The lessons from the Chinese water BOT projects 
suggest that the BOT model may not be suitable for small sized projects. The governments 
also need to consider if the right conditions to implement a BOT exist, namely, the 
institutions and the resources (i.e. laws, regulations, experts and money) crucial for 
delivering and implementing the programme are in place. All of these factors are vital 
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Chapter 7 Findings and Discussions  
 
7.1 The findings about the development and implementation of China’s BOT  
 
In the last two chapters, this thesis discussed the overall trends in the development of BOTs 
in China’s motorway and water sectors. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
implementation of motorway and water BOTs in six provinces. Chapter 6 then explored the 
problems and experiences of utilising BOTs by considering the institutional context and the 
contracting practice of local governments at city levels.  
In terms of the performance of all projects involved in this research, the study highlights 
that the overall experience of the China’s water BOTs is so far negative. Meanwhile, the 
results of implementing BOTs in the motorway sector are mixed but much better than those 
in the water sector. Some positive experiences have been discovered in some motorway and 
water BOT projects. However, these good practices were found in only a small number of 
cases (23 out of 96 projects). In addition, the findings revealed that BOTs are often used by 
the governments at city level as a ‘buffer’ to postpone their fiscal crisis and administrative 
problems. The real motivation of implementing BOTs for the city governments is fairly 
short-term objective driven with political target-oriented policies (to increase GDP 
indicators, fulfil the infrastructure gap and to fulfil the national plans required by the 
ministries of the central government).   
In this study, the weaknesses of BOTs have been discussed. They are based on long-term 
contracts, e.g. with high transaction costs and inflexibility. In practice, there are also a large 
number of other problems which can cause the failure or cancellation of BOT projects. 
These include, the contributing factors from Chinese BOT governance institutions, BOT 
related industries, legislation and social-economic issues. This research noted that both 
governments and private contractors in China are not really in a position to undertake BOT 
projects, in terms of their capability, experience, skills or financial resources. Moreover, 
BOT related industries in China are not well developed and are unable to sufficiently offer 
technical, financial and legal support to the application of BOT projects. Finally, the 
development and implementation of BOT’s also suffered as a result of the changes in 




Putting all of these findings together, Diagram 7.1 represents  
 
 How BOT projects work?  
 What were the results of implementing BOT projects?  
 What contributory factors drove the projects to failure (or success)?  
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BOT Mechanism, Programmes and 
Arrangements 
 Poor planning and design of BOT 
projects (project selection, 
affordability, local demands and risks) 
 Procurement :Non-completive b idding 
in some cases and poor negotiation 
 Long-term contracts, higher 




External Circumstances   
 Stable national economy, but, 
uncertainty in  local economy and 
the fiscal crisis or government 
debts at city level 
 Politics: Changes and uncertainties 
in local governments at provincial 
and city level 
 Local government support and 
commitments 
 National strategies and planning on 
infrastructure 
 Public sector reforms 
 Event: the Financial Crisis in 2008 
 
 Outcome 




motorway and water 
sectors in China in 
short-term 
 A high cancellation 
and ‘buy-out’ rate (by 
the governments) of 
BOT contracts 
 Poor quality of 
construction; and Poor 
operation performance 
 Weak  competition in 
water BOTs 
 Low Efficiencies in 
























/interactions Institutional Contexts  
 Local Authorities: short-term political target (GDP) driven; Lack BOT experts, skills and 
experience; lack budgets for preparing and planning BOTs; poorly structured and  poorly 
empowered BOT teams; insufficient collaboration between different departments on the 
public side 
 Banking sector/capital market: these are big barriers for BOT contractors’ financing 
 Private Contractor (BOT): high portion of equity finance; lack experience and skills on 
carrying out large infrastructure projects  
 Construction Industries: SOEs dominated the construction and infrastructure market 
 Consulting Markets: a handful of qualified BOT consulting firms and advisors  
 Others 
 
BOT Mechanism, Programmes and 
Arrangements 
 Poor planning and design of BOT 
projects (project selection, 
affordability, local demands and risks) 
 Procurement :No petitive 
bidding in some cases and poor 
negotiation 
 Long-term contracts, higher 
transaction costs, poor contract 
design, opportunistic behaviours 
 Construction: poor quality, significant 
cost reduction in the motorway BOTs 




7.2 The findings on comparing Chinese BOT projects and British PFI schemes: the 
similarities and differences 
Given the findings on the development and implementation of Chinese BOTs, a comparison 
between BOTs and the PFIs in the UK is presented. Table 7.2 (page 290) shows the major 
similarities and differences between these two policies and their practice, in terms of 
objectives, context, development levels of their associated markets and industries, the 
results of BOT and PFI implementation and finally practical and emerging issues. 
Table 7.2, establishes some similarities between BOT and PFI schemes and their practice, 
including same contracting methods, similar models, comparable objectives, similar 
ideologies underpinned by the programmes and familiar problems with contracts. 
Significant differences were observed in areas of institutional context and related industries 
and also in the fields of government and private contractor capability, BOT governance 
institutions and structures.  Although there are many detailed similarities and differences 
that can be discussed, this section emphasises several important points by which 
comparison of the two is relevant.  
 
7.2.1 PFIs and BOTs as long-term contract projects  
Firstly, it is significant that both BOT and PFI suffered as a result of using long-term 
contracting method in practice. This finding indicates this as a weakness of both BOT and 
PFI models as shown by the Transaction Cost Economics. No matter how the context 
differed between the UK and China, BOT and PFI were inevitably affected by these 
contracting issues. Common issues were that BOTs and PFIs both have higher transaction 
costs, incomplete and inflexible contracts, opportunistic behaviours of both parties within 
the contract and a lack of expertise and skill in the public sector to manage long term 
contracts for the delivery of public services.   
However, as this study shows, China and the UK chose different ways to deal with these 
contracting problems. In China, a large number of city authorities tried to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with BOT transactions. Notably, Chinese local governments 
attempted to conduct very brief outline business cases plus very simple project planning 
and design without recruiting external advisors. In this way, the governments reduced the 
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transaction costs in the BOT planning and preparation stages. Governments at city level do 
not recruit financial, legal and technical advisors in the procurement, bidding and 
negotiation phases. As a result, the contracting costs of BOT projects were significantly 
reduced in these cases. Finally, full-time project managers on the governments’ side were 
not appointed by the local councils to regulate and monitor the performance of BOT 
contractors. All of these measures significantly reduce the transaction costs of BOT, whilst 
resulting in poor project selection and planning, higher risks of private contractors’ failure, 
a very high cancellation rate of BOT contracts and higher operational costs at later stages. 
Without careful and robust project selection, planning, procurement and tendering work, a 
number of BOT projects eventually collapsed at very earlier stages.     
The governments in the UK adopted a different approach to handle the transaction costs 
associated with PFI. The key approach used by the government is one of standardization 
and the Treasury’s PPP unit has published four versions of the PFI Standardized Contract 
Models in the last ten years. One of the purposes of the PFI contract’s standardisation is 
aimed to make PFI contracts more complete and unified, thus reducing the cost of contract 
drafting. Secondly, the government attempted to standardize the procedures and practice of 
PFIs. They issued a range of guides on the planning, procurement and tendering processes 
of PFIs, in order to mitigate the transaction costs in these stages. Finally, the government in 
the UK advocated the concept of long-term partnership between the public and private 
sectors, and attempted to build a strong contract relationship, eventually reducing 
‘opportunistic behaviour’ in PFI transactions. However, it is difficult to evaluate the real 
effects of attempts to build relational PFI contracts, since robust evidence has not been 
observed in the UK. In contrast, negative experiences have been found in some cases as the 
NAO explored (NAO, 2009b, 2011). 
 
7.2.2 BOT and PFI: their similar official objectives, but different priorities  
By looking at the official objectives of using BOT and PFI the governments in both China 
and the UK anticipated that they would need to introduce private capital investments, 
transfer risks and improve the efficiency of public services and management. However, in 
practice it was observed that the priorities of BOT and PFI differed quite a lot. The PFI 
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scheme is largely based on the concept of ‘value-for-money’. The BOT in China largely 
concentrates on maximization of private investment capital. The different priorities of these 
two schemes led to quite different attempts to use private capital. In China, to attract private 
infrastructure investment in a short-term period, local governments at city level often 
ignored and thought little of the long-term benefits and issues of using BOTs. The Chinese 
local authorities’ main concerns were how to introduce private capital investments as soon 
as possible to solve their current fiscal crisis and political problems. In contrast, PFIs 
attempted to put more consideration on ‘whole-life costing’, the transfer of risks and value-
for-money tests. Meanwhile, PFI in the UK also suffered as a result of short-term oriented 
objectives due to the accounting treatment incentive and budgetary pressures, e.g. the 
shortage of public finance for infrastructure and the use of PFI as an off-balance finance. 
 
7.2.3 Different social-economic contexts in the UK and China leading to different 
practices 
It is difficult to say that China’s approach to using BOT is wrong, or that the British 
approach to implementing PFI is better. As this study explores, the contexts in the UK and 
China differ largely. Therefore, the governments in China and the UK face different 
challenges in developing infrastructure projects. For China, the local governments need to 
develop urgently needed motorway and water infrastructure as soon as possible to respond 
to the rapid urbanisation within the country. However, for the UK, the governments have 
more pressure to update ageing facilities and demands for better public services to maintain 
the current public infrastructure.   
It can be seen that both the governments in the UK and China adopted pro-market and neo-
liberal ideologies in developing public infrastructure and services. However, the histories 
and experiences of using the market-mechanisms of the two governments are quite different. 
The government in the UK has extensive experience and lessons of using market-oriented 
methods to deliver infrastructure projects and provide public services, e.g. large scale 
privatisation, contracting-out and the use of PFIs in the public sector during the last three 
decades. Conversely, China has little experience and only a short history of private sector 
use in developing infrastructure projects. Both the government and private contractors in 
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China still do not have the necessary experiences, skills, resources and capabilities to 
properly perform BOT projects. Finally, given the large number of BOT projects 
undertaken by domestic investors, this study discovered that the contractors had little 
experience and competence to do the works. In only a few of cases, were BOT contractors 
able to properly carry out the projects with the necessary finance and experience to manage 
a super-large infrastructure project. In these cases, the BOT contractors happened to be the 
publicly listed corporations which were owned by the state.  
In addition, the development of the private economy is quite different between the UK and 
China. The Chinese private economy has developed rapidly in the last three decades, 
although it is still weak and very much a supplement to the state-owned economy. As 
shown in table 7.2  at the end of this section (page 290), the private sector played a very 
limited role in the Chinese capital market, banking industry and infrastructure industry. All 
these fields are tightly controlled by the state-owned enterprises. Therefore a Chinese BOT 
scheme is difficult to implement without the backing of a strong and mature private 
economy.  
This study does reveal that China’s central government had hoped to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of building, financing and operating infrastructure and public services by 
using BOTs. However, the development and implementation of BOT at provincial and city 
levels is challenged by several issues including a rigid and bureaucratic public 
administration, an undeveloped private economy and various underdeveloped BOT related 
industries.  
Compared with BOTs, the British PFIs met different challenges and issues. The UK has a 
long history of capitalist and market-oriented economies. The construction, banking and 
accounting industries were very much concentrated in a small number of multinational 
companies. As has been discussed in chapter 3, the medium and small companies find it 
difficult to get involved in the PFI markets. Furthermore, when dealing with these highly 
skilled PFI private contractors, the government often found itself at a disadvantage. The 
NAO (2009) commented that the government needs to get smarter when buying into PFIs. 
The findings of the Public Account Committee (2011) have shown that the private 
contractor always gained more benefit from PFI deals than did the UK taxpayers. For the 
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governments in the UK, the key issue is how to get a better PFI deal, in order to achieve 
‘value-for-money’ for the taxpayers.    
 
 
7.2.4 Management practice of BOT and PFI: decentralisation vs. centralisation  
This research indicates that the governance structure of Chinese BOTs is highly 
decentralised. The governments at provincial and city levels can make their own decisions 
on whether to adopt the BOT model or not. The provincial and city governments also are 
able to issue their own BOT policies and circulars. The central government in China has 
retained only very limited control on the development and implementation of BOTs since 
2005. This thesis highlights the geographical and economic differences amongst the 
provinces of central and eastern China with those of the western provinces. These 
differences have resulted in a centralised and standardised BOT system being very difficult 
to establish by the central government. For instance, the area and population of the Guangxi 
Minority Autonomous Region in China is equivalent to that of the UK. China has 27 
provinces, 5 minority autonomous regions and 2 special administrative regions. In fact, at 
least 15 provinces in central and eastern China are equivalent to the whole of the UK in 
terms of area and population. This is another reason why it is impossible to establish a 
centralised and standardized BOT framework in China. Therefore, most of the BOT 
projects were conducted at city level in terms of their own initiatives and decisions.  
In China the system of BOTs originally worked from the bottom up. i.e. provincial 
governments initially introduced and used the BOT model. Then, the central government of 
China centralised the approval and management processes during the period from 1994-
2004. However, the highly centralised management of BOT usage met a number of 
challenges, such as the resistance of local governments, complicated and time-consuming 
approval procedures and a lack of consideration of local factors. All these difficulties with 
centralised BOTs resulted in the national government finally decentralising management to 
provincial governments in 2005. However, this study found that this decentralisation caused 
new problems for local BOT management. One of the problems is that local governments 
do not know how to properly regulate and inspect BOT projects and their contractors. In 
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many cases, the management of BOT projects was often kept at ‘arms length’. Local 
governments at city level generally knew little about the performance management of BOT 
contracts.  
In contrast with the experiences in China, the PFI in the UK adopted a highly centralised 
and standardised approach. Firstly, a PPP unit was established within central government to 
manage the PFI’s development, e.g. designing and formulating PFI policies, publishing 
technical guidance and approving some applications from local PFIs (Treasury, 2009). 
Secondly, both the central government’s ministries and the local councils followed certain 
procedures (14 steps) and standard practice when the PFI model was employed (Allen, 
2003), with the Standardized Contract Model being an example of this. Finally, the central 
government in the UK highly advocated the standardisation of PFI practice and still retains 
substantial roles in the use of PFIs. For instance, the government urged the ministries and 
local authorities to employ the Gateway Review, the Green Book and the ‘Value for Money’ 
tests in practice. Furthermore, the NAO, the Audit Commission, the Public Account 
Committee and the Economic Affairs Committee, all actively reviewed and inspected the 
performance of PFI contracts. The most significant feature of PFIs in the UK is that they 
are highly centralised and standardised. The UK also worked from the top down to develop 
PFI policy and manage PFI practice, which is in fundamental contrast to the Chinese BOT 
decentralised, ‘arms-length’ and working from the bottom up approach.   
7.2.5 The relevance of BOTs and PFIs 
Based upon the analysis mentioned above, it is difficult to say how the experience of 
developing and implementing British PFIs is relevant to China’s BOTs despite the fact that 
the two models are very similar and comparable. However, the governments in China and 
the UK may use these similar models but to solve different problems. In other words, the 
key purposes and motivations of using BOTs and PFIs differed between China and the UK. 
China use BOTs as a financing tool to urgently raise the much needed infrastructure capital 
investments, in order to fulfil the infrastructure gap. The UK employed PFI as a way to 
improve public infrastructure and services’ management, finally achieving value for money 
for the taxpayers (although the final results are still controversial). If these two schemes had 
different purposes, and operated within different contexts, the final outcomes are inevitably 
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different. Therefore, the overall experience and lessons of using PFIs in the UK are not 
always relevant to those of Chinese BOTs.  
However, as this study explored, some experiences and lessons of the practical and 
development issues of using PFIs can still be learnt by the Chinese governments, e.g. the 
use of a long-term contract to develop an infrastructure project. As presented by table 7.2, 
all similarities between the two schemes exist in the areas of contracting practice. In some 
provinces where BOTs were employed on a much larger scale and with relatively longer 
timescales, some elements of PFI practice were still relevant. Since the Chinese BOT 
projects are fairly well concentrated in a small number of provinces, this study suggests that 
these provinces have the potential to learn from the experience of PFIs and improve their 
BOT practice in the future. In the next section, this study will address these lessons and 




Table 7.2 A Comparison of PFI in the UK and BOT in China 
 
Items and Factors 
Definitions (PFI and BOT) 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Concession Contracts Yes Yes 
Maturity of Contract  About 30 years No more than 30 years 
Bundling Design or Not Yes No (But, found in some large 
water BOTs funded by 
multinational contractors) 
Payment Mechanism Governmental Annual 
Payment or Unitary Charges 
(Direct Tolls were also found 
in a few road and bridge 
cases) 
Direct Tolls, ‘pay-as-you-go’, 
(In some cases, the public 
sector paid) 
Objectives (claims) 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Mobilizing private investments Yes Yes (Key Objective) 
Risks Transfer Yes (key objective) Yes,  
Value-for-money  
Or three Es  
(Efficiency, Effectiveness and 
Economy) 
Yes (key objective) The governments claimed 
‘efficiency improvement’’ 
Private management, skills or 
advanced technology 
(Innovations) 
Yes (key objective) Yes 
Contexts and Backgrounds 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Neo-liberalism or pro-Market 
ideologies 
Yes  Yes, the government 
enthusiastically promotes 
marketisation of infrastructure 
and social services  
Fiscal difficulties and shortfalls 
of the governments  
Yes Yes, significant fiscal crisis 
(infrastructure investments 
shortfall) at city levels 
Increasing social 
demands/updates on aging 
facilities/maintain pressures 
High Very high (the real extent 
needs study) 
Other alternatives   
- Budget finance Yes, but there is institutional 
bias, especially in NHS and 
Schools  
Yes, but difficult to apply 
- National Development 
Bank 
No Yes, but only cover a small 
demand on developing 
infrastructure  




Development Levels of PFI markets and private industries 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Capital Markets Well-developed overall (but, 
severely weakened in 2008) 
 
- Corporate Bond market Well-developed Little support to BOT 
contractors 
- Stock market Well-developed In developing, offer some 
support to BOTs 
- Insurance market Well-developed Few services designed for 
BOTs 
Banking Industry Well-developed Well-developed (state-owned), 
very limited efforts made for 
BOT debt financing  
Construction Industry Well-developed Well-developed (state-owned), 
private contractors’ 
competence is really poor 
Consulting Industries   
- Financial Well-developed Less than 10 qualified firms  
- Legal Well-developed A few qualified BOT legal 
firms 
- Technical Well-developed Over 10 thousand state-owned 
design and planning 
institutions, few private firms 
Capabilities of private 
contractors 
Relatively strong Over 95% of Chinese water 
BOT contractors have very 
poor financing, management 
and technical capabilities 
A large number of BOT 
contractors and sub-
contractors have not sufficient 
capability to commence 
projects  
Facts of the Implementation  
Scope Central and Local Level Local Level only 
Procedures  14 Steps 9 steps, the procedures are 
similar to PFI, but no uniform 
and standardized guidance on 
how to conduct these steps. 
Specified and unified PPP units 
in the central government 
Yes (PPP Unit, H.M. 
Treasury) 
Not found at central level 
(decentralised), 
Some infrastructure project 
management departments were 
found at provincial and local 
level, not specific with BOTs 
Policy and Regulation 
Framework  
Relatively complete A few policies and regulations 
have been issued 
Standard Contract Models Yes Yes, but only for Water Supply 
Sewage Treatment and Solid 
Waste Treatment sectors 
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Complexity High High  
Issues, Results and lessons related to Implementation 
 British PFIs  Chinese BOTs  
Degree of Transparency Low, but higher than China’s Very low 
On-balance sheet Not yet No, there is no accounting 
interpretation or practice in the 
public sector. Some 
interviewees believed BOT is 
an ‘extra-extra budget’ finance 
Achieve Value for Money of 
taxpayers 
(or Efficiency, Effectiveness and 
Economy) 
Controversial and 
inconclusive, but failed in 
many cases 
Efficiency (large cost 
reduction in motorway BOTs, 
but poor quality, design and 
planning) 
 
Effectiveness (a large amount 
of private capital investment 
introduced in the short-term to 
postpone the fiscal crisis, but 
long-term fiscal risks are   
maybe higher) 
 
Not economic, some contracts 
are expensive and with high 
transaction costs  
 
Risks Transfer, allocations and 
premiums 
Controversial, probably a 
few risks transferred, but 
with high premiums 
The governments attempted to 
transfer all risks to private 
contractors, resulting in an      
expensive contract, 
or project failure, cancellation 
and buy-out by the 
governments, 
or some risks were transferred 
back to the governments 
 
Transaction costs  High High in some projects, 
However, the governments 
attempted to cut these costs 
without hiring BOT advisors, 
resulting in higher ‘operational 
risks and costs’ at a later stage.   
Incomplete Contract Found in many cases Yes, in many cases 
Contracting risks (opportunistic 
behaviours, hold up and lock in) 
Found in many cases Yes, in many cases 
Relationships/Cooperation Poor or inconclusive Poor, but in some cases, a 
good relationship between 
project managers and 
contractors may create 




Contract Management and 
Monitoring 
Poor or inconclusive  Piecemeal or laissez-faire 
approach  
Expertise, skills and Training Insufficient in public sector Insufficient in public and 
private sectors,  
Degrees of competitions in 
procurement and tendering  
Seems to be weaker with 
poor competition at post-
contracting stages 
Poor in water BOTs’ 
procurement and bidding,  
poor competition at the post-
contract stage  
Overall performance and effects Inconclusive and 
controversial 
Mixed results in the motorway 




7.3 Discussion: BOT problems and PFI’s lessons—what can the Chinese learn? 
 
7.3.1 What caused the problems with BOTs: the weaknesses of the implementation of 
the BOT model in China’s motorway and water infrastructure sectors 
 
Whilst much of the policy content between British PFIs and Chinese BOTs is different, 
some of the operational and emerging issues are the same. It is possible for China to study 
the problems of PFI implementation to solve the issues they meet in BOT practice. The 
biggest issues for China are the high cancellation and buy-out rate of BOT contracts and 
their poor value for money. There are various causes which have contributed to the 
problems of using BOTs.  
As this study has revealed, BOTs have various weaknesses in developing road 
infrastructure and water services. The major ones include the following:  
Low transparency of BOT contract and relevant information was found in all of the 
motorway and water projects. This information was obscured by the governments and 
private contractors in accordance with the requirements of commercial confidentiality. This 
low transparency of information ensured that BOT projects were not inspected by the 
public or by other departments of the government. Inadequate disclosure of information on 
current projects also made it difficult for the public and the governments to conduct 
evaluations on the real performances of BOTs. This may also help to cover up corruption 
activities happening within BOT projects.    
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As discussed in a number of sections in this thesis, the fundamental weaknesses of the BOT 
model revolve around the contractual problems and risks associated with long-term BOT 
contracts, e.g. higher transaction costs, inflexibility of the contract in practice, incomplete 
poorly defined contracts and their clauses as well as the opportunistic behaviours of the 
governments and private contractors. The development and implementation of BOT 
projects in China suffered as a result of these issues and viable solutions have yet to be 
found by the governments.  
Poor practices and management on the BOT’s planning, procurement, tendering, 
negotiating and regulating stages were also observed in all ten cities. These involved more 
practical weaknesses and emerging issues of using the BOT model including: 
Poor decision-making on BOT’s adoption and any alternative procurement routes: in many 
cases of motorway and water projects, the BOT model was wrongly adopted in unsuitable 
projects. The findings of this research also reveal that under-prepared agencies and 
departments in city governments adopted weak project planning and design work practices. 
This was due to a lack of experience or professional resources available in-house at city 
councils and also limited financial budgets preventing the local councils from recruiting in 
adequate professional advisers. This was because the governments tried to minimize the 
transaction costs involved in the planning and design of BOT projects. In addition, 
preliminary feasibility studies and outline business cases were conducted with insufficiently 
detailed design briefs. The preparatory work of BOT projects was often done by poorly 
resourced public sector managers within insufficient timescales. With poor design and weak 
project planning, many BOT projects, particularly for water supply and sewage were put 
out to tender, causing a number of problems in the later stages e.g. Uncertainty on project 
costs in the procurement stage, re-design and major revisions of projects, delays and poor 
quality project construction, poor performance and higher maintenance costs in the 
project’s operation and finally, significantly increased overall risks.  
Contrasting with the PFI model in the UK, the design of most BOT projects were 
undertaken by the city councils or their agencies in the very early stages. This was because 
city councils often did not trust the design capabilities of private contractors, or that 
projects were expected to be funded by government budgetary finance. However, 
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government designed BOTs did have some weaknesses. Private contractors were totally 
excluded from the design work of BOT projects which constrained their experience and 
innovation in the design and construction processes. In some large water BOT projects, the 
most experienced and competent contractors had to fundamentally change the design, 
which incurred further extra costs.   
The weaknesses of the BOT model in the procurement and tendering processes are also 
significant. Firstly, there are too many government departments involved in BOT approval 
and governance increasing the complexity and costs of using private finance in 
infrastructure projects. These departments were not wholly integrated into the approval and 
procurement processes, which meant that the procurement was unnecessarily long, and with 
higher costs that finally led to a delay in the project construction.  
Another practical weakness of BOT is its higher bidding costs. Evidence from the city 
councils highlighted that both BOT contractors and the local governments were really 
concerned by the excessive cost of financial, legal and technical services.  
The third weakness of using BOT procurement and tendering is poor competition. 
Particularly for the small water and sewage projects, non-competitive bidding was often 
adopted in a number of cases. The problems of non-competitive bidding have been 
discussed in previous chapters, notably, low transparency in the process, risk of corruption 
and expensive contracts.  
Fourthly, the procurement of BOTs often took too long and suffered from a number of 
uncertainties and changes by local governments and contractors resulting in delays with 
construction and operation. There are a number of reasons for a lengthy procurement 
process, including the lack of a standardised and detailed procurement framework, 
inadequate and poorly designed output specifications for projects in feasibility studies, and 
poor negotiating skills within the authorities. Some city councils attempted to speed up the 
procurement and tendering processes. However, some BOTs were contracted out too 
quickly by the governments, leading to many vital issues of the BOT contract not being 
fully considered and researched by the governments and the contractors, e.g. risk allocation, 
project output specifications and detailed contract clauses.  
Fifthly, both the government and private contractors failed to provide sufficient accurate 
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information in the procurement and tendering phases. Both parties (governments and 
contractors) attempted to give misleading information to achieve advantages over others. 
Finally, the procuring departments and the BOT teams seemed unable to select the right 
bidders. This was due to a lack of criteria for bidder selection, insufficient relevant skills 
and experience of the BOT teams, the underdeveloped credit check system in China and   
lack of concern on the real competence of BOT bidders.      
The problems of using long-term contracts have been discussed, and some practical issues 
have been explored in this research, e.g. risk transfer and allocation, and the output 
specification. The governments at city level attempted to transfer the risks associated with 
the BOT as much as possible, rather than to allocate them to the parties of the contract to 
manage. This study also emphasised that the governments and their managers were not able 
to write complete output specifications into their contracts, leaving them incomplete and 
difficult to enforce. 
One of the emerging issues of using the BOT model in the Chinese motorway sector is the 
poor quality found in their construction. This issue may be caused by a number of 
contributing factors as mentioned above, e.g. poor planning, design and low-quality 
contractors. However, this study presented two other factors which are also important. 
Firstly, the main contractors need to enforce vital quality control on the sub-contractors and 
material suppliers but continue to emphasise cutting costs. Secondly, the governments at 
city level did not conduct proper inspections of projects, probably because of the low 
transparency of costs and lack of supply chain information of BOT contractors. The 
governments did not know how much money was being spent, as this information was 
essentially confidential. In addition, the operational performance of the water and sewage 
projects was very poor. The main causes of this were the poor design and planning during 
the early stages, as well as the inadequate government evaluations at the post-contracting 
stages.  
For the governments in China, especially those at provincial and city levels, the urgent and 
immediate tasks were to improve their BOT practice by addressing the weaknesses and 
emerging issues mentioned above. Some experiences and lessons from PFIs may be 
relevant to BOT practices. However, some might not be applicable to China’s BOT practice, 
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due to the local governments in China not having sufficient capabilities and resources. 
Meanwhile, it is possible that the PFIs in the UK had suffered from similar issues that 
affected BOTs, and that solutions to these were also unavailable in the UK.  This section 
looks at what lessons China can learn from the UK including what it needs to adopt or 
adapt and what it needs to avoid.  
 
7.3.2 Transaction costs of using long-term contracts and the lessons learnt from PFIs  
The transaction costs of using BOTs are high, as this research has already highlighted. 
However, the public sector managers in Chinese city councils do not fully understand the 
relationship between the success of a BOT project and the transaction costs. Informed by 
the lessons and experiences of British PFIs, transaction costs are unavoidable (The Treasury 
Committee, 2011, NAO, 2005, 2008, Pollock et.al, 2003, Edwards, et. al., 2004). These are 
the costs of using long-term contracts and cannot be easily eliminated. There is a consensus 
amongst the governments and academics in the UK that PFI is an ‘expensive’ method by 
which to develop public infrastructure and social services (Dixon et. al, 2001, Whitfield, 
2007, NAO, 2009, The Economic Affairs Committee, 2009, the Treasury Committee, 2011). 
Due to its higher transaction costs, the PFI model is not suitable for all projects, particularly 
small ones (Treasury 2003) because their transaction costs (e.g. bidding costs and financing 
costs) are relatively higher and cannot be offset against the benefits that PFIs bring in.  
In terms of the transaction cost perspective, the lessons of the UK showed China that not all 
projects can be developed by using private finance. Depending on the size, value, industries 
and return on investments of an individual project, the local governments in China need to 
be very careful when selecting the BOT model for motorway and water projects. The 
governments need to consider what the potential benefits and costs of using BOT are in the 
long and short-term and what potential costs and risks are involved for a particular project.  
When the governments consider adopting the PFI model, they need to evaluate if the 
potential costs of PFIs are able to be traded off against the benefits that they bring in. PFI 
also needs to be compared with other procurement routes, e.g. publicly-financed projects.  
The UK adopted a system in the public sector to compare and help the public agencies and 
authorities to make decisions on whether to employ PFIs or not in a public infrastructure 
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project. This was a good attempt to try and justify that PFI is better than alternative 
procurement policies. However, as discussed in chapter three, the experience of using 
Public Sector Comparators is controversial in PFI appraisal and decision-making because 
of its inaccuracies and flaws. The Public Account Committee (2011) argued that the use of 
PFI had been based on inadequate comparisons with conventional procurement processes 
and had not been sufficiently challenged. At the same time, some scholars (Coulson, 2006) 
argued that in value for money tests, the governments in the UK had also underestimated 
the transaction costs incurred by the PFIs. A large number of transaction costs were 
excluded in the decision-making process, particularly involving Public Sector comparisons. 
This resulted in a large number of projects passing through the tests but not achieving real 
value for money later. The PAC (2011) argued that PFIs were used in the past, but without 
clearly proving whether they provide value for money. These lessons helped China to 
understand that decisions on adopting the BOT approach needed to be made by public 
procuring bodies and that transaction costs are an important consideration of the decision. 
Underestimating the costs of BOT projects would lead to unsuitable projects being selected 
and eventual failures in the later stages.  
The lessons of using PFIs also showed China that the transaction costs associated with 
BOTs can be mitigated through standardising procedures, publishing standardised contract 
models and adopting of a relational contracting practice. The standardised procedures and 
PFI contract models can mitigate the costs of PFI deals, since similar PFI projects would 
follow this practice. By considering the capabilities of Chinese local governments, the 
experience of standardised PFI practices are relevant to BOTs, though not to all provinces 
in China.  
The barriers to learning from the UK include the large geographical and economic 
differences that exist in the provinces of China, as well as highly decentralised BOT 
governance structure. The Chinese central government therefore found it difficult to 
standardise the implementation process and contracts in all 34 provinces and regions. A 
highly standardised BOT practice may affect the flexibility of the implementation process 
and underestimate the impact within the local context of an individual project.  
However, it is possible that the governments at provincial level could establish their own 
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standardised BOT procedures and contracts by addressing local contextual factors. In 
provinces with a large number of BOT contracts and with available BOT experts, the 
experience of PFI standardisation could be a useful asset. This would be in terms of the 
local government’s institutional resources, capabilities and commercial skills. Some 
provinces in China may have a large number of BOT contracts being implemented, but do 
not have the necessary BOT experts and financial budgets to establish a standard 
framework or to publish their own standardised contracts.  
As discussed in this section, both BOT and PFI models suffered as a result of higher 
transaction costs during their implementation which is the biggest weakness of the BOT 
and PFI models. Standardisation of PFI contracts and practice may mitigate some of the 
costs in a project, but this lesson is only relevant to certain provinces in China.  
 
7.3.3 Building a relational BOT contract: the experience and lessons from the PFIs  
There is also another way to mitigate the costs of BOT transactions, as PFI’s experienced 
and that Transaction Cost Economics recommend. This is by establishing a relational BOT 
contract between the public authorities and the BOT contractors.  
The central finding of this study is that about two-thirds of motorway and water BOTs 
experienced conflicts between the local government and the BOT contractors. These 
conflicts largely increased the cost of using BOT contracts in practice. The main reason for 
the formation of these adversarial relationships between government and BOT contractor is 
the opportunistic behaviour shown by both parties of the contract. The motivations and 
incentives of the participants in BOT projects, were ‘profit-driven’ or politically ‘target-
driven’ in the short-term. The unbalanced structure of China’s BOT contracts also led to 
private contractors often being locked into BOT contracts by the local authorities. 
Opportunistic behaviour and the low trustworthiness of local governments and BOT 
contractors significantly increased the transaction costs and the projects’ risks which 
eventually led to the project being cancelled. To the governments in China, the important 
issue is how to minimise the opportunistic behaviours in BOT transactions and reduce the 
risks of project failure and cancellations.  
According to the PFI experience, a good relationship between the public and private sector 
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is helpful to mitigate the transaction costs of BOT contracts. The lessons from the British 
PFIs highlighted that the public sector and private contractors should build good 
cooperation if (Treasury, 1999, 2006; the NAO, 2001; and the OGC 2002): 
 both parties of the contract have an understanding of each other's business and a 
common vision of how best they can work together as partners.  
 there exists a clear and well-designed contract which  includes allocating risks 
appropriately, establishing clearly defined quality of service and value for money 
mechanisms and building in arrangements to deal with change in the future. 
 the project has BOT directors and management staff with the right skills and in-
depth knowledge critical to good contract management.  
 Finally, high openness on project information and good communication between the 
contractor and the governments. 
The research has shown that not all public clients and private contractors have built up 
good cooperation and a long term relationship as the government had hoped. The 
experience and lessons needed to build a relational PFI contract in China are difficult to 
apply, because although the concepts used in the UK seem easy when discussed, in practice 
they are not. Chinese governments at city level always put the emphasis on the short-term 
benefits of BOTs rather than the long-term ones. In these sorts of examples a relational 
contract is difficult to establish.  
As mentioned in the last section, city councils in China were normally unable to design a 
high quality BOT contract to include an appropriate risk allocation and well-defined output 
specifications. In addition, open transparency for project information is difficult in practice, 
since both the governments and private contractors need to keep certain information 
confidential. The governments in China are only able to offer more training for their 
managers to gain more skills and in-depth knowledge on BOT contract management. The 
communication between governments and contractors needs to be enhanced in the future, 
which would be beneficial to improve the BOT contracting practice.  
The lessons of using PFIs also indicated that not all public clients and private contractors 
had built good cooperation and a long-term relationship as the government had hoped. The 
NAO (2009) explored that the relationship between the government’s PFI teams and private 
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contractors are just ‘them and us’ and ‘purchasers and suppliers’. 
 
7.3.4 Building an effective BOT management structure at provincial and city 
government level: relevant experiences from PFIs  
The findings of this study suggest that there were many challenges for the public sector 
when using the BOT approach. The major one is the lack of effective administration and 
technical support during the implementation of BOT policy at city level. Provincial and 
central governments manage the Chinese BOT programme very much at ‘arms-length’. 
This means that the governments at city level have to find the right methods of using a 
BOT policy by themselves. Experience gained in the UK highlighted the importance of the 
PFI governance framework, including the support and cooperation between different 
departments and public bodies, e.g. a PPP unit in the Treasury, Partnership UK, private 
finance units in line ministries (e.g. the Highways Agency) as well as the NAO. The World 
Bank (2003), Qin and Yu (2005) and the Asian Development Bank (2005) highly 
recommend setting up a centralised BOT unit at central government level within the 
existing government structure. This is based upon the experience gained from the UK. By 
considering the lessons and experiences of PFI projects (PUK, 2009, Bates, 1997), the 
potential benefits of creating a BOT unit can be itemised as follows: 
• more technical support to the policy’s implementation for BOT projects, 
• providing more guidance material and best practice on reviewing BOT projects’ 
development, 
• strengthening project management and practice  
• a better development and quality control of contract standardization and risk transfer 
strategies by considering BOT practice,  
• more relevant support to city councils who are going to use BOTs  
• more BOT training for governmental staff, 
• improving lessons learnt and exchange experience within the BOT network, 
• more transaction support to individual BOT projects with detailed and relevant solutions 




• better quality control of projects, 
•better responses on the operational and emerging issues of the development and 
implementation of BOT projects in local areas.  
However, this study argued that these recommendations might be difficult to realise in 
China. According to evidence from previous BOT applications, the National Development 
and Reform Committee in central government rigorously controlled the development and 
implementation of BOTs during the period 1994-2004. However, this highly centralised 
BOT governance structure did not work very well in those ten years, notably its low 
efficiency, poor effectiveness, lengthy processes and high bureaucracy. The significant 
weaknesses of centralised BOT governance are the lengthy approval and decision-making 
procedures, bureaucratic management and complicated processes of BOT applications 
which result in addressing little of the local context plus very high costs to BOT investors. 
Therefore, this study argues that a proposed BOT unit at the central government level is 
likely to repeat the past mistakes of managing Chinese BOTs. 
To improve the effectiveness of BOT management, China may learn a few relevant lessons 
from the highly centralised PFI system. For Chinese provincial and city authorities, a 
dilemma of managing BOTs is that the governments have to retain some control on projects, 
whilst giving certain freedom to private contractors. However, if the governments 
rigorously controlled the approval and procurement of BOTs, it would result in higher costs, 
bureaucracy issues and lengthy and complex BOT management. In contrast, if ‘hands-off’ 
management were to be adopted by the governments at local level, there would be the 
possibility of losing control of projects. It is difficult to say how relevant the experience 
from the UK is for this issue.  
However, PFI’s early experiences may be relevant to BOTs in China (e.g. Bates Review on 
PFI, 1997, 1999). The provincial governments in China need to review the current BOT 
administrative framework and procedures, in order to find out which public bodies should 
be involved in a BOT project and which should not. They also need to identify which 
department should do what kind of job. Roles, authorities and responsibilities of different 
institutional bodies on the public sector side in a BOT need to be assigned and streamlined, 
in order to reduce bureaucracy and avoid disorderly management. Local governments are 
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also able to make other improvements on the BOT governance structure, in order to 
improve the effectiveness of BOT management and adoption of the BOT model at local 
level. However, all these adjustments and improvements need to address the local context 
and available resources held by local authorities.  
This study highlighted that in a few provinces, it would be helpful to establish a BOT unit 
within the provincial council or in the provincial Development and Reform Commission. 
This is because the current BOT governance structure and framework in these provinces is 
not able to handle the increasing number of BOT projects being implemented. To achieve 
better management of privately financed projects as well as developing appropriate 
strategies and policies for the future, a BOT unit at provincial level is vitally important.  
However, there are still some potential costs and barriers to establishing a unit of this kind, 
as this study reveals. Firstly, the provincial governments need a large number of BOT 
projects in the procurement process and in operation to justify the costs of creating and 
operating a BOT unit. The unit should not be built until there is a definite strong need to do 
so (e.g. having a large number of BOT projects to manage within the existing structure). 
Secondly, the provincial governments need to raise a considerable amount of money to 
establish a BOT unit. Thirdly, the governments at provincial level need to attract and recruit 
a number of BOT experts and specialists from the market. Fourthly, the provincial councils 
need to make a strong political commitment and have plans for developing and applying the 
BOT model in the long-term future. Finally, the political costs and risks of a structural 
change in the provincial governments need to be considered. This is because the creation of 
a BOT unit may have a major impact on the current management and power structure 
within the governments. Some departments may lose their participating powers in the large 
infrastructure projects and some departments may get more authority in managing BOT 
projects. Based upon the above analysis, it can be seen that a BOT unit at provincial level 
may bring certain benefits in terms of project management though not necessarily for all 
provinces and regions in China. By considering the number of BOT projects locally, the 
availability of associated budgets and BOT expertise in local markets, and the long-term 
strategies and commitments of the local governments on developing BOTs, this study 
estimated that only four provinces in China have the potential to establish a BOT unit 
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within their governments. 
Another good example of PFI management is that the NAO and the PAC of parliament are 
heavily involved in the evaluations of the implementation of PFIs. Lessons, best practices 
and subsequent recommendations have been made in order to secure value-for-money in 
PFI projects as well as to inspect PFI’s performance and any emerging issues. This good 
practice from the UK can be transferred to China, since evaluations and inspections on the 
performance of BOT projects rely on the city councils and their departments which is not 
ideal. The Chinese NAO and its branches at provincial and city level have been able to take 
on this responsibility because they are already responsible for audits and evaluate all 
publicly funded projects at all levels of government. The roles, experiences, capabilities 
and skills of the Chinese NAO are able to properly conduct such evaluations on BOT 
projects.   
 
 
7.3.5 Improving the Planning of BOTs in the motorway and water sectors:  relevant 
experience and lessons from the British PFIs 
This study reveals that city and provincial councils in China made decisions on BOT 
planning, in terms of short-term targets and political pressure. Without improving the 
incentives of using BOTs, it is difficult to alter BOT’s decision-making, long-term planning 
and project design practice. However, it is difficult to change the short-term oriented 
incentives of local governments and PFIs offer no answer to this problem. Some PFI 
projects are also driven by short-term targets, e.g. the off-balance finance driven PFI 
projects (NAO, 2009).  
Whole-life costing and value for money are important lynchpins in PFI planning and 
decision-making (Treasury, 2003), but their implementation in PFI has been very 
controversial. The whole-life costing method is very relevant to BOT practice in China and 
will force the governments and contractors to carefully think about the whole-life cost and 
performance of infrastructure rather than making short-term decisions based on short-term 
budgets (The Treasury Committee, 2011). However, this method was rarely used in 
publicly funded projects and in the early BOT planning. For city councils in China, it may 
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be difficult to conduct a whole-life costing analysis because of the lack of financial 
expertise and the absence of strong commercial skills and experience. Only a few provinces 
have the potential to use whole-life costing in managing BOT projects.  
Therefore, in order to make good decisions and to plan well, city councils need to put the 
emphasis on improving the current planning practice, e.g. improving the quality of 
‘economic appraisals and analysis’ on BOTs. City councils and their decision-makers need 
to seriously understand the importance of financial feasibility analysis, cost-benefit analysis, 
environmental impact analysis and fiscal affordability tests. The fiscal affordability test is 
not compulsory for BOT projects. Also, the provincial Development and Reform 
Commission and BOT line departments, e.g. the Transportation and the Construction 
Departments, need to effectively audit and inspect the city councils’ decision-making, 
planning and design in BOT transactions.  
The British PFI’s show the importance of good planning in the whole procedure of PFI 
practice. In fact, by looking into the processes of implementing PFIs, preparation and 
planning works are the highest priority of the central and local procuring authorities 
(although in practice, some PFIs also failed to carry out good planning and preparation 
works). To achieve high quality planning and secure the quality of PFI transactions, the 
procuring authorities need to follow some important steps to assess their strategies, 
appraisals and business cases defined in the technical guidance and assessment documents, 
e.g. the Green Book and Value-for-Money assessments published by the Treasury, and the 
Gateway Review 1-4 which was issued by the OGC. The PFI approval authority in the 
Treasury also established a clear criteria for PFI applications (Treasury, 2009), including: a) 
affordability, b) design quality, c) output specification, d) risk allocation, e) commercial 
interest, f) compliance with a standard form, g) value for money analysis, h) suitability of 
advisors,  i) indicative timetable, j) capability and competence of project team,  k) 
commitment of sponsors, stakeholders, and users.   
Some of these experiences and lessons of PFIs are important and relevant to achieve good 
quality project planning in BOT projects, e.g. consideration of financial affordability of 
local governments, importance of output specification as well as risk allocation, suitability 
of advisors and capability and competence of project teams. Some points have been 
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discussed in other sections of this chapter but two points need to be considered here. Firstly, 
BOT is an ‘outputs’ and ‘performance’ based approach. Therefore identifying the outputs of 
BOT contracts is crucial to the use of the BOT model. However, most of the city councils 
in China do not have the capabilities and know-how to define BOT’s output specifications, 
including the service’s quality, costs and availability. During the course of the interviews, 
frontline managers noted problems in relation to clearly defining the outputs of their BOT 
contracts, but they had no idea how to resolve it.  Training for local BOT contractor 
managers should be given regarding this emerging issue.  
Risk management is another weakness of BOT and PFI planning. The PFI’s lessons 
indicated that identification, valuation and allocation of risks are important elements of PFI 
planning and that they should be written into the contracts.  However, the emerging issues 
from this surround what risks have been substantially transferred to private contractors and 
to what extent. The negative lessons from PFI highlighted that there may be only a few 
risks transferred to private contractors who could then charge high premiums for taking on 
these risks. Edwards et. al. (2004), Coulson (2006) and the Economic Affairs Committee 
(2009) explored that only some construction risks, e.g. cost overrun risks and project delay 
risks, were transferred to private contractors.  Furthermore, some risks were transferred 
back to the public sector in some PFI cases. Edwards et. al. (2004) revealed that in PFI road 
projects, the demand risks on road services were essentially afforded by public bodies and 
not private contractors. To improve the planning works of BOT projects, three lessons from 
PFIs are quite important. Firstly, the Chinese city councils need to study and identify the 
risks associated with a BOT project as early as possible in the planning stage. Secondly, not 
all of the risks can be transferred to private contractors. Transferring too many risks would 
lead to high premiums charged by contractors. This is because as private contractors take 
on more risks, they ask for more returns, which would increase the costs of the contract. 
Also misallocation of project risks between the governments and contractors would finally 
contribute to lower value for money and the projects’ collapse and cancellation, due to 
BOT contractors unable to manage the risks in terms of their own capabilities. Finally, the 
city governments need to carefully study what risks could be transferred to private 
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contractors and at what prices. A realistic way to look at the risk transfer issue is for the 
Chinese government to at least build a risk assessment protocol.     
 
7.3.6 Improving the procurement and tendering processes of BOT: qualified bidders, 
tendering methods, transaction costs and degree of competition  
This study also discovered that competition in water BOT tendering is weak, because 
nearly half of all water BOTs adopted one-to-one non-competitive bidding.  The results of 
this research show that local governments would benefit from stronger competition in the 
tendering processes. Based upon the findings of this study, as well as the lessons from the 
British PFIs (NAO, 2003, 2007, 2009, PAC, 2003), the degree of competition in BOT 
tendering depends on many factors, but the important ones are the rate of returns and size 
of the projects, complexity and the costs of bidding. The projects with the high rates of 
return normally attract more bidders, therefore competition is stronger. However, it is very 
difficult for small-size water BOTs to attract qualified BOT bidders because of the lower 
rate of return and relatively high bidding costs. Even in some water supply and sewage 
treatment BOTs, competitive bidding cannot be applied, and negotiation has to be adopted. 
This study suggested that city councils or public agencies could invite two or more bidders 
to negotiate at the same time. This would increase the degree of competition between 
different bidders, although it would also increase the costs of the BOT bidding.  
One of the biggest issues for the procurement and bidding of Chinese BOTs is when the 
city government does not select and appoint qualified bidders, leading to the collapse of a 
project. In 35 cases of water and motorway BOTs involved in this study, inexperienced and 
low-quality bidders were chosen by the city councils and local procuring bodies, causing a 
number of problems in the construction and operation stages. These problems included 
poor quality construction and poor operation of water facilities. In the cases of British PFIs, 
the criteria of selecting and appointing a preferred bidder was designed by the governments 
and advocated by the World Bank, which directly cited this guidance on its website (see, 
Treasury, 2004, Guidance on How to select and appoint a preferred bidder). The preferred 
bidders must have: 
 presented proposals that meet the output specification;  
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 provided whole life value for money;  
 accepted the key contractual terms and the required transfer of risk;  
 confirmed access to finance that does not require underwriting by the public sector 
or revisions to the contractual terms;  
 quoted a unitary charge and specified other costs, if there are any, that are 
affordable  to the public sector;  
 if a consortium is involved, demonstrated fully that it is a cohesive entity rather than 
a disparate  collection of constructors and service providers. 
Based upon the findings of this research, not all these criteria of PFI could be used in the 
practice of BOTs in China. This is because of the availability of qualified BOT contractors 
in the market as well as the emphasis of the governments on the selection of preferred 
bidders. With an underdeveloped private economy, the priorities of Chinese city councils 
are on how to attract high-quality contractors to get involved in BOT bidding. Also, 
informed by PFI experiences, Chinese local governments need to consider the bidder’s 
overall capabilities rather than focus on the lowest bidding prices. As the findings of this 
study highlights bidder’s financing capabilities and experience on managing public 
infrastructure projects needs to be carefully checked by the public procuring bodies. 
Similarly, in selecting and appointing external advisors, local authorities also need to 
consider the experiences and skills of BOT consulting firms rather than the prices they offer. 
In fact, these practical and emerging issues in BOT procurement and tendering are relevant 
to several factors, e.g. good project selection, high rate of return and lower risks of BOT 
projects, availability of high quality contractors in the market and competition amongst 
bidders.   
 
7.3.7 Improving the evaluation and inspection of construction and operational 
procedures within BOT projects 
The quality of the construction and operational procedures within BOT projects largely 
relies on inspection from the contract client. The lessons of PFI highlight that the absence 
of full-time project managers, having unskilled staff in the governments and a lack of 
penalties for contractor errors contribute to poor quality and services of PFI projects (NAO, 
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2009, Economic Affairs Committee, 2009). These problems were also observed in BOT 
practice in China; however the situation here was even worse than in the UK. By 
addressing these transferable lessons from the UK, Chinese city government project 
managers need to appoint even more qualified and full-time experts to supervise BOT 
construction and operation. Training should also be given to inexperienced project 
managers. In some cases, qualified project surveyors or accountants need to be introduced 
into the project, to identify the real quality, cost and relevant financial data of the 
construction and operation. A full data record system should be established by the city 
government to measure and backup the data surrounding contractor performance, and a 
construction quality standard needs to be established by the central government and its line 
ministries. This was shown up by the experience from the UK (The Treasury, 2003, NAO, 
2003, 2009b). The Ministry of Construction required that the city councils report the results 
of the water online-testing system every three months in all water and sewage treatment 
projects, including BOTs. In this way, the local authorities have to highlight the 
measurements to water BOT contractors. 
The negative lessons from the PFIs are that the governments and projects managers 
normally put few penalties on any poor performance by PFI contractors (NAO, 2009). As 
has been discussed in the previous section, BOT and PFI are both implemented on the basis 
of contractor’s performance and projects’ outputs. The end-users and the governments paid 
for the high quality services provided by contractors. Therefore, based on this experience, 
the local authorities in China should make deductions or penalties for any poor 
performance of a BOT contractor. This acts as a way to secure value-for-money of end-
users of motorway and water schemes.  
Furthermore, the ideas of ‘benchmark and market testing’ of the British PFIs (NAO, 2007, 
PUK, 2007) may be studied by the city governments in China to regulate and evaluate the 
performance of BOT contractors. This study discovered that local and provincial 
governments have a large amount of data on the performance of publicly-funded motorway 
and water projects. This data and its indicators could be used by local authorities to 
compare the technical and economic performance indicators of BOT contractors, for 
example, operating costs, profit level and water quality. A detailed benchmark and market 
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testing tool would save construction and operational costs and enhance the bargaining 
powers of local authorities.  
 
7.3.8 Improving the institutional capabilities of city governments to manage BOT 
projects. 
 
The findings of this suggest that governments at all levels in China lack sufficient experts, 
skills and experience, as well as market knowledge to implement BOT policy. Necessary 
resources from the public sector are important to enable success in the motorway and water 
BOT programme, namely skilled BOT experts within the public sector and the budget for 
carrying out the BOT projects. To improve the institutional capabilities of the provincial 
and city governments in the short term, the experience from the British PFIs is helpful. A 
way of improving the governments’ capabilities on managing PFIs, had been to introduce a 
large number of PFI experts into the public sector to offer advice on implementation at 
policy level as well as on the detailed technical problems within individual PFI projects. 
However, a number of reports and studies argued that the public sector in the UK may rely 
too heavily on the short-term external advisors in PFI procurement and tendering, leading 
to the public sector essentially losing experts and skills in managing public projects 
(Economic Affairs Committee, 2009). Medium term, the governments also need to provide 
more training for their PFI project managers and directors in local governments. This is 
because external expertise from the private sector can only be introduced into PFI projects 
in the short term during the tendering and bidding stages. (NAO, 2009a, The Economic 
Affairs Committee, 2009). A better understanding on the nature of BOT contracts and 
contract management, as well as commercial knowledge would be helpful to managers and 
staff in the public sector to perform better in BOT dealings. The relevant training would 
improve the skills, know-how, experience and confidence of public sector managers. 
Some negative experiences were also observed in PFI project management. Ruane (2002) 
the PAC (2008) and the Economic Affairs Committee (2009) argued that it is common for 
PFI managers and directors in the public sector to be less-experienced and low-skilled, in 
some cases without a PFI related background. In many PFI projects, a full-time project 
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manager was absent, leading to a number of projects not properly inspected and managed. 
Similar findings have also shown that BOT teams in Chinese governments are often poorly 
resourced and empowered at present. They consist of a large proportion of temporary 
unskilled staff, low political authority and commitment, as well as inadequate budgets to 
support BOT transactions. All these factors created a number of issues in BOT’s planning, 
design, tendering, negotiation and evaluation stages. The most significant issue is that all 
members of the BOT teams in city governments worked on a part-time basis and were 
unpaid for any extra work done. Therefore, members of BOT teams would lack 
conscientiousness with regards to their work, since no benefits could be achieved through 
hard work.  
 
7.3.9 Creating environments to enable the implementation of BOT policies:  legislation 
and financing systems 
The findings of this research indicated that there are some barriers to the use of the BOT 
programme which cannot be overcome without a strong political commitment from high 
levels of government, notably the problems related to the BOT legislative framework and 
the restricted access to Chinese capital markets. The legal framework and system in China 
is a fundamental barrier to the implementation of the BOT programme. The government, 
especially the State Council, National Development and Reform Commission as well as the 
Ministry of Construction need to continually make efforts to improve BOT legislation, 
although few lessons could be learnt from the UK on this point.  
Another significant problem discussed in the last two chapters is that the Chinese banking 
and capital markets have very strict regulations on the debt financing of private BOT 
contractors. Poor debt-financing resulted in the financing costs of the Chinese BOT model 
becoming very high. The World Bank (2003) suggested that BOTs should promote the use 
of debt financing in their projects in the same way as the PFIs have done (90% of their 
financing is from debt finances). However, this is easy to say but difficult to do. In the 
current situation it is difficult for Chinese BOT contractors to get financial help from the 
Chinese state-owned banks or to raise money from corporate bond markets. This is because 
of the higher risks of BOT projects and poor credit of Chinese domestic BOT contractors 
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which bring higher risks to Chinese commercial banks. This issue is not relevant to the 
experience of PFI.  
The governments in China need to find a realistic way to provide financing for private 
contractors and BOT projects. The experience of British PFIs indicates that some banks 
played a leading role in some BOT projects, such as Barclays and the HSBC’s 
infrastructure finance department. In fact, the National Development Bank of China which 
specialises in developing infrastructure projects is considering the opportunities of offering 
loans to BOT contractors as this study has explored. Other commercial banks and insurance 
companies are also studying the possibilities of directly participating in BOT projects. A 
bank-led BOT model needs to be considered by the governments and the state-owned banks 
in China. However, a bank-led BOT model such as in the UK and Australia would require 
the focus of a different study that would concentrate on the banking industry’s involvement 
in BOT.  
 
7.3.10 Accounting issues relating to BOTs in China  
This study has revealed one of the main drivers for the implementation of BOTs is that the 
government at provincial and city levels wished to benefit from extra extra-budgetary 
finance. This has a similarity to the implementation of the British PFIs (NAO, 2011, 2009a, 
The Treasury Committee, 2011).The accounting and budgetary incentives of BOT and PFI 
led to poor investment decisions. Some provincial and local governments tried to use BOTs 
as much as possible in their motorway and water projects. However, potential fiscal risks, 
affordability problems and relevant accounting treatment on the BOT approach have not 
been fully considered by central and local governments. According to an investigation by 
the World Bank, the value of Chinese BOT contracts in all sectors was at least £70 Billion 
in 2009, similar to PFI’s in the UK. However, they were not presented in any financial and 
budgetary report to the government at city and provincial levels. The government in the UK 
had already presented some PFIs in their balance sheets in terms of the IFRS 12 by 
recognising the debates on the ‘off-balance finance sheet’ matters in relation to PFI projects 
and with the enforcement of the International Financial Reporting Standards by the British 
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authorities in 2008. Despite this, PFIs are still excluded from the National Accounts which 
adopt UK accounting standards. 
By considering the accounting and budgeting system applied in China’s government at 
present, it is not feasible to bring BOTs into the accounts and financial reports of the local 
authorities immediately. However, the central government of China should be aware of the 
potential fiscal risks brought by BOTs, which can become invisible debts of the local 
governments at city and provincial levels. The central government in China was already 
aware of the explicit debts and borrowing of the Chinese local governments. The initial 
investigation and statistics on provincial and city councils’ debts (loans) were concluded in 
2011. The CNAO’s report indicated that the explicit debts of provincial, city and county 
governments is over £1 Trillion (RMB 10 trillion) at the end of 2010, accounting for 27% 
of the GDP. Therefore the BOT as an extra extra-budgetary financing method should be 
studied by the central government. Possible accounting solutions could be given in the 
future, such as the IFRS application used in Chinese Business Enterprises Accounting 
Standards. This recommends the Chinese governments need to investigate how extensive 
the scale of BOTs are and the potential financial risks to city governments. 
 
7.4 Summary  
 
Based upon the main findings of the study, this chapter highlights the key contributing 
factors which have a profound influence on the development and implementation of the 
Chinese BOT model in the motorway and water sectors. By considering the results of this 
research, a comparison of BOTs and PFIs indicated that there are some fundamental 
differences between Chinese BOT practice and British PFI’s. Major differences were 
observed in areas of institutional context and related industries and also in the fields of 
government and private contractor capability, BOT governance institutions and 
management structures. These differences largely constrained China from learning lessons 
and good practice from the British PFIs. A systematic learning of the lessons from PFIs in 
the UK is not possible due to this reason. As discussed in the above sections, even a 
‘piecemeal’ approach to learning these lessons is difficult for Chinese governments. In 
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many cases, China and the UK’s governments faced similar problems in developing and 
implementing privately financed policies. However, poor capability and insufficient 
resources in the city governments of China resulted in solutions from the UK not being 
applicable for solving similar problems with BOTs. Only a few practical lessons and 
experiences of PFIs are relevant and applicable to China’s provinces. This study found that 
some ideas of PFI management and governance are really valuable to China, such as public 
sector comparators, value-for-money tests, whole-life costing methods, benchmarking and 
market testing, risk transfer and allocation, plus the relational contracting approach. 
However, the practice of PFIs underpinned these ideas which are still controversial in the 
UK and not transferable to China. By addressing the findings of this study the main barriers 
preventing the learning of lessons in China include the following points, objectives and 
major priorities of using the BOT model,  
 notably, the financial situation and the fiscal crisis of local governments, 
 capacity and resources of local governments in managing the BOT model, e.g. 
necessary experts, experiences, commercial skills and knowledge and sufficient 
budgets,  
 availability, capacity and resources of high quality BOT contractors in the market 
and their comprehensive capabilities, e.g. experience, skills, and managerial and 
financing capability to build, design, operate and finance large infrastructure 
projects,  
 development of a framework of legislation for BOT, 
 the development level of banking industries and capital markets and the support 
they give,   
 development of BOT consulting industries,  
 national strategies on developing infrastructure projects.  
Constrained by these contextual factors, BOT practice cannot be changed and improved 
overnight. This study has highlighted that the improvements on the current BOT practice in 
China will be a long-term and gradual process. Meanwhile, local governments at provincial 
and city level need to put emphasis on improvements to their own current BOT projects, 
and especially improvements addressing the local context. There is no unified solution.  
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In fact, this chapter follows the framework of Rose’s Lessons-Learning (1992, 2005). It 
explores the problems and causes of applying BOTs in China and considers possible 
lessons and solutions from the UK. Some relevant PFI lessons have been identified, but 
other experiences and lessons from the UK are not highly relevant to China and its local 
governments in 34 provinces. As Rose’s model (2005) indicates, to decide if a lesson could 
be learnt from another country, the policy importing country needs to address context 
influences in its own country, as well as whether they have sufficient resources (e.g. 
necessary institutions, budgetary finance, experts and skills in the governments) to apply 
possible solutions. As discussed in this chapter, some significant weaknesses of using 
privately financed projects were observed in the UK and China. These included high costs 
of using long-term BOT and PFI contracts (e.g. high financing costs, high premiums on risk 
transfer, difficulties on identifying and allocating risks associated with projects, inflexibility 
of contracts), and the short-term oriented accounting and budgetary incentives of using 
BOT and PFI. These two fundamental problems caused a number of faults and emerging 
issues in the infrastructure projects’ planning, procurement, tendering and post contract 
management. Higher costs may not sufficiently offset the benefits of using BOT and PFI. 
Short-term oriented objectives and the accounting and budgetary incentives of BOT and 
PFI often lead to them being used even if they do not provide value-for-money. However, 
there are still no obvious solutions in the UK and China. Therefore, what should China do?  
 
The next chapter will offer nine strategic rules to improve the governance of BOTs in China 
in future, draws on the ‘transaction costs economics’. And, the chapter 9 will draw a 
conclusion and make some detailed recommendations on the future development and 
implementation of BOTs in China’s motorway and water sectors, based upon the relevant 






Chapter 8 Managing Build-Operate-Transfer Projects in China: The 
Strategic Rules for Governments  
8.1 Introduction  
The last chapter discussed the key findings of this study, including the key failures and 
successes of implementing BOTs in China’s motorway and water sectors, and the 
common lessons of applying Chinese BOTs and the UK's PFIs at present. These lessons 
showed that both of the governments in China and in the UK are suffering a series of 
problems surrounding BOT or PFI projects and their contractual management. The core 
matter, in relation to the applications of BOTs and PFIs, is the transaction costs. By 
addressing these issues surrounding the BOT practice, the basic questions for Chinese 
local authorities to re-consider are firstly, why do the national and local governments 
actively promote the use of private financing models in infrastructure projects? 
Secondly, when will governments use private finance participation models to develop 
infrastructure projects? In other words, which delivery model would make the most 
sense and in what situation? Thirdly, how will governments implement and manage the 
BOTs and what outcomes do they hope to achieve?    
This chapter offers the strategic rules for Chinese local authorities by considering the 
lessons learnt from the management and implementation of BOTs and PFIs in the past. 
All of these strategic rules are generated from the experiences of adopting British PFIs 
and Chinese BOTs, and draw upon a transaction cost economic analysis. Following this 
chapter, detailed suggestions will be made in chapter 9.  
A transaction cost theoretical framework is employed here, for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the findings of this study show that governments of both the UK and China met 
common challenges on managing privately financed, long-term contracting models to 
delivery public infrastructure projects and services, even though the social, economic 
and political contexts are divergent in these two countries. For better governance on 
BOT projects, the key improvement should be to pay attention on how to properly 
manage the BOT projects and their contractual practices, by addressing relevant similar 
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lessons from the UK (e.g. Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2000, Dixon, et.al., 
2005, Pollitt, 2005, NAO, 2011). Transaction cost theory will inform of the possible 
solutions and strategies for the governments for managing their BOT projects. 
Diagram 8.1 Determinants of Transaction costs in BOT and PFI cases: human factors, nature of 
long-term contract and environmental variables 
                                                  



























Secondly, the TCE framework is able to link different factors and variables that have 
strong effects on the implementation of BOTs, see diagram 8.1. A BOT or a PFI project 
is sophisticated, it is a cross-disciplinary work that involves a number of managerial 
areas, e.g. financial management, policy management, project management, contract 
management, legal arrangements etc. The transaction cost theory can link these different 
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areas together and offer an integrated analytical framework with the key link between 
them being the transaction cost. By understanding and exploring how transaction costs 
of BOT projects are determined and changed in different stages of the project, it is 
possible to develop the strategic rules for government to minimize or mitigate these 
costs and finally to improve BOT implementation and the decision-making policy (see 
diagram 8.1 on the last page). By using the concept of 'transaction costs', this study can 
throw light on the following: the relationship and interactions between the 'outcomes' of 
using the BOT model; the human factors and motivations of key players of BOTs, the 
BOT management mechanism (e.g. the issues associated with BOT decision-making, 
planning, contracting and evaluation); the BOT's institutional arrangements (the 
problems in relation to the BOT governance structure) and the social-economic contexts 
of BOT operation (e.g. 'uncertainty' in the market).  
Furthermore, from the aspect of transaction cost theory, as Vinning and Boardman 
(2008) debated, the sum of the total costs to provide the infrastructure should include 
the direct production costs (e.g. the construction costs, operating costs etc.), and also the 
transaction costs and the various external costs, whilst maintaining acceptable quality 
conditions. Vinning and Boardman (2008: 150) introduced a new concept in their paper, 
the 'total social costs' (of a privately financed project), which include: the production 
costs of BOTs; their transaction costs; (net) negative external costs; and finally holding 
quality standards. When governments judge the way to deliver infrastructure, they 
should seek the option that will be able to minimise the sum of the total social costs. 
Failures and ignorance on transaction costs and social externalities associated with 
privately financed projects (PFI or BOT) would result in making wrong decisions and 
lead to project failures. The use of value-for-money test is a typical example of this. For 
instance, Coulson(2006) argued that the value-for-money test (PSCs) clearly ignores not 
only the transaction costs of PFIs, but also other negative social externalities, leading to 
poor decisions being made and negative external activity (e.g. strong opposition from 
the Unions). In many BOT cases the Chinese local authorities made similar mistakes. 
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They often ignored the transaction costs of BOT deals and were less concerned with the 
negative social costs brought on by BOT projects (particularly in planning processes). 
Examples include the unpopular acquisition of a farmer’s land with unfair compensation, 
and also the hiring of unemployed staff from the SOEs upon the adoption of BOTs. In 
these cases, the 'production and operational costs' of BOTs seem very low. However, the 
total social costs were higher than other routes providing public infrastructure, since 
some transaction and social costs were transferred at later stages of the projects, or 
created negative externalities to the local communities.  
Meanwhile, human factors and variables need to be taken into account during analysis 
of the implementation of BOT and PFI projects. These include the divergent goals and 
motivations of the participants (conflicts of interest between governments and private 
contractors), and the opportunism in the contracting practice. The starting point of a 
transaction cost analysis on the BOT and PFI model should be the real motivation and 
goal of governments and private contractors. The evidence from China and the UK 
revealed that private sector participants aimed to maximise their profits, and public 
authorities mainly wished to achieve short-term budgetary and political goals. These 
divergent goals (interests and goals conflicts) in a BOT or a PFI would contribute a 
number of difficulties, conflicts and opportunistic behaviours into the processes of 
performing and managing BOT contracts. They would inevitably increase the 
transaction costs, reduce projects' quality, create negative externalities, and a dissolute 
partnership at the end (Vinning and Boardman, 2008, Yescombe, 2007, Flynn, 2007). 
Human resources within governments are another consideration. The questions for 
governments are whether there are sufficient BOT experts and professionals in the 
public sector, or if the project managers and decision-makers have sufficient knowledge 
and skills to manage BOTs in practice.   
Finally, for achieving a good analysis on the total costs of BOTs and PFIs, and making 
the right decisions on adopting a privately financed model, the nature of the contract, 
project and market also need to be carefully considered by the governments. The 
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findings of this research have already indicated that the total costs of using a privately 
financed model can be extremely high, especially when the projects have high asset 
specificity, high complexity and many unforeseen events (uncertainty), with low 
competitiveness (since there are few suppliers available in the market), and with 
insufficient support from under-developed (Chinese) banking, consulting and legal 
systems. All projects involved in this study, such as highways and water facilities have 
the characteristics mentioned above. Thus, transaction costs of BOTs in Chinese 
contexts and circumstances are likely to be higher than those of a publicly funded and 
managed alternative and also maybe higher than PFIs in the UK, due to China's 
insufficient experience of managing a market-oriented economic system. Higher 
transaction costs and higher total social costs of Chinese BOT projects also suggest that 
the risks and possibilities of failure of the projects are likewise higher than traditional 
government provision and that of other countries.  
By recalling the key elements of TCEs, combined with the evidence from the BOTs and 
PFIs, we find that the detailed problems associated with BOT projects may occur in 
different stages throughout the project life cycle (as discussed in chapter 7). However, 
the main factor surrounding Chinese BOT and the UK's PFI is the 'transaction cost'. A 
series of implementation and operational matters associated with BOT deals can be 
traced and conceptualised to their fundamental causes, potential transaction costs and 
social costs involved in the projects. Through analysing and identifying how these costs 
are changed and raised (discussed in chapter 6 and 7), it is possible for Chinese 
governments to learn some of these strategic rules and to minimize these costs and 
improve the future governance of BOTs.  
 
8.2 Strategic rule 1: Thinking and planning strategically 
As Vinning and Boardman (2008), Coulson (2006), Lonsdale (2005) and Greeve (2008) 
argued (as well as the findings of this study), when the governments considered using 
the BOT (PPP) model, their main concerns were normally the 'production costs', not 
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transaction costs and external costs. Therefore, it suggests that for a better management 
of BOTs in China, the governments should seek to strategically calculate and minimise 
the sum total social costs of using BOTs at the present value. This would include not 
only the construction costs and payments to BOT contractors, but also the contractual 
transaction costs, (net) negative externalities, and finally maintaining a constant quality. 
In this way, the decision-makers in governments are able to think about the applications 
of BOTs more comprehensively (rather than focusing on economic aspects in the 
short-term), then making relevant decisions in the right way. The governments who are 
going to adopt BOT models need to strategically evaluate and trade off the potential 
social and economic benefits and costs of the BOT financing model and not just focus 
on the administrative, economic and financial fields.  
Meanwhile, a BOT project is a long-term project which covers a period of 20-30 years. 
Although every local authority in China is facing major financial and administrative 
pressures at present, any short-term oriented decisions need to be in line with the 
long-term strategies and development of society. Otherwise, BOTs would fall into 
failure quickly. Many local authorities in China decided to adopt the BOT model just 
because BOT is able to postpone their financial crisis and delay political pressure on 
them at present. However, the authorities need to understand that the BOT model does 
not solve their crisis, as these issues will resurface two or three years later. It cannot be 
denied that the short-term impacts of BOTs are quite attractive for local authorities, e.g. 
mobilising a large amount of private capital, speeding up the local infrastructure 
development, reducing present financial pressures and creating more job and 
commercial opportunities for the local market. Also, BOT can bring economic benefits 
and positive social benefits to local communities in a short-term period in some cases, 
for example, significant improvements on local road systems, and environmental 
improvements on local water quality. However, the governments and their 
decision-makers need to think strategically about their BOT plans, by taking account of 
the long-term costs and benefits of projects, through an analysis of the social cost and 
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benefits throughout the projects' whole life cycle.   
Since the Financial Crisis in 2008, a number of local governments in China have 
stopped and bought out their BOT contracts from the private partners. And more local 
councils in China abandoned their BOT proposals, turned to the traditional publicly 
financing models or debts finances, since the financial situations of Chinese local 
councils were largely improved following the issue of Chinese Stimulation Package in 
2008. However, the cancellation of BOT contract were not free of costs, a large amount 
of compensations have been made to BOT contractors. This requires the governments to 
answer some questions: why did they abandon BOT model? And why did they choose 
BOT model at the beginning? The use of BOT model is just for 'getting money' from the 
private investors in many cases.     
 
 
8.3 Strategic rule 2: Enhancing the understanding of the objectives of private 
contractors, managing interests and conflicts between governments and private 
participants in BOTs 
 
Drawing upon the UK literature into the PFIs (e.g. Yescombe, 2007, Vinning and 
Boardman, 2008) and evidence from the Chinese BOTs, it can be found that the public 
and private participants clearly have conflicting goals within the BOT framework. 
Although a number of governments and officials claimed that BOT is a 'cooperation' 
and a 'win-win' game, conflicts between governments and private contractors have been 
observed in many cases.  
These conflicts inevitably have influences on BOT management, increasing the 
transaction costs (possibly leading to negative social costs) and raising the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour. Partnerships can eventually end up dissolved. This is because 
the private contractors normally want to maximise their long-term returns on the BOT 
projects at the present value. Private participants in BOTs would not voluntarily 
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consider social objectives or improve the efficiency of public services. Private 
contractors also would not naturally allocate risks with governments in BOT projects 
until there are considerable returns clearly defined in the contracts. Since private 
contractors are only wishing to achieve the maximum profits with minimum risks, they 
would make any attempts to defend their own interests throughout the project's life. 
However, the governments and their leaders are also 'self-interested'. Governments are 
mainly driven by accounting and budgetary incentives and political pressures. They 
need to solve their financial and budgeting matters, perform their superiors' 
administrative orders, and fulfil demands on local infrastructure and public services to 
achieve a good 'reputation' within their terms of office in the local community (chapter 
5). The objectives and motivations of Chinese local authorities are more political and 
short-term orientated. The evidence from China shows the decision-makers in local 
authorities tended to solve their political and financial issues in a short period, but 
attempted to transfer all risks to private contractors with minimum costs. A high failure 
rate of BOT projects verified this way does not work in practice. The conflict of 
interests and goals between governments and private contractors is one of the basic 
reasons for conflicts and high transaction costs within the BOT model in China.   
For the governments and their decision-makers, it is important to understand the 
fundamental objectives of private partners in BOTs. They can then give instructions to 
direct private contractors to gain reasonable returns and also bring net social benefits to 
local communities. The governments also need to pay more attention to the long-term 
benefits and costs brought in by BOT models rather than the short-term ones. The use of 
BOTs also requires the governments to make substantial contributions to the projects. 
The key point here is how effectively they define and allocate the risks and returns of 
the BOT projects. This requires a more complete and clearer BOT contract to define the 
responsibilities, benefits and risks allocation of governments and private participants. 
'Partnership' is built upon a proper allocation of responsibilities and returns.     
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8.4 Strategic rule 3: Developing an 'open' and 'transparent' BOT project 
This is another basic rule for all BOTs in China and the following two strategic rules 
need to be addressed from the use of PFIs and BOTs (Chesson and Maitland-Smith, 
2006, Froud, 2003, Heald, 1997a, Dawson, 2001). Firstly, a privately financing model 
like BOT, should be presented and disclosed on the scheduled budgets or extra-budgets 
of governments and secondly, the relevant data and documents of BOTs should be 
deposited and open to the public. This should include the contracts of BOTs, or the key 
clauses that are important to the interests of the public. By considering the 'commercial 
confidentiality' of BOT transactions, the government as the agency of local communities 
should increase the real transparency of BOT transactions as much as possible.   
There are three reasons for this basic strategic rule, especially for local governments at 
city and county levels in China. Firstly, the transparency of BOTs from an accounting 
point of view requires that the governments bring their BOT transactions back onto their 
scheduled financial reports, rather than treating these as extra-extra budget financing 
methods. Therefore, the potential influences of BOTs on the local public financial 
system as the public debts would be clearer. And this is a commitment for future 
governments and the local community. The current Chinese public sector accounting 
arrangements do not address BOT transactions and BOTs as a creative accounting 
means would put local public finance at large risk in future. Secondly, more 
transparency in BOTs procurement, bidding and contracting processes would lead to 
less risk of corruption and reduce the opportunistic behaviours of both the governments 
and private contractors to some degree. Finally, the public 'status' of BOT projects 
requires that the local governments clearly show how the public money (or service 
charges) is spent and evaluate the private contractors’ performance (efficiency concerns). 
The local communities and people have the 'right to know' with regard to the 




8.5 strategic rule 4: Establishing a clear BOT management framework  
From a traditional management perspective, a BOT project includes some basic steps or 
activities and the government and local authorities need to carefully plan, organise, lead 
and evaluate (control) the projects. In this way, PFIs and BOTs both involve some key 
steps: 1) analysis of the necessity and desirability of projects, such as a social 
cost-benefits analysis, 2) comparison and balancing the decisions on different options of 
developing public infrastructure projects and public services (government production, 
BOT or contracting out), 3) organisation of the tendering, bidding and contracting of 
BOT processes and monitoring of the implementation process of BOT projects, and 
finally 4) overall evaluation of the projects and if BOTs  have borne out government 
and public objectives.  
However, as this study disclosed it is not clear which department should be responsible 
for what steps of work in a BOT project? It is confusing as to which agencies should be 
responsible for the planning, decision-making, organizing and evaluating processes. Too 
many departments of the local authorities were involved in BOT planning and 
decision-making, as this research explored. Also, there is no department to undertake 
the evaluating work in BOT projects. In many cases, the decision-makers and organisers 
of BOT projects evaluated the outcomes by themselves. This clearly gave them 
incentives and the public agencies and departments never criticized their own earlier 
decisions and works (Vinning and Boardman, 2008). The absence of a BOT evaluating 
system largely increased risks of performance of BOT contractors without any 'control' 
mechanism. There is also poor and inefficient communication and coordination between 
the planning, decision-making and implementing agencies within the public authorities. 
These agencies work separately for their own departments' interests, with little 
'information exchange', leading to inefficient BOT project management and even raising 
strong conflicts between themselves. Therefore, there is a strong need that the 
governments to establish a clearer BOT management system and to adjust the current 
BOT administration institutions and framework. Furthermore, even if a clear 
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governance framework was built, it would also need sufficient BOT expertise in the 
public sector to manage the projects. The evidence from Chinese motorway and water 
projects revealed that the lack of BOT expertise, knowledge and skills are common 
problems for the decision-makers and project managers in local authorities.    
 
8.6 Strategic rule 5: Maintaining reasonable competition in BOT bidding  
As this study's findings show nearly all of the 30 small water and sewage BOTs adopted 
one-to-one negotiations in the bidding processes. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
there are some disadvantages with one-to-one negotiation: e.g. Government is likely to 
get an expensive contract, due to their poor negotiating and commercial skills; very low 
transparency within the negotiating process often leading to the risk of corruption; and 
low value for money because of poor competition. To select the best bidders and 
contractors for a BOT project and achieve better value-for-money, there are some 
aspects to making the BOT bidding process as competitive as possible (Vinning and 
Boardman, 2008, Treasury, 2003a). Firstly, strong competition can be achieved by 
allowing publicly-owned enterprises participation in BOT bidding processes, especially 
for the SOEs in water and transport industries and publicly-listed in stock markets. The 
experience from BOTs shows that the degree of competition within BOT bidding would 
be enhanced by SOEs joining in. The bidders from the private sector would feel 
competitive pressure from the publicly-owned companies who have both strong 
financial and technical capabilities. Secondly, to achieve higher competitive levels, the 
governments need to find at least three bidders. However, for some small water projects 
in China, it is relatively difficult, since these projects were too small to achieve 
'economic scale effects' and less attractive for the large companies. In this situation, the 
local authorities need to search the publicly owned companies could take on the projects. 
If few companies express their interests in the projects, two-to-one negotiation should 
be adopted in order to maintain the least competition. Finally, it is clear that competitive 
bidding may bring extra-costs for BOT projects and governments. However, as the 
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transaction costs show these costs inevitably occur during the BOT contracting process, 
and can only be remunerated later to the bidders. Or small contracts are simply too 
small to be likely to generate sufficient savings and a ‘base’ be placed below which 
BOT should not be considered.     
 
8.7 Strategic rule 6: BOT model is not suitable for all kinds of projects: 
characteristics of infrastructure projects and BOT's transaction costs 
As summarised by the Treasury of the UK (2003), De Lemos et.al., (2003), Dixon (2003) 
and Pollitt (2005), the PFI model is not suitable for all projects, particularly for small 
projects and IT projects. There are also strong debates as to whether the PFI model is 
workable in health projects in the UK. The decision on the adoption of a private finance 
model (like PFI and BOT) largely depends on the characteristics of an individual project. 
The analysis of transaction cost economics (Vinning and Boardman, 2008, Flynn, 2007) 
suggest that the projects which exhibit high asset-specificity, complexity and 
uncertainty normally have high transaction costs and high risks of failure, especially for 
the local authorities who lack strong commercial and contracting skills. Based upon the 
lessons from China's BOTs, small water projects would significantly minimise 
efficiency and increase the unit costs, leading to higher operating costs. High 
asset-specific projects with long-term uncertainty (motorway and water BOTs) also lead 
to opportunistic behaviours on each side of the BOT contracts. Both the governments 
and contractors have the risks of projects being held up. However, in China, the private 
contractors are often vulnerable due to their poor bargaining power with the 
governments in BOT transactions.  
Although governments are able to mitigate some of these transaction costs through 
standardizing BOT contract models and training the public sector staff, local authorities 
still need to be aware that BOT models are not workable for all kinds of infrastructure 
projects. BOT models bring some risks into infrastructure projects, particularly for 




8.8 Strategic rule 7: Increasing the involvement of Chinese state-owned banks and 
creating more financial channels for private investors in BOT projects 
 
By investigating 98 BOT projects in China's water and motorway industries, it surprised 
the researcher that Chinese state-owned banks (state-controlled commercial banks) are 
playing a very limited role at present, except for projects undertaken by Chinese 
state-owned enterprises and international investors. The government-owned banks in 
China have set a series of strict conditions for loan applications associated with BOT 
projects since they are highly 'risk averse'. To get a loan from China's state-owned banks, 
private investors would need to meet complex procedures and very strict conditions on 
credit audits. These directly increase the costs of BOT finance and create problems of 
BOT financing in practice. From the long-term aspect, without banks' supports, BOT 
projects are not able to be developed sustainably. The banks also lose the possibilities of 
gaining higher profits from participating in infrastructure projects. Although, the 
governments in China at all levels declared that they are going to encourage and support 
the development of a private economy, few realistic attempts have been made, e.g. 
financial support from the state-owned banks. This study believes the Chinese 
state-owned banks and local governments-controlled financial banks are able to play a 
more important role in BOT projects, in order to providing financial support to BOT 
contractors, and reducing the financing costs of BOT transactions.   
However, this leads to the question as to why the local authorities or SOEs cannot 
directly access these loans to develop their infrastructure projects and, why the banks 
are not allowed to participate into the projects directly. This is another side to Chinese 
public sector management and the fiscal and management relationship between the 




8.9 Strategic rule 8: Avoiding low debt-to-equity financing ratio, reducing 
financing costs and risks in BOTs   
To ensure that the private sector participators in BOTs have sufficient equity for risks, 
and the governments can make sufficient incentives for them, local authorities in China 
normally require a very low debt-to-equity ratio in BOT contracts. In certain cases, the 
governments require private investors and contractors (or SPVs) of BOTs to put a 
considerable equity investment into the projects. The average equity finance (including 
all motorway and water projects) accounts for over 65% of total project investments. 
Within Chinese water BOTs, equity finance normally exceeds over 85% in total project 
value.  
It is very common within BOT and PFI transactions for the parent companies to 
establish a separate, stand-alone company for a specific project (called project company 
in China or Special Purpose Vehicles in the UK). In this way the parent companies 
would minimize the amount of their own capital at risks and accept the limited liability 
defined by the contract. The governments' intention is that a large portion of equity 
finance in BOT investments would reduce the possibility of project companies and 
equity financiers declaring bankruptcy (experienced in the UK with the London 
Underground case, NAO, 2004a, NAO, 2004b, Flynn, 2007) and create strong 
incentives for BOT contractors, with equity financiers difficult to remove from the 
transaction. However, for BOT projects in China, the portion of equity finance in the 
total project investment is too high for private sponsors to maintain a stable cash flow, 
and significantly increases the financial costs of projects, leading to considerable 
financial costs and risks. Furthermore, the private contractors would require a higher 
return on BOTs, since the risks associated with projects are so high.  
The lessons from the PFI and the BOT in China presented two extreme examples for 
implementing private participation in public infrastructure projects. A too high 
debt-to-equity ratio would reduce the incentives of private equity financiers to perform 
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the contract and actively solve the operational problems. The equity participants would 
declare bankruptcy to avoid their responsibilities and risks with the projects when things 
go wrong, e.g. The UK's PFI (Vinning and Boardman, 2008). However, a too low 
debt-to-equity ratio would significantly increase the financing costs and risks to private 
contractors who may not be able to handle them. Given that the contractors exiting 
procedures are not defined in BOT contracts, private participants can easily be locked-in 
which may finally lead to the collapse of the whole project. The governments in China 
need set a reasonable equity-to-total project investment ratio for a BOT project. In this 
way, a proper incentive for the private contractor can be created and the financial risks 
and costs of BOT projects would be reduced.  
 
8.10 Strategic rule 9: Improving Chinese BOT’s legal environments, establishing a 
transparent and low cost negotiation and arbitration system and identifying the 
private contractor exiting procedures in BOT contracts. 
 
This study has shown that in one-third of the projects involved (23 projects), the 
governments and private contractors had strong conflicts. However, few of them 
renegotiated the contracts or put their disputes to the courts or arbitration agencies. The 
key reasons for this are the extremely high costs and extensive time taken up by 
renegotiations and lawsuits. Any major re-negotiations of a contract would be costly and 
time consuming, and needs the agreements of the leaders of the local authorities. In 
addition, the arbitration charge for BOT cases is as high as 3-5% of the contracting 
value of projects. From the transaction cost economics point of view, the legal costs 
surrounding BOTs are high which will discourage private participation in public 
infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, due to the suspicions of private contractors 
regarding the independence of the Chinese legal system, private investors would not put 
disputes with local governments into the courts. Therefore, improvements in the 
Chinese legal system need to be made, but more practically, a transparent and low-costs 
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arbitration system is needed to be able to bring some benefits for implementing BOTs. 
First of all, a low-cost arbitration system for BOTs would significantly reduce the 
transaction costs for both governments and private participators. Second, this system 
would improve the confidence of private investors in their BOT transactions. By 
protecting the interests and property right of private contractors, private participation in 
infrastructure would be indirectly promoted. Finally, based upon the BOT contracts 
agreements and other relevant laws, a transparent and fast arbitration procedure would 
force both parties of BOTs to perform their responsibilities and tasks seriously or they 
face immediate penalties (Vinning and Boardman, 2008).  
However, when the disputes and re-negotiations between private participators and 
public authorities fail to reach an agreement and the BOT contract needs to be abrogated, 
there must be an exit system for the private contractor. The key point in this situation is 
who will take over the management of projects and what remedy or compensation 
arrangements will be made. In Chinese practice, the private sector contractors are often 
locked-in a BOT contract and unable to quit, with even the 'partnership' with 
government having disintegrated (this has been discussed in the chapter 6).   
8.11 Summary  
As chapters 7 and 8 have discussed, the implementation of BOT met a series of issues in 
China, particularly associated with 'transaction costs'. If the governments attempt to 
successfully use the BOT model to develop infrastructure and achieve expected 
outcomes, they need to minimise the total social costs associated with applications of 
BOTs, and follow the basic strategic rules, namely:  
 Thinking and planning strategically by addressing the sum of total social costs of 
BOTs within their life cycle; 
 Properly managing any conflict of interests with the private sector; 
 Improving the transparency of information of BOT projects and contracts; 
 Building a clear and efficient managerial and administrative framework; 
 Maintaining a reasonable level of competition; 
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 Carefully selecting from the proposed projects by considering all aspects; 
 Designing a proper financing structure with proper incentives for the private 
contractors; 
 Arranging for substantial support by coordinating with state-owned banks as well 
as other BOT industries; 
 Building a quick, low-cost re-negotiation and arbitration system and arranging an 
exiting procedure for private investors; and in the longer-run reforming the legal 
system, e.g. issuing the relevant BOT laws and regulations.   
      
Each of these points aims to reduce the overall cost of adopting BOTs, so as to achieve 
value-for-money, and bring positive benefits to local communities and their   residents. 
However, in practice, use of these strategic rules may increase some of the costs of BOT 
projects. The governments need to reform their current management structure and style 
together with making big adjustments on BOT related industries. It is possible that after 
considering and implementing these strategic rules, fewer BOTs would be adopted in 
the future. The BOT is a market-oriented route to developing infrastructure but is 
neither free of costs nor easy to manage, it should be more selectively used by 
governments. BOT is only applicable when the total social costs of the model are lower 
than government provision and can be traded off against the potential benefits. The 
divergent goals of both sides of the BOT contract; the nature of infrastructure projects; 
the contextual influences from the socio-economic environments and  insufficient 
support from the BOT associated industries are all potential causes of conflict between 
governments and private participants. To improve the future management of BOTs, the 
governments need to address the strategic rules above in order to reduce costs of using 
the BOT model. These strategic rules need to be itemized into detailed instructions and 
recommendations.    
It is time to review the applications of BOTs in China in the last three decades, in order 
to find out: the real benefits and costs of using the BOT model in China, the adaptability 
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of the BOT model in Chinese water and motorway sectors, what outcomes have been 
achieved so far, and how the governments will improve the implementation of BOT 
policy in future. This study indicates that the lessons of PFIs are relevant to China's 
BOTs, particularly for the managements on contractual practice. However, BOT as a 
market-oriented method may meet much more challenges in China, since the Chinese 
underdeveloped market economic system. In the next chapter, this study will draw a 
conclusion, and translate the strategic rules of managing BOTs into detailed instructions 
and recommendations at the end.    
 




Chapter 9 Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
Based upon the findings and the discussions of the development and implementation of 
motorway and water BOTs in China, this study highlights the need for China’s governments 
at both central and local levels to consider improvements to the use of BOT policy in the 
future. A number of city councils in China have reverted to public provision instead of the 
BOT models. In the cases of motorway and water BOTs in China, 30 out of 96 projects 
have been bought-out by the governments so far. Some local governments in China are 
continuing to push forward with plans for the private provision of key infrastructure 
services, while the large Fiscal Stimulus Package of the Chinese governments in 2008 and 
2009 meant the use of BOT sharply decreased. In terms of the investigation of the World 
Bank (2011), only 15 BOT contracts were signed in 2010. In the present circumstances, the 
governments in China need to re-think the strategies and methods of using BOTs in 
developing public infrastructure in subsequent projects.  
9.2 Conclusions 
 
The central government in China has tried to encourage the governments at local level to 
develop infrastructure projects by adopting pro-market, pro-efficiency and pro-privatisation 
BOT policies. The leaders and senior officers of the country have been affected by the 
ideologies and practice of ‘Public Choice’ and New Public Management that have been 
implemented in public sector reforms of developed countries. Through the implementation 
of the BOT in China’s motorway and water sector, the government claimed that BOT 
would:  
 introduce private investment in the public infrastructure and utility industries,  
 accelerate the development of the public infrastructure and services that had up to 
that time been suffering from under-investment, 
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 introduce competition in these markets, and improve the construction and 
operational efficiencies of public projects, 
 improve resource allocation and investment decision-making in the public 
infrastructure and services, decreasing political intervention,  
 and finally, to introduce new and advanced technologies, and technical innovations 
that were expected to be brought in by the private contractors.  
However, this study found that many of the claimed benefits and objectives of the BOT 
have not been realised in practice, within the motorway and water sectors overall. BOTs 
made contributions to the promotion of efficiency, economy and effectiveness in some of 
the public infrastructure projects, but also failed to do so in a number of motorway and 
water cases.  
This study has shown that the government in China has not established the relevant 
institutional capabilities and infrastructure to manage support and review the 
implementation of BOT projects. The existing BOT policy frameworks for motorway and 
water BOTs need greater clarity and standardization. The expected outcomes of using BOTs 
will only come when governments make a significant contribution and commitment 
towards good practice. The ‘arms length’ strategy of the government is not effective and 
sufficient to promote the development and implementation of BOT policy. Meanwhile, in 
terms of the findings of this study, the governments at provincial and city levels did not 
have sufficient capabilities, skills, experiences and knowledge to implement BOTs.   
Secondly, BOT models have been implemented in practice with high transaction costs. The 
Chinese government should introduce a minimum contract to be used in their motorway 
and water projects, in terms of the size, value and specific features of the individual 
projects, and the local contexts. Ideally, future studies should be carried out in other sectors 
and provinces to see if the problems are replicated. 
Thirdly, given the long-term duration and incompleteness of BOT contracts, opportunistic 
behaviour on both sides of the contractual agreement became a big barrier against forming 
long-term partnerships between the government and the private contractors. In nearly two-
thirds of the 95 projects covered by this study, trust and good cooperation between the 
government and the contractors were not found.  
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Fourthly, the local government in China do not effectively control of the management and 
inspection of BOT contractors in a number of cases, as this study discovers. Even the 
public authorities did not assess the quality and service provided by the private contracts, 
due to the lack of a BOT regulation and evaluation system.  
In addition, the real motivation for adopting BOTs by provincial and city governments are 
short-term and target-focused, The decision on implementing the BOT model was largely 
driven and influenced by the political and administrative interventions (centrally planned, 
industrial schemes) rather than an assessment of ‘needs’ of the local communities. The 
public, especially local residents and public service users were entirely excluded from the 
BOT projects’ decisions-making and planning.  
Private contractors aim to make ‘profits’ through providing public services and facilities. 
However, only a few ‘strategic’ BOT investors have both the experience and capability to 
develop and manage a large infrastructure projects. Most of these strategic investors are 
multi-national or Hong Kong based companies that are tending to acquire larger share in 
the water markets. The Chinese domestic BOT contractors are usually medium or small 
companies, and have neither the experience, nor the capability to manage an infrastructure 
project.  
By analysing key enablers and barriers of implementing BOTs, this study highlights three 
sets of variables (contributory causes) which had profound influences on the outcomes and 
effectiveness of BOT projects. These included institutions in relation to BOTs, the 
weakness of the BOT model as a contracting method, including arrangements, policy and 
procedures of implementing the programme, and social, economic and political contexts. 
The findings of this study have shown there are some similarities existing between the 
Chinese BOT policy and British PFI programmes. However, significant differences 
between BOT and PFI were observed, expressing the difference between the British public 
sector’s management and China’s. Therefore whilst much of the policy context between 
British PFI and Chinese BOT are different some of the operational and emerging issues are 
the same. It is these relevant aspects that have generated the following recommendations. 
Only several lessons are transferable to a few provinces in China where a large number of 
BOTs and strong commercial and financial skills are available. This study indicates that if 
337 
 
BOT is used, just as a ‘financing’ tool. Then the failure rate is high and value-for-money is 
low. The implementation and development of BOT requires some fundamental public 
sector reforms and infrastructure adjustments in China.     
By analysing key weaknesses of BOTs and addressing the relevant lesson from the British 
PFIs, this study then suggests how to making BOT policy workable in China and achieve 
potential benefits. The following actions may be adopted by the governments at different 
levels. 
9.3 Cross-sector and strategic recommendations on the improvement of BOT policies 
Recommendation A, in respect of the ‘right to know’  of the public as well as to increase 
the transparency of information of BOTs, a BOT database needs to be established by the 
central governments, e.g. National Reform and Development Commission, or China NAO, 
or by its line ministries, Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Transportation.  
Recommendation B,  
B-1 Decision makers and projects managers in Chinese governments need to clearly 
understand the relationship between transaction costs and overall costs and success of BOT. 
To use the BOT model, transaction costs are inevitably incurred. That is the cost of using a 
contracting approach.  
B-2 A well-defined standardised BOT contract model will mitigate the transaction costs 
which need to be drafted by the central or provincial governments.  
B-3 A standardised BOT contract may include different clauses. However, key components 
of the standardised contracts may clearly define the output specification, allocation of risks 
and well-defined performance-payments arrangements. The current version of China’s 
Standardised Water and Sewage Treatment BOT Contract models are not able to cope with 
these issues in practice. Thereby, they need to be continually updated by the Ministry of 
Construction.    
B-4 Meanwhile, a standardised contract model may not address local contexts or situations 
and the characters of individual projects. Therefore, the BOT contract model should keep a 
certain flexibility in respect to the local contexts. The provincial and the city councils may 
revise the clauses of BOT contracts in terms of their own situation and projects’ features.  
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B-5 To decrease the opportunistic behaviours as well as information asymmetry in the 
contracting practice. The communication and a higher degree of transparency between the 
public clients and private contractors are important. Both governments and private 
contractors may exchange project information regularly.   
B-6 Furthermore, regular inspections and audits on the performance of BOT contractors 
need to be conducted by the provincial and city councils, in order to ensure the 
governments or service-users get ‘value-for-money’. The criteria of evaluation need to be  
defined in the contracts (this will be recommended in a later section). 
B-7 Re-negotiations on BOT contract need to be considered and used by the governments 
to increase the flexibility of contracts. In many cases of China’s BOT, re-negotiations 
seldom take place at present.  
B-8 Finally, a rational contracting relationship needs to be established between the 
governments and contractors. Also, if the close relationship between the contractors and the 
project managers get too close it may increase opportunities for corruption and reduce 
competition.  
B-9 The local governments at city level should establish their trustworthiness in the BOT 
market. In many cases used in this study, the power structure in the BOT contracts is not 
balanced. The local governments’ bargaining power is much stronger than private 
contractors. Differing from PFIs in the UK, the private contractors were often ‘hold-up’ and 
‘locked-in’ BOT contracts. The governments usually break the ‘rules of the game’ at first, 
resulting in big losses for private contractors. The negative result of government’s 
opportunistic behaviours is clear and that the investors are scared away.   
To implement these recommendations, a large amount of costs will occur for the public 
procuring bodies. However, at least these options are able to largely mitigate the costs and 
risks of long-term contracting. The governments need to estimate the benefits of BOTs and 
ensure they offset transaction and other costs of the use of BOTs.  
Recommendation C, A clear framework for BOT legislation is important to attract private 
contractors and protect the interests of private investors. Provincial governments need to 
design and publish their own BOT circulars and regulations, therefore providing a 
framework for BOT legislation. This recommendation is not relevant to the UK’s lessons. 
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However, it is still worth saying that at present, the biggest risks associated with Chinese 
BOTs are legal and political risks. This is because China is still in the process of a transition 
from the planning economy to market economy. The property rights, contracts, and 
independent courts have not fully developed. Practically, a transparent and low-costs 
arbitration system is needed to be able to bring some benefits for implementing BOTs. 
When the disputes and re-negotiations between private participators and public authorities 
fail to reach an agreement and the BOT contract needs to be abrogated, there must be an 
exit system for the private contractor. 
Recommendation D, An effective BOT governance framework at provincial government 
and city levels is important to the development and implementation of BOT projects. In 
practice, there are a number of public bodies involved in a motorway (7 departments from 
the city council) and a water BOT transaction (7 or 9 departments). The current governance 
structure at city and provincial level is ineffective.  
D-1 Therefore, the governments need to stream-line the existing responsibilities of the BOT 
governance framework.  
D-2 A BOT unit needs to be  introduced in some provinces where there are  a large number 
of BOTs. As the experience of the British PFIs has shown, a central PPP unit plays an 
important role in the PFI’s development, e.g. policy design, projects approval, provide 
assistance to local governments and issue technical guidance. However, the experience of 
the PFIs may be only transferable to a few provinces in China where the government 
actively proceeds with and manages a large number of BOTs.  
D-3 The BOT unit need to be built into the Department of Development and Reform 
Commission or in the governor’s office.  
D-4 To establish a BOT unit at provincial level, the provincial governments need to 
carefully consider  the potential costs and benefits in their own cases: the number of BOT 
projects in local areas, the availability of financial budgets for the unit, the availability of 
BOT experts in the local region, and the objectives and long-term strategies of the BOT 
model. The governments need to trade off the costs and benefits of creating a BOT unit.  
D-5 Two major functions of the BOT unit at provincial level may include: 1) review and 
develop BOT provincial policies and guidance, 2) provide technical, legal and financial 
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assistance to the BOT practice at city council levels.  
D-7 the governments at both central in line ministries and provincial governments need to 
design and publish detailed guidance in respect to the difficulties of BOT practice at city 
level. 
D-8 BOT managerial authorities at provincial level also need to develop their own 
strategies, policies and guidance in order to improve adoptability of BOT at local level. 
Necessary technical support to city councils needs to be provided by provincial departments.  
Recommendation E, In this study, one of largest differences between China’s BOT and 
British PFI is the industrial contexts in the two countries. China has some disadvantages in 
implementing BOTs because of the under-developed financial, legal consulting sector and 
the entry restrictions on private contractors in state-owned banking and capital markets. 
This point is not relevant to PFI.  
E-1 the government at central level and the state-owned commercial and policy banks need 
consider the possibilities of a deeper involvement in the BOT transaction. 
E-2 A bank-led BOT model such as in the UK and Australia would require focus of a 
different study concentrate on banking industries involvement in BOT.  
 
9.4 Recommendations on the developing motorway and water BOTs: improving BOT 
practice  
In this section, the recommendations are made, in order to improve the practice of BOT at 
project level and at city level, by addressing relevant experience and lessons from the 
British PFIs. In terms of the findings of this study, due to increasing dissatisfaction with the 
BOT model, more and more public sector managers and decision-makers turned to identify 
the purpose of BOT, whether simply a financing need, or improvement of services. 
According to the findings and discussions in the last chapter, there is no definitive answer. 
This needs to be considered case by case, in terms of local authorities’ fiscal situations and 
other social, economic and political contexts. As this study found the politicians, decision-
makers and senior directors at city and provincial levels often do not look for the ‘best 
solutions’. In some cases and situations, BOT is not an optimal option, but is satisfying 
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compromise choice for the local authorities. However, finally BOT was chosen. Decisions 
are normally made by what problems the councils faced and in what contexts. Decision-
makers at city level may face different options in developing local infrastructure, while 
decisions were usually made in terms of short-term and politically-oriented considerations. 
This common issue is found in many BOT cases and cannot be changed in a short period.   
As this study has indicated the focus in local governments in China has been on the 
maximization of private investment, while Value-for-Money has normally been overlooked. 
Value-for-Money is not an objective (or emphasis) of the Chinese BOT model. This is a big 
difference between BOT and PFI. The lessons of Value-for-Money tests are not transferable 
and problematic, while some elements may be still relevant to some city councils where 
there are better financial situations, more financial expertise and rich commercial skills.   
Recommendation F, for improving the planning quality of BOT,  
F-1 Some elements and ideas of Value-for-Money Tests need be studied or pilot tested by 
some city councils, such as, ideas of Public-Sector Comparators by considering 'total social 
costs' of BOTs.  
F-2 Whole-life costing method as an element of PFI planning also needs to be considered, 
such as evaluation on competing options, improved awareness of total costs, more accurate 
forecasting of cost profiles; 
Above recommendations F1 and F2 are ONLY for the city councils who have rich 
experience with BOTs, have more financial experts and strong commercial skills to study. 
These methods and documents used in PFI investment planning and assessments only 
worked in the context of the UK.  Even methods used in the PFI received a number of 
critiques.  
F-3 Local councils may focus on the maximization the private investments in some 
circumstances. However, they also need to consider what potential risks BOTs brought in. 
A risk assessment protocol was needed at least.  
F-4 Risks involved in the BOT projects should be well-defined and allocated. The public 
authorities need to understand that not all risks of BOTs are able to be transferred to private 
contractors. In practice, risk analysis of BOTs is not carefully conducted and costed, 
because the government attempts to transfer risks to the contractors as much as possible. 
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F-5 The councils at city level need to carefully select the projects best suited to use the 
BOT model, in terms of their rate of return, project value, size and the technical 
perspectives. Many water projects even failed in the project selection stage, due to the small 
size, high costs and low profitability. BOT model cannot be used in all public projects and 
solve all problems of governments.  
F-6 The governments at local and provincial level need to understand the importance of 
financial feasibility analysis, costs-benefit analysis, and environmental impact analysis 
which are currently used in BOTs. These documents should not be made just for getting 
approvals and planning permissions. These documents are important analysis not simple 
justifications for use if BOT are adopted and should include more reliable information and 
analysis. 
F-7 The provincial government also should offer guidance and training for local BOT 
managers on how to identify the ‘output’ and write an output specification of the projects. 
Even BOT projects were designed by the governments in many cases. The output 
specification still is an important part of the contract and a checklist of the contractor’s 
performance 
F-8 A standard approval procedure and criteria for undertaking a BOT project should be 
established at the provincial government level to provide guidelines. The current approval 
system at provincial level follows the procedures of publicly funded projects and does not 
address the features of BOTs.  
 
Recommendation G, BOT as an extra extra-budgetary financing method (the description 
of some interviewees) should be studied by the central government and possible accounting 
solutions should be made in the future, such as IFRS application as applied to companies 
should be referred in government classification. This recommends the Chinese 
governments need to investigate how large the scale of BOTs are and the potential financial 
risks to city governments.  
 
Recommendation H, The current BOT practice in the procurement and bidding processes 
has much room for further improvement. Some lessons from the UK are relevant here.  
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H-1 An open and competitive process should be the priority of the city councils, 
particularly for the projects with good profitability and low risks (some motorway BOTs). 
H-2 Non-competitive biddings are adopted in a number of BOTs. The negotiation process 
should be more transparent, minimizing the corruption. Qualified advisors should be 
introduced on the public side to ensure good deals are made.  
H-3 The selection of external advisors of BOT project should be based upon their 
experience, not the price they offer. To many city councils the advisory cost is too high. 
However, this is a cost of using the contracting method.   
H-4 When identifying the preferred bidders for a BOT contract, the local governments 
should consider their comprehensive capabilities rather than focus on the lowest bidding 
prices. The bidder’s background and experience on managing public infrastructure project 
should be considered. 
 
Recommendation I, The performance and process of construction and operation should be 
properly supervised and inspected by the public authorities.   
I-1 Due to the poor performance of construction and operation for BOTs revealed in this 
research, local authorities should conduct close evaluation and inspection on the motorway 
and water projects regularly in the construction and operational phases of the projects.  
I-2 For the motorway projects, the inspection should focus on the quality of projects. For 
the water BOTs, the inspection needs more emphasis on the operation processes.  
I-3 Finally, the ideas of ‘benchmark and market testing’ methods used in British PFIs 
should be adopted by the city governments in China to regulate the performance of BOT 
contractors at post-contracting stages.  
I-4 The local branch of the Chinese National Audit Office needs to include and inspect the 
regulations of BOT. 
Recommendation J, Finally this study highlighted that the results of BOTs were largely 
affected by the capabilities of the public sectors and their staffs.  
J-1 The governments at provincial and city levels in China need more training for decision-
makers and project managers in areas of commercial knowledge, skills and theories of 
implementing BOT programmes. 
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J-2 Provincial and central governments need to organise forums or a network to share 
knowledge and lessons of the implementation of BOTs.  
J-3 Full-time and skilled BOT project managers need to be appointed to contract and 
supervise the performance of BOT projects.   
J-4 The managers and experts of local councils who worked in the temporary BOT project 
teams need to be paid for additional responsibility.  
J-5 More financial budgets need to be approved by the local councils who carry out the 
related works in BOT projects.  
At the end of this section, by reviewing the findings of this research, the author 
recommended, 
Recommendation K, Although motorway BOTs’ performance has not been as good as the 
government anticipated, BOT models still bring a number of economic and social benefits 
for local communities. The BOT model can be used in the subsequent projects, by 
addressed the problems in previous cases.  
Recommendation L, However, the overall result of the implementation of water BOTs is 
negative. The governments need to consider to continuously improve the model in the 
water sector. And remove the key barriers of using the BOT model in water industries.    
 
9.5 The relevance between this study and previous research into China’s motorway 
and water BOTs  
 
This study explores and presents the problems surrounding the implementation of BOT in 
Chinese motorway and water sectors, enhancing the understanding on the contributing 
factors of successfully implementing BOTs. By drawing lessons from the British PFIs in 
the last decades, this thesis has made detailed recommendations on the possible 
improvement of the Chinese BOTs. Some findings and conclusions of this study differ from 
those of previous studies on China’s motorway and water BOTs. Although there are over 50 
reports, papers and books which have been conducted by international and Chinese scholars, 
and governments and organisations, significant differences between their findings and those 
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of this study have been found.  
Firstly, the scale and scope of the implementation of motorway and water BOTs in China 
were largely under-estimated by the World Bank (2003), PPI (2010) and the Asian 
Development Bank (2005). According to the evidence gathered from China ( as it has noted 
in chapter 5), over 400 recently established water and sewage treatment plants have adopted 
BOT models since 2002. Nearly 20% of total motorway investments in China were funded 
by BOT approaches since 2001.  
Secondly, the shortfalls of BOT as a long term contracting approach to develop local 
infrastructure projects were overlooked by previous studies. Matters related to transaction 
costs, incompleteness and inflexibilities of long term contracts and opportunist behaviours 
were rarely studied and discussed by the literature of the Chinese BOTs. This study 
recommends that the water and small size projects may not be suitable for the use of the 
BOT model. However, large scale motorway projects had fewer problems during the 
implementation of BOTs.  
Thirdly, most of the previous studies focused on the short-term financial benefits of BOTs 
since the programmes were introduced to urgently boost capital investment for China’s 
public infrastructures (Blackman and Wu, 1998, Fu, Chang and Zhong , 2006, Wang & Ke, 
2008, Adams et al, 2006, Qin and Yu, 2005, Cheng & Wang, 2009).  However, the long-
term effects and accounting matters of implementing BOT, such as the financial 
affordability and the long term debts of local governments have not been fully studied.  
Fourthly, although a number of Chinese scholars (for instances, Fu, Chang and Zhong, 
2006, and Wang and Ke, 2008) found that, in the post-contracting stage of water and power 
plant BOT projects, the degree of competition was not sufficient. At the same time, Ho 
(2006), Adams et. al. (2006) and Qin and Yu (2005) debated that the Chinese provincial and 
city governments emphasis was on attracting BOT investment from the private sector, and 
paying little attention to creating market competition and efficiency improvements. 
However, these studies were not aware of the real ‘incentives’ of adopting BOTs from the 
local authorities in China who were driven by short-term political or administrative orders 
and targets. Also, the local governments did not recognise ways and means to strengthen 
competitions and improve efficiency. Zhong et al, (2008), Fu, Chang and Zhong (2006), 
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Chen & Messor (2003), expressed similar opinions about the goals of Chinese BOTs, while 
contesting that the efficiency promotion in Chinese BOTs cannot be easily achieved in 
practice without considering institutions, conditions and contextual constraints of the BOTs 
applied. This study further suggested that it is difficult and complex task to strengthen the 
competitions and improve the efficiency of BOT project. The local authorities needed to 
address some key factors in relation to the competition and efficiency of BOT projects, 
such as the characters of motorway and water industries, the transaction costs of the 
projects and the management and supervision on BOTs after the contract let out.  
Fifthly, similar to this study, a number of scholars and organisations argued (The World 
Bank, 2003, ADB, 2005, Adams, et. al. 2006, Zhong, 2008, Fu, et. al, 2006), that in contrast 
to the growing number of BOT projects in China,  the BOT policy and the regulatory, and 
legal frameworks had developed slowly in the last two decades. This study has discovered 
that the current frameworks of BOTs are still under-developed and incomplete, similar to 5 
years ago. There have been a handful of BOT policies that have been published by the 
central government and its ministries since 2006. All of these official BOT policies were 
still too simple and too vague to be used. Furthermore, the existing institutions at local and 
central governments were insufficient and incapable of implementing BOT in China.  
Sixthly, over half of the studies on Chinese BOTs were about risks allocation and 
management, and almost all these 25 studies were based upon quantitative surveys. They 
also only represented the perceptions of BOT project managers (Wang, S.Q., et. al., 1999, 
Wang, S.Q., et. al., 2000, Zeng, et. al., 2008, Chen, Xuan and An, 2010).  Although the 
political and some commercial risks have been identified by those research, the risks which 
brought in by incomplete BOT contracts were not considered, e.g. the risks and effects of 
‘hold-up’ and ‘lock-in’ in the BOT cases.   
Finally, few of the previous studies implied a theoretical framework to support their 
analysis and discussions, leading to some common and transferable lessons of the BOT 
model not been drawn and ready to being learnt from.  




This study explores the problem surrounding the implementation of China’s BOTs in the 
motorway and water sector. Based upon the lessons-learned from the implementation of the 
PFI programme in the UK, this thesis offered the following recommendations to improve 
BOT policy in the future. However, due to the nature of this doctoral research work, the 
study only covered limited areas (6 provinces) for the China’s BOT, due to constraints of 
time and finance. Meanwhile, the majority of interviewees and data were collected from 6 
provinces and 10 cities in certain regions of China, where BOTs have been widely 
implemented. Therefore, this study covered small sample sizes, in terms of the number of 
interviewees and the number of projects in the 6 provinces selected. The geographical and 
social-economic contextual differences between China’s provinces needed to be considered 
also. However, all 6 provinces covered by this study were the most active and top players 
of motorway and water BOTs in China. Most of their experience and lessons on 
implementing BOTs were highly representative, valuable and transferable.  
Based upon the contributions and limitations of this study, it suggests that future useful 
research should continually focus on the operational performance of China’s BOT projects 
in the motorway and water sectors, since more projects have been commenced since 2009. 
In addition, the feasibility and potential difficulty of implementing a BOT in China’s 
healthcare, housing, education, railway and defence sectors could be studied, since these 
areas were newly opened to private contractors in 2010. These proposed studies may also 
draw and learn lessons from the PFIs in the UK which is the country has with longest 
history and richest lessons of using a long-term contracting approach in all these fields over 
the last few decades. Finally, future studies could address the relevance of other countries 
or regions’ experiences when implementing PFI or BOT models in China’s infrastructure 
projects, e.g. countries as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Australia. As lessons-learning 
theory (Rose, 2005) suggests, the policy-import countries may look at, compare and 
analysis the experiences and lessons from different sources, locations and countries, to 
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Appendix 1: The China’s Fiscal and Taxation Reforms in 1994 
Introduced New Taxes in China in 1994 
The most important of the new taxes was the VAT levied on most manufactured goods at 
the uniform rate of 17%. In addition, a 33% profit tax was introduced, with uniform rates 
for state, collective, and private enterprises. The system of personal income taxes was 
unified and made slightly more rigorous. A ‘consumption tax’ (actually a luxury or excise 
tax) was introduced for cigarettes, alcohol, and a few other luxuries. A number of minor 
local taxes were introduced (or more accurately, regularized). In return, the previous 
system of industrial and commercial taxes was abolished, and the SOE profit contract 
system was also eliminated. 
Tax revenues allocations between the centre and local governments in China 
These new taxes were assigned to various levels of government. The central government 
had complete claim on the consumption tax, customs duties, and most direct and indirect 
taxes on central-government-controlled sectors (e.g., railroads, financial institutions, and 
some large centrally controlled Enterprises). Provincial governments had direct control 
over direct taxes on local enterprises, as well as a number of relatively modest taxes, 
including real estate taxes, and pollution and resource fees. The key provision was the 
designation of most VAT revenues as ‘shared income’, with 75% going to the central 
government and 25% to the local government. 
New institute on managing taxes collection   
In order to collect these taxes throughout the country, a new central government taxation 
authority was created in 1994. Under the previous system, most tax revenues had been 
collected by local government tax bureaus, and localities had then transferred funds to the 
central government. Under the new system, the central government first collected the 
bulk of revenues—including all VAT revenues—and then shared them with the provinces. 
To manage such a system, a central government tax agency was created and given 
substantial authority                                                           (Naughton, 2007: 433)                                 
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Appendix 2 China’s Key facts and indicators in 2009 
 
1. Total Area of Territory: 9,600,000 square kilometers 
2. Administrative Divisions (Five Levels):  
Central Government of China 
The state council, including 27 ministries, commissions, departments, The People’s 
Bank of China (the Central Bank) and the National Audit Office (China) 
            Provincial Governments  
            Four municipalities directly under central administration: Beijing, Tianjin, 
            Shanghai and Chongqing 
            Twenty two provinces: Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
            Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Auhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, 
            Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu 
            and Qinghai  
            Five autonomous regions: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia and 
            Xinjiang 
            One special administrative region: Hong Kong 
            City Governments: 333 
3.         Population: 
            Total population: 1,328,020,000 
            Sex composition: male 683,570,000 (51.47%); female 644,450,000 (48.53%) 
             Rural–urban division: urban population 606,670,000 (45.68%), rural population 
            721,350,000 (54.32%) 
            Birth rate: 12.14 per thousand 
            Death rate: 7.06 per thousand 
            Natural growth rate: 5.08 per thousand 
4.         Economy: 
            Gross National Product (GNP): 30,285,340million yuan 
            Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 30,067,000million yuan 
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            GDP composition: primary industry 11.3%, secondary industry 48.6%, 
            Tertiary industry 40.1% 
            Total volume of exports: 10,039,490 million yuan 
            Total volume of imports: 7,952,650 million yuan 
            Trade balance: 2,086,840 million yuan 
5.         People’s Livelihood: 
            Per capita annual net income of rural household: 4,760.6 yuan 
            Per capita annual disposable income of urban household: 15,780.8 yuan 
            Annual average wages of staff and workers: 11,298.96 yuan 
            Annual per capita consumption: 11,242.85yuan  
            Balance of savings deposit of rural and urban residents: 21,788.54 billion 
            yuan (16,407 yuan per capita) 
6.         Labour: 
             Number of people employed: 774.80 million people 
             Employment composition: primary industry 39.56%, secondary industry 
            27.24% and tertiary industry 33.19%; urban 302.10 million (39.0%), rural 
            472.70 million (61.00%) 
           Number of urban registered unemployed: 8.86 million 
            Unemployment rate: 4.2% 
7.         Education: 
            Number of schools: 2,263 regular institutions of higher education, 90,121 
            secondary schools, 349,126 primary schools 
            Number of students enrolled: institutions of higher education 6,076,612, 
            secondary schools 35,087,120, primary schools 16,957,150 
            Number of full-time teachers: institutions of higher education 1,237,451, 
           secondary schools 5,855,440, primary schools 5,668,674 
            Students per teacher: institutions of higher education 4.9, secondary 
            schools 6.0, primary schools 3.0 
8.         Health: 
           Number of health institutions: 278,337 (19,712 hospitals) 
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           Number of beds: 4,038,700 (2,882,900 hospital beds) 
           Number of hospital beds per 1000 population: 3.05 
10.       Housing: 
            Per capita floor space of residential buildings: rural areas 32.4 square 
            meters, urban areas 27.1 (2006) square meters 
11.       Currency: 
            1 yuan_0.143986 US dollar 




Source: State Statistical Bureau (2010) China Statistical Yearbook 2010, Beijing: China 




Appendix3 China’s ‘Open Door’ Policy and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
 
In 1979, The People's Republic of China developed its ‘open door policy’ to help increase 
trade relations with the global community and also to reinvigorate an economy left stagnant 
by the Cultural Revolution. The private investors, many of whom were overseas Chinese 
from places like Hong Kong and Taiwan Initially, the PRC decided to set aside four Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ's) in southern china and focus their efforts to draw foreign 
manufacturing there. These four SEZ's were chosen for the following reasons:1) Shenzhen: 
proximity to Hong Kong 2) Zhuhai: proximity to Macau 3)Xiamen: proximity to Taiwan 
4)Shantou: Vast overseas connections with Chaozhou origin Chinese in Thailand and Hong 
Kong (BBC, 2010). 
 
In a Chinese Special Economic Zone, there were special tax incentives for foreign 
investments and greater independence on international trade activities. Economic 
characteristics are represented as ‘4 principles’: Construction primarily relies on attracting 
and utilizing foreign capital; Primary economic forms are Sino-foreign joint ventures and 
partnerships as well as wholly foreign-owned enterprises; Products are primarily export-
oriented Economic activities are primarily driven by market forces. In addition, the 





Appendix 4 The reviews on value-for-money and performance of the PFI in the UK 
 
Study Date Sample and 
Cases 




LSE Enterprise  
2000 29 business 
cases 
 
Initial evaluation Yes 17% cost savings estimated 
against the PSC, 
risk transfer accounted for 




2000 7 business 
cases from 
 
Business cases Yes   10–20% cost savings 
estimated 






















Yes Traditional ‘public’ 
infrastructure provision 
arrangements 
were on-time and on-budget 
30% and 27% of the time, but 
PFI-type partnerships were on-
time and on-budget 76% and 




2002 3 NHS 
hospitals 




No The PFI justification is a 
‘sleight of hand’ 








Yes • the best deal was probably 
obtained in every case, and 
good 
value for money was probably 
achieved in 8 of the 10 cases 
 










report PFI projects delivered schools 
more quickly than projects 
funded in more conventional 
ways’ 
• ‘The public sector 
comparator has lost the 
confidence of 




2004 8 cases from 
roads 





Case reviews and 
interviews 
 
No • Contracts reviewed 3 years 
in 
• ‘PFI is an expensive way of 
financing and delivering 
public services . . .’ 
• ‘the chief beneficiaries are 
the providers of finance and 
some of . . . the private sector 











• ‘we have no firm evidence 
that the current PFIs would 
deliver on their long-term 





of UK cases 
plus 5 cases 
United Kingdom 
Literature review 
Yes ‘it seems difficult to avoid a 
positive overall assessment’ 
Shaoul 2005 General 
observations 




No PFI has turned out to be very 
expensive with a lack of 
accountability 
• Suspects that PFI policies 
‘enrich the few at the expense 
of the majority and for which 
no democratic mandate can 
be secured’ 









support the Treasury cost and 
time overrun claims of 
improved efficiency in 
PFI’ . . . [estimates 
being quoted are] ‘not 
evidence based but biased to 
favor PFI . . .’ 
• only one study compares PFI 
procurement performance, 
and ‘all claims based on [this] 
are misleading’ 
NAO  2009 A 72 NAO 
reports 




the past cases of 
the PFIs/PPPs 
from the NAO 
In some cases, 





Private finance can deliver 
benefits but is not suitable at 
any price nor in every 
circumstance; 
Evaluation of the use of 
private finance is not well 
developed 
NAO  2009 b 114 PFI 






- The report noted 
that 69 % of PFI projects had 
delivered on time and 
65 % on price. This compares 
with 63 % of non-PFI 
projects delivering on time 







Appendix 5 Information sheet and Introduction for this study (Translated from 
Chinese)  
 
Working Title: The Relevance of the development of PFI’s in the UK and their 
implementation in Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) in Chinese Road and Water Sectors 
 
Name of researcher: Mr. Jingchi Huang  
 
The topic, areas and researcher involved: An Introduction  
 
Since there are only a few pieces of literature addressing the implementation of BOT 
models in Chinese motorway and water projects, this study is going to investigate and learn 
how BOTs are operating in the context of the Chinese motorway and water sectors (the 
results, problems and obstacles of these applications). It will identify what lessons from the 
implementation of UK PFIs are relevant to China, in order to improve the BOTs in the 
motorway and water sectors after considering the potential contexts and conditions in China. 
it will also to make recommendations for China’s utilisation of the BOT model within 
China’s socio-economic contexts. The study (interview or focus group or observation) will 
be carried out by Jingchi Huang, a research student for the Leicester Business School, De 
Montfort University, Leicester, UK. This study is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw 
from this research without giving any reasons at any stage.   
 
The procedures of the research  
 
If you decide to participate in the research,  the researcher will contact you to make an 
arrangement to visit and speak to you. The research may take 60-120 minutes of your time 
to talk about your experiences on implementing (motorway and/or water)  BOTs in China.   
 
The data and results collected from you 
All information collected from you will be confidential, and will be used for academic 
purposes. All data collected from you will be kept in a safe place and will be destroyed at 
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the end of this study.  
Finally, if you are interested in the results of this research, a copy of the summary will be 
sent to you.  
 
Contact for further information 
 
If you would like any further information about the study or need to ask any questions, 
please contact Jingchi Huang on 0044-(0)7738978055, or E-mail: 
jingchihuang@gmail.com.  
 
Thanks for your time.  
Regards, 




Appendix 6 Interview Consent Form (Translation from Chinese) 
 
Title of Study: The Relevance of the development of PFI’s in the UK and their 
implementation in Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) in Chinese Road and Water Sectors 
 
Name of Researcher(s): 
Mr. Jingchi Huang                                         (De Montfort University, Leicester, UK)  
 




 2. I agree that I would not receive any payments or gifts from the participations in the 
Jingchi Huang’s research. My participation is voluntary and I reserve the right to withdraw 




 3. I agree/do not agree to Mr. Jingchi Huang using an audio-taping device in the interview 
process or focus group. Mr. Jingchi Huang will keep all of my information private. I also 
clearly understand that all data  and audio-tape will be deleted by Mr. Jingchi Huang when 




Name of interviewee________________ Date _____________ Signature_____________ 













Could you introduce yourself and your duties 
in your department?  
And how is it related to BOTs? 
 
Experiences and 
Contexts  BOT 
 
In your opinion, what are BOTs? 
What policies have been issued by your 
departments or central government to promote 
the BOT’s implementation in the last ten years, 
in what contexts?  
Why does your department want to use the 
BOT model to develop local infrastructure 
projects, in what circumstances? 
What BOTs models have been implemented in 
what kinds of projects by your company? Why?  
Mechanism, 
Programmes and  
Implementation of BOT 
What are the standard procedures of the 
implementation of a BOT project?  




Is about the overall performances/outcomes of 
the BOT projects 
What factors/drivers/barriers do you think will 
have effects on the implementation of BOT 
projects? 
Ending Question What do you think are the benefits and 
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drawbacks of BOT? 
Do you think BOT is a better way to develop 
local infrastructure projects (than conventional 
projects)? 
Why? 
What are your suggests (extra points) on the 
implementations of BOTs?  





Appendix 8 Interviews schedule and Guidance  









Could you introduce yourself and your duties 
in your department?  
 
And how is it related to BOTs? 
 
How many BOT projects have been developed 
by your department/company?   
 
How many projects have you participated and 
when, where? 
 





Contexts  BOT 
 
In your opinion, what are BOTs? 
 
What BOTs models have been developed or 
implemented in what kinds of projects by your 
department/company?  
 
What is the portion/scales of BOTs in total 
public infrastructure in your 
province/city/department/company?  
 
Why do your department want to use BOT 
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model to develop local infrastructure projects, 
in what circumstances? 
 
Which reason/driver/factor do you think it is 
the most important to make decisions (BOT if 





Programmes and  
Implementation of BOT 
what are the administrative and approval 
procedures when local government is going to 
build a project by using BOTs?  
 
What policies are related to the adoption of 
BOTs? 
 
What departments of the government involved 
in? 
 
What preparation work has to been done by 
your department/organisations, by whom?  
 
How does government arrange a BOT 
procurement and bidding? 
 
(How do you make sure it is fair and open? 
What are the procedures and what standard will 
be used to evaluate potential bidders? How 




What about the BOTs contracts? Who did 
design it? Who are responsible for the 
negotiations details?  
 
If  any external advisors have been introduced  
 
And how does your department/ organisation/ 
government ensure the BOTs projects were 
built and operate in accordance with the 





Have your BOT projects finished constructions, 
on time and without cost-overrun? 
How many BOT contracts were terminated?  
Why? 
What factors/drivers/barriers do you think will 
have effects on the implementation of BOT 
projects? 
Which one(s) are crucial in your opinion? 
What do you think the benefits and drawbacks 
of BOT? 
How do you think the cooperation between you 
and the local governments? 
Ending Question Do you think BOT is a better way to develop 





What are your suggests (extra points) on the 





Appendix 9 Interviews schedule and Guidance 








Could you introduce yourself and your duties 
in your department?  
 
And how is it related to BOTs? 
 
How many BOT projects have been developed 
by your department/company? How many 
projects have you participated and when, 
where? 
 





Contexts  BOT 
 
In your opinion, what are BOTs? 
 
Why do your company want to undertake BOT 
projects, in what circumstances? 
 
Which reason/driver/factor do you think it is 




Programmes and  
Implementation of BOT 
Where and how did you get the relevant 




What preparation work has to be done by your 
company, by whom? (What documents do you 
need to provide when your company is going to 
bid a project?   
 
Did you experience any difficulties and 
problems in the bidding process (What 
assistance do you receive from the procuring 
bodies)?  
 
How did your company win the project (s)? 
What are the key success factors to win a BOT 
project, in your opinion?  
 
What about the BOTs contracts? Who did 
design it? Who are responsible for the 




How is about the overall 
performances/outcomes of the BOT projects 
(Finished on-time and in Budget?) 
 
What standards or criteria have been used to 
evaluate your performance by your public 
clients? (Any Bonus or Penalties?)  
 
What factors/drivers/barriers do you think will 




Which one(s) are crucial in your opinion?  
 
How do you think the cooperation between you 
and your private contractor partners(s)? (any 
arguments? And how did you sort it? ) 
Ending Question (Optional Question: are you satisfied with your 
profitability of the BOT contracts? Why?) 
What are your suggests (extra points) on the 
implementations of BOTs in the future 
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